NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

1877 1930

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1930 OCTOBER No. 644. Vol. CVIII

LONDON: CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C.2

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price 3/-. Annual Subscription 36/- (Prepaid), Post free.


THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price Three Shillings.



THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

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No. DCXLIV—October 1930

THE INDIAN CONFERENCE

Quousque tandem—the schoolboy tag—must have been in the minds of many as they watched a much-enduring Viceroy struggling to achieve the impossible and placate the implacable. Lord Irwin's patience has now been sufficiently abused, and the Round-Table Conference will meet without Catiline and his comrades, otherwise Mr. Gandhi and the Nehrus. Even so, it will serve certain good purposes. It will redeem our promise to consult every interest in India before the new Constitution is framed. It will give our people, and especially our legislators, time to devote to the Indian problem some of the study which it requires. And it will demonstrate the complete inability of the Indian extremists to produce any rational scheme whatsoever for a settlement. These and other good purposes the Conference may serve, but there are two ends which it most certainly will not attain. It will not furnish us with any estimate of how the position is viewed by the great mass of the Indian people, and it will not arrive at a form of Constitution which the Indian

extremists will look at. Any doubts on the latter point have been finally dissipated by the ultimatum from Yerawada Gaol.

Is this to be counted altogether a calamity? In ordinary business an agreed settlement is the negotiator's goal, and to some observers the Conference will seem fruitless unless it secures this hall-mark of success. More serious is the consideration that, while India in her task of nation-making has need of all the brains and all the energy which her ablest sons can offer, she is going to have no constructive aid from the brains and energy which unquestionably inspire the extremist movement. These misfortunes, however, have to be faced. They are not of our making; and if the story of the last few years has anything to teach us, it is that no compromise and no concession along our lines of political thought have any appeal to the Hindu extremists. When they tossed aside the tentative but substantial advance offered by the Constitution of 1919, their demand was all for Provincial Autonomy. When there seemed a possibility of this being granted (it is virtually what the Simon Commission now advise), they promptly raised their call to Dominion status. On the Viceroy assuring them that Dominion status is our aim, they threw off all further pretence and demanded complete independence. *Swaraj*, or self-rule, has been their cry throughout; but their definition of the term has grown more and more extravagant with each of our attempts to meet them, until it is now confessedly a claim that India shall sever her British connexion and revert to an autonomous Hindu State with no Constitution and no means of defence. To this a Conference of responsible statesmen could hardly be expected to assent.

By way, then, of Indian representation there will be three definite groups at the Conference; this leaves out of account the Burmese, whose chief concern presumably will be the proposal to separate their country from India proper and to place it under some form of administration which has not yet been discussed. Of the three dominant groups, the first comprises the spokesmen of the Indian States. Their *rôle* will be one of some difficulty, though the particular Princes and Chancellors who have been invited may be trusted to fill it with wisdom and dignity. It will be difficult, because the individual members have no authority to speak for the Princes as a whole, each State being wholly independent of its neighbours. It will be difficult also because any intervention in the politics of British India will be regarded with suspicion, although their personal character and administrative experience should render some of the Princes valuable consultants. Their primary interest, however, will be to ensure the full recognition of their treaty rights with the British Crown and to encounter all attempts to bring them into allegiance to

any form of government which may be established in British India. Otherwise, their advice will chiefly be required in regard to laying down the federal lines on which, as all parties agree, the future Constitution of India as a whole must proceed.

The second group will consist of the right wing of the Nationalist party, once known as Moderates and now calling themselves Liberals. Their position will not be free of embarrassment. Though their demands rest at Dominion status, they have apparently, on the subject of complete independence, no special quarrel with the extremists, their differences being chiefly on the pace of advance and the methods of securing their object. Their desire to wrest the leadership of the Nationalist movement from the extremists will impel them to play for higher stakes than they can afford, on the chance of being able to show India that they can be trusted to drive a better bargain than their noisier comrades on the left wing. With them will be associated a few prominent Mahomedans who, for various reasons, have habitually taken a line of antagonism to British rule, but who cannot pretend to be typical of their community.

The third group is a loose aggregation of the representatives of various minority interests—the Moslems, the great landlords, the depressed classes, European commerce, Sikhs, Christians, etc. These are concerned not so much with the general problem as with objecting to any Constitution which does not provide such safeguards and guarantees as the protection of their respective communities seems to demand.

From the traditional piece of furniture appropriate to a Conference the round table promises to be converted into a platform. Each of those groups and diverse interests will seek expression; though it is scarcely conceivable that they will add much to the sum of human knowledge on the main issues, yet they will all claim to exercise the privilege, dear to the Indian mind, of putting their case in its fulness before the final tribunal. And it is to this tribunal that they will look for a final decision. In other words, with the Conference the period of bargaining and negotiations will come to an end, and the British Parliament will have to consider its verdict. In what manner this verdict is arrived at, whether, as in 1919, after a further public inquest by a Committee of both Houses or otherwise, is immaterial. What is essential is that there shall be a clear decision by Parliament, and an equally clear intimation that the decision is to be accepted and obeyed. There has recently been some tendency to overlook this elementary fact. Our distress at the unrest, our theories of self-determination, the eloquence of Indian patriots and their appeals to our idealism, have somewhat blurred the issue which lies between two simple alternatives. Either India must drive

out the British by force and achieve independence as America did, or she must abide by the orders of the British Parliament. There is no middle course.

If wisely handled, the Conference can help Parliament in arriving at this momentous decision. In the absence of the extremists, it cannot produce an agreed Constitution. It is unlikely to be able even to produce a Constitution which is agreed by those who attend it, and it may not make the attempt. But it can at least enumerate the problems and the issues. It can take the project of Sir John Simon's Commission, the only comprehensive project for a new Constitution which has yet been devised, and probe the criticisms upon it. It can render more precise the safeguards claimed by the minorities ; it can possibly even discover what is meant by Dominion status. Too unwieldy for anything except general discussions, it will probably work chiefly through committees, the only means by which it can hope to epitomise the vast accumulation of evidence on every aspect of the question. In this way it may perchance throw light on certain points which are still obscure—the attitude of Indian opinion, for example, towards the electorate, towards Sir Walter Layton's taxation proposals, the future of the public services, the case for Second Chambers, and so on. But whatever may be the objective, and whatever the procedure, of the Conference, its essentials are threefold.

First, it must not be unduly protracted ; the situation in India demands an early settlement of controversies which have already lasted too long. Second, and of high importance, the British members of the Conference must give the whole of their time and thought to its business. On the other side of the table they will be faced by some of the most acute intellects of modern India, by men who have devoted years to developing their demand and to persuasive dialectic in its support, whose knowledge of all the disputed facts and figures is intimate, and whose forensic skill it is difficult to over-state. To get upon even terms with such colleagues requires more than the few hours a week which the busy man can snatch from his office or the politician from his duties to Parliament and his constituency. It requires a whole-time study both of the case generally and of its salient details, and ample leisure to hear and see both sides of every issue.

The third essential need of the Conference, and that for which our prayers may most fervently be offered, is an extra dose of common-sense. In the matter of India we seem recently to have been suffering from such lapses in that elementary virtue as amount almost to what the jargon of the day styles an inferiority complex. We are so often taxed by the Indian extremist with lack of imagination that we begin to feel ourselves devoid of all

sympathy and understanding. Mr. Gandhi is so constantly held before us as a saint that we are becoming convicted of sin. We are charged so vehemently with arrogance in setting ourselves up as judges of India's fitness that we are constrained to admit the pharisaism latent within us. It is a curious instance of the power of Eastern hypnotism, and it is producing ludicrous results, a humbling of our hearts when there is no need to be humble, a lurking sense of shame when we have every reason for pride. It is less than eleven years since we launched the present Constitution with some feeling of generosity and confidence; many of us are behaving to-day as if we disowned its paternity. And yet what has happened in the interval to discredit the policy of 1919? We may have blundered here and stumbled there, but we have in all good faith persevered in the task of training and practising Indians in the art of government; and if they refused the training and the practice, wherein are we to blame? In no single respect has it been shown that the line of action which Parliament adopted eleven years ago is either an injustice to India or a constitutional impossibility.

If, therefore, we can get back to our ordinary common-sense, surely it is apparent that there is only one question on which the British people have to make up their minds and the British Parliament to formulate its decision, namely: For what measure of self-government is India prepared? The question is one of fact, and not of sentiment, and the answer is not to be sought in generous gestures. If there is clear evidence that in fact India is fit and ready for home rule, then she must have it; we must walk out and be content with the same friendly association as we enjoy with Canada or Australia. If there is evidence that she is not yet fit for self-government, or that she is fit for only a modified form of self-government, then we must maintain our control in whole or in part, as the case may be. If we do otherwise, we shall be doing wrong in India and to the world. We may yield to none in our homage to India's ancient civilisation or her subtle philosophies; we may reverence the lonely idealisms of Gandhi and Tagore; our sympathy with the Indian patriot's dislike of an alien occupation may be unfeigned, and we may appreciate to the full how the iron of constant subjection has entered into India's soul. At the same time we may assent with genuine cordiality to the axiom that good government is no substitute for self-government. But in none of these admissions do we find the final argument for the immediate political emancipation of India. The one and only final argument would be that immediate political emancipation will mean political freedom. Can that argument be sustained?

So strenuously and so often have the pros and the cons been

canvassed that to refurbish them seems almost an insult to the reader's intelligence. In support of the argument we have some evidence in the Indian States, which seem to present a general level of contentment with a purely Indian administration. The freedom of the people, even in the most enlightened State, is limited; but it may be—though in some of the States it is far from certain—that they have as much freedom as they desire. Against this consideration, however, it has to be remembered that the rulers of the States have a long experience in governing; that they have no external responsibilities, as Great Britain takes care of them in this respect; and that we could not now, even if we would, partition British India into a series of rajas' kingdoms. On quite different lines it may be argued that brahmanical Hinduism has established so complete a social organisation, and that the high-caste Hindu inherits so fully the traditions of a ruling class, that British control would easily and painlessly be replaced. Apart, however, from the fact that the substitute would be something widely divergent from our democratic ideal of liberty, the fatal difficulty here is that the Moslems will not accept a Hindu oligarchy, and that there are no signs of such an accommodation between the two communities as would make the transition either easy or painless.

To enumerate the reasons for the view that immediate self-government in India would not mean political liberty for the people is to catalogue the obstacles which lie in the way of India's advance as a nation, the handicaps inherent in her social and economic life. When any such catalogue is attempted, it is angrily attacked by the Nationalist on three grounds. First, all these evils, he cries, are the result of British rule; remove that incubus and they will disappear. Second, many of them are being rapidly reformed from within, a process for which we give the educated Indians no credit. Third, the sole purpose of the catalogue is to blacken India in the eyes of the world and strengthen the case for our selfish and hypocritical retention of power. In face of the indignation thus expressed—genuine and not unnatural, however unreasonable—it seems invidious to insist. But the evils are there; everyone who has worked in India knows that the progress of reform is slow and the impetus behind it feeble; and they unquestionably operate as clogs on political advance. Some of them are the consequences of Nature and climate; some, like the tyranny of the priesthood and corruption in local government, are not unheard of in Western lands, and there had better be no casting of stones; many of the others are rooted in ignorance, which the better education of the people, as national finance permits, ought largely to abate. Yet, when all these allowances are made, there remain factors in the organisa-

tion of Indian life which differ so widely from the corresponding elements in Western life as to make it impossible for us to see how they can be reconciled with political liberty. The most outstanding examples are the treatment of the depressed classes and the status of women, neither of which can by any stretch of imagination be ascribed to the British connexion. On both these evils reformers are at work—all honour to them ; but they have little support from public opinion, and there is no assurance that home rule in itself would remove such obstacles to freedom, any more than it has done in the self-governing States.

Paramount over all the other steps to political freedom is the sense of nationhood, that unifying, binding power which is so difficult to define and so easy to recognise. The progress of Nationalism in India is real, but the onlooker is apt to overestimate it gravely. The existence of parties which call themselves Nationalists, the proceedings of the National Congress, the non-co-operation movement give an appearance of what we should ordinarily regard as national activity ; but the appearance is in many respects fallacious, and the unity owes more to outside pressure than to internal cohesion. All through the older history of India the only common influence on the lives and minds of men was Hinduism ; and, although its sphere was circumscribed by the advent of Islam, Hinduism still remains the dominant power in the country. The movements that are shaking India to-day are very largely the revolt of orthodox Hinduism against Western influences which threaten to imperil its supremacy. They attract, it is true, support from other quarters—advanced Hindus who are striving to escape from the bonds of orthodoxy, a few restless Mahomedans, and malcontents generally. But the ferment which we loosely call nationalism is in reality a stirring of Hinduism, and something very different from the nationalism with which we are familiar in the West. In all probability it will do good in the end, by paving the way for a true nationalism ; but at the moment Hinduism, whether static or militant, is at the most the matrix of a future nationhood.

We come then to this inevitable conclusion, that, Indian nationhood being still in the embryo and the obstacles to the attainment of political freedom being what they are, the constitutional framework within which nationhood will grow up and political freedom develop must be a different structure from that which was devised for Canada and Australia when they started on their career as members of the British Commonwealth. In their case the conditions were complete personal liberty, much local patriotism, an acceptance of the theory of the equality of men, and the traditions of responsible government, as well as some practice in it. In India these conditions have yet to be

established, and any Constitution must be a scheme of preparation rather than of adaptation. Consider first the sense of nationalism, and how the Constitution can respond to its development. We do not contemplate one nationhood for the Punjab and another for Madras; there must be some means of union for the expression of their common interests and the exercise of their common privileges. Nor can we imagine that there will ultimately be one nationhood for British India and another for the Indian States; before an external aggressor they must stand or fall together, and in ordinary times the interlocking of their territories, their interdependence in commerce, transit, communications and currency, their racial and cultural associations, all require some machinery for co-operative action. The only machinery known to our political science is a federation; and the ultimate goal of the Constitution will be a Federated States of India, in which the units will be the great princedoms, groups perhaps of the smaller principalities, and the British provinces, either as now framed or subdivided and rearranged on lines of closer racial and linguistic harmony. The exact type of the central federal Government and the relations between the federal units will be for the political craftsmen of the future, as experience grows and the habit of common action ripens. All that the Constitution of to-day can do is to lay foundations which will carry the structure.

Turn next to the preparation for political freedom. It may be India's destiny to demonstrate to the world that the social system of Hinduism, with the primacy of the brahman and the regimentation of caste, is not incompatible with modern progress. But, before that is possible, there is much to be done. The humane treatment of the depressed classes and the liberation and education of women have already been mentioned; other reforms could easily be multiplied. The peasantry, to begin with, have to be redeemed from the serfdom of the moneylender; the habit of hoarding has to yield to the needs of industrial capital; the land tenures have to be alleviated. In social matters, the Hindu joint family—a nursery for parasites and an extinguisher on individual enterprise—may have to be broken up, and enormous changes must come in domestic hygiene and public sanitation. Education, as Sir Philip Hartog's report brings out, calls for far more scientific handling than it is now receiving, and the creation of an enlightened electorate in particular throws an immense burden on the statesmanship of the future. Behind all these and many kindred tasks lies the most difficult of all, the evolution of that sense of citizenship which will put an end to the more normal occasions of discord between the two great communities on whose co-operation the future happiness of India depends. Every one

of these labours is for the Indians themselves to encompass, and all that the new Constitution can do is to provide the Indian leaders with the power and responsibility of tackling them, and a reasonable security against the more grievous consequences of error.

We must now return to the Conference. It cannot be expected to formulate views on all these far-reaching problems, but it cannot avoid envisaging them as it discusses the political future. The next step towards self-government must be either whole or partial. If full self-government is granted at once, as one section of the Conference may claim, then experience and prudence will be sacrificed to a gigantic gamble in the well-being of the entire Indian people. If a partial measure of advance is decided upon, the Conference will find unbiassed testimony as to the present and a reasoned scheme for the future in the two volumes of the Simon Commission's Report. The scheme in particular provides for the two primary *desiderata* of the position. It lays the lines of a federal Administration and it gives ample opportunity to the federal units in British India to deal in their own way with the social and economic weaknesses which hamper the growth of nationhood, while it retains with the Central Government the power of preserving peace on the frontiers and internal order so long as the provinces are working out their domestic problems. At the risk of reiteration it must be emphasised that no other project yet framed offers any alternative solution ; and it would be no derogation of either the dignity or the authority of the Conference if it would consent to take the Simon Commission's Report as the basis of its deliberations.

MESTON.

THE EGYPTIAN RIDDLE

In Egypt the stage is set for the next act in the conflict between the Wafdist Parliament and the Government of King Fuad. For some time now either side has been quietly making its dispositions, and during this month of October, when a large instalment of the land tax falls due, it is the intention of the popular party (the Wafdists) to render the position of the present Government untenable by a general refusal to pay. The preceding scene had closed in the early summer with the defeat of Parliament. Since then the King, with our acquiescence, has interposed Sidky Pasha between himself and Parliament; but though the King may be camouflaged by the figure of this or that politician, the character of the plot remains substantially unchanged.

At first sight it would appear strange that a Wafdist Government which still retained the unquestioning support of 90 per cent. of the voters should have gone into voluntary liquidation. They were confronted by threefold difficulties—economic, constitutional, and political. The world depression had hit Egypt hard: the purchases of cotton inaugurated by Adly Pasha had been prolonged until the Government had spent some 13,000,000*l.*; and they were faced in the immediate future with the necessity of making either the unpopular declaration that the Government would not support the cotton market in the coming season, or the unrealisable declaration that they would. But their constitutional difficulties were equally acute, and even more fundamental.

In the speech from the throne at the beginning of the parliamentary session the Government had announced their intention of introducing legislation to safeguard the Constitution. To taunt a political party which endeavours to preserve parliamentary institutions with self-interest merely because its own supremacy would thereby be assured is merely pharisaical, but the terms of the measure imposing maximum penalties of penal servitude for life and a fine of 10,000*l.* were, though not retrospective, undoubtedly severe. The constitutionalist, however, had good grounds for uneasiness. Since the institution of parliamentary government less than seven years ago, four short-lived Parliaments have been elected, of which one did not even survive the opening

ay. *There were, however, other measures of a less controversial* iaracter over which the Government found the King equally nconciliatory. Laws for the establishment of an agricultural ank and for the erection of a Cour des Comptes and of a Cour des assations remained unsigned, while over the nomination of :nators and certain administrative appointments a similar dead-ck arose. In spite of the very wide powers that the King, after tussle with his Ministers, had secured when the Constitution is drafted, his vote was only suspensory. Notwithstanding his position, a measure if revoted within a month by a two-thirds ajority of Senate and Chamber became law. But the rumours an understanding between the King and Sidky Pasha had ached the ears of the Wafd and made them nervous that ey might meanwhile be torpedoed by the King as they had :en before. Finally, their failures in the realm of foreign, as ell as home, policy and the negative nature of their programme ade the *rôle* of an irresponsible Opposition particularly congenial. Whatever the decisive motive may have been, Nahas Pasha ected to resign, even though it left him open to the accusation being a politician rather than a statesman, and of putting rty before country.

The problem which faced England was not an easy one. If e denied the Wafd the power to coerce the King, which, in our sence, they would have possessed, were we prepared to give a inority Government the requisite support? The theory that the rm of internal government which Egypt adopts is no concern ours must be based on an ignorance of the fundamental fact at no Government except a Wafdist Government can last for single day without our support. A Government can only intain itself in power if it enjoys popular support, or depends force, or takes advantage of the apathy of the majority of the pulation, though it may, of course, depend on more than one these factors. Since the Protectorate was abolished in 1922, ypt has seen three different forms of government: an auto-cy, either the Palace ruling through a Prime Minister or a ime Minister ruling with the acquiescence of the Palace, minority Government, and government by the Wafd. Of ese three, only the last commands popular support; the mainder all rely to a greater or less degree on force, and at force is necessarily ours. Without British officers in the lice force and a British Army in the background no Govern-ent could rely on a sense of duty in either the Egyptian police the Egyptian army prevailing over their sympathies with the tional party. As our intervention is required only when the yptian forces fail in their duty of preserving order, and as

they fail only when the Wafd is out of power, it follows that our intervention is always exercised against the Wafd. If the King decides to oppose the Wafd, it is the British Army which prevents the Wafd retaliating; while if the Wafd desires to oppose the King, it is the British Army which chastises the Wafdist mob.

Thus no vacuum exists for each factor to exercise unmitigated its full and logical effect. Indirectly and ultimately the presence of the British soldier leaning Gallio-like over the parapet of Kasr el Nil Barracks pervades all Egypt, it sways the decision of the native *omdeh* hundreds of miles up the Nile as effectively as the King in his palace next door. Whenever events point to a trial of force, Great Britain, to protect interests which disorder might indirectly jeopardise, is forced to intervene physically. On this inevitable intervention minority government in Egypt always banks and often bluffs. Only recently a writer in the *Evening Standard* declared : 'One thing is quite certain, and the British public ought to know it, had the organising brains in the Egyptian police and army not been British, Cairo would have been in the hands of the Wafd on July 22 last.' In fact, England alone maintains the present Government in power.

The suggestion, therefore, contained in the reply of Sidky Pasha that abstinence from speech and overt action is the true criterion of the neutrality in internal affairs to which we are pledged is as fallacious as it is specious, and no one knows this better than the Pasha himself. To argue that inaction spells neutrality and indicates the cessation of influence is as mistaken as to maintain that the queen has no influence on the chess-board so long as she remains on the same square. Great Britain is a counterpoise, and no change of Government is possible unless she shifts her weight in the balance.

But Sidky Pasha certainly had cause for complaint. Having resolved to acquiesce in a minority Government taking office, we at least owed it to him not to aggravate the inevitable difficulties of his situation—for his task is far from easy. Outside a small clique he has no backing in the country. He is regarded as unscrupulous and ruthless. The King, with whom his relations have for years been far from cordial, would not hesitate to throw him over if he felt his own position secure. No reliance can be placed either on the provincial police force or the Egyptian army, on which the control of the country depends. Under similar conditions Ziwer Pasha in 1924, and Mahmoud Pasha in 1928, had at least been able to count on the unqualified support of the British Government. Yet on this occasion, afraid to accept the logical implications of our decision, we pursued the mischievous and irresponsible policy of encouraging both sides. Mr. Churchill might well ask whether

it was a film we were making by the banks of the Nile—Charles I. and Oliver Cromwell in an Egyptian setting.

At the critical moment, while disorder in Alexandria was at its height, Mr. MacDonald adopted the unprecedented course of addressing a warning, not only to the Government, but to the Opposition. To the Prime Minister it was to be 'made quite plain that His Majesty's Government did not intend to be used as an instrument for an attack on the Egyptian Constitution. In consequence they could be no party to an alteration in the electoral law.' Sidky Pasha would be held responsible for the protection of foreign lives and property in Egypt. Nahas Pasha, on whom a similar responsibility was laid, was also warned that domestic squabbles must not be allowed to imperil foreign interests. More entertaining stipulations could hardly have been devised. Sidky Pasha was to be precluded from attempting the sole solution on which rests his slender chance of founding a firm Government, while the opposition were to be denied that violence which Sidky Pasha will astutely take care to make their solitary means of expression. The British Government can hardly have been so naïve as to imagine that the Egyptian Prime Minister would welcome the issue to his opponents of a paternal injunction to behave themselves, even though it relieved him of some responsibility in the event of disorder. There was certainly ample excuse, if not justification, for the reply Sidky Pasha addressed to the Government. Not often does the British Government court and receive so deliberate a snub. His retort could hardly have been more effective unless he had chosen, as well he might have, to address it to Mr. Stanley Baldwin as well as to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

The success of the King's Government in the struggle with Parliament, which is now entering on an active phase, depends on a continuance of the royal favour and of our tacit support. So long as Sidky Pasha does not offer the same personal provocation as did Mahmoud Pasha, the shock of the constitutional crisis in the spring will probably deter His Majesty from throwing over the pilot. But if he is to succeed in imposing his rule on the country in the face of the popular party, he will have to adopt measures which are not merely unconstitutional, but also repugnant to Western notions. So long as they are designed to promote the practical welfare of the country, and not personal or sectional interests, we shall probably tolerate them. But this is his difficulty—if they are not stringent, they will not attain their object; if they are, we cannot afford to countenance them, for we shall incur the odium of having made them possible. But even if he succeeds so far, the British Government want results, and sooner or later he is sure to be badgered about a treaty. The British Govern-

ment now realise that a one-man treaty is useless. So, once again, we shall assist at the familiar spectacle of an Egyptian Prime Minister endeavouring to detach the more moderate members of the Wafd and to modify the Electoral Law so as to enable him to control the elections and secure a majority for his own policy.

Prophecy is, admittedly, the most gratuitous form of error, yet the chances of his achieving the latter result, no matter what modification he introduces, may safely be deemed remote in the extreme. If the British Government were to leave him to consolidate his position in his own way, he might by wise rule win over a section of the country, and reduce to apathy the majority who should be getting yearly more convinced of the futility of political agitation. But the Wafd, if only to retain their hold, would be forced to challenge his position. *The Times* has rather ingenuously suggested that they can 'best prove their fitness to govern the country by showing moderation in the hour of triumph, and discretion in time of temporary eclipse.' Too great a prudence in times of eclipse leads to extinction. Already speech has been denied them: Parliament is closed, public meetings are forbidden, their papers have been suppressed, and the victim, gagged and bound, can only express himself by gestures. The Wafd have replied with a declaration of non-co-operation, and the first stage is to be the non-payment of the land tax. For such a policy to succeed, a better organisation and a far more general response is needed than for riot making. A dour determination is necessary, for there is nothing exhilarating about seeing your cattle and land sold to your enemies for a mere song when the Government distrain and put them up to auction. It appears more than doubtful whether the resolution of the peasant will be equal to this ordeal. If non-co-operation breaks down, nothing is left but demonstration, and demonstration, to be effective, must be violent. In short, the maintenance of the present *régime* constitutes a definite invitation to violence. If Sidky Pasha is unable to repress it, he will, no doubt, be careful to see that it takes a form which is likely to endanger foreign interests, and so make sure of our intervention; but even if he finds it unnecessary to involve us actively, we shall still have to bear the discredit of his repressive measures.

We shall then be faced with the problem whether it is advisable and justifiable to continue to give Sidky Pasha the moral support which he requires. Unfortunately, excluding the Wafd, no real alternative presents itself. For neither the King nor the Constitutional Liberals have any following, though both, no doubt, would claim that the fault was ours. We should have certainly found it difficult to sanction the *régime* which the King would have

med at establishing. If his private ambitions had only suffered m to tinge the despotism which he coveted with the merest ispicion of constitutionalism, if he had organised a party which fered the elements of a just, disinterested, and constructive lministration, his people would have forgiven the idiosyncrasies his personal aims, and the British Government would at one me have thankfully relegated the control of Egypt to a *régime* iat fell short of their present ideals of representative institutions. country would have responded more readily to the idea of a enevolent autocracy, or drawn greater benefit from it.

The immense knowledge, influence and power which the Palace is gained since the King, a stranger alike to his people and their nguage, ascended the throne thirteen years ago is a sufficient oof of his ability and energy. With the death of Zaghloul a nique opportunity occurred for the King to assume the *rôle* of tional leader, though the people were not slow to forget the tivities of his young adviser Nashat, and to note the personal ıds to which the brief supremacy of the Palace two years before id been directed. But the chance has passed, and will not recur ıless the King is prepared to abandon the *rôle* of *tertius udens* which he has preferred to sustain all these years, to the iscomfiture of both ourselves and the Wafd, and range himself hole-heartedly on the side of the treaty makers, confident that s astuteness, unaided and unfettered by the British Govern- ent, will then secure his supremacy and ready to stake his rone on the throw.

If we cannot support the King, neither can we bolster up the onstitutional Liberal Party, which, like Tom Noddy, is all head ıd no body. It is, in fact, numerically non-existent, and would e lucky to carry half a dozen seats out of the 220 odd of which arliament is composed. This party has never organised a rious appeal on political lines to the common people, whom at eart it despises, and to this extent it must bear the responsibility failure.

It is not the tragedy of Egypt alone that her most capable en should be those who do not secure public support. Indi- dually, the Constitutional Liberals possess almost a monopoly those qualities that should be most useful to Egypt—ability, ıowledge of the world, a sense of statesmanship, and a polish, sed in most cases on a Latin culture, which, in contrast to their ompatriots, has made them insidiously attractive to our dip- mats. For it is this 'moderate' group who have always tained the greatest concessions from Great Britain, and it is ith Adly, Sarwat and Mahmoud, regardless of their lack of andate, that Great Britain has engaged so frequently in negotia- ons foredoomed thereby to sterility.

We are thus forced back to the Wafd. What are the Wafd? According to one view, they are a set of unscrupulous agitators in the direct pay of Moscow, fired with undying hatred of capitalism, imperialism, and all the other 'isms' for which the British Empire stands; according to the other, they are a group of Gladstonian Liberals with a pious belief in the doctrines of liberty and representative institutions. In point of fact, it is a party led and directed mainly by an inner ring of professional politicians composed of landowners and lawyers. Its most enthusiastic supporters are students and schoolboys; but it has to-day an undoubted hold of one sort or another on the peasantry, which comprises 80 per cent. of the Egyptian people. It is, as no other party has ever attempted to be, a thorough political organisation; in every provincial capital there is a headquarters, in every town a committee, in every hamlet an agent. If the suspension of Parliament is prolonged, a shadow Parliament is ready to come into existence, complete with President, Cabinet and working committees.

Analogies from English or Indian politics are particularly dangerous. The Wafd must not, from their courting of the British Labour Party, be thought in any sense to be socialistic in tone, for the bulk of the landowning class belong to the party, and they stand for no economic creed; nor, as in India, is any degree of 'disloyalty' involved: their aims are fundamentally non-British; their sentiments are as anti-British as those of the Constitutional Liberal Party, no more and no less, though their methods have rendered their hostility more apparent. The domination of the country by the Wafd may be a tyranny which discourages the expression of moderate feeling by a non-vocal majority of its inhabitants, but the fact remains that it is an effective domination. With the Wafd in power there have never been either riots or bloodshed. Called into existence to meet a national emergency, it was held together and inspired by the genius of a national leader and the cry of complete independence; with the termination of its original mission it would tend to break up, as it is the force of external pressure rather than any real internal cohesion which binds it together. Whether or not it is this fear which always restrains the Wafd at the last moment from accepting proposals for a treaty, it does certainly appear that they will never have the courage or resolution to sign. If the Wafd will not conclude a treaty with us, neither can we usefully with any other party, for a treaty ratified by an emasculated Parliament or accepted by a minority Government will not even bring us those meagre and questionable advantages which are claimed for it.

For many years our policy towards Egypt has been to subor-

dinate everything to this single end. But is a treaty of such paramount importance to us? The main incentive, no doubt, of those who have so long worked for it is to put an end to a period of restless strain on either side. But something more than mere malaise must have been at the root of this frantic desire of successive Foreign Secretaries to reduce as gracefully as may be our commitments under cover of an act of generosity. Year in and year out as spring time came round the same unambiguous signs of desire for *rapprochement* have appeared. The blindness which such a condition is popularly supposed to induce has more often than not afflicted the Egyptian suitor who has returned to Egypt, confident as Sarwat that his charms, or as Mahmoud that his force of character, would be as irresistible to his colleagues as it had been to the British negotiators.

Three advantages are claimed for a treaty: first, a secure title—it has been suggested that our right to maintain troops on Egyptian soil might, if Egypt succeeded in getting the issue before any international court of law, be held to be somewhat flimsy; secondly, we should be rid of our responsibility for foreigners; and thirdly, we should earn the friendship of the Egyptian people.

A foreign Power might seek to complicate our position in Egypt by supporting an Egyptian appeal, but in 1922, when we declared Egypt an independent nation, the foreign Powers were formally given to understand that we considered our special position in Egypt such that any attempt to intervene in Anglo-Egyptian relations would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Eight years have passed, and acquiescence in our statement of the position has been universal. That blessed word 'rationalisation' can, no doubt, be invoked in favour of handing over foreign interests to the Government best placed to-day to care for them. Such an arrangement will, doubtless, lessen our embarrassments until the day comes, as come it may, when a foreign Power intervenes physically on behalf of its nationals. As to friendship, let there be no sentimental slush. A member of the Labour Government may declare with a glow of self-conscious generosity, 'We are giving Egypt independence'; but the Egyptian politician regards independence as a natural right. The heir to a property is not expected to evince special friendship for the usurping relative because he has eventually succeeded in dispossessing him. Causes of friction, it is true, should be minimised, and individual friendships between Englishmen and Egyptians will persist, but the Egyptian will continue to put his compatriot first, and his co-religionist second, and to feel a far closer affinity with certain southern European races than he can ever share with us.

When all is said and done, England, then, stands to gain very little from a treaty. One can only conclude that the policy of the British Government towards Egypt is part and parcel of their policy towards Iraq, Arabia and elsewhere, and is stimulated by *an unnatural thrill similar to that which certain queerly constituted individuals derive from turning over the counterfoils of their cheque-book.*

When they reflect that all these years the only real bar to an agreement has been our insistence on the maintenance of British troops in Egypt, that to gain this point Zaghloul would have sold his birthright, and that only last year any terms might have been wrung from the Wafd if they had been allowed the credit of eliciting such an incomparable concession, it must be their crowning mortification to have been induced to part with this trump card to the one man who could give absolutely nothing in return; and a card once played can never take another trick.

If, then, the treaty is not likely to bring us any substantial advantage, ought we not to substitute some other central idea as the basis of our policy? What is that central idea to be?

The most striking feature of Egyptian political life during the past ten years has been an instability which it would be hard to parallel in any other country. In that period fourteen different Cabinets have held office, and not so long ago as many as ten Prime Ministers and seventy Ministers and ex-Ministers were alive. The transition from one Government to another has been accompanied by direct reversals of major policy, as well as of administrative detail, by the substitution of officials of the right political colour, and by the persecution of all ranks of their political opponents. Under such conditions it is impossible for a country to make any real advance, either social, political, or material.

Should not our policy, then, be to promote and develop the Government which stands the best chance of a prolonged period of indisputed control? If we are convinced that the essential minimum of good administration can only be secured by the continuance of the present *régime*, and that, sheltered in the early stages, it will not merely succeed in imposing itself forcibly, but will strike root in the country, then, indeed, we have every justification for extending help and encouragement. But unless we have this conviction—and there is little enough in recent Egyptian history to support such a view—we have no right to prohibit, nor shall we in the long run do any good by prohibiting any particular form of political life. Nations, like people, may be educated and shepherded in one direction, but ultimately they must work out their salvation for themselves; and if there is ever to be any

stability in Egypt, Parliament must be allowed a full opportunity to prove its worth or its bankruptcy.

However unsuitable a form of government it may be for a country in the present stage of Egyptian civilisation, and however unrepresentative it may be of the average Egyptian fellah whom claims to represent, it has become a force which it is foolish to verlook and idle to deny. Though *The Times* is perhaps overtating the fact when it asserts that there is a genuine and widepread desire that representative institutions should be given a air trial, it at least is not true, as Mr. Lloyd George would have is believe, that it is we who are forcing ideas of democracy and overnment on an unwilling East. The astonishing growth of he idea of nationality shows how readily Western ideas can e assimilated. The Egyptian fellah, if asked who he is, will ell you to-day, 'Ana Masri' ('I am an Egyptian'), where ten ears ago he would have answered, 'Ana Muslim' ('I am a Mohammedan').

For years politicians have chosen to regard as stationary the ate of illiteracy in Egypt, regardless of the immense extension of ducation. But of what value is this literacy test in any case? The book learning of a board school education substitutes often mass of undigested facts with a fine self-conceit for the sterling haracter and common-sense that the old illiterates had. It would e better far to entrust the vote in Egypt to the old-fashioned Egyptian who lived a patriarchal life on his own estate, exacting nd meriting the respect of his dependants, than to the hysterical ffendi who will be in control if literacy is made the qualification or suffrage.

The Egyptian Parliament has so far had few opportunities, nd used them badly. But parliamentary institutions would ever have reached full growth in England had she not enjoyed period of isolation from European influences and dangers in hich to work out her domestic problems undisturbed by any lread of interference by her neighbours. It is their conflicts vith England and with their King that have rendered Egyptian Parliaments so short-lived.

If, then, we are to give full scope for the experiment of some orm of parliamentary government and to make the treaty no onger a primary object of our policy, a reconsideration of our osition in Egypt is necessary.

It is interesting to recall that about the time of the Milner Commission the United States of America sent a du-umvirate on a very similar mission to the Philippine Islands. There, too, a white race was confronted by obligations and responsibilities in respect of an alien people of a lower standard of civilisation.

There, too, a clamour had arisen for independence. In the admirably definite and concise report which General Leonard Wood, the outstanding figure in the history of American colonial administration, submitted to his Government there stands placed at the very end, to strike with greatest emphasis, the words: 'We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.'

At that very moment we were elaborating the policy which four months later was announced to the world under our Declaration of 1922, the very enshrinement of the doctrine of responsibility without authority.

It is easy to under-estimate or to forget the difficulties of the time: a revolution followed by a gradual surrender of our power, until we could no longer, without Egyptian co-operation, ensure the administration of the country, an unchecked campaign of assassination, and three years of very definite official encouragement to Egyptian aspirations of independence. The opportunity was certainly very tempting of abating Egyptian hostility and shifting responsibility for an irksome situation, but there were certain responsibilities we could not evade. So long as we denied the right of entry to foreign Powers we had to protect their subjects and their interests. We also undertook obligations towards native minorities and reserved rights to ourselves for the preservation of Imperial communications. While retaining those responsibilities, we deliberately discarded every instrument which had enabled us in the past to discharge them. The Egyptian police and army were no longer under the undisputed orders of their English commanders, and English officials were either placed under Egyptian authority or rendered impotent. Not otherwise could we give independence in the unreserved spheres, but the foreign communities made it quite clear that in their eyes it was mere hypocrisy to attempt to disassociate ourselves from responsibility for the general condition of the country.

Powerless as we thus became on issues where the Declaration justified intervention, it was not surprising that such issues constantly recurred. The Wafd made little pretence of recognising any but the concessional aspect of the Declaration, while the Constitutional Liberals rendered only lip service to its terms. There was only this difference, that whereas the former preferred shock tactics, the latter favoured the more subtle attack by infiltration. In defence persuasion, bluff, or bayonets were our sole weapons, with the result that in minor issues, where we were likely to shrink from our last resource, they were able to ignore persuasion or call the bluff with impunity.

In such circumstances as these only an outstanding personality could hope to maintain our position without considerable erosion taking place, and all the force of character of the High Commissioner was needed to galvanise into some semblance of life the faded image of British prestige. If, at times, Lord Lloyd endeavoured to exercise preponderating influence in spheres which our policy excluded from our purview, it was because he realised more clearly than anyone that, on issues where we were vitally and legitimately affected, successful assertion of our rights depended on the strength of his own position, and not on any sanction that either he or the Foreign Office could apply. This is, however, a situation which, given even the exceptional man, cannot be maintained indefinitely.

If therefore we found, as we probably should, that the Egyptian Parliament were unalterably opposed to any reasonable treaty, we ought to recognise the fact, and no longer regard the situation as transitory. The time has surely come when we should abandon the obsequious importunacy which has lost us point after point, and address Egypt in this manner: 'We conceded you independence subject to certain reservations. There can be no question of going back on that Declaration now; it is neither advisable nor practicable. On the contrary, we intend to increase your liberty by scrupulously abstaining in future from our unavowed practice of trespassing in matters of policy and detail which are outside the scope of our reservations. But as regards these reservations, they were framed when we expected, within a reasonable period, to arrive at terms for their settlement. If we cannot yet agree on terms on which to hand over these responsibilities to you, we must have a working arrangement whereby we can fulfil them in the normal course of administrative routine without the necessity of periodical armed demonstrations, which are as repugnant to us as they are disturbing to your political life.' For no serious statesmen could subscribe to the bankrupt policy contained in Mr. MacDonald's bombastic declaration, 'Warships were sent to Alexandria, and that would be done again and again.' It might be found on investigation that no additional administrative facilities or sanctions were required in respect of three out of the four points; but to ensure the protection of foreign interests and minorities, the reservation over which continual clashes have occurred, we should need the grant of certain definite, though limited, executive powers.

In this way, by a mere administrative adjustment giving effect to a reservation that has been recognised for eight years, we should facilitate our own task in Egypt and, with the reduction of friction to a minimum, should create an atmosphere in which Egypt could work out her own political salvation. Democracy, as

Amiel has said, makes bad work but produces citizens, and it is to that slow educative value of representative institutions we must look with patience.

Such a policy offers, no doubt, no prospect of a startling leap forward, but not even will the most brilliant of treaties or declarations bring the Golden Age to Anglo-Egyptian relations. Let us recognise, if we must, that we live, as Lord Tyrrell once said, in an age of transition, makeshift and compromise; but our policy need not, therefore, be solely based on tactical advantage or the expediency of the moment. Rather should our watchwords be firmness, consistency, impartiality and sympathy; and let our politicians, diplomats and administrators take to heart the words of the Emperor philosopher:

> How worthless are all those poor people who are engaged in matters political and as they suppose are playing the philosopher—all drivellers: do not expect Plato's Republic but be content if the smallest thing goes on well and consider such an event to be no small matter.

A. R. I. MELLOR.

LAMBETH, 1930

It can hardly be affirmed of the Anglican Episcopate as a whole that it is an unbusinesslike organisation. If its members are to be brought together from the ends of the earth every tenth year, quite a considerable part of each interim must be occupied in preparations of various kinds. The individual Bishops, faced with the likelihood of being absent from their spheres for some months, have to make arrangements for 'carrying on' till they can return. No inconsiderable portion of the overseas Bishops are men who join apostolic labour to a modest wage, and who cannot add to the provision for their long transport the charges of their maintenance for many weeks during the London season. Moreover, by an ancient and an honourable tradition, all the visiting Bishops, with their women-folk, may look forward to a brief visit to Lambeth Palace as the Archbishop's personal guests, and the Bishop of London, with characteristic expansiveness, follows suit at Fulham. Imperial Conferences, of course, are accustomably managed on a similar or a much greater scale, but the Government Hospitality Department is continuous; it functions smoothly all the time; the Church, on the other hand, must improvise its arrangements *ad hoc*, and the visitors are the first to admit that this time all went smoothly and graciously, as usual.

But the Conference of 1930 saw a financial change, very little appreciated, but of no small significance. Hitherto the whole expense—adapting and furnishing the library for the sessions, circulating the necessary invitations, instructions and memoranda, providing lunch and tea for 300 men *de die in diem* for three weeks and for a large and favoured committee for a fortnight—has fallen upon the official income of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The whole company of the Bishops were actually his guests. It is true that in the background there were generous laymen who raised a fund for his Grace to administer, but the responsibility was his alone. This time the Home Church, by a vote of the Church Assembly, deliberately shouldered at least a considerable part of the burden. In two successive years the Budget of the Assembly has included an item of 1000*l.* for the purpose. There

is, of course, a difference between the Assembly's Budget and Mr. Snowden's. He exacts the dues for which he budgets; the Church depends on the payment of parochial quotas, and at present these are in the doldrums of 75 per cent., though, no doubt, there are freshening breezes ahead. But such an arrangement strikes at the root of the calm privacy which the Lambeth Conference has hitherto enjoyed. It brings its finances under the more or less public audit of the Central Board of Finance. It may affect many things in the future. For the moment it only adds a certain financial decorum to the free traditions of the long series of these assemblies.

But with this decorum there follows a faintly perceptible change in the personality and the capacity of those who take part. You will not, indeed, detect any difference in the chairmanship. Lord Davidson of Lambeth, with his unrivalled recollections of far-gone Lambeth Conferences, has passed to his rest. But the training which for years he had imparted to the actual secretaries of the present Conference, taking them into his full confidence in all particulars, was always and equally at the disposal, in ample friendship, of the man whom he expected to succeed him. So Dr. Lang came to his great task fully prepared, and at the same time personally dowered with all Lord Davidson's patience of long, and sometimes, as others felt, needlessly long, discussion. It was not only the American Bishops (though they gave most frequent expression to it) who felt that their reverent affection for the Primacy of Canterbury can and surely will be maintained, personally as well as officially, now that the pallium is on fresh shoulders.

Nor is it likely that the reverence of the visitors for the Church of England will be minished or brought low by their recollections of the obvious pre-eminence of the Bishops of the Home Church, whether in public debate or in committee. By the inherent right of their own capacity as theologians, as orators, as men of letters, as philosophers (for the Archbishop of Armagh should be added to them), these products of Establishment had the pre-eminence and did not need to love to have it so. The Indian Bishops maintained the high repute which they won in 1920; the clear-headedness of the Bishop of Madras is their mainstay as before; and it was sometimes difficult to realise that Bishop Palmer has ceased to be of their company. But most of the 307—say, 200 of them—are the product of some form of election, or of appointment as the result of some expressed local desire. They are the men whom the Churches which they serve desire to have for their overseers; their lives are devoted to self-forgetting labour, often in conditions of great hardness. But for the most

part they are not men who fasten their nails like masters of *assemblies. Frank Weston, of Zanzibar, was one such master in 1920; but the trumpets have sounded for him on the other side. His peer was not heard in 1930.*

The question arises whether this condition of things is inimical to the Christian progress of the whole body everywhere. Let the condition be stated in another way. All over the world the work of the Church is being set forward and superintended by earnest and eager chiefs, who often have been, and still remain, part of what they now oversee. Their time for close study has long been restricted, even if they have any reasonable supply of books within reach. In their dioceses their speeches or exhortations are normally addressed to folk whose thinking is simple, and whose theological education is elementary. When they come to Lambeth, they show an almost pathetic eagerness to address what they regard as a highly accomplished audience. Evidently there is something *ad rem* which at the moment they desire to set forth, but, from not being adequately seized of their own point, they fail to make the impression which their personal excellence merits. The real power in debate belongs, it would seem, to the Bishops at home and a few others.

Now, as regards the chief subjects before the Conference, there need be no question that this turned out, and may still turn (as St. Paul would say), to the furtherance of the Gospel.

Apply it to the South India proposals. The Conference of 1930 differed from its predecessor by having on its programme a *clou* subject, about which the interest of the outside world had been engaged, to an extent to which perhaps the Colenso controversy of long ago offers the only real parallel. To this question most of the Bishops from overseas brought the practical knowledge that comes of personal experience. In their spheres they are in contact with numbers who take the line followed by the native Christians of South India. These converts, if not the only begetters, are the real origin of the Union proposals. The native attitude is simple and sincere. You Westerns, they say, come to us with your Message, and we welcome it. But you wear your rue with differences, upon which you must not expect us to set the same store as you do—differences of ministerial rank, differences of liturgical custom, differences of baptismal system. You tell us that your Message is always and everywhere the same, and it is the Message that matters to us, its essence, not its accidents. We want to be free, as we journey through the wide spaces of our country, to turn aside to any Christian minister who is willing to impart the Message to us. We want to be free to join in the worship of such groups of our national fellow-Christians as may

be ready to receive us. Where is the harm? How can you deny us the good that must surely result to the cause which we all have at heart?

Take, as a sign-post, the less prominent case of Persia, where the Christian Church is faced by the simple severity of Islamic occupation, and has no other problems. The north of the country is evangelised by Presbyterians; the south by a storied undertaking of the Church Missionary Society. Three years ago the Christian leaders of north and south met at Isfahan and projected plans for union. If these have not yet got far, the sheer simplicity of the problem is full of promise. The plans came before the 1930 Conference at Lambeth for comment and advice. The Conference (resolution 41) expressed 'deep sympathy' and 'general approval'; it even followed the good example of its Unity Committee, admirably presided over by the Archbishop of York, in speaking of 'the Persian Church' or 'the Church in Persia,'[1] when what it really means thereby is the conglomerate of Anglicans and Presbyterians who are steadily opposing the Cross to the Crescent. The Unity Committee actually went on, with all due caution, to hint at possible schemes of joint Ordinations as between the two spheres.

Now, up to the point when you begin to talk about joint Ordinations, the Lambeth Conference does not need to be a body of leaders richly furnished with theological ability, but rather a band of sane men ready to refer all such questions to the arbitrament of their own administrative experience in fields not very dissimilar. But India looms larger than Persia. India from the early days of Christian effort in that land has been the scene of the labours of Christians of every kind of 'view.' When the Church of England began its Indian missions it did not hesitate to accept the aid of Continental Lutherans. To-day the Cowley Fathers and the Oxford Mission to Calcutta rub amicable shoulders with envoys of the Church Missionary Society and with those of societies which regard the cause of Evangelicalism as being jeopardised if it be in any hands but their own. There was therefore something spectacular and arresting in a movement, now some eleven years old, for joining up the three forces which operate in South India—to wit, the Anglicans, the South India United Church (*i.e.*, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, etc.), and the Wesleyan Methodist Church. The very idea of it started theologians at home preparing great store of ecclesiastical ammunition. At least there should be such a barrage as never was. The Lambeth Bishops, as it turned out, were largely unaffected by all this technical literature. Some read it all, and

[1] *Lambeth Conference*, 1930 (S. P. C. K.), p. 122.

were conscious of a surfeit; a few put it entirely on one side, feeling rather that it was their business to listen to the men who had experience of the actual conditions. The great majority of them, while of no mind to pull down one side of the Lambeth Quadrilateral—'the Historic Episcopate locally adapted,' etc.—or to make little of the value of the rite of Confirmation, were convinced of the worth of both by their personal experience, and did not need either antiquarian research or theoretical endorsement. So with both hands and a glad heart they could trust the South Indian Bishops to continue their negotiations. It is true that the Lambeth Conference envisages a state of things in which these South India Christians will become 'a distinct Province of the universal Church' (resolution 40 (*b*)). But no one in his senses doubts that whoever is Archbishop of Canterbury in 1940 will invite the Bishops of this imagined Province to the next Lambeth Conference.

And during those ten years one may quite reasonably hope that, at least as regards the mission field, there will be definite progress towards unity. The 42nd resolution of the Conference may be headed 'Special Areas'; it may talk about 'exception to the general rule'; it may have a note attached to it, quite unusually, as if to show that someone had got frightened at his own courage and must needs make it clear that he is not such a terrible reprobate after all. Anyhow, there it stands—not applying specifically to South India, but generally to the Church's advance everywhere, and it is worth giving in full with its appendant caveat:

Special Areas.

42.—The Conference, maintaining as a general principle that inter-communion should be the goal of, rather than a means to, the restoration of union, and bearing in mind the general rule of the Anglican Churches that 'members of the Anglican Churches should receive the Holy Communion only from ministers of their own Church,' holds, nevertheless, that the administration of such a rule falls under the discretion of the Bishop, who should exercise his dispensing power in accordance with any principles that may be set forth by the national, regional or provincial authority of the Church in the area concerned. The Bishops of the Anglican Communion will not question the action of any Bishop who may, in his discretion so exercised, sanction an exception to the general rule in special areas, where the ministrations of an Anglican Church are not available for long periods of time or without travelling great distances, or may give permission that baptized communicant members of Churches not in communion with our own should be encouraged to communicate in Anglican churches, when the ministrations of their own Church are not available, or in other special or temporary circumstances.

The Conference adopted the following explanatory note.—In view of the dangers of misconception, we think it desirable to say that in recognising

that a Bishop of the Anglican Communion may under very strict regulations and in very special circumstances permit individual communicants to join with members of other Christian bodies in their Services of the administration of the Lord's Supper, we felt bound to consider the difficulties created by present conditions, especially in some parts of the Mission Field. But we would point out that the very special circumstances and the very strict regulations specified in this resolution of themselves show that we are not departing from the rule of our Church that the minister of the Sacrament of Holy Communion should be a priest episcopally ordained.

Anyone who passes on from this to the resolution (No. 46), which has no such caveat, and which 'urges the desirability of organising and participating in efforts of Evangelism in co-operation with Christians of other Communions . . . as a means of strengthening [the] sense of unity in the Gospel,' need have no doubt that the members of the Conference in the lump were qualified to face the facts of the Christian situation.

But something beyond experience and sagacity and average theological equipment is required of men who come to deal with the problems of approximation to the ancient and hoary Communions of the Orthodox East, and to certain more western Christians who are not of the Roman obedience. It was here that the marked technical equipment of some of the English Bishops naturally and inevitably asserted itself. For long years—some of them almost from the days of their graduation—they had been training themselves by study and travel and personal contact with Orthodox ecclesiastics for such a time as this. The Œcumenical Patriarch had gone to work at an early stage to accumulate an impressive deputation, which was headed by the Patriarch of Alexandria, and consisted of those suave, long-bearded, keen-eyed ecclesiastics, with whose aspect many of us have become familiarised by travel through the Mediterranean. It is not their fault, but their misfortune, that political and dynastic considerations form a large part of their interests, and make them expect a kind of assistance from the Church of England which its remoteness from political administration precludes it from affording to them. On the other hand, their theology is rigid and age-worn, save where some of them have taken courses at western or German universities. They have a notion—quite natural in view of their principal contacts hitherto—that the best hope of attaining their objects, the likeliest chance of finding themselves in definite association with the Church of England, lies in the Anglo-Catholic section of the Church and in its further advance in numbers and importance.[1] So the real

[1] Their permanent representative in England, who is familiar with our language and with our ecclesiastical conditions, phrases his anticipation thus:

requirement in the negotiations with the Orthodox, of whic Lambeth, 1930, marks a notable stage, is a well-trained theolog used with indubitable honesty. The Lambeth Conference obviously too large for such a task. It can 'produce' a we staged reception of the delegates. But there are few of it members who are capable of such precise negotiations, and thos few need watching.

Roughly, it can be said to the Orthodox with complet candour that they need have no theological hesitation abou union with a section of the English Church, or with sections c the national, regional and provincial Churches in communio with it. The published record of the Conference makes it quit clear where statements have been made to the Orthodox whic are true of the part, but not true of the whole, even thoug resolution 33 (*c*) describes the record of the negotiations as con taining 'a sufficient account of the teaching and practice of th Church of England and of the Churches in communion with it, i relation to those subjects.'

An instance or two will suffice to show the need for a complet candour and for the avoidance of any partial presentation of th facts. The Orthodox seem to have inquired, quite naturall what is the attitude of the Church of England towards Prayer for the Departed. To this the Bishops answered 'that in th offering of the Eucharistic Sacrifice [a phrase which is itself sectional variant for more usual descriptions] the Anglica Church prays that "by the merits and death of Thy Son Jes Christ, and through faith in His blood, we and all Thy whol Church may obtain remission of our sins, and all other benefit of His Passion,"[3] as including the whole company of faithfu people living and departed.'[4] There is no question that ther have always been, or that there still are, members of the Anglica Church who use the words in this inclusive way. To say withou any qualification that 'the Anglican Church prays' with thi intention is to profess that what is true of the part applies to th whole. That, indeed, is equally characteristic of the famou *Responsio* made in 1897 to the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* of Pop Leo XIII. by Archbishops Temple and Maclagan. The actua origin alike of the theology and the Latinity of this *Responsi* has never, perhaps, been openly avowed[5]; but, if it were, it woul

'Why should we not think that a time is coming when the Catholic nucleu which always existed in the Anglican Church should not prevail over the whol body, so that it should appear in that form which would make reunion with ou Orthodox Church possible?'

[3] From the first Post-communion prayer.

[4] *Lambeth Conference*, 1930, p. 139, par. 11.

[5] See Bishop John Wordsworth's appendix in *Memoirs of Archbishop Templ* (1906), vol. ii., pp. 388ff, especially p. 391.

be realised how far there was or was not a real justification for *the plenary fashion in which the Responsio kept using 'we,' as though there could be no others in question. 'This whole action,' it says in describing the Anglican Liturgy—'this whole action, in which the people has necessarily to take its part with* the Priest, we are accustomed to call the Eucharistic sacrifice.'[6] But are we? Is the statement widely applicable? Was it even so with Archbishop Temple himself? Those who justifiably ask such questions will be the first to wonder why, when the Orthodox were reminded out of Article XXVIII. that 'the Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner,' they were not at the same time reminded that the Article forthwith adds: 'And the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith.' No doubt the Orthodox are well aware of it.

Now, all this negotiating skill and all this theological preciseness are becoming of first-rate importance to the future development of the Church of England and of its various partners as represented at the Lambeth Conference. Not that there is anything new about either the skill or the preciseness or the negotiations which bring them into play. The famous library in which the members assembled has great store of letters dating from Archbishop Tenison's era, which show Oriental Orthodox and Continental Lutherans and the like making their approaches to Lambeth and receiving definite descriptions of the attitude of the Church of England towards this matter and that. But shrewd observers of the times will realise that all these intercommunications are taking on a fresh and fertile importance. 'Lambeth, 1930,' will of course always be of interest to some, because the Bishops made a more unmistakable pronouncement on questions of sex and birth-control than any that they have hitherto achieved, largely because close touch has been kept of late with the best medical and technical opinion. Others will fasten on the section headed 'The Christian Doctrine of God' and will feel that here under the able guidance of the Irish Primate the truths of the old Gospel can hold up their head to confront the latest advances of scientific and philosophic thought. Others, again, will turn eagerly to the report on 'Youth and its Vocation.' They may wonder that youth in particular should be selected for special treatment, and not childhood or middle age. But they will recognise that an effort has been made to set the religious life before young people in all its sobriety and seriousness, rather than, as is too often the case, in the sentimental light of a mildly exciting adventure.

[6] *Lambeth Conference*, 1930, p. 136.

But these are pronouncements for the moment. In each case *the situation may be quite different ten years hence.* But *the question of the development and future organisation of the Anglican Communion as a whole* is a permanent problem to which 'Lambeth, 1930,' has made contributions of far-reaching consequence. For this reason it is well to focus attention upon the work of Committee No. IV. The personnel of it might seem inconspicuous, as if the notabilities were naturally seconded for more vital and intellectual considerations elsewhere. Its brief report has for the hasty reader a rather arid appearance—dioceses, provinces, national Churches and the like. But its subject is the future development of the Communion as a whole, and it is vital.

We may state the situation in the words of the report: 'There are two prevailing types of ecclesiastical organisation: that of centralised government, and that of regional autonomy within one fellowship. Of the former, the Church of Rome is the great historical example. The latter type, which we share with the Orthodox Churches of the East and others, was that upon which the Church of the first centuries was developing until the claims of the Roman Church and other tendencies confused the issue.' [7] This is gently and considerately stated, but it is a challenge all the same. Over against the Roman type of centralised domination it sets the Anglican type of unfettered self-government, 'a commonwealth of Churches without a central constitution,' 'a federation without a central government.' [8] Divest 'Anglican' of its geographical associations. Let it be but an ecclesiastical type, and it can serve to designate all that chooses to associate itself with Lambeth in that liberty which is where the Spirit of the Lord is.

Nevertheless, some measure of central organisation is needed, and one which can clearly stop far short of 'central government.' It is needed, because the lack of it involves risks of a Patriarchate—a plan which Lambeth itself would emphatically reject. It is needed because a decade is a long time in a world of rapid change, and, amid whatever limitations, we have to 'carry on.' It was this need which led to the creation of the 'Consultative Body,' a somewhat mysterious junta, which can easily now be changed into something more obviously representative, especially if the American Bishops will forget President Monroe and bear their part in it; which, indeed, they now seem likely to do.

A commonwealth of Christian Churches such as this might readily be joined by small bodies such as the Old Catholics and

[7] *Lambeth Conference*, 1930, p. 155.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

the Moravians, or by great historic Communions such as the various Orthodox Churches and the Church of Sweden. It would give the great non-episcopal Churches at home, of whom the ordinary Christian thinks first and foremost and most fervently, when he thinks of reunion at all, a fresh opportunity and a compelling pretext for considering why they should any longer stand outside a federation which is wide enough to embrace all that is not of the Roman obedience, and which in time may avail to show Rome herself that here is something with which she need not fear to co-operate, but which is too valiant and world-wide to be merely subdued and absorbed. Then at last the peace of the world will be secured because the united voices of all the Churches demand it, and disunion will cease to retard the victory of the Cross.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

THE BROMLEY BY-ELECTION

THE belief in the validity of by-elections as a test of current popular opinion is one of the superstitions of English political life for which it is by no means easy to find a logical basis. In fact, the conditions in which by-elections are generally fought are so entirely different from those which prevail at a General Election that inference from them is always dubious. It is possible for energetic organisers to concentrate their forces upon a single constituency to a degree which is entirely out of the question at a General Election : the power of the machine is correspondingly magnified. Doubtless a long series of by-election victories or defeats has a real significance. It is scarcely possible to doubt, for instance, that the successive defeats of the Liberals before the war meant that the Liberal Government was thoroughly unpopular and would have been overwhelmingly defeated at the next General Election. But the isolated by-election is extraordinarily deceptive as a test of general popular feeling. Both Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Disraeli fell victims on different occasions to these false auguries. The most dramatic example of all was the Bermondsey by-election just before the Liberal triumph in 1910. At this election, in the very middle of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's 'raging, tearing propaganda,' the Free Traders, led by so stout and eloquent a champion as the late Mr. Spencer Leigh Hughes, were decisively defeated by a Protectionist tanner, Mr. Dumphreys. The victory immensely encouraged the 'Tariff Reformers' and proportionately depressed their antagonists. Yet it was entirely illusory. Mr. Dumphreys, in the event, never took his seat. He was defeated in Bermondsey at the immediately ensuing General Election, while his beaten opponent was triumphantly returned for Stockport. But no multiplication of such instances will diminish the popular interest in by-elections nor the significance, distorted by the hopes of the victors and the fears of the defeated, which is attached to them ; and the Bromley contest was no exception to the rule.

Yet if the object of this election had really been to obtain the opinion of the country, a less representative constituency could scarcely have been chosen. As at present defined it has never

been represented by any but a Conservative. The repeated attacks of one of the ablest and most accomplished of the younger Liberals, Mr. Kingsley Griffith, were always easily repulsed; and at the General Election on a huge poll the Conservative majority in a three-cornered contest was well over 7000. If the Liberals have failed to shake the Conservative domination, Labour has been equally unsuccessful. In the only 'straight' contest in the constituency since the war a much respected local Labour leader of very moderate views was decisively rejected. The inference seems clear that the Conservative hold on the seat, very strong in any case, is doubly secured by the division of the other parties. *Labour in Bromley will not support a Liberal candidate in any probable circumstances; and a very considerable body of Liberal voters cannot be induced to support even a moderate Labour candidate.*

The circumstances in which it was fought might have been specially designed to make the result still more unreal and artificial. The election was decided on the old register, a fact which in any case would have meant the disfranchisement of many new voters. In Bromley, where building has been going on with quite feverish haste in recent years and the population has been swollen enormously by an influx of new villa dwellers, continually moving, this fact meant that literally thousands were deprived of their votes. In the near future this new vote may completely alter the political complexion of the constituency. In this August by-election it did not count at all. Add to this that it was an August by-election with half the population of the well-to-do comfortable suburb away and by no means easy to trace, and with the half that remained even less disposed than usual to any active display of political enthusiasm, and the unrepresentative character of the struggle becomes clearer still. Bromley is never exactly a hotbed of any form of political enthusiasm. In one populous quarter of the constituency at the last General Election all three parties failed completely to attract any gathering that could fairly be called a meeting. In the hot August days meetings were as somnolent and as sparsely attended as ever: an exasperated *Manchester Guardian* commentator was driven to refer to 'the South Sea island calm' of Bromley; and the description was substantially true. The country and the newspapers might be agitated by the issues at stake in the return to Westminster of a new member for Bromley. Bromley itself, till the very eve of the poll, was not.

But to one political party, at any rate, the issue really was of importance. Conservatism in the early days regarded the conclusion as foregone, and was mainly concerned to stamp it beforehand with the official seal and warn off newspaper interlopers.

Labour, profoundly depressed, never hoped to do more than make a demonstration. It never has done more in its own strength in Bromley. But to Liberalism, at the time when the vacancy unexpectedly occurred, the contest was obviously of extreme moment. The situation of the party was very anxious. Its credit had been deeply impaired by the continual schisms in the parliamentary party. In the constituencies the local organisations were suffering from the exhaustion and the disappointment of the great effort put out at the General Election. The rank and file were listless and despondent, the leaders themselves waiting rather hopelessly upon events. The collapse of the *Electoral Reform Conference had ended one hope of securing a reasonable measure of representation for the 5,000,000 Liberal electors. The question jeeringly raised by many opponents was* whether these millions any longer existed, and whether the whole party was not in reality in process of rapid and complete dissolution. This question the Bromley result seemed bound to answer : it might answer it with deplorable emphasis. Liberalism had always been easily the second strongest party there ; but the Labour vote had risen ominously at the General Election. If the Liberal now fell to the third place, the writing on the wall would be unmistakable. A heavy Liberal vote, on the other hand—above all, a barely possible Liberal victory—would encourage the depressed forces of Liberalism to a degree out of all proportion to the real significance of the occasion.

Liberal headquarters rose to the situation with great energy. The young, popular, and extraordinarily energetic Liberal candidate found himself vigorously supported by the full resources of the powerful Liberal central organisation, and the 'star' meetings arranged by its managers were incomparably the best attended in the whole election. Sir Herbert Samuel's admirable opening speech was heard by a quite considerable audience—for Bromley, a very considerable audience indeed. Miss Megan Lloyd George's meeting was crowded to the doors, and Mr. Lloyd George himself attracted the usual multitude which flocks to hear him alone among contemporary orators. On this occasion the great crowd did not lose its time ; for his speech, humorous and earnest, critical and constructive, and throughout marvellously eloquent, was a masterpiece of its kind. It deserves a place in any oratorical anthology as a model of what an eve of the poll speech ought to be.

Long before this, of course, the real drama of the election had developed. At the very beginning, almost before the curtain was fairly rung up, the Ghost had appeared in the person of a certain Colonel Combs, claiming to be the nominee of the local branch of the United Empire Party. As the existence of this body had

not previously been suspected, the Ghost was not taken very seriously by anybody. Most of the newspapers did not so much as mention him: those which did, did so only to deprecate his precipitancy. It was assumed that he would disappear; and so he did, but only to give place to a far more substantial personage. There was nothing ghost-like at all about Mr. V. C. Redwood; the only mystery about him was how exactly he got on to the stage at all.

It is certain that Lord Beaverbrook had nothing whatever to do with it. Personally friendly with Mr. Campbell, whom the official Conservative machine had hastened to adopt as the one and only true Conservative candidate, and entirely satisfied with his assurances on the question of Empire Free Trade, Lord Beaverbrook never had any intention of intervening in the Bromley election. The ambiguities of his attitude, which lent themselves to easy ridicule, were due, not to any real hesitation, but simply to the embarrassment of the position in which he found himself. From Lord Beaverbrook's point of view, Mr. Campbell was a sufficiently good Protectionist; and he regarded it as folly to risk, by opposing him, the return of an avowed Free Trader. Lord Rothermere also seems at first to have hesitated. Mr. Redwood always robustly denied that he was sent to Bromley by Lord Rothermere; he simply came. There is no reason to disbelieve him. For the first day or two after his adoption he did not in fact enjoy the support of Lord Rothermere's organs; it was only later that all the trumpets sounded suddenly to the battle. Why, is still a mystery. One main reason, no doubt, was Lord Rothermere's fierce antipathy to Mr. Baldwin, to whom Mr. Campbell, the Conservative candidate, never ceased to proclaim his devoted allegiance. Another may have been a desire to show that he could do in Bromley what Lord Beaverbrook had recently done in North Norfolk, and perhaps do it better. Yet a third possibly was the fact that he heartily approved the policy for which Mr. Redwood was so sturdily, and indeed so noisily, fighting. After all, it was his own policy, and there is no real reason why a man, merely because he happens to be a newspaper proprietor, should not have convictions and be ready to fight and make sacrifices for them.

It was the fact that Mr. Redwood stood for a definite policy, and a policy defined by a newspaper, that makes his appearance so very significant. Newspapers both new and old have continually 'campaigned' in favour of some one 'plank' in a policy in which they happened to be particularly interested. This is no new thing. The old Press did it quite as often and as insistently as the modern popular Press; the subjects have varied from the Bulgarian atrocities and Home Rule to housing reform and the

importation of foreign pigs. 'Independent' candidates have also occasionally stood under the auspices of a newspaper in support of these isolated issues. Mr. Esmond Harmsworth, though always reckoned as a Conservative, was elected for Thanet nominally as an 'Anti-Waste' candidate under the same auspices as those under which Mr. Redwood stood at Bromley. The late General Townshend and his predecessor were both returned as Independent members for the Wrekin Division of Shropshire with the enthusiastic backing of Mr. Bottomley and his paper. The peculiarity of Mr. Redwood's position was that he was not so much a newspaper candidate as the champion of a newspaper policy, complete in itself and distinct from that of any other party. It was, it is true, a somewhat crude and incoherent policy. There seems no necessary connexion between High Protection, rigid economy, and the strong hand in India and Egypt. But policies are not by any means always coherent; many bodies of political doctrine have been no more coherent and far less distinctive than this.

The policy—it is of high significance—proved highly popular in Bromley. Probably thousands of loyal Conservatives who supported Mr. Campbell in obedience to the party whip would really have preferred Mr. Redwood's policy. His full-blooded, uncompromising Protection commanded far more respect and excited far more genuine hopes than Mr. Campbell's cautious, watery variant possibly could do. His Imperialism was thoroughly popular, and the most genuine cheers which Mr. Campbell ever won were raised when he adopted and repeated Mr. Redwood's denunciations of the 'weakness' of the Government in India and in Egypt. But Mr. Redwood's trump card was that he was 'the prosperity candidate': it swung definitely over to his side a fairly large shopkeeper vote, normally probably Conservative, but attracted strongly, in the grip of the trade depression, to a candidate who promised them relief from the burden of taxation and the assumed injustice of foreign competition. That he came forward as the standard bearer of 'a new party' lent an air of verisimilitude to his promises. Mr. Redwood had other adventitious advantages besides his own forceful personality. The 'Trade' was on his side—a not unimportant asset in a constituency which is said to include within its wide borders something like 150 publichouses. The very unwise personal attacks of the Conservative Central Office, which became panic-stricken as the struggle proceeded and lost its head, won him certainly hundreds of adherents. There was nothing really discreditable in his record; it shocked nobody but the staider type of Conservative, who was sufficiently shocked with Mr. Redwood's methods already and would not have voted for him in any case.

The average Bromley elector was not shocked: on the contrary, he was rather irritated by disclosures which looked merely spiteful because they were really irrelevant; and Mr. Redwood was quite astute enough to exploit the reaction which set in in his favour as a result of these attacks.

The main reason of the astonishingly large poll which the United Empire candidate eventually secured was, however, undoubtedly his claim to be the 'prosperity candidate.' A veteran statesman once expressed to me the opinion that the fate of all Governments is determined ultimately by the state of trade. There is substantial truth, if there is some exaggeration, in this view. United States politics furnish the classical example of the operation of trade conditions on politics. The great strength of the American Republican Party in the past has been that it was able to suggest that Republicanism was the political creed under which trade flourished; while a Democratic Government was in itself a threat to trade. There is probably nothing in it: there is no reason to suppose that American Democrats are in fact less careful or efficient guardians of the material prosperity of their country than American Republicans. But it has so happened that the two or three serious checks in American prosperity (till the last three years) have all occurred under the short Democratic Administrations; and the long periods of unbroken prosperity have coincided with the periods of Republican rule. The result has been to convert a political slogan into a tradition and a superstition, which has only recently received its first shattering blow in the occurrence, under a Republican Administration, of the most disastrous trade set-back the United States have ever known. British Conservatism has never been able quite to identify itself with the commercial prosperity of the country in the way the American Republicans have succeeded in doing. But there has for years been a vague suggestion that Liberal, or still more Labour, administration involved a menace to trade. It has been a grave handicap to both these parties. Mr. Campbell and his supporters vied with Mr. Redwood in the endeavour to exploit this belief; but without very much success, because the prolonged post-war trade depression, mainly under Conservative Governments, had already gone far to shatter it. The 'new party' had stolen this particular weapon from the Conservative arsenal, and the plaintive pleas of orthodox Conservatives that it was really theirs passed unheeded.

The surprising effect of Mr. Redwood's intervention was to alter completely the bearing of the result on the three existing parties. It had seemed at first that the contest might be of importance, perhaps decisive importance, to the Liberals, and of hardly any to Conservatism or Labour. In the event it had little

apparent bearing on the future of Liberalism, and considerable bearing on that of the other two parties. The Liberals did not do very well; but neither did they do particularly badly. They failed to win the seat, but they reduced very heavily the majority against them, and they retained without difficulty their place as the second largest party in the division. Their poll fell considerably, but it remained large enough to make the Labour cry that they were a 'fading' party rather meaningless. The net result was to leave them very much where they had been before—an uncomfortable, uncertain position like that of a swimmer struggling against a strong current and making little or no progress.

For the future of Conservatism this election will probably prove far more important. The Conservative managers had evidently intended to make it a demonstration of the strength of the party discipline and of its loyal devotion to Mr. Baldwin as its leader. Mr. Campbell was unwearying in protesting his devotion to both; but the electors—even the Conservative electors—heard these appeals very indifferently. The local machine was just strong enough to hold the seat, but as a demonstration of party loyalty it was an extraordinarily unimpressive performance. It was so very evident that the loyalty, even limited as it was, was reluctant and half-hearted. Mr. Redwood in his long speech after the poll announced that he had lighted a fire which would never be put out. If he meant that the United Empire Party would now go on from strength to strength as an independent political party, he was probably wrong. Fires of this kind have a habit of going out of themselves. But if he meant that the policy for which he fought would in the reasonably near future become the authorised policy of the Conservative Party, he may have been right. With some of its crudities a little toned down that may happen. If it does, the Bromley election will really prove an important political landmark; for it will mark the transition of Conservative policy from the form in which it has been moulded since the war—the form which its critics within the party denounce as 'semi-Socialism'—to a form much older, more rigid, and more definitely Conservative. Mr. Baldwin in his message to his champion at Bromley startled his own followers by referring to their party and doctrine as 'Tory.' It is doubtful whether the word has ever been used before officially by a Conservative leader. Mr. Baldwin's slip—if it was a slip—may have been an unconscious prophecy. It is quite possible that his party may be about to return, with incalculable results, to its older, half-forgotten traditions and beliefs.

For Labour the result was scarcely less significant. A declining Labour vote has been a feature of a succession of recent by-elections, and a natural one in view of the widespread and deep

disappointment created by the evident impotence of the Government to grapple with the difficulties which beset it. But in Bromley the Labour vote was halved and the Government party left ignominiously at the bottom of the poll—quite hopelessly defeated by an interloper without local connexions and without even the semblance of an organisation. Mere abstentions would scarcely have produced this result. The locust, in the shape of Mr. Redwood, must have devoured quite a number of votes cast for the Labour Party at the General Election. The 'prosperity' cry, that is to say, is quite as dangerous to Labour as to any other party—perhaps more dangerous. It is not necessary to exaggerate it. The solid industrial populations of the big towns will no doubt continue steadfast in the faith and return Labour members by overwhelming majorities for the great industrial centres. But what put Labour in office was not really this vote, but the surprisingly large measure of support which the party received at the last General Election in rural or semi-industrial or even residential districts. If that is going or gone, the great movement which has been sweeping onward with so apparently irresistible an impetus will receive a tremendous check at the next General Election. That may alter its whole character. If the Bromley by-election was a foreshadowing of that, as it may prove to have been, it was a portent indeed.

STUART HODGSON.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RUSSIAN

THE resemblances between two men seem to us more striking when they do not stand before us side by side—more striking still when we have only one of the two before our eyes. 'What a wonderful likeness!' we exclaim. 'You might be his brother.' But if the other man in question were suddenly to appear on the scene the likeness would vanish. So it is with the Russian Revolution, which is now in its thirteenth year and which we are far from being done with. Everyone who has watched it has noted the resemblances between it and the great revolution in France, and has drawn contrasts between the year 1789 and the year 1917. I lack space here to deal fully with this theme, and it would be too soon to try to do so, as the Russian drama has reached only its third act—or its fourth. The long interval between the two great events has the effect of intensifying the differences between them, for historical occurrences are like statues, which in the course of a century take on an incrustation imparted to them by wind and weather. They grow romantic; and when they lose an arm, or even a head, the effect is merely to increase their artistic beauty. The Parthenon itself would give us a shock if by some magic we were to see it suddenly one morning in its Periclean perfection, in all its pristine brightness of colouring; the heroes of Homer, if we had the facts of their lives before us in documents, or even if we had the scenes of their battles reproduced for us in the cinema, would perhaps seem to us mere brigands and barbarians. The age of our grandfathers is thought of in all countries as the Golden Age just because of the effacing hand of time: the miseries and evils of the period have been forgotten. Leave a battlefield alone for 100 years and it may take on the aspect of a peaceful happy glade.

Millions of people whose hearts are thrilled by the sight of the actual document—now preserved in a Paris museum—in which the Rights of Man were proclaimed, or who even read its memorable sentences in books, will turn with horror from all that has been happening in Russia. They do not realise that in Russia the sacrifices made in the Reign of Terror are now forgotten,

while elsewhere only the sacrifices are remembered. Who shall condemn those emigrants, driven out from Russia—like those driven out from France—who fill the world with their grievances? When a man has lost everything—his fatherland, his family, his home—he must be of strong character, indeed, if he can admit, nevertheless, that behind such deeds of oppression an idea is at work which the Future has only to purify in order that its issue be deathless. I have met men of such strong character and learnt to know them.

In the France of 1789 there were exceptional individuals who descried the star of a higher justice rising up above the thunder-clouds. I may instance the case of two Americans—Gouverneur Morris and Washington. Writing to Washington in 1789 from Paris, whither he had come on a political mission, Morris declared that there were men and women of great qualities at work in France, but that they were in the background—a background deep in shadow. A great building of Liberty was being erected, he said, but out of materials which might fall to pieces and bring the architects to ruin. Washington replied that it was difficult for people under such conditions not to fall from one extreme into another; and that in this event rocks and unseen reefs might bring shipwreck, followed by a more accentuated despotism than that which had been exercised before.

What will follow the present *régime* in Russia? That is the question raised by everyone whose gaze is directed on Moscow, whether he yearns for or dreads a new dictatorship or tyranny. The answer to the riddle is not to be sought in the history of the French Revolution, for the two movements were different; perhaps more light is thrown on the development of the French Revolution by the development of the Russian.

Certain resemblances are at least unmistakable. In both cases we see a stubborn mediæval system of sovereignty condemned in theory in half a dozen books decade after decade and then practically annihilated by a rebellion of the people. In both cases the privileged class was overthrown, subjected to banishment and in some measure to the penalty of death. In Russia the landed property of a few of the nobles was given to the people; in France the feudal land system was done away with. In both cases an exhausted minority was replaced by a powerful majority by means of moral force in accordance with natural economic laws.

Nobody will still feel regret to-day over the loss to the French nobility and clergy of their immemorial power and boundless wealth through the motion of the Vicomte de Noailles on that August night in 1789, or over the throwing open of official and

military posts to all French citizens. The United States of America have had no experience of such a condition of things since they became independent; in Europe it had been the normal condition, and in Russia (which, indeed, ought really to be classed with Asia) it continued for another seventy years, until the practical slavery of the peasants was abolished; for until 1861 the Russian peasants—*i.e.*, 85 per cent. of the population—were serfs. But it was not until 130 years after the French Revolution that the Russian Revolution achieved more thoroughly that status which, thanks to the former, had become common to all civilised States. Russia had needed a defeat in the war, and a few leaders, to awaken a people adapted to suffering and by nature not very active. Of all the European States none had incurred such inevitable losses from the war as Russia, for she had allowed herself for a longer period than any other to be duped by a proud and incorrigible class.

What happened in France in 1789 had not happened for two and a half centuries—had not happened since the Reformation: a people was carried away by a great movement. On both occasions, in 1789 as in 1917, the idea of a primitive right of mankind had taken possession of the soul, and after the proclamation of it had been made in new and convincing fashion by a few individuals, it had impelled the masses into immediate action; on both occasions the spark was kindled first in the capital cities, and then the conflagration spread slowly, never reaching many parts of the wide provinces and the extremities of the land. On both occasions the action was national, the idea international, for the French Revolution also was in its own eyes world revolution and was launched as such. And in truth it was a world revolution, though of much slower growth and subject to much greater modifications than was originally intended. The stream of Liberty, reddened with the blood of thousands of martyrs, did not pour into the plains, fructifying everything at once; hills and valleys delayed its progress, until at last, in greatly altered character, only a little reddened now, it split itself up in distant alien regions. Almost everything that we possess in Europe in the form of civilian liberty had its origin in that great impulse, and only if we look at the matter with the eyes of the emigrant can we fail to admit that similar indirect effects of the Russian movement are making themselves felt, more slowly, in very different ways, perhaps even against the ideas of the protagonists, but unceasingly. When recently I questioned Trotsky on the subject he said:

I have long been studying the sociological character of the Revolution, and I am now engaged in recording my impressions. Things may take a backward turn for us—perhaps we shall even go so far back as to have

another Tsar; but the great things we have achieved will remain, the abolishment of private ownership above all, and the handing back of millions of acres to a couple of thousand idle inheritors has become impossible.

History shows, indeed, that every thesis with great spiritual effects, every innovation capable of being put effectively into practice, resorted to in resistance against the habitual sanguinary conflicts, must begin by being carried to excess in order afterwards, when the heart-beat of the State has become more quiet, to be resumed as a positive vital force, the harmful elements in which have been eliminated. Did not the French Revolution kindle the idea of Equality, and was not its effect instead to strengthen Capitalism? Nevertheless, it kindled the idea of Liberty at the same time and, in a certain measure, brought it into existence. Can the modern history of Europe point to a more impressive document than the proclamation of the Rights of Man of the year 1789?—the proclamation that all men were born and remain free, and with equal rights; that all men were safeguarded against oppression; that all sovereignty was rooted in the nation; that no community and no individual could exert an authority which had not its root in the nation's will. The entire nineteenth century has been based upon these maxims; no Napoleon has been able to combat their essential truth; and one can point to no greater truth of their effects than the fact that to-day they are regarded as commonplace; for, as a Frenchman has said, the Utopias of to-day are the commonplaces of an enlightened to-morrow.

But the circuitous road to these victories of revolution was long, and was marked at first by scaffolds and the lime pits into which were thrown the thousands of the beheaded; it was accompanied by the clatter of the guns, which shot down more thousands of innocent citizens until the leaders themselves fell victims to the guillotine or the bullets. In this respect both revolutions are particularly alike—we are still in the midst of the intensification. Cagliostro and Rasputin respectively open the chains of events, in 1786 and 1914—in both cases three years before the outbreak; both of them acquired mastery over the hearts of the sovereigns by working upon their credulity and superstition; both knew how to influence minds of a decadent generation by intrigue; both won for themselves the enjoyments craved by their passions; until the one was condemned to death but afterwards allowed to languish in prison, while the other, without trial, was assassinated.

King Louis and Tsar Nicholas, so like each other in their weakness, were both dethroned, imprisoned, and done to death

by an excited populace; only the Tsar's end lasted a year, the King's five years. The French revolutionists, equally surprised by the lack of resistance offered to their seizure of power, proceeded more slowly, and they had even included in the proclamation of the Rights of Man the sentence: 'The person of the king is inviolable and sacred.' Nicholas was warned by a clairvoyant that he would be suddenly attacked and captured in a couple of days' time. King Louis, on the other hand, surrounded by a people given to free expression in speech and print, had been warned for years and ought to have been able to avoid everything. Seventeen years before his execution Turgot, on being dismissed from office as Minister of Finance, had foretold for him to his own face the doom of Charles I. of England. Both he and his consort had persisted in their thoughtless, spendthrift existence. Both in France and in Russia one must wonder at the patience of the people in tolerating such behaviour. The monarchial idea must have sunk extraordinarily deep in the mind of Europe for it to have been possible for the people to put up for twenty years with a king who came to the throne when he was twenty, ignorant, selfish and pleasure-loving, and for it to have been possible a hundred years later for another people to put up for twenty-four years with a neurotic tsar who stood in fear of his relatives, of his generals, of the priests, and, above all, of his own power.

In both countries the cleavage between the rich and the poor was extreme, for both lacked what to-day we call the middle class. In his famous treatise the Abbé Sièyes reckoned the number of the clericals and the nobles who were in complete control of France at 200,000 and the third estate at 25,000,000; in the same way tsarist Russia possessed a class of nobles, officials and priests quite insignificant in numbers who enjoyed complete sway until the founding of the Duma, and against whom the peasants and the workers, constituting 85 per cent. of the population, stood powerless.

'Within twenty-four hours the nation has gone forward a hundred years'—so it was declared in a letter written in August 1788 with reference to the calling together of the États Généraux. The letter was from the pen of Count Mirabeau, and if the adherents of the late Tsar Nicholas should speculate now as to what was lacking to them in the year 1917—what might at least have postponed their misfortunes for a while and then perhaps have won back power for them from outside by a war—they may well feel that it was a Mirabeau. Kerensky was lacking in almost all the attributes required for the playing of this great *rôle* of a political reformer. 'War against the privileged!' Mirabeau wrote at that time to a friend.

There you have my solution. . . . Moreover, I am a Monarchist in a high degree. . . . It would be a barbarous thing for our generation to have recourse to force. Thanks to the art of printing education should suffice to carry through all the revolutions which mankind owes to itself; only by this method of proceeding will the people lose nothing of what they have won for themselves. [And he proceeds :] You know that the time is past when the favour of a King was sufficient to make the fame of a minister. . . . In future only the nation will be decisive regarding success in politics.

When later the Revolution came into being with the storming of the Bastille, Mirabeau would perhaps have been the saviour of his order, only that he lacked, as he said himself, a virtuous youth and a spotless name. He held aloof from that decisive sitting at which, three weeks later, the Feudalists gave up their rights and he had the good fortune to die soon afterwards. Otherwise he would certainly have been beheaded instead of being the first Frenchman to lie in the Panthéon.

After his death the Revolution became more extreme. During the year 1789, at the first sitting of the Estates of the Realm, which one might almost compare with the first Duma, the representatives of the Third Estate still entered by a side door, ill-clothed, wearing shabby hats, while the clericals and nobles strutted about brilliantly attired; a year later the power was in the hands of the masses under the leadership of four clubs. One more year and the King is in flight. Yet another year and the Tuileries Palace is stormed and the Republic constituted. Five months the King is led to execution. Another year and the Dantonists, accused of corruption, are executed by order of Robespierre. Then after four months comes the great turn in the wheel of fortune: Robespierre is executed and power falls into the hands of the men of the Thermidor—July 1794. It is at this date, five years after the beginning of the Revolution, that this retrograde movement starts. Then comes another period of five years, ending with Bonaparte's consulate, and five years later the Revolution becomes outwardly a paradox when Napoleon becomes emperor.

The so-called Reign of Terror under Danton and Robespierre had lasted scarcely two years. What they were concerned with was no longer the political, easily achieved equality, but economic equality: soldiers' councils for the administration of certain battalions, the socialistic State, the education of the children by the State, the dividing up of the land for cultivation among the peasants, the levelling of private incomes, the prohibition of all luxury, the annihilation of the individual's interests in favour of the interests of the community. 'Il ne faut ni riches ni pauvres' —there must be neither rich nor poor. In all these features the

French programme was very similar to the Russian. The principal means for establishing all this was also a kind of Tcheka: revolutionary court consisting of twelve jurors and five judges, with powers *de facto* to imprison or execute everybody and availing themselves of this power in thousands of cases. Just as in France the power passed from the Girondists to the more radical Jacobins, and then again from Danton to the more radical Robespierre, so we find it passing in Russia from the cadet Kerensky by way of the Mensheviks and social revolutionaries to the Bolsheviks, but all this happened, not in the course of two years, but in the six months between March and October 1917.

The Communist-Soviet Power, moreover, like the Convention, had to contend with the intervention of foreign countries; Lenin and Trotsky fought against the armies of Koltchak, Denikin, Judenitsch and Wrangel, and they sent forth on their banners to the frontiers the call for a world revolution, even going so far as to employ the modern means of wireless in order to spread their doctrine in all countries. But Lenin showed proof of a statesmanlike mind in the middle of the sixth year of his government—in the year 1921—when he gave way to the force of famine and abandoned, or at least shelved, his own doctrinaire laws by introducing the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.). Whether it was the cleverness of this regulation, or whether it was due to the general situation in the world, certain it is that within a year from then, in the spring of 1922—that is, within five years—through the Treaty of Rapallo, he had secured the recognition and friendship of Germany, followed by at least the recognition of most of the other States of Europe. So also it had been in France. Just five years after the storming of the Bastille the country had attained to the point of consolidation under the outside influence of the public opinion of the world and of the forces of moderation at home.

Here, however, begins the outstanding difference between the two movements. For a while in Paris in the sixth year of the Revolution things began to settle down again so steadily that in the twelfth year the First Consul was able to write: 'The Revolution is going back to the beginning. It is come to an end.' We are now witnessing a new intensification of the Russian Revolution in the corresponding twelfth year of the Soviet Government. Its causes are partly of a personal and partly of a material nature: partly they are a mere matter of atmosphere.

The first thing was to get rid of Trotsky, the last of the great protagonists, the creator of the Red Army, to whom his antagonists, owing to his great popularity, imputed dictatorial intentions, assuredly without grounds. Sunk in general esteem,

he remains in Russia writing and speaking against Stalin and his disciples as men of the Thermidor, who were yielding up the things that had been won by the Revolution.

The land had to be industrialised, the great farms had to be entirely done away with, private ownership had to be completely uprooted, in order to counteract the instincts of capitalism which were coming up again. Stalin had to silence such utterances, hearkened to as they were by all those who were discontented, and he did so by means of a dangerous *coup* by handing over his enemy to capitalistic Europe instead of killing him. At once, however, there remained nothing else for him to do than to adopt extremism himself, for he lacked the authority of Lenin, who alone was in a position to change round.

In addition, when Stalin the year before took over the policy of Trotsky in regard to the peasants, there was a general feeling that a ring was being formed in the world. Every step taken by the Western States was viewed distrustfully, Germany's natural wish to come to an understanding with France was suspected, and it was decided to make Russia absolutely independent, feeding herself, clothing herself and arming herself. So as not to have to buy the machines from abroad which she needed, Russia had to pursue agriculture at a fantastically high pressure in order to be able to export; grain exports, which before the war had averaged 11,000,000 tons, were now increased from zero to 3,000,000 tons, and the harvest was so small that 250,000 tons had to be imported. During the last years the exports had increased; a certain advance had been made again in the matter of these exports, but admittedly at the price of the peasants' food supply. Moreover, the effort to constitute great State properties and collective peasants' farms had this political basis—that it was feared that Stalin did not venture to follow undoubtedly better methods (those of developing individual farms and lessening the taxes upon the bigger enterprises) from fear of opposition from the Left.

The second recent mark of the intensification is the advance of atheism; but here also a comparison with that of France can scarcely be instituted, for the atheistic movement in France was fiercer. It is true that the old calendar was abolished then in France as now in Russia, and that already in 1792 it was decided, as to-day in Russia, to make every fifth day a day of rest, whereby every month was divided up into ten-day periods. Instead of naming the days after the old saints, they were named after animals and plants: wine, chestnut, horse, potato, ox, goose, honey. This was followed by the most violent attacks in the Convention on God and on the priest, religious vestments were worn in comic procession through the street, the royal tombs in

the Church of St. Denis violated, the words 'To Reason' were written upon the doors of the churches, and the beautiful Mme. Momoros displayed her charms as the Goddess of Reason in Notre Dame. Six months later Robespierre had begun to champion the existence of a Higher Being, and while still attacking the priests declaimed no longer against God. It was now he formulated the half-comic, half-pathetic decision which ran :

1. The French people acknowledges the existence of a Highest Being and the immortality of the soul.

2. The most fitting worship of the Highest Being lies in the assertion of the Rights of Man.

Now, instead of the beautiful lady, it was the less beautiful Robespierre who at a great festival figured as a high priest in a blue gown with a tricolour girdle and plume, carrying a sheaf of corn in one hand and a bouquet of flowers in the other. Above the church doors the words 'To the Highest Being' were inscribed now. Seven years later Napoleon concluded his *Concordat* with the Catholic Church ; a year later Easter was once again celebrated for the first time as a thanksgiving feast.

The development in Russia ran on other lines. Only the Communist Party, to which only about 1,000,000 souls belong out of a population of 100,000,000, professes atheism, everyone who allows his child to be baptised being excluded from it ; all the others possess freedom of belief and were free for a decade to visit the churches ; only they did not often do so—at least, in 1924, when I was visiting in different parts of Russia and tried to investigate the matter. In Russia the churches had admittedly sunk to be a mere tool of the tsardom, the priest stood morally and intellectually far below the level of those of the Roman Church, and in literature the drinking and begging 'Pope' cut always a comic figure. The Russian peasant, as those who knew him best before the war used to declare, was superstitious rather than religious, and he was swiftly torn away from his mysticism and fears when the heavens failed to send down thunder and lightning on the agitators despite their Godless orations.

The old customs and habits of centuries which still survived have been more actively fought against during the last year ; Stalin and his men were forced into this by the party of the Left, who accused them of being too tolerant. When a worker secretary of a great factory stepped into the assembly and, in order to curry favour with the central authorities, proposed the turning of the local church into a club-house, who could then venture to object ? If the workers constituted the majority of the local *rayon*, the decision to close the church was ratified by the central body.

Occasionally things went otherwise. In one case in a village to the east of Moscow last autumn, when the officials from the neighbouring big town arrived to carry off the bells of the village church in conformity with the decree, the inhabitants rioted and killed the agents. In the trial which ensued the witnesses were skilfully manipulated so as to make it appear that the revolt was kindled by a few peasant proprietors, together with the Pope, and these were condemned and shot. There would seem to be dangerous political elements in such proceedings, and it was only the members of the orthodox religion who were apt to be prosecuted, not evangelical ministers, and rabbis. As for the few priests of the Church of Rome who fell victims, they would seem to have been agents of Poland, or to have been represented as such.

But since March last a new movement in the backward direction has been taken on this as in other important questions. The leaders of the party disassociated themselves from such Hotspurs, and Stalin, who had been obliged to allow the dissatisfaction to rise to a certain level, now feels strong enough to call back his agents. For six months past, from last autumn down to this spring, he was obliged to tolerate the persecution of the priests, the closing of the churches, the behaviour of the tax-collectors, because he had no accommodation for any more prisons. The younger generation, brought up on Communistic principles, presses forward, and the man at the head must now endeavour to go more slowly without possessing Lenin's authority.

The older men amongst the peasants cross themselves once more and say : 'Little Father Stalin is a wise man after all : he has given orders that we are to have our cow back and that we may go into the church once more.' For on March 15 the new proclamation appeared to the astonishment of all ; the closing of a church is only to be permitted in accordance with the unanimous decision to this effect, and since the Madonna was spat upon in a procession last winter everyone is punished who mocks at religion. In this change of attitude, however, it would seem that we are confronted only with a tactical manœuvre, and, if I am not mistaken, the situation in Moscow is still far removed from the so-called Thermidor. Stalin is not Robespierre and Trotsky is not Danton. The breaking up of religion is not peculiar to Russia, for in other parts of Europe tens of thousands are yearly abandoning the church ; the reasons for this are manifold, but I cannot deal with them here. Neither the Russian nor the French Revolution had religious causes or aims ; one cannot even say that God, who in the seventh year of the French Revolution was once again acknowledged, has yet come back to Moscow in the thirteenth year of the Russian Revolution, for he was never

driven out by State decree. Neither Reason nor the Highest Being were inscribed on the church doors, nor was it ever ordained that the churches were to be closed and the priests to be expelled. Their influence was not enough for it to be necessary to uproot them. Moreover, the social problems, with which the Bolsheviks are above all confronted, are too serious and too simple for them to be burdened with religious problems.

The only religion known to new Russia is the religion of Work. In this passion for work the Russian Revolution differs fundamentally from the French; in France it was necessary for the dictator to call back all the citizens to their activities. In Moscow, ever since October 1917, people have worked feverishly, and this is all the more astonishing as the Russian in his disinclination for action is the very opposite of the Frenchman. Whether the work makes him happy is a great question, but that it is necessary nobody doubts. If the Bolsheviks had brought their people nothing else than the habit of work for all, they have achieved more than Europe had allowed itself to imagine.

EMIL LUDWIG.

A POLICY FOR CENTRAL EUROPE

The land tenure reform legislation in the countries of Central Europe broke up the estates of about 35,000 large landowners and reduced them to the position of small owners or bought them out altogether. In short, the large landowner has disappeared from the life of the eastern half of Central Europe altogether, except in Hungary, where he still dominates social and political life, and to some extent in Poland. The aristocracy thus displaced was an aristocracy in the narrow sense, a separate caste surviving from feudal times, with only formal alterations in spirit and structure. It refused to adapt itself to modern conditions, assimilating neither new elements nor new ideas, standing out consistently against the extension of political rights and liberties. The principle of its existence, racial and social oppression, was responsible for the permanent crisis and inevitable collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The economic policy of this aristocracy was naturally dictated by the fact that its powers rested on the possession of the land; it consisted simply in protecting its own interests against other classes of producers by protective tariffs. It took practically no part in the development of industry and commerce. Not being directly concerned in the cultivation of the soil, as a rule it did not even take the initiative in introducing new technical methods in agriculture. Thus the new States lost at the same time a repressive controlling force in political life and a directing force in agrarian policy. After the war there seemed no likelihood that hundreds of thousands of small-owner cultivators, spread over thousands of square miles, working under conditions as different, for instance, as the sugar beet cultivator of Bohemia and the Rumanian wheat producer, with no common interest but the bare fact of landownership, should contribute much to the settlement of post-war Europe. But that single dominant factor has formed in each of the countries concerned a strong agrarian party which has proved itself stronger in the long run than any other concentration of interests.

It is necessary, of course, to distinguish between the movement in the Balkans and the movement in Central Europe. The

eaders of the Serbian and Bulgarian parties were inspired by adical ideals. The policy of Raditch, for instance, argued that, ince in an agrarian State the peasantry is the only productive lass, the State must be built up from below on the basis of the easantry, the village community formed from the peasant families, he political district from the village communities, and from the olitical districts the State—that is, a State organised in the iterests of producers, the Soviet system without the Marxian ogma. The party's policy naturally degenerated into exclusive grarianism. In Czechoslovakia and Poland, on the other hand, he agrarian parties have never taken an extreme line, since they vork under entirely different conditions. Agriculturists in these ountries—particularly in Bohemia—are obliged to recognise he interests of the consumer of agricultural products, since griculture itself is highly industrialised. There is, therefore, o trace of the anti-industrialist and anti-capitalist tendency f the movement in the Balkans. Here the principles of the grarian parties have no reasoned political theory behind them; hey consist simply in the claim for democratisation, not destruction of capital, for equal treatment in taxation and tariff policy, nd, most important, in social policy. In Central Europe there s not the same astonishing contrast between town and village life n the matter of public health, educational and social institutions s American sociologists observed in the United States before he war; but the improvement of conditions of rural civilisation s a more imperative task, since communications are less highly eveloped and there is less migration to the towns.

Among the leaders of the agrarian parties in Europe are to e found the chief movers in constructive political achievement n these countries. Stambolijski, the late Bulgarian leader, a ypical representative of the hard primitive methods of the lass struggle, was, nevertheless, the first strong statesman to armonise the interests of his country with those of his neighbours nd with the whole international situation, and the first to bridge he gulf between former enemies—and between enemies whose atred was so deeply rooted and intimate as that of the Serbs nd Bulgars. It was Witos, who for long years had led the onservative Peasant Party in Poland, who did more than any nan to make Poland politically and morally capable of resisting he Russian attack, inspiring his people with the strength of the easant—conservative, enduring, attached to the soil—with the nystic devotion of the Slav. It was Rataj, his faithful supporter, who maintained the dignity of parliamentary institutions in the onflict with Marshal Pilsudski in 1926. His colleague, Jan Dabski, will play an important part in the work of genuine lemocratisation in Poland and the strengthening of the peasant

democracy against Bolshevist influences. In Rumania the government of Maniu has succeeded in establishing a very solid conservative democracy, with guarantees of political liberties and of adequate treatment of ethnic minorities. In the struggle with the old *régime* Maniu amalgamated his party with the Rumanian Tsaranists, led by Madgearu, Mihalache, and Raducany: this unified peasant party has become, and seems likely to remain, the very centre of Rumanian State policy, a powerful force in the political life of the Balkans. In Jugoslavia the attempts of Jovanovitch and other prominent politicians to organise a strong agrarian parliamentary party did not lack response in the Serbian peasant masses, and there is no doubt that united agrarian democratic movements of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes would have been able to give Jugoslavia a strong political axis, if it could have mastered regional rivalries, as it actually did in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Poland.

The strength of the agrarian parties lies, first, in the fact that agriculture represents the social and also the economic centre of gravity in these countries. Agricultural development is less dependent on national financial power than industry and commerce. Small units of production remain the most efficient from the standpoint of intensive cultivation, if they are united in co-operative marketing and credit associations.

Secondly, their strength lies in the steadying influence of the agricultural population in politics. After a war which changed the significance of so many ideas and upset so many old prejudices in Central Europe, it is to be expected that the whole series of social and political terms should lose their old meaning. We cannot speak of conservatism in the same sense as before the war; the state of affairs which we want to conserve to-day was formerly the ideal of extreme radicalism. Conservative policy at the present time means maintenance of the republic, and in this sense the peasant farmer is conservative. But he is not reactionary—he consolidates, concentrates; his steadying influence is an effort, not a dead weight, in political life. Radicalism, for the Slavs, is not a progressive policy; it is a negative attitude to the State, the habit of irresponsible criticism, driven still deeper into Slav mentality by the unhealthy political situation in the old monarchy, which merges easily into anarchism. Švehla has said, 'Anyone can say "No, I won't"; but to say "Yes" and bargain is the work of a statesman.' The peasant in the new social order cannot be indifferent to the wider interests of the State.

Equally salutary in the new States, where the anti-clerical and anti-religious agitation of the Liberal and Socialist Parties has simply driven the believing masses into the arms of the Clerical

Party, is his attitude to religion and morals. The Liberal Parties soon recognised the effect of their policy and substituted for it indifference in religious questions; the Social Democratic Parties have also recognised that they were working on wrong lines. The value of the peasant's attitude consists in his refusal to let anyone make political capital out of his faith or moral or religious ideals. Clericalism is not to be fought by the methods of the so-called 'progressive' parties. In this struggle the Czecho-slovak Agrarian Party has never participated. The wisdom of this refusal to interfere with deeper religious questions has been proved by the results of the last two elections: the figures show that it has won relatively more votes from the Clerical Party than definitively the anti-Church and anti-religion parties.

The emergence of these firmly rooted organisations signifies a forward direction in the intricacies of Central European politics. The greatest achievement of the party in Czechoslovakia has been its success in uniting the different nationalities of the republic—an achievement of the impossible, it might have seemed to the foreign observer ten years ago. The old monarchy and the old social order were incapable of promoting better understanding between Czechs and the German Bohemians; they could do nothing but observe the intensification of racial friction. One has to recall the many attempts at conciliation, and the many falls of Ministries which they entrained, to realise the apparent hopelessness of this task. True, it is too soon to speak of a solution of the minority problem, but the party is feeling its way towards a solution on the only possible lines.

Further, agrarian democracy provides the only foundation for a foreign policy for the new States, based, not on casual alliances, but on recognition of common interests and co-operation of neighbours. To bridge the gulf between pre-war nationalism, which appealed to a low class of instincts and emotions, and post-war internationalism, which makes the highest moral and intellectual claims, is an impossibility. But for creative nationalism—as contrasted with pre-war disruptive nationalism, which is based, not merely on recognition of differences of language and customs, but on the recognition of the nation's contribution to human culture—there is a natural approach to international co-operation through a half-way house: recognition of the common culture of the Slav races. It is not the sentimental, intellectualist pan-Slavism of the pre-war period, founded on the belief that blood is thicker than water; that belief finds no purchasers on the modern political stock exchange. But our cultures originate from the same source, they are closely inter-related; we have the same, or similar, conditions for the creation of our contribution to the international forum. Only the

centuries divide us. *If we ask what class of the nation it is which has kept its characteristic traits most unsullied by the touches of* ·oreign *civilisation,* we find that *it is not the professional or* .ntellectual or the capitalist or the proletariat class, but the :ountry people. Scientific students, such as la Fontaine, Muret ınd others, have established the fact that the majority of moral .nd intellectual, and, above all, artistic, elements in Czech and Slovak culture correspond exactly to the same elements in the Poles and the South Slav cultures. In the Czech and Slovak ·easants' cottages old artistic themes, old customs, old philosophy, ıld traditional wisdom, and the old costumes have maintained hemselves, which on closer examination would reveal their esemblance to the Polish. The fundamental similarities are reater than the superficial differences; this, as Múret asserted n a review of Reymont's *Chlopi*, is also true of the Russians and Poles. It is, of course, a community of cultures on a primitive evel, but all the more deeply rooted. The peasant is not only he upholder of the national culture of the people or race, but at he same time, since he emerges from the mutually related masses, he representative of the old Slav spiritual values, that which is ommon to all the Slav peoples. Our political co-operation is a ociological necessity, resting on bases of science and sentiment.

Under present conditions of social differentiation, social *approchement* means *rapprochement* of peoples in their social roups and classes. In an attempt to give a democratic content o official political co-operation which represents only the form, o-operation of the Slav races would naturally begin with the ırmer. It should extend itself to the industrial working class, o the industrialist and intellectual, to bring about a fusion of all lasses in the co-operation of these nations, which would carry ith it the necessity of bringing our legislation into line with that f the other nations.

To the argument for closer co-operation in matters of legisıtion with the other Slav races our opponents commonly raise .ie objection that it is impossible, since there are great differences ı the degree of progress attained. Progress among the Slav ıces has a sinking curve from west to east, but a straight line om north to south, simply because the Czechs were engaged for enturies in a struggle with the progressive and cultivated ermans; they became habituated to the cultural methods of e struggle and of international competition. The Slovaks ıme into conflict with the Magyars, the Magyar nobility and udalism. Their opponent was less civilised, and therefore their eople could not reach maturity like the Czech people, which .d a highly civilised opponent. In the same way the Poles in 1 Russia had a less advanced opponent, and they could therefore

appropriate modern methods from no one, in contrast with the vestern Poles in Poznań in their struggles with the Germans. Similarly with the Slovenes and Croats in Jugoslavia. The lovenes in Western Jugoslavia were opposed to the cultivated ermans, and so their methods were more highly developed than ose of their neighbours, the Croats.

We are, therefore, not so widely separated from the South lavs and the Poles as at first sight appears. It is possible that e Pole from Poznań does not stand so near to the Pole from ast Poland so closely culturally and psychologically as he does the Czech, who has learnt his methods in the same way in the eat struggle with the Germans. The same holds true of the echs and the Slovenes, and of the Slovaks and the Croats, who semble each other because they had the same opponent for o years and have become habituated to the same kind of fluences.

This conception of the sociological content of political co-eration is, of course, nothing new. Germany and Austria are ing the same thing, mutually adapting the legal principles of eir civil and criminal law, their traffic rules, and the basis of eir cultural policy. Formally the Anschluss does not exist, ut *de facto* it is prepared for, not by official policy, but by the ct that the whole social structures in Germany and Austria are ginning to resemble each other, a process which will continue ntil their inner structure is absolutely identical. If the Germans, *á facti*, can bring about this sort of *rapprochement* there is no ostacle to our doing the same. If we are startled by this actual hievement of the Anschluss, it would mean that we and the oles and the remaining Slavs had frittered away the first twelve ears after the war without creating the easily attainable onditions for co-operation, *rapprochement* and consolidation of r national strength.

Only by this consolidation can the Slav races adjust their lationship to Germany satisfactorily. I am not referring here the possibility of armed conflict, but to general questions of ternational relations, economic and cultural co-operation, and mpetition. It is a situation which must be treated with mplete candour. The German question for the Czechoslovak ate is not only the question of the 3,000,000 Germans within r frontiers, but of the 60,000,000 on the other side of the ontier. The Czechoslovak State will continue in any circum-ance to apply its minority policy consistently. But, so long as e are only 10,000,000 Czechs and Slovaks, the feeling of security will always be present, because for us alone an alliance ith Germany is a *leonina societas*. If we are conscious that we, hen united with the Poles and Jugoslavia, are not 10,000,000,

but six times as many, this disturbing feeling of insecurity will evaporate. Not only we, but also the Poles, could then conduct a sound minority policy and come to a genuine understanding with the whole great German people. It is this psychological factor which is vital to an honest peace policy.

Co-operation of the Slav races is the essential preliminary to closer union among the countries of Europe; it is, of course, an aspect of the same principle, closer international relations, which inspires all contemporary international politics. But the emergence of the agrarian parties not only supplies the basis of closer political contacts; it represents a fundamental step forward in economic welfare. Co-operation of the agrarian States is an essential preliminary to any project for European tariff union. Against the principle of the Pan-Europe movement no objection can be raised; the question is not, Do we or do we not want a Pan-European movement? but, Is Pan-Europe possible? Is it capable of benefiting anyone or not?

If we imagine Pan-Europe as a confederation with the tariff barriers raised, as a unitary customs area, then it is clear that Pan-Europe is not possible, and, even if it were possible, that it could not be advantageous and therefore not permanent. Europe is not an economic unity. West-Europe, predominantly industrial, has other economic interests than the agrarian States of Central Europe. West-Europe has a surplus output of industrial products, we have a surplus output of agricultural products, and therefore we must make a distinction between what would benefit the international capital invested in West-European industry and what the farmer in Central Europe urgently needs—the farmer, who, it must be remembered, represents 70 per cent. of the whole Central European population.

If Pan-Europe were to arise suddenly, sweeping away all the tariff barriers, including the agricultural, we should be overwhelmed by the economic and financial power of West-European industry. We should have all the disadvantages of a great customs area dominated by industry, and we should have neither the strength to resist nor the guarantee of an economic safeguard for agriculture. That would mean the pauperisation of the agrarian States of Central Europe and the pauperisation of agrarian democracy itself. If the farmers of these States cannot safeguard their products, and the State cannot safeguard its small peasant landholders, that would mean that agrarian democracy would be shaken to its foundations in Central Europe, since the agrarian represents the only stable element; it would mean that the ground was cut away from under the feet of cultural development in Central Europe. We should be

threatened by the danger of a chaos, which is to-day, in the neighbourhood of Soviet Russia, altogether unthinkable.

That would be the effect of Pan-Europe as it is at present conceived, organised from the standpoint of West-European capitalism and industrialism. It is for this reason that we must approach the question of international *rapprochement* by progressing from the smaller problems to the greater, and not *vice versâ*. Only in this way can Pan-Europe be made a reality, resting, not on public manifestations of international enthusiasm, but on a real abolition of the economic friction between the different States.

An economic union of the agrarian States is often rejected as downright impossible: their tariff and commercial policies are believed to open an unbridgeable abyss. To objections of this sort I always answer that it is undoubtedly true that the commercial policies of the agrarian States are mutually opposed, and that competition between them is bound to exist; but it is also true that competition exists between the German, Polish, and Czechoslovakian miner, and that, in spite of it, the Second International exists. Similarly there exists sharp competition between the French, German, and Czechoslovakian industrialists, and, in spite of it, they have their contracts and agreements. For the same reason an organisation must exist between us, in order to reduce the causes of conflicts to a minimum. The advantage of a general co-operation of the agrarian States would far outweigh the difficulties and possible disadvantages.

These advantages are the general agrarian and political internal conditions. We must not allow ourselves to be side-tracked by looking only at what the critics point out—that is, the difficulties and hindrances of commercial policy. We must realise that if agrarian democracy builds up an internal State policy for taxation, finance, transport, social legislation and tariffs, and if, as a result of solidarity, it arrives at a genuine agrarian policy, this internal policy, above all in the fiscal and economic sphere, will be able to do more than compensate the losses which agriculture suffers in the individual lands by making reciprocal concessions in their trade policies. Both the possibility and the necessity of our co-operation lie in the achievement of agrarian solidarity.

Anyone has the right to object that this is mere speculation. I, too, would regard it as speculation if I could not point to an incident which recently took place in Geneva. The discussion concerned the measurement of the tariff duties between European States, and during it the agrarian question suddenly crystallised. Without great preparations the representatives—not agrarians, but the official representatives of the agrarian States of Central

Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary)—sat down to the conference table, and were obliged to assert that it would be necessary to put up a united front of the agrarian or half-agrarian States of Central Europe against the demands of the predominantly industrial States.

What would a special regional understanding of the agrarian States in Central Europe imply? In practice it would mean at present Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Southern Slavs, Poland and her neighbours—that is, the Slav States with Rumania. That would be the core, representing a certain solution of the Slav question, since the Slav races would be more strongly represented than they would be in any other way, or ever have been in any of their international manifestations. But it would be represented in such a way as to offer a proof to the whole world that it is no question of an offensive community of the Slavs, because it would include beside us the Rumanians and later also the Hungarians, when they have created more favourable conditions for the growth of an agrarian democracy. But this agrees completely with certain results of international politics; the principle of regional agreements is already accepted and approved by the League of Nations.

The basis of international commercial relations is at present the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment. Now it is generally recognised in the League of Nations that this principle cannot be maintained, and that regional agreements must be reached whenever they are possible; that implies that when the regional agreement of our agrarian States comes about it must be organised on a basis of preference duties, and not of most-favoured-nation treatment. Once the validity of this principle is accepted in Central Europe, a new Central Europe would arise, brought together and supported by agrarian democracy. An international *bloc* will be able to regulate its relations to all the other States of Central Europe with the calm of security, and will represent the first and decisive stage of European *rapprochement*, which can only be firm and lasting if the difficulties, which at present could act like dynamite on the whole of Europe, could be settled in such a way that we could begin to build up the foundations of a United Europe where the obstacles are greatest. This procedure in international *rapprochement* is not the *a priori* West-European, which simply says: I want Pan-Europe; therefore let there be Pan-Europe. The ground must be prepared and the more important hindrances cleared out of the way. Not until the new Central Europe is united by its natural centre of gravity, agrarian democracy, will it be possible to speak of *rapprochement* between the European nations.

MILAN HODŽA.

A PLEA FOR THE PRIVATE MEMBER'S BILL

In this energetic age, when so many matters of public interest are continually occurring and being packed into our minds by the daily Press, it is impossible to remember everything. Even among those who follow fairly attentively the proceedings of Parliament, I doubt whether more than a very few have more than a very hazy recollection of a certain private member's measure which created some little stir when a few years ago its introduction in the House of Commons took place—it was known in its brief day as the Abatement of Noise Bill.

The Abatement of Noise Bill originated in the fertile brain of the late Mr. Newton Oman, a Birmingham hardware manufacturer, who had conceived what he supposed to be a simple and practicable means of damping down the excessive din which is so trying a feature of modern life, and possibly a factor seriously inimical to the health of the community.

For some time, beyond writing letters occasionally to the local journals and reading a paper before the Edgbaston Lyceum Club, Mr. Oman does not appear to have pushed his plan very hard. At length one of his communications to the Press attracted more attention than usual, the upshot being that an organisation was founded and endowed with a moderate sum of money—the League for the Discouragement of Unnecessary Noise, more popularly known as the 'Make Less Noise' movement.

The usual procedure of societies of this type was faithfully followed and with fair success—the circularising of people of importance and of members of Parliament, with a lavish distribution of leaflets and pamphlets to the general public, lectures by paid and voluntary speakers, and so on. At the end of two years the time seemed ripe for endeavouring to obtain that legislation without which Mr. Oman's plan could not be put into operation. A fairly prominent member of Parliament was induced to overcome his reluctance to occupy the time of the House, several other members engaged themselves to support him, and, one of the latter having recently had a lucky draw in the ballot for private members' measures, it was possible to introduce the Abatement of Noise Bill on the next available

Friday—that being the day, as everyone knows, on which private members are permitted to air their little Bills.

To Mr. Oman and to the considerable body of non-parliamentary supporters he had secured the prospects of successful achievement seemed rosy. A good deal of lobbying had been done, whilst voters in all parts of the country had been induced to write to their own members asking for a pledge of support, and this, though in some cases ambiguously worded, had been given by a considerable number—a majority of the House, in fact.

First place in the ballot for this particular Friday had been obtained for a legislative effort, the pressing importance of which was not widely perceived—the Preservation of Crayfish (Pollution of Streams) Bill. Mr. Oman and some of his friends who had come early to listen to the proceedings of the House on this fateful day were astonished to hear it debated at interminable length. A member representing a home counties division—neither he nor it need be named—particularly distinguished himself for the length, if not the depth, of his speech: he revealed no really profound knowledge of the habits and biological needs of crayfish, but it was afterwards pointed out, as at least a curious coincidence, that in the constituency represented by this member was a factory employing hundreds of hands and engaged in the production of wireless sets—including loud speakers.

The Abatement of Noise Bill came up for hearing at twenty minutes to four, and at three minutes past four Mr. Speaker adjourned the House without question put.

The promoters tried again a few months later, and the Bill was so far even more fortunate than before in securing this time first place on the Orders of the Day. A very promising debate ensued. The opposition to the Bill was small and the adverse criticism was considered to be of a somewhat puerile and cheaply facetious character. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department intervened to congratulate the promoters of the Bill on their success in getting it discussed. He had felt, in listening to those who had opposed it, that there was no real volume of opinion against the fundamental principles embodied in this measure. Any matter of detail that required to be adjusted could easily be dealt with at the Committee stage. In short, the Under-Secretary took nearly half an hour to tell the intently listening House what a really splendid Bill this was. He took nearly two minutes to add that, in view of the congested state of business, he could hold out no hope whatever of the Government's giving it further facilities.

The Government never did. Most of the advocates of the 'Make Less Noise' movement began to lose heart. Mr. N. Oman is believed to have died of a broken one. And the Abatement of

Noise Bill, which nobody any longer loved, was quietly filed away in the archives of Parliament under its appropriate heading of 'Bills that Never had an Earthly Chance.'

As the reader has of course perceived, I have been speaking in parable—endeavouring to make one fiction serve as a composite picture of a number of fairly similar facts. Have I more than faintly caricatured the truth ? I venture to suppose that no one who knows what takes place on those Fridays of each session when private members are permitted to try their hands at fabricating legislation will charge me with very much exaggeration.

Let us consider whether there is not a case for improvement in this matter. From time to time subjects arise suitable for legislation, but having the speciality that they do not naturally attach themselves to the peculiar theory and practice of any of the parties, or are more or less equally acceptable to all. The very fact that they have this non-party character may ensure for them wide support in the country and in Parliament. And yet a member of the House of Commons, speaking not so many months ago, could say all too truthfully of a measure of this type : 'Hon. members on both sides of the House have stated that they are in agreement with the principle of the Bill. That is about the worst thing that can befall any measure in this House. It invariably foreshadows its defeat.'

One reason why these private members' Bills have almost invariably no chance of getting beyond their early stages is that Governments seldom like them and that the Government in fairly recent years has had the power not only of initiating most of the legislation—which, so long as our party system exists, is a proper and inevitable state of affairs—but the power also of giving a most effective quietus to any legislation it has not initiated, by simply declaring it will not allow time for it to get passed.

The reasons why the Government generally does give that quietus are fairly obvious, though not necessarily defensible. The Government—which under our system means the Cabinet—is a body of exceedingly busy and harassed people who know that, try they never so hard, they will fail during their term of office to find time for all the party legislation their party expects. Are they, then, to provide time for measures their party does not expect ? The decision, of course, is generally in the negative.

One does not want to be too cynical, but it is perhaps not unfair to suppose that the average Government is not desperately anxious to attach to the record of its career any legislation for which there is a large opposition vote, and for which, accordingly, the Opposition will be entitled to a large amount of the credit.

And then a Bill which is favoured by a considerable body of the Opposition may not find favour in the eyes of important members of the Government's own party. Serious unpleasantness may threaten, for the objectors know the Government can slay if it wants to. The temptation to slay is great, especially as it can usually be done in quite a kind and inoffensive way by a polite Secretary. 'The heavy programme of the Government'; the statement that the Department concerned finds the Bill to be unworkable; the vague offer of some form of inquiry, these seem to be the favourite methods.

It may be said that if there exist these non-party proposals for legislation commanding a considerable amount of support throughout the country, then surely one or another of the parties would find its account in adopting some of them as items in its programme. No doubt this happens from time to time. It rarely happens as regards the sort of subjects commonly embodied in private members' Bills. To understand why that is so demands a little knowledge of political psychology.

It must be remembered that the type of law-making the private member usually attempts is, so to speak, the gleanings of the field of possible legislation. Where there is a big and glaring abuse or some widely desired amelioration such as Parliament is competent to deal with, one or other of the parties is pretty sure to be willing to take the question up. The small abuse or injustice, the minor amelioration, create less appeal at headquarters and places where they draw up party programmes. Such matters make a poor show in the melodramatic General Election battle; they do not rouse passion—especially party passion—and therefore do not promise much in the way of vote-catching. Again, agitations for the remedying of small grievances and the production of small goods have about them a faint element of the ridiculous and the cranky; they may not get far in Parliament, but they are exceedingly likely to get into the comic papers. And British political parties regard as a useful asset a reputation for sobriety and seriousness, and they do not care to be associated with cranks.

But this is where the private member gets his opportunity, if he only could and would use it. For the fact is that many of these comparatively unimportant matters that are within his province are really more important than at first sight they seem. Even a trifling abuse is worth the labour of abolishing if it is widely felt. A small betterment cannot be said to be very small if you take account of all the good it is going to do over a considerable period. After all, in the lives of most of us it is the little things that count. Mr. Willett's idea was a comparatively little thing. Yet at the moment I cannot recall any other single Act of Parliament

of the last fifteen years that has advantaged the community to the same extent as has the Summer Time Act. It is very much to the point to cite it here, for although we got it by accident, as a war measure, it is precisely the sort of thing a group of private members would be likely to take up; and had it actually been left to them and the party rule that renders their labour impotent, we should doubtless have been wanting its benefits to this hour.

Perhaps almost everyone except a few professional politicians will agree with my contentions so far. It may be urged, however, that to suggest how the private member's Bill can be made an effective instrument of legislation is not easy. I have no doubt the difficulties are not insuperable—where there's a will there's a way. It is obviously a problem for Parliament itself and for experts. In the middle of writing this article I have read a recently published book by Mr. Ramsay Muir, *How Britain is Governed*,[1] and it was most interesting to arrive at the pages in which this extremely able student of politics deals with my present theme. Part of what he says is as follows (p. 205):

> It may be suggested, therefore, that the procedure on private members Bills should be amended, and turned into a really useful element, in the work of the House, by some such provision as the following. At the beginning of each session a committee representing all parties in the House should be set up—possibly the Committee of Selection, which now chooses the members of other Committees, would serve the purpose. To it any member, or any group of members (this would include the leaders of a non-Government party), should be entitled to send, not merely the title, but a *précis* of the heads of a Bill which he or they wished to introduce. The Committee should choose the Bills which were in its opinion most deserving of discussion. Successive Fridays should be devoted to debates on the Second Readings of these Bills. Those which were carried by a sufficient majority—say two-thirds of those present—should then stand referred to one of the Standing Committees of the House for detailed consideration, and in due course should come before the whole House—not necessarily on a Friday—for the Report Stage and a Third Reading. Not many Bills would stand this ordeal. But the possibility would be there, and it would not depend wholly upon the will of the Government. Some element of the independent initiative of the House of Commons in legislation would be restored without invading the primary responsibility of the Government for all the main legislative work of the Session.

One difficulty Mr. Muir does not deal with here. A law is not —at least, it should not be—merely the expression of an abstract principle. It has to be administered. Its administration more or less involves one or more of the Government departments—for the provision of inspectors, say, or whatever it may be. Now the permanent officials of any department concerned may deal a

[1] Constable & Co. (1930).

deadly blow to a Bill—whether a Government one or not—by convincing the Minister of that department that it is unworkable. As a rule, no doubt, these experts are pretty sound judges in such a matter, but they are not infallible, and it may be that occasionally their good-will is wanting. What looked like a clear case of the lack of good-will was revealed and severely commented upon less than two years ago. Lord Banbury and others introduced in the House of Lords a Bill designed to prevent, if the magistrates thought fit, a person who had been convicted of cruelty to a dog from holding a licence to keep a dog for a specific period. There can hardly be a single normal person in the country who will object to what was aimed at. The House was astonished to learn from the Government representative that the Home Office regarded the Bill as unworkable. He did not condescend to explain why. No wonder one of the noble Lords present, Lord Buckmaster, remarked: 'I object strongly that a Bill here should have its opposition entirely engineered not by the considered opinion of the Government but by some department which regards its interests as affected by the Bill or which, it may be, is sorry that it has not introduced the Bill itself.' [2]

What seems to be required, when Government officials decide that a private member's Bill is impracticable, is that the parliamentary representative of the department concerned should explain what the difficulties are and submit to the criticism of the House. If the House decides that the objections are frivolous or can be overcome, then it should be the duty of the Minister to see that his 'bureaucrats' loyally carry out the wishes of Parliament.[3]

There remains the important point of ensuring that private members' Bills really have a majority of support in the country. The alleged lack of this is often the excuse made for refusing them facilities—a very proper attitude in a democratic country—though Governments frequently fail to adopt it as regards their own measures. Governments, however, have as a rule plenty of opportunities for gathering what the electorate thinks about their own major measures. These have been canvassed in the Press and on platforms, and perhaps voted on at the last General Election. The private member's Bill in the nature of things can have no such opportunities for coming into the limelight and standing the fire of criticism. On the other hand, the very fact that such a Bill is a single and often a quite simple measure makes it much easier to discover how the country feels about it than in

[2] Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Tuesday, January 29, 1929.

[3] Probably if private members knew their Bills had a reasonable chance of passing they would take steps to have them more carefully drafted, and also take accurate soundings as to possible opposition.

the case of the large and complex programme of a party. imagine that if and when my Abatement of Noise Bill becomes practical politics the majority of M.P.'s will have no difficulty in sensing what the majority of their constituents think of it. A further safeguard of public opinion would be feasible with some of these private members' Bills—that of giving them a trial run, with the alternatives of renewal or withdrawal at the end of a year or some other specified period.

Summarising what I have said, then, I suggest that there is nothing improbable in the notion of a private member bringing forward a non-party measure which is worthy of being passed and which the electorate would be willing to have passed. I suggest that a somewhat Gilbertian situation arises when, as may often be, the very fact that a measure is widely and largely supported renders its chance of passing not greater, but less—because, for the reasons I have explained, the Government does not like it and has an almost absolute power of stopping progress. I suggest that the private members, some of whom honestly believe in their Bills, should think on these matters. And, as a final and additional suggestion, to those numerous 'societies' and 'leagues' which induce voters to badger their members into promising support for some particular proposed bit of legislation I suggest that it would be a good plan to leave such tactics alone for the present and to unite in securing a demand that the private members should get together and bring in a Bill making it possible to pass a reasonable proportion of private members' Bills.

G. H. Bowker.

Note.—On the recommendation of a recent Select Committee there has been an alteration of Standing Orders which may brighten the prospects of private members' Bills a little. The effect seems to be that, consequent upon the beginning of a new session of Parliament in October, second readings are now spaced between October and December and January and March, thus leaving the Government the time they most want in April for financial business, and then four Fridays in May are set aside for the concluding stages of those private members' Bills which have made most progress. This should give a little more time, but does nothing to overcome the other handicaps to such Bills which I have specified.

THE RENASCENCE OF PERSIA

THE last decade has been a momentous period in the history of Persia. The ancient kingdom is witnessing a remarkable revival of the spirit of nationality under Shah Riza, who, rising from obscurity, has founded the Pahlavi dynasty. In this article I propose to outline the salient features of this veritable renascence.

When I first travelled in Persia some forty years ago, I gradually realised that I was back in the Middle Ages. Communications had not improved since the days of Cyrus, who founded the Persian Empire in B.C. 550, and there was little contact with Europe. Nasir-u-Din, who was the reigning Shah, was a capable ruler according to Persian ideas, but, like Solomon in his old age, he devoted himself to the pleasures of the harem, which, incidentally, absorbed a large proportion of the revenue. Actually the Shah disliked educated Ministers, and frankly admitted that he preferred to be served by men who did not know whether Brussels was the name of a city or of a cabbage! Holding these views, he refused permission to travel in Europe, more especially for the purpose of education. The army, corruptly administered and led by officers entirely lacking in martial instincts, was practically useless as a fighting force, and the men eked out their lean years of service by working as porters. So far as I could gather, there was no particular discontent in the country, conditions being similar to those that had prevailed for centuries past. The very few Persians who had been educated abroad were disliked by their fellow-countrymen, and their influence was negligible. Indeed, it was difficult for such men, unless they had studied medicine, to find remunerative employment in their native land. At this period European civilisation was chiefly represented outside the capital by consular officers, by British and American missionaries, and by British bank and telegraph officials, whose influence was a great power for good. Europeans who knew the language and sympathised with the people were considered to be trustworthy friends, and constituted the only connexion of Persians with the civilisation of the West.

Sometimes it is difficult to give a date or name an event that stirred a people towards a movement, but such an event

was the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. It was designed to end the unhappy rivalry that existed between Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and in this it was successful, but, so far as Persia was concerned, the result was calamitous. By the terms of the Agreement the two Powers divided Persia into zones of commercial influence without consulting that Power, which, as was inevitable, bitterly resented the slight. Moreover, the Russian officials acted as if their zone, which included two-thirds of Persia, was to be annexed, and but for the Great War such undoubtedly would have been its fate. At the time of the Agreement the influence and popularity of Great Britain were at their zenith, owing to her deep sympathy with Persian aspirations for better government, which Mohamed Ali Shah was attempting to crush, not without the support of Russian officials. Persians have a proverb which runs: 'Enemies are of three kinds—to wit, enemies, enemies of friends and friends of enemies'; and when they realised the result of the Agreement they decided that Great Britain had ceased to be their friend.

During the Great War Persia was unable to maintain her neutrality effectively, with the result that British, Russian, and Turkish troops fought on her soil. To the patriotic Persian the position was deeply humiliating, and undoubtedly strengthened the rebirth of nationality. The Armistice found British troops and the South Persia Rifles, under British officers, maintaining order in the south; in the north-west British troops held lines of communication from the Irak frontier to the Caspian, and again we held lines of communication across Eastern Persia from British Baluchistan to Russian Turkestan. The British Government was extremely anxious as to the position in Persia. Her treasury was empty, there was no stable Government, and it was evident that there would be anarchy unless help were rendered. To add to the difficulties of the situation, the Bolshevist Government was hostile. In these circumstances Lord Curzon decided to negotiate an Agreement by the terms of which a Financial Adviser was to be supplied, together with administrative officers. It was also proposed to create a Persian army. The negotiations for this comprehensive scheme occupied nine months, but it was ready for ratification at the end of 1919. The Persian Prime Minister, however, realising the growing strength of the opposition to the Agreement, was unwilling to summon the *Majlis*, and as the months passed the national feeling against it increased in volume.

In April 1920 Denikin's fleet fled from Baku, which the Bolsheviks had seized. It sought refuge at Enzeli, where, by the advice of the British, it was disarmed and interned. As was bound to happen, the Bolsheviks followed up the fleet and

bombarded Enzeli. The British detachment was instructed not to fight the Bolsheviks and was withdrawn to Resht, and afterwards to Kazvin. This retreat in the face of the Bolsheviks constituted a heavy blow to British prestige, the Persian point of view being that we had undertaken to protect Persia and had failed to do so.

The *Majlis* was finally summoned to meet on February 20, and on the following day Riza Khan seized the reins of government and arrested the Ministers. The new Cabinet immediately denounced the Agreement, and the *Majlis*, after a debate in which violent attacks were made on the British, confirmed its decision. Looking back, one cannot fail to be impressed by the efforts of the British Government, which on more than one occasion undoubtedly saved Persia from anarchy. The situation after the Armistice may be compared with that prevailing in Afghanistan at the close of the second Afghan War. In both cases it was saved by the unexpected appearance of a strong man, Abdur Rahman in Afghanistan and Riza Khan in Persia, who proved to be the saviours of their respective countries.

Dynasties in Persia have usually been founded by successful soldiers. Riza Khan, by birth a peasant of Mazanderan, was an officer of the Cossack Division, which force was despatched to expel the Russians from the Caspian provinces in 1920. In this it signally failed, was routed, and took refuge within the British lines at Kazvin. A British officer was appointed to restore its *moral*. In this he was successful, so much so, that when a certain Teheran politician opened up relations with the force and suggested a *coup d'état* Riza led 3000 men to the capital, which was occupied without serious fighting.

Riza, as War Minister, displayed considerable strength of character, coupled with a grim determination to put an end to foreign interference. To ensure the devotion of his troops he insisted on certain branches of the Ministry of Finance being placed under his control, and, having by this means secured the sinews of war, he speedily ejected the politician who had initiated the *coup d'état*, and thenceforward he dominated the Government, becoming Prime Minister himself in 1923.

The relations of Riza Khan with the weakling Shah were ostensibly those of a loyal subject, but when Sultan Ahmad paid a lengthy visit to Europe he found himself a nonentity upon his return. Indeed, even at state ceremonies, the grandees turned their backs on their Shah to bow to the masterful Minister. Sultan Ahmad, realising that he could not cope with the situation, retired from the scene and recently died in Paris.

In March 1924, deeply influenced by the example of Turkey, there was a strong feeling in favour of the creation of a republic

with Riza Khan as President. The Press became violently anti-monarchical, telegrams advocating a republic poured in from the provinces, and Riza, impressed by the apparent strength of the movement, consented to the proposal. At this juncture however, the Turkish Grand National Assembly not only abolished the Caliphate, but disestablished the Moslem religion. This caused a strong raction in Persia, headed by the *Mujtahids* and the movement suddenly collapsed, but not before Riza had adroitly joined the party of the *Mujtahids* and proclaimed that the establishment of a republic in Persia was contrary to the Shia religion! His influence had evidently suffered no serious set-back, since, in the following year, he demanded, and was granted, dictatorial powers by the *Majlis*. This grant was followed by the deposition of the absentee Shah, and in December 1925 a Constituent Assembly was convened which elected Riza Khan to be Shah.

From the beginning Riza set to work to assert his authority over the provinces, to disarm the tribes and to restore law and order. He perforce based his authority on the army, and, re-enlisting officers and men of the South Persia Rifles and the Cossack Division, he has organised an army, 40,000 strong, which is better trained and organised than any force commanded by Persians in modern times.

The difficulties of his task were great. To take the case of *Shaykh* Khazal, who had ruled the Arabs of the lower Karun Valley, almost as an independent chief, Riza was determined to enforce the authority of the Government, whereas the *Shaykh* foolishly denounced the new order. In the upshot he was arrested and interned at Teheran, and the revolt of his followers was suppressed. A still more difficult problem was the disarmament of the nomad tribes. The Lurs, inhabiting a mountainous region to the north of Dizful, resented the construction of a road through their country, realising that it was merely the preliminary to a railway. They rose in revolt and defeated the Persian troops, but finally they were pacified. Similarly the Kashgais, who fought the British so bravely in the Great War, revolted, but finally submitted. It must, however, be noted that neither of these martial tribes was defeated in the field, and, until beaten, they will continue to be a thorn in the side of the Shah.

The relations of Persia with Russia since the Armistice constitute an interesting study.[1] The Bolsheviks, following the policy of Peter the Great, determined to annex the rich Caspian provinces after the rout of the Cossack Division referred to above. They spread eastwards, occupying Mazanderan, and

[1] I would acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Toynbee's admirable *Survey of International Affairs* for 1928.

at one time thought of seizing Teheran, which would have been but feebly defended. However, they were doubtful as to the attitude of the British, and were loth to quit the abundance of the Caspian provinces for the rugged Elburz passes and the semi-desert area surrounding the capital. Finally they reported to Moscow that they had made no progress with the people, who detested their attacks on the Moslem religion, with the result that it was decided to abandon the policy of annexation and to make friends with Persia.

Owing to the hostility against Great Britain, which was at that time considered *the* enemy, a treaty was speedily concluded in 1921. By its terms Russia renounced all debts due to the Russian Government, and handed over the Banque d'Escompte, various roads, the Julfa-Tabriz railway, the quays and steamers on Lake Urumia, and the port of Gazian opposite Enzeli. Finally, all privileges under the Capitulations were renounced. It was stipulated that a Customs Convention should follow, but, owing to the peculiar economic views held at Moscow, this proved to be difficult. Indeed, relations became strained to such an extent in 1926 that an embargo was placed on Persian exports, which constituted a heavy blow to traders and agriculturists. In the following year a provisional agreement was arrived at, by the terms of which Persian exports were limited to 50,000,000 roubles, Russian imports being 10 per cent. less. When ratifications were finally exchanged in 1928 the port of Enzeli, which had been seized in 1920, was, at long last, restored to Persia and renamed Pahlavi. During the period covered by these negotiations the friendly feelings towards Russia that had been inspired by the Treaty of 1921 changed. This was partly due to a clearer recognition of the fact that the Soviet is distinctly an aggressive Government, whereas Great Britain has ceased to be considered in this light. Moreover, apart from the question of religion, which is still a living force in Persia, there is a deep gulf set between that country, with its determination to adopt European civilisation, and Russia, which has deliberately repudiated it.

To turn to the question of relations with Turkey, I have already shown how deeply Persia has been influenced by its political changes. But, in addition to the permanent hostility of Shia for Sunni, Persia can never forget that Turkey has repeatedly devastated her fertile provinces and has aimed at her dismemberment. In 1926 a Treaty of Perpetual Peace was negotiated between the two Powers, to be followed by negotiations relating to Customs and Posts. Good relations are, however, constantly strained by the 'Turkification by force' practised against the Kurds, whose kinsmen in Persia support them. In October 1927 a crisis was reached, when the Turks

believed that a detachment of their troops captured by the Kurds was imprisoned in Persia. Rupture of relations was threatened, but explanations were offered, and ultimately the treaty was ratified in 1930. The Kurdish question, however, may well continue to upset Perso-Turkish relations, and at the time of writing is acute.

The relations of Persia with Afghanistan need little more than a passing comment. A Treaty of Peace between the two Powers was duly ratified, and Amanulla visited Teheran on his return from Europe. The influence of his western neighbours undoubtedly encouraged him in his attempt to drive his more fanatical subjects along the narrow path of progress, which ended in revolution and his flight from Afghanistan.

The relations of Persia with Iraq are of especial interest. It would have been reasonable to suppose that the Persians would welcome the substitution of Great Britain as Mandatory Power for their hereditary enemy. But this was not the case. Great Britain, which had stripped Turkey of half her provinces, was, as stated above, considered to be *the* enemy, but, apart from this, there were other reasons. In Iraq more than half the population belongs to the Shia sect, mainly grouped round the sacred cities of Kerbela, Najaf, Samarra and Kazimain, which the *Mujtahids*, who are of Persian descent and keep in close touch with Persia, have made into centres of fanaticism. In the revolt of 1920 they took an active part against the British, and again, in 1922, a *Mujtahid* of Kazimain issued a *fatwa* that Moslems who failed to oppose the Anglo-Iraq Treaty would be denied burial in Moslem graveyards! Later in the same year, participation in the elections was forbidden by the same *Mujtahid*, who was deported to Aden as a stage on the pilgrimage to Mecca. By way of protest nine of the leading *Mujtahids* left Irak for Persia, where their frantic appeals to the fanaticism of their fellow-countrymen created intense feeling against the British. Time, however, yet once again proved to be the great healer. The *Mujtahids* heard that Irak was not upset at their departure, whereas the large income they drew from pilgrims practically ceased. Accordingly they yearned for Iraq, and, after giving assurances that they would leave politics alone for the future, they returned to their homes in chastened mood. The holy firebrand of Kazimain retired to Meshed.

A second question that aroused the deepest feeling in Persia was the status of the large number of residents in Iraq who were of Persian descent. In 1924 persons desirous of renouncing Iraq nationality were called upon to do so. Thousands were affected, many of whom neither understood the order nor could afford to pay the fees. To add to the complication, the Persian

Government claimed for those whose Persian status was established the privilege of Capitulations at a time when they were preparing to denounce them in Persia, and declared that, until they were granted, the Persian Government did not intend to recognise Iraq officially. To this stern pronouncement Iraq replied that, under Turkish rule, Persians had enjoyed no such privileges, and again, that Persia had expressed no intention of granting capitulatory privileges to Iraq subjects who were resident in Persia.

The case for Iraq was overwhelmingly strong, but Persian pride held the field, until, in 1929, the British applied to the League of Nations for its approval to terminate the Anglo-Iraq Judicial Agreement, by which certain privileges were enjoyed by Europeans. Persia, realising that the bottom was knocked out of her case, hastened to negotiate, with the result that a Mission was sent to congratulate the Shah on the anniversary of his third coronation, and, at a banquet given in its honour, the Prime Minister announced the official recognition of Irak.

Perhaps the most important proof of the new order in Persia is to be found in the abolition of the Capitulations, under which Europeans and their subjects could only be tried by their consuls. The first breach in the system was their denunciation by Turkey in 1914, followed by their abolition in the Peace Settlement at Lausanne. The Soviet Government, as already mentioned, renounced capitulatory privileges in 1921. This act was of especial importance to Persia, in view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomanchai, concluded between victorious Russia and defeated Persia in 1828, imposed the very system which it was now sought to abolish. It was evident that, without a complete reorganisation of the law and the judiciary, Persian courts would not be competent to try Europeans. The Government had already taken up this question, and in 1927 the New Judicial Regulations, based to a large extent on French law, were formally inaugurated by the Shah, and were followed by a notification to the Powers that the Capitulations would be abolished in the following year. In the negotiations that followed certain safeguards for foreign residents were insisted upon. The Persian Government probably realised the initial weakness of its judiciary, and displayed a reasonable readiness to meet the views of foreign Powers, provided that the principle of the abolition was accepted. At the time of writing reliable informants state that the judges are ignorant of the laws that they administer and give verdicts that contravene them. It is obvious that competent judges cannot be created by a resolution of the *Majlis*, and it will take time—probably a long time—before the laws will be efficiently and honestly administered.

It is an accepted axiom that without good communications no country can prosper. As already stated, Persia, until quite recently, was in what may be termed the 'caravan' stage, and to remedy this the Shah determined to construct a trans-Persian railway. He selected Khor Musa, an inlet on the Persian Gulf, as the southern port, and gave a contract for a line to be constructed across the Karun River to Dizful, a distance of 150 miles. In the north he concluded a contract for a shorter length of line from Bandar Gaz, a port at the extreme south-east corner of the Caspian, to Sari, a town to the west, which lies a few miles inland. The first sod of this grandiose scheme was cut in the autumn of 1927, and two years later the northern section was opened by the Shah, and is reported to be working although the track is overgrown with weeds. In January 1930 the section from Khor Musa (renamed Bandar Shapur) towards Dizful was also opened by His Majesty. The embankments had apparently not settled down, and, owing to floods following heavy rains, the royal train was derailed and the engine caught fire. In May the syndicate operating on the southern section declined to proceed, alleging that the Persian Government owed them 600,000*l.*, and the Persian reply was to denounce the contract.

Whatever the position may be, it is to be hoped that this pause will give time for reflection and further inquiry before continuing the gigantic task. It may be pointed out that the creation of a modern port at Bandar Shapur, where the land has to be reclaimed from mud flats, and where there is neither fresh water nor population, will cost millions sterling. Again, north of Dizful the line in its ascent to the elevated Iranian plateau will cross range after range of mountains, and will traverse a sterile country inhabited by a few thousand predatory Lurs who only graze it during the summer months. To Burujird is 356 miles and to Teheran is 730 miles. It is to be noted that, owing to physical difficulties, the main caravan route running from Bushire to Shiraz, Isfahan, and Teheran is left many miles to the east.

The northern section measures only 300 miles, but one-third of the distance will pass through the lofty Elburoz, and will involve some 25 miles of tunnels. The total cost may aggregate 50,000,000*l.*, and, in view of the poverty of Persia, its scanty population, its aridity and consequent lack of exports, I hold the view that, even if it were completed, the railway could never pay. If His Majesty would be pleased to follow the example of Peter the Great and visit England as a student, he would realise the facts, and would probably decide that Persia did not yet possess men or means sufficient for such an undertaking.

Persia lies on the 'Highway of the Nations,' and constitutes

an important section of the air route between England and India. Pioneer flights from Cairo to Karachi were inaugurated shortly after the Armistice, and in 1925 Persia agreed provisionally to grant the British a right of way along her southern coast. Probably, however, determined at all costs to carry through the abolition of the Capitulations, she suddenly announced that an airway along her coast would not be permitted, but that an alignment across Central Persia might be considered. Negotiations were thus brought to a deadlock until the question of the Capitulations had been settled, when an agreement was concluded with Imperial Airways allowing the coastal route, and in 1929 the through service *viâ* Bushire, Bandar Abbas, and Jask was inaugurated. Thanks to the energy of the German firm of Junkers, Persia possesses a series of airlines radiating from the capital to the four quarters of the compass. These lines connect at Baghdad and Bushire with Imperial Airways, and thus provide rapid communication with the outer world.

To conclude, Persia is fast changing—perhaps too fast in some ways. In any case, the process is a difficult one. She is under military rule, and although the old governors were corrupt, yet much of the money they amassed was spent among the people they governed and among whom they lived. To-day the military officers generally treat the provincials with unconcealed contempt ; they are frequently changed and seldom know the people they rule. Again, taxation is heavier and is collected in full, whereas under the old order it was usual to strike a bargain with the tax-collector. Fresh taxation has been recently imposed in the form of a graduated income tax, which will involve a rise in the cost of living. It has also been decided to adopt a gold standard, which is bound to mean the creation of reserves in Europe. Consequently, although the finances have been set in order by an American Financial Adviser, the cost of the railway and other improvements may well prove a burden too heavy to bear. In short, as is also the case in Turkey, finance is the weak point.

Apart from this question, the recent election of Persia to the Council of the League of Nations will add to her prestige and rightly increase the national pride. Again, her undoubted renascence will be fostered by the International Exhibition of Persian Art that will shortly be held in London, an exhibition that will prove to the world how brightly her genius has burned down the ages. Persia is now ruled by a resolute and patriotic Shah, who already has achieved much, and her many friends will wish His Majesty a long life in which to continue his beneficent activities.

PERCY SYKES.

THE PROBLEM OF THE BASQUES

THE Basques have always been something of a mystery. When, over 2000 years ago, the Romans first invaded the Iberian Peninsula the native dialects which they heard there must all have sounded equally uncouth and barbarous. Nevertheless, Latin writers such as Strabo and Livy single out for special mention a tribe called the Vascones, whose language served to distinguish them completely from their neighbours and to Roman ears was 'barbarous and not to be borne.'

The Vascones dwelt originally on the banks of the Ebro in the region round Calahorra. There is reason to believe that they were reduced to submission in the second century B.C., but they are not mentioned by name until the following century. Thereafter their gradual migration may be traced first northwards beyond Pamplona (Pompælo), where Pompey established his winter quarters among them during one of his campaigns, then westwards to the sea, and finally across the Pyrenees, the northern slopes of which they appear to have reached by the sixth century A.D.

About 1500 years ago, therefore, these Vascones are known to have occupied the region now inhabited by the Basques. It is unfortunately impossible to identify them with the Basques with complete certainty, for in the twelfth century the Latin name divided into two forms, Bascli (or Basculi) and Gasconi, which in turn became the modern appellations of Basques and Gascons. There is little apparent resemblance between the modern word 'Basque' (or 'Vasco,' to give it the Spanish form) and the name 'Eskualdunak,' or 'Euskaldunak,' which the Basques give to themselves in their own language. It has been shown, however, that this name means no more than 'those who possess the *euskara* (Basque language).' When the extreme inaccuracy is recalled with which the Romans Latinised the names of barbarian tribes or towns it appears by no means impossible that the Latin *vasc-* may be a corruption of the root *eusk-* (which is thought to come from the Basque *eguzki, iduzki:* sun), and that the two names may therefore be identical in origin.

Latin writers furnish very little information concerning the

Vascones, beyond the fact that they were fierce and fearless warriors, who in the intervals of making war danced and feasted in front of their dwelling-places in honour of a nameless god. The Dark Ages which followed the fall of Rome are, historically speaking, even darker in the Basque Country than in the rest of Europe. That the Basques did not lose their reputation for ferocity when they embraced Christianity is proved by the great number of martyrs whom they helped to earn an eternal crown, and by the fear in which they were held by the earliest pilgrims to the shrine of St. James, whose route to Santiago de Compostella lay through their country. In the fourth century Prudence described them as *inquietos Vascones*. Five hundred years later St. Leon, the first Bishop of Bayonne, was assassinated by 'very cruel pirates and satellites of the Devil.' Encouraged by his success, another bishop, St. Amand, visited the land of the Basques, where he 'hoped to win the palms of martyrdom on account of their ferocity.' Indeed, in the twelfth century the whole Basque race was included in a general excommunication earned by their persecution of the faithful.

It is difficult to judge to what extent the Basques were affected by the successive invasions of the Iberian Peninsula. Their survival as a distinct race has been commonly ascribed to the inaccessibility of their country. This inaccessibility, however, is little more than a legend invented to explain the very fact of their survival. The Basque Country is mountainous indeed, but the mountains are neither so high nor so rugged as those of the central and eastern Pyrenees, and they are broken by gentle valleys and rolling plains. If the country was never permanently occupied by Romans, Goths, Franks or Moors, this fact is ascribable rather to its barrenness, to ignorance on the part of all but the Romans of its mineral resources, and to the fact that it lay to the side of the main route followed by these invasions.

The Basques cannot have failed to come into contact with these conquering races. If they kept their blood pure and failed to absorb foreign civilisations accepted by their neighbours, the reason must be sought in their savagely independent outlook. That they played a considerable part in the reconquest of the Peninsula is evident from the *fueros*, or special privileges, which they then acquired. When the Moors had been driven southwards, and their conquerors were faced with the task of consolidating their victories, those who volunteered to colonise the reconquered lands were granted *cartas de población* (letters of settlement) conferring upon them in perpetuity certain rights and exemptions. These rights grew up in one form or another throughout Spain, but it was only in the Basque Country that they continued to be observed long after they had become a glaring anachronism.

They varied from province to province, from valley to valley, and even from village to village. Handed down by oral tradition, they grew into an unwritten code of laws of regulations dealing with all subjects, from the political constitution to the smallest details of everyday life. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries they were codified, and some of them survive till the present day, although the majority were abolished during the Revolution in France and after the two Carlist wars in Spain.

For a long period the Basque Country was no more than a conglomeration of miniature counties and 'republics,' endlessly engaged in sanguinary warfare amongst themselves. By the twelfth century, however, Navarre was already a kingdom, Soule and Labourd viscounties, Alava and Guipuzcoa provinces, and Vizcaya a *señoria*. When the other petty kingdoms of France and Spain sacrificed their individuality to form united monarchies the Basques at first held aloof. The French provinces remained semi-independent under English dominion for some 300 years before they passed to France under Charles VII. and Henry of Navarre. In the fourteenth century Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya and Alava, which had always acted in concert with each other, voluntarily took the King of Castille as overlord, and in the sixteenth century Navarre was taken from the House of Albret by Ferdinand and Isabella. In each case, however, the suzerainty was purely nominal. Beneath the famous oak tree of Guernica the kings of Spain swore to observe the *fueros* of Vizcaya. The king was not, as elsewhere, the owner of the land, and his person was the only point of contact between his Basque provinces and his other domains. In the former he was represented by a *corregidor* or *bailli*. His Basque subjects owed him neither taxes nor, outside the limits of their province, military service. The actual administration was in the hands of a representative provincial assembly known as the *junta* (Spanish provinces), *états* (Soule and Basse-Navarre) or *biltzar* (Labourd). The king's representative could summon the assembly to meet, but without their consent no order of his was valid, and all executive authority was vested in the *syndic*, their nominee.

The Spanish Basque provinces were included in the embargo which precluded foreign countries from trading in South America. They maintained their own consuls in the Low Countries, with which they carried on an extensive trade, and on occasions they concluded separate treaties with foreign countries or with their brothers to the north of the Pyrenees. The great measure of independence enjoyed by the Basques at a time when European tendencies were all directed towards federation is a striking example of the manner in which their individualistic spirit favoured their survival as a separate race.

Except for the prosperity which foreign trade, privateerin and whale and cod fishing brought in their train, the condition the Basque provinces changed little between the fifteenth an eighteenth centuries. During this period the outside wor! quietly accepted the existence of the Basques, and, taking b small interest in ethnological and linguistic problems, gave litt thought to the question of their origin. The Basques, too, toc themselves for granted, and it was not until the latter half of tl eighteenth century aroused a thirst for that 'little knowledge which is always so dangerous that they sought to solve th problem of their own existence and to establish the origin of th language which is their most individual characteristic.

The mediæval writer Scaliger (1540-1609) laid the foundatior of a belief not only in the great antiquity of Basque by describin it as 'one of the fourteen languages which Latin did not destro; but also in its difficulty by adding: 'They say that they unde stand one another, but I do not believe it.' In about 1750 Spanish-Basque priest called Larramendi awoke general intere in the language by publishing a grammar under the stimulatin title of *El Imposible Vencido* (*The Impossible Conquered*). Th first writers on the Basque language were all Basques and nearl all priests. Their works breathe a firm and serene convictio that theirs, and no other, was the language spoken in th Garden of Eden. At the end of the eighteenth century or Dominique Lahetjuzan, Vicar of Sare, went so far as to deriv from Basque roots the names of Adam, Eve, Cain and Abe Eden itself was naturally nothing but an abbreviation of *ederrena* the most beautiful. Adam meant '*source, origine, abondanc mère, plénitude d'intelligence.*' Eve meant 'cut out' (from Adam side). Cain was the 'striker' and Abel 'he who invoked God b animal sacrifices' (*abere* is Basque for the Latin *pecus*). Lahe juzan's patriotic zeal carried him even further, and he proceede to derive the Basque *gorphutz* and *arima* (which are merely tl Latin *corpus* and *anima*) from Basque roots meaning '*matiè exhalante pétrie par celui qui est en haut,*' and '*ressemblanc rapport, multitude, centre, comble, abondance, source, plénitude.*'

Scarcely less fantastic were the opinions expressed by Spanish-Basque priest-philologist called Erro. With rare goo sense his colleagues made no attempt to conceal their opinio that he was a harmless lunatic. Erro, however, took his theori before the cathedral and chapter of Pamplona, who, after sever months of deliberations, triumphantly vindicated him and put t shame his critics who had had the temerity to base their objectior on mere common sense.

The beliefs shared by Erro and Lahetjuzan have not con pletely died out, for no more than twenty years ago a pamphl

was published at Saragossa under the title of *Glorious Discovery, Recognition and Demonstration of the Identity of Basque and the Language of Paradise.*

Etymology, always a dangerous hobby, has tempted many later writers into unsound analogies between Basque and Celtic, Finnish, Georgian, Japanese, Hindustani (this from the irrepressible Borrow), and various North and South American dialects. The German scientist William Humboldt was the first to place Basque researches on a scientific basis in his book *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens vermittelst der Vaskischen Sprache* (Berlin, 1821). According to his theories the Basques were no more than a remnant of the Iberians who had once inhabited the whole Peninsula, but who, like the ancient Britons, had been driven by successive invasions into one remote and mountainous corner of the country. This theory, even if proved, would not lead very far, for little is known of the Iberians beyond the fact that they came originally from North Africa, and that they are in some way related to the Hamitic group of races. Humboldt, therefore, only substituted one unknown for another. For nearly a century, however, his theories divided students of the Basque problem into two camps—the 'pro-Iberians' and the 'anti-Iberians.' The latter, moreover, were united only in name, for some of their number believed the Basques to have come originally from Asia by way of Central Europe, while others, led by Julien Vinson, held that they had never been more than a small tribe living between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.

There is something to be said on both sides. On the one hand, there are many place names scattered throughout the Peninsula which are completely Basque in appearance, and the mysterious Iberian inscriptions, as deciphered by Hübner and Boudart, reveal words which can plausibly be interpreted in Basque. On the other hand, the investigations of anthropologists show that there exists among the Basques, in a proportion of from 25 to 40 per cent., a form of skull which is found nowhere else in France or Spain. It seems unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that the Iberian type, if this be it, should have disappeared so completely from other parts of the Peninsula.

The latest theory, propounded by Bosch Gimpera, is a compromise between those of Humboldt and Vinson. This Spanish ethnologist supposes the Basques to be the remnant of the palæolithic (and therefore pre-Iberian) inhabitants of the Pyrenean region. Only thus, in his view, can their peculiar physical type be explained. At a very early date, however, they were subjected to strong Iberian influence and either adopted the Iberian language or borrowed largely from it, thus accounting for the points in common between Basque, Iberian, and the Berber

dialects. This hypothesis, if not conclusive, has at least the merit of combining in the most acceptable manner the established results of modern research. For the present, at all events, it may be accepted in the absence of anything more conclusive.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a general tendency to abandon the fruitless study of a problem which would probably never be solved, and to concentrate on the objective phenomena which could still be observed. The Basque language had failed to reveal any ascertainable relationship between the Basques and the other races of the earth. But its study has since proved far from unproductive in other directions, for it sheds invaluable light on the mentality of the people whose thought it expresses and on the stages of civilisation which they had attained when it was affected by successive external influences. If, for example, all words of Latin derivation are excluded from the Basque vocabulary, the latter is shown to be rich in pastoral terms, but noticeably poorer in agricultural terms. It may, therefore, be deduced that when the Basques first came into contact with Roman civilisation they were a pastoral people just beginning to turn their attention to agriculture. The words for most cutting instruments may quite possibly date back to the Stone Age, for they are derived from the word *aitz* : stone. In other respects the vocabulary indicates a primitive civilisation and an uncultured materialistic outlook. It is indescribably poor in abstract conceptions. The one word *gogo* denotes the mind and all its functions, such as will, desire, mood and thought. Another curious feature is the complete absence of collective nouns. There are separate names for every tree, animal, or colour, but none save those derived from Spanish for colour, tree or animal in general.

The conception of a primitive, unimaginative race suggested by an analysis of the language is confirmed by the character of the contemporary Basque peasant. It is peculiarly unfortunate that his almost insular self-sufficiency, his suspicion of the foreigner, and consequent taciturnity have woven around him an atmosphere of romantic legend which causes him to be depicted as an imaginative dreamer living in a sort of Celtic twilight meditating on the distant past and the equally remote future and possessed of an outlook which, truth to tell, never existed among men until it was invented by Rousseau and Chateaubriand.

The outlook of the Basque peasantry is essentially objective. Although they are devout and unquestioning Catholics, there is a pagan quality in their faith which is reminiscent more of the Old than of the New Testament. They take their God for granted just as their ancestors must have accepted their Sun God or Thunder God. Like these, He is a God of wrath rather than of mercy

Their faith is lacking equally in the mysticism of the Middle Ages and in the tenderness which has been discerned in Christianity in later times.

There is, indeed, in the character of the Basques a streak of hardness which is primitive in its neglect of the more cultivated virtues of compassion and altruism. This is not to say that they are needlessly brutal. Their hardness is not so much of a positive as of a negative order, which seems to show that this quality has sprung rather from the natural outlook of a race which has never apprehended modern ethical conceptions than from any definite defect in their moral composition. Indeed, they possess in a high degree the more robust virtues of loyalty, dignity, and patriarchal rectitude. Their hardness, however, suffices to explain certain somewhat unlovable traits in their character, such as their callous attitude towards suffering, both human and animal, their unconcealed contempt for every form of weakness and deformity, and their indifference to the feelings which may be wounded by their peculiar brand of biting satiric humour.

The same almost primæval quality is discernible in their moral outlook, which is based less on any religious or ethical code than on the material interests of the family and the community. As a matter of course they speak out with the utmost frankness everything that is in their minds, but there is seldom or never any obscene intention. It never occurs to them to call a spade anything but a spade, and they never mince their words before their womenfolk, who nevertheless see therein no cause for blushing. In their songs, legends, or folk-plays there is never anything deliberately pornographic.

Adultery is universally condemned. A guilty couple may awake one morning to find a tell-tail trail of rushes uniting the doors of their houses. More often village disapproval is manifested in the form of ' rough music,' which in cases of extreme provocation leads to organised ' charivaris ' called *tobera-mustrak*. These are long carnivalesque processions, culminating in a satirical play setting forth the details of the scandal, followed by an elaborate mock-trial and the sentence of the accused. It is significant that rough music of this sort is also earned by the remarriage of a widow or the thrashing of a man by a woman, two offences which are regarded less kindly in a primitive than in a civilised community.

No greater contrast could be afforded to Basque disapproval of adultery than their lenient attitude towards pre-nuptial promiscuity. Little or no importance is attached to a girl's escapades before marriage. Should she find herself in trouble she will be mercilessly teased and held up to ridicule in improvised songs. But she will not be expected to marry her lover, nor will

she have any difficulty in finding a husband. The latter, indeed, will not merely overlook the existence of an illegitimate child, but will welcome it into his home, just as primitive man must have welcomed every prospective pair of able hands.

Basque want of imagination finds its complement in a complete lack of creative originality. Almost everything which was at first regarded as an outward expression of Basque culture has eventually been shown to be an ingenious adaptation of borrowed ideas. It is only the intense conservatism of the race, leading them to cling to antiquated traditions long after their original models have disappeared, that has given rise to the mistaken impression that the culture and customs of the Basques have always been different from those of their neighbours. Possessing nothing original of their own, they are slow in their acceptance of foreign ideas, slow but sure in their assimilation of them, and very sure in their ultimate attachment to them.

That so conservative a race should ever have absorbed foreign traditions may seem surprising. But the Basques have had many more contacts with the outside world than is generally realised. Within historical times they have experienced an English occupation of Gascony and a later British invasion of the Peninsula. Their mercenaries went to the Navarrese kingdom of Achaia in Greece, to Palestine with Eleanor of Aquitaine, and to Wales with Edward I. Their sailors accompanied Magellan round the world, fished for cod on the Newfoundland banks, and taught the rest of Europe the whaling industry. Their corsairs were a thorn in the flesh of the British merchant marine from the seventeenth till the beginning of the nineteenth century. From these wanderings the Basques returned to their native land with their minds full of strange things seen and heard, many of which they adapted to their own use.

At first sight there is nothing more strikingly original than the Basque game of *pelote*. But a closer study of its history and development show it to have sprung from the mediæval game of *longue paume*, which was played in Italy and France until it was replaced by the *courte paume*, from which tennis is derived.[1]

Similarly, Basque folk-song is full of reminiscences of early Church music, of mediæval court minstrelsy, of eighteenth century *chansonnettes*, and of the popular songs of many countries. These different materials are unified by a style of singing which owes more to modal than to diatonic tonality, and more to the rhythm of speech than to that of music. Peculiar as these songs sound to-day, they would probably have seemed much less distinctive 500 years ago.

[1] See *A Book of the Basques*, by Rodney Gallop. (Macmillan & Co. In the press.)

There are moments when the wanderer among the Basques seems to be transported back into the early Middle Ages. A year ago the writer was fortunate enough to witness the performance of a 'pastorale' at a small village in the province of Soule. A rough stage had been erected on the *pelote* court, and in the white backcloth there were two gaps—one for the entrance of the 'good' characters and one for that of the 'wicked.' The play, a life-history of François I. of France, lasted for five hours. The Frenchmen, clad in blue, were called 'Christians,' and their enemies, albeit Spaniards and Italians, were called 'Turks,' and came and went through the 'wicked' entrance, bowing to a little black dancing-jack called Mahoma who was suspended over their heads. They wore red uniform coats, yellow breeches, and tall crowns of flowers and feathers. The play was written in short quatrains which were rhythmically chanted on notes of varying pitch, while the actors marched backwards and forwards across the stage with no attempt at gesture or expression. The frequent battles were no more than elaborately conventionalised war-dances. To symbolise death the players lay down on a white sheet, and on every such occasion the action was suspended while the Satans performed an elaborate dance before carrying the body off to purgatory. So unique in the world to-day is the conventionalised technique of these plays that many writers have regarded them as an original Basque contribution to the art of the theatre. But in sober truth they differ but little from the mystery plays of the Middle Ages.

The variety of influences which have been combined to form what may be called the Basque 'style' is most easily discernible in decoration and in folk-lore. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Basques produced what seemed to be a highly individual school of carving in wood and stone. Their designs were principally geometric, but the discoidal tombstones, the lintel stones, and the wooden chests and household utensils which they decorated testify to remarkable powers of adaptation, variation and combination. Yet the germs of these patterns may be traced back eventually to Coptic and Merovingian models.

In the same way the traditional stories which are told round the fire on winter evenings are a naïve jumble of classical mythology, Oriental tales, Celtic fairy-lore, New Testament parables, and mediæval legends of witches and evil spirits. Only the setting and the details are truly Basque, and these folk-tales do no more than demonstrate once again the Basque talent for assimilating and retaining antiquated themes the invention of which must be ascribed to other races.

There are, however, certain Basque customs, acquired doubtless at a more remote period, the origin of which cannot so

easily be established. Throughout the country the children go 'wassailing' on various festivals. Thus on New Year's Day, in Navarre, they carry round the 'luck' in the form of the first rain that has fallen in the New Year; on other occasions they mask their faces or take a 'guy' with them. In one or two villages the peasants occasionally revive the 'hen-game,' in which a hen is buried with only its head showing and then beheaded with a ceremonial which recalls pagan animal sacrifices. In other places when the master of a house dies the fire is removed from the hearth and the ashes are scattered, or the cattle are taken from their stalls and are not suffered to lie down until after the funeral.

There are parts of Basse-Navarre where the peasants, when they gather on November evenings to strip the maize stalks, are visited at midnight by a 'white mare,' represented by two youths under a sheet. Students of the *Golden Bough* will have little difficulty in seeing in this white mare an animal personification of the Corn God. Nor will it greatly surprise them to learn that in Soule and Navarre a hobby-horse dances in the carnival celebrations and is 'hoisted' or 'shot' at the end of the dance.

This ritual dancing—for there is no doubt as to its origin in pagan ritual—is one of the most curious survivals in this country of survivals. Although it has come to be associated with the carnival or with various Church festivals and has suffered every sort of mediæval accretion, its original purpose peers through this transparent disguise wherever it is found. In Vizcaya it takes the form of a sword dance, in which the captain is finally held aloft like the stiffened corpse of a sacrificial victim; in Soule of a complicated pantomime in which the hobby-horse is pursued, shod, and gelded before his final hoisting; in Basse-Navarre of a Corpus Christi procession of fantastically clad dancers who leap before the high altar just as David leapt before the Ark. A sharp line of demarcation sunders these dances from the *aurresku*, *fandango*, and *farandole*, which are purely recreational in purpose. They are performed annually on fixed dates and with the utmost gravity by chosen teams of male dancers. Moreover, they are full of close analogies with the remains of the spring rite throughout Europe. If, therefore, it cannot be definitely proved that these primitive customs were borrowed from foreign sources, there is at least presumptive evidence that they are not peculiar to the Basques and that they were once general throughout Europe.

The more closely one studies Basque customs and traditions, the more one is driven to share the conclusions reached by Vinson after a lifetime of research—to wit, that 'the Basques have nothing original, nothing exclusively their own save their language.' Camille Jullian, the French historian of Gaul, is more explicit when he writes that 'each vanished age seems to have

bequeathed to Basque civilisation the heritage of at least one ineradicable custom.' This civilisation—if the word is not too pretentious for the homely peasant culture of the Basques—thus reveals itself to be no more than an eclectic epitome of the stages through which European civilisation has passed. Its contribution towards a solution of the problem of Basque origins is practically negligible.

On the other hand, this very fact raises a problem of no mean importance. What influences, what elements in the Basque environment have isolated these antiquated traditions and preserved them incorrupt as flies in amber? It may even be questioned whether this new problem is not really the more baffling of the two, and the more worthy of study. The origin of every branch of the human race is equally mysterious if it is sought far enough back in the remote past. But it is a matter of greater marvel that a small race like the Basques, who are in our time but not of it, whose very existence, indeed, is an anachronism, should have survived till the present day, uncontaminated by the admixture of other races and bringing with them something of their original mentality coupled with a host of traditions saved from the bonfire of the pagan past.

Hitherto the geographical explanation has been accepted as sufficient. But surely a few moments' reflection will show it to be inadequate. There are parts of Europe far wilder, far more mountainous and inhospitable, than the Basque provinces. Yet nowhere, not even in the Balkans, has there survived a race so primitive and so essentially ancient.

The solution of the problem must be sought in some element in Basque character, some alloy made up of pride and dignity, suspicion and reserve, conservatism and self-sufficiency, which, like an ancient Egyptian unguent, has preserved them till the present day, incorrupt yet embalmed in the past.

RODNEY A. GALLOP.

VIRGIL'S BIMILLENARY

I

Such celebrations as are punctually inspired by the effluxion of time prove too often to be merely opportunities for a fresh misunderstanding of their subject. They inevitably direct attention to the passage of years, to the mutability of taste, and to the multiplicity of the events, in the history of art or of action, that have succeeded the life or work that they commemorate. When the person or event celebrated belongs to the world of affairs, these considerations have their relevance; but they can only mislead the mind in its judgment of an artist and his works. They tempt the critic to think of a work of art as an antique, and to invent false reasons to explain why what he finds alive to-day should have lived so long. None the less, anniversary celebrations do forcibly remind us of the past, and by making it the subject of reflection provide an opportunity for revising error and re-enforcing truth.

What is it that makes Virgil as great to-day as he was 2000 years ago? The question plunges him who would answer it unawares into metaphysics, for he must recognise how far Time and Change have power in the world of Art. The world which admires the *Æneid* to-day differs, it may seem, in almost every respect from the world for which the *Æneid* was written. The physical conditions in which life is lived are different; new problems confront the intellect, and new views both of the nature of the physical world and of man's spiritual destiny are debated and believed; the world since Virgil's death has seen more than one revolution in morals and in art; the Empire whose birth he celebrated has fallen, and the language in which he wrote has died; yet his poems remain, not, indeed, as widely read by students of literature as in his own day, but by those who do read them at least as deeply admired. How is it that where so much has changed, the response evoked by the qualities of his work should stay the same? How is it—to put a question wider but cognate—that the classics have not lost their power in a modern world?

To this question two answers suggest themselves : the classics retain their influence partly because old reputations die hard, partly because classical literature, degraded into an educational instrument, has been inflicted upon each succeeding generation at an age when the power to resist is imperfectly developed and the memory is at its most tenacious. This, however, explains only what is superficial—the potency of the classics, not their power. It must be remembered that they contribute not only to the education of schoolboys and the libraries of gentlemen ; that they do not depend entirely for their strength upon human weakness.

To the question what is the source of their real and permanent strength two answers may be given—answers which differ fundamentally, for between them there is all the depth of a metaphysical gulf. The first answer has never been more popular than it is to-day, and is never so loudly or so confidently given as on such occasions as that of a millenary celebration. It boldly recognises the mutability of things, and declares that in a changing world the classics themselves have changed. The classics change (it is said), and their change is not vicissitude or mutation, still less the change of decay, for they are not dead, they are 'alive to-day.' Once that claim has been advanced (and who dares challenge it ?), it is but a step to the assertion that, living, they draw new life, new strength, new character, from each succeeding age. Each age, on this view, contributes something to Virgil, each age finds in him something new ; 'to' each age he 'means' something different, and from each age he demands a new interpretation.

This answer is popular, for it reassures those who are inclined to ask how anything that belonged to a by-gone day can be of importance to us now—for, however 'modern' we may wish to be, when we turn to Virgil, on this view, we are not turning back ; it allures those to whom any view is made plausible by the facile comparison of an abstract idea with a living organism—and no analogy is more popular or more delusive ; and it comforts those to whom more than superficial learning is unattainable, for it sets an almost equal value on the classics in the original and in translation. Nor is the view without a certain philosophical plausibility. For the common reflection that the past is unalterable—a reflection which ministers sometimes to our comfort, sometimes to our despair—is in a sense unwarranted : the past not only can, but must inevitably, change, however passionately we may desire that time in its passage should isolate and leave untouched a moment or an hour. It is not merely that the past may fade in our memory ; memory can keep its treasures as bright as when they were committed to it,

but it cannot keep them simply as they were: by every fresh word that we speak, by each fresh gesture, by each new thought and action, we change irrevocably the context of what has gone before. Every event in history adds to and so changes the whole of history, and so also the relations of its component parts. And just as meaning depends upon context, so, it may be said, each event is what it is through being a particular part of a particular whole—namely, the series of events in time up to the occurrence of that event. That past is perpetually changed by the momentary present, and to this change everything in time is subject. To every age, therefore, the *Æneid*, in a sense comes as something not merely fresh, but different, because every age changes by new knowledge, new opinion, new experience —a change which is dimly reflected in criticism and commentary—the *Æneid* which its predecessor handed on to it.

This, we suspect, is one of those grand metaphysical truths which strike most deeply on their first recital, and depend for their effect less upon their real merits than on the arrogance of their apparent claims.

Though it is, in a sense, true that everything in time is subject to change simply because it is in time and thus is constantly acquiring fresh relations, yet these acquisitions are mere acquisitions; there is something that acquires them; there is a persistent unity, which can be recovered by abstraction. And in our everyday life we usually attach more importance to that unity than to its adventitious qualities. Our behaviour to-day is determined rather by its probable effect on the events of the morrow than by its certain effect on the events of the year before last. We can, perhaps, atone for sins, but a sin atoned for is not a sin undone. Confidently can we say that

> In all the ages this shall never be
> As if it had not been.

A classical poet has reminded us that it is not within the power even of omnipotence to make undone that which has been done, and a modern poet that 'the gods themselves cannot recall their gifts.' That what is true of life is true of literature we are reminded by the familiar *dicta* which tell us that the spoken word cannot be recalled, and that the letter which has been written remains.

In this connexion it is salutary to remember that Virgil wrote his works for his contemporaries to read 2000 years ago; that they were then (so far as the Fates allowed him to complete them) complete, expressing his intention, not 'meaning' a hundred different things to a hundred different and unborn generations. 'The' *Æneid* is that poem which Virgil wrote and

his friends published after his death, free from the after-interpretation of twenty centuries. Those who forget this, and insist that the *Æneid* is even incomplete, will find that they are pursuing a quarry which they themselves have endowed with wings, and they cannot complain if they are eluded by that which they themselves have made elusive. Looking back over twenty centuries in their search for 'the' *Æneid*, they will find not one *Æneid*, but a hundred, each merging imperceptibly, as each generation merges, into that which succeeds it. If they are wise, they will remember that though we can enrich literature by personal associations, we do not thereby 'make' literature or change the literature that we find (though we may obscure and distort it beyond recognition); and a bimillenary celebration is a good occasion for reminding them that the *Æneid* was a completed whole 2000 years ago.

For even if the *Æneid* may be looked at as a complex system or mere conglomeration, or as a living thing that changes as it lives, there must be some nucleus of that collection, and some explanation of its attractive power; there must be some reason why the living thing has lived so long beyond the ordinary span of literary productions.

The explanation is to be found on the other side of the metaphysical gulf—the side on which abstraction is allowed to do its necessary work. The 'nucleus,' the thing which has lived, is the *Æneid* that Virgil wrote, and the secret of its power can only be discovered by freeing it from the accretions of twenty centuries and looking at it, in so far as is possible, in the nakedness in which it left Virgil's mind. To discover what the author meant, nothing more, nothing less, nothing else, is the professed object of the scholar and should be the object of all intelligent readers; it is often a difficult task, and those who bring to it the prejudices of their own age make it more difficult still, not only for themselves, but also for their posterity. But those who endeavour to transport themselves back 2000 years and recapture the *Æneid* that Virgil wrote may be assured that they will find in it, and will not lose in discarding the accumulated interpretations of succeeding ages, the secret of its immortality.

II

'To judge rightly of an author,' says Dr. Johnson 'we must transport ourselves to his time, and examine what were the wants of his contemporaries, and what were his means of supplying them.' Certainly the wants of Virgil's contemporaries influenced him, as they must influence almost every artist, in his choice of a form in which to write; when he came to write his last and greatest work they even dictated its subject and in a

-e measure determined his treatment of it. His poem was -force of a tedious species in a difficult genus : it was a national ic. Within this awkward framework it had to look both -ckward and forward : to incorporate archæology, history, and -th ; and to celebrate the foundation of a nascent empire and int the direction of its future triumphs. Its author had to ar the burden of Tennyson superimposed on that of Milton : myth was as far removed from the world around him (though distance is to us diminished by the telescopic effect of time) was the Arthurian legend from the Victorian age, yet the tory of which it was supposed to be a part was as vital to him was to Milton the story which opened with the legend of Eden. -th a living present and a fixed tradition imposed their limita- -ns on his freedom in the exercise of his art. Virgil's mastery -r form and content was so great that his posterity has never -npletely realised that the form in which he wrote was of all -rary forms almost the least suited to his genius. His art -uld have developed most freely had he devoted himself to the orter and less exacting form of the epyllion ; thus would he have tained greater scope for variety and experiment, and he might -e left us a collection of poems in which his genius would have peared to better advantage than in the twelve books of a ntinuous epic.

The needs of his age, however, being what they were, Virgil -isfied them ; how completely, his contemporary success -eals. To his contemporaries he was more than an artist ; was almost a prophet. To-day his message survives as some- ing of only historic interest ; its political import has lost its gency, and its moral tone, though in advance of the age in which wrote, is hardly abreast of ours ; we do not go to the *Æneid* learn chivalry or to the *Georgics* to learn contentment with a nple life, though the poems may have taught these lessons their early readers.

Certainly Virgil is not a moral teacher in the ordinary sense the words : he does not set out to tell us either by precept or parable how to live, and his works may be searched in vain an effective appeal to the promptings of conscience or to the -ctions of religion. True, he takes us to the Lower World, but picture of the tortures of the damned and the pleasures of the -ssed hardly provokes a resolve to imitate the virtues which to Elysium or to avoid the vices which paved the way to heron. Few can have determined to eschew arrogance through -ding of the punishment of the Aloidæ, and how many rapes can -e been averted by a timely recollection of the fate of Theseus ? Nor is Virgil's picture of the Upper World any richer in -mples for our moral instruction. Assiduous though he is in

his praises of simplicity and magnanimity, he teaches mortals not to look for pity, or even justice, at the hands of fate. The characters who claim most vividly our affection and our admiration—Nisus and Euryalus, Camilla, Pallas, Lausus—all perish as a result of their own valour and unselfishness. While virtue suffers, vice is painted in no darker colours: every boy admires Mezentius, and Mezentius is a savage; every man loves Dido, and Dido is abject passion incarnate. Most unfortunate has he been with his chief character—the hero whom he endows with every virtue, every talent, and every charm; the perfect son, the perfect soldier, the perfect Roman; the leader in whom Augustus was no doubt intended to recognise 'some faint shadow of himself' has impressed posterity as a tiresome prig, and the climax of the epic leaves most of its readers more eager to show their sympathy with the vanquished than to rejoice with the victor at the prospect of his approaching nuptials and the foundation of the city of Rome.

Virgil is far from being a moral, and still farther from being a religious, teacher. Yet in both morals and religion he has been influential. Even to-day most readers of the classics would go to him rather than to any other poet of pagan antiquity to find an echo, however faint, of their own religious convictions or their own religious doubts. In the Middle Ages he was regarded without difficulty as a Christian teacher, the Prophet of the Gentiles. This no doubt was due to accident—to the accident, for instance, that his fourth *Eclogue* was capable of a double interpretation. But such a misconception would not have been possible if Virgil had regarded himself as the mouthpiece of a religious doctrine. It is his lack of any positive religious conviction, his freedom from all dogma, that has made him the prey of the mystic, just as it is his extreme reluctance to indulge in any moral reflections (he allows himself three or four at the most in the course of the *Æneid*) that gives him a sort of moral sublimity. So, too, with philosophy: no writer with so few pretensions to having thought out a philosophic system is so often invoked as an interpreter of the mysteries of human life and destiny. In morals, in philosophy, in religion, he in many ways resembles Wordsworth; if he has not Wordsworth's confidence in the beneficence of nature, he equally believes that *mens agitat molem*, and is equally ready to extend his sympathy over the whole range of suffering. But his anticipation of Wordsworth cannot be illustrated by quotation; where the later poet is explicit, Virgil is content to leave his thought unspoken. 'Virgil says much in little,' wrote Dryden, 'and often in silence.' His silence has nowhere been supposed to speak louder than on the twin topics of religion and morality.

We hardly go to Virgil, then, in order to learn how to becon good or wise, though to his contemporaries he may have taugl both these lessons. If we wish to understand Virgil we mus take into account these elements in his work, but if we wish learn the secret of his perennial power, his power over us, w must ask not what external needs of his day he satisfied, but what more simply, are the merits of his writings.

III

The secret of Virgil's immortality is, after all, an open secret he was a successful artist. That has not, perhaps, always bee the reason why his readers have admired him ; he has often bee worshipped for qualities that he does not possess ; but as long a there are those who care enough for beauty and for skill in it production to seek them in his works, he will not be without a audience ready to do him homage.

This may be said not only of Virgil, but of a great deal c surviving classical literature : it will survive as long as ther exist men able to read Greek and Latin and endowed wit intellectual and æsthetic tastes, men who take pleasure in litera ture, and are eager to acquire knowledge of it and find the beaut in it. To those whose desire is for knowledge alone, classica literature will offer a field of attraction almost evenly distributed their pleasure may lie in interpreting Persius, in investigatin the prose rhythms of Isæus, in analysing the dialects of th lyric poets, in restoring the text of Manilius—in acquiring an sort of insight into any sort of author. Those who love grea literature will read the classics chiefly for their masterpiece Neither class of inquirers need ever fear that Greek and Lati literature will fail to provide them with the material that the seek. The pure artistic merits of the classics, like all suc qualities, stand outside time : they are not subject to its influenc for good or for evil ; they have gained nothing in the passage c twenty centuries, and they need lose nothing in the passage c twenty more. They are to-day exactly what their autho made them ; and those who possess the gifts necessary fc appreciating them need only go straight to them in order t satisfy their desires.

Virgil, in so far as he was an artist, has no especial messag for this century, and the value of his works in one century do not differ from their value in another. To find it, we must g back to the source untainted by the multifarious influences c subsequent generations ; but going back is no retrogression, f in the realm of the highest art there are no such words as ' ou of date ' or ' up to date.'

IV

A bimillenary is an occasion when to lay stress upon the timelessness of art is more than usually desirable. Yet it is necessary, especially when Virgil is the artist under our review, to remember that art, in this world, has to embody its products in forms which are subject to the influence of time. It is one of the cruellest conditions of human existence that beauty, to be communicated, must be clothed, or rather realised, in perishable forms. By this condition all the arts are sufferers. The works of the painter and the sculptor are more than any others subject to the domination of pure chance: innumerable must be the paintings and the statues that have been abolished by no other agency than the hand of time. The musician is in a slightly happier position, for he can multiply copies of his work; yet whenever it is re-created he is in the hands of his executant interpreter.

Literature is in this respect, since the discovery of printing, safest of all, but it has not always been so. The dust-heaps of Egypt remind us by their tantalising treasures that neither the merits of a masterpiece nor the multiplication of its written copies can make up for the frailty of the material to which in writing it is committed. And the East is not without examples of literatures whose concrete vehicle has survived, but which were written in a language to which the key has been irrevocably lost, so that whatever treasures they may contain are for ever hidden from our eyes. From these dangers Virgil is immune. His text has survived in a state of excellent preservation; his works have been reproduced in manuscript and print almost as often as those of any other author in the world, and knowledge of the language in which he wrote is perhaps unlikely ever utterly to perish. Yet he is, and always has been, open to a danger less devastating but more insidious. More than any other artist, his strength lay with the subtleties of language. He was pre-occupied more than any of his contemporaries, and himself increasingly as he grew older, with the selection and the use of words. Appreciation of his achievement, therefore, is bound up with an intimate knowledge of the language in which he wrote. In the choice of words to suit not only his meaning but his mood, in the variation of cadence and of colour, in the management of metre and of period, he was adept, and no poet has excelled him in the faculty of matching sense with sound. These matters are, in a greater or lesser degree, the concern of every poet, and his skill and interest in them does not differentiate Virgil from many other writers. But he went beyond almost every other poet in experimenting with words. It was the desire to do this,

and the precise nature of the experiments that he performed, that gave its especial, 'Virgilian,' character to almost every line he wrote. His experiments were at once delicate and daring; of their daring and delicacy the Romans, more familiar than it is possible for us to be with the *nuances* of their tongue, must have had better means of judging than ever posterity has attained: they could tell, and we cannot, how far Virgil indulged his fancy in inventing words, in reviving archaistic words, and in using words in novel senses and novel combinations. It is strange, therefore, that time has left undimmed the charm of Virgil's art, and that we should recognise it unconsciously, doing homage to the effect without knowing fully the nature of the cause.

In this respect there is one English poet who shares with him almost identical characteristics—Lord Tennyson. With him, as with Virgil, preoccupation with the use of language came to play a more and more important part in his composition, till it became with him, as with Virgil, at times an intolerable affectation; with him, too, the interest of his later work often lies in the unheard felicities of language in which he expresses the *nuance* of his meaning. When English is a dead language the novelty will have gone from such a phrase as:

> all her dress
> *Wept* from her sides as water flowing away.

Now that Latin is a dead language can we recapture the thrill given to its first readers by

> tota cohors . . . relictis Ad terram *defluxit* equis?

only by comparing a sentence which we recognise as an experiment in a living language—

> their malice on the placid lip
> Froz'n by sweet sleep—

can we appreciate such a phrase as Virgil's

> nec umquam
> solvitur in somnos, oculisve aut pectore noctem accipit

When we read that Lancelot 'maddened with himself and moaned,' we are struck by a sense of novelty which Roman readers would almost certainly have felt, but which we do not experience in reading such a phrase as 'furor iraque mentem præcipitat.'

Tennyson's aptitude for periphrasis can hardly escape an English reader's notice as long as English is a spoken tongue; but how often in reading Virgil must we come without knowing it upon phrases which jarred upon their first readers just as

'the knightly growth that fringed his lip' and 'azure pillars of the hearth' jar upon us? If Virgil had been born in 1809 and had written in English, he might well have expressed the approach of his seventy-ninth birthday by declaring that

> The centuries three strong eights have met
> To drag me down to seventy nine.

What seems in Tennyson at times an irritating preciosity in the combination of words—he speaks 'Temple eaten terms' for terms kept by eating dinners in the Temple—is observable in Virgil, particularly in his later work—he speaks of a boundary stone as being set up 'litem ut discerneret arvis'; sometimes we are gainers over his contemporaries, and what seemed offensive to them is passed by us unnoticed; sometimes the felicity must have depended upon the strangeness, and both together escape our attention.

Experiments such as these were sometimes unsuccessful, but more often successful, and in the mass their effect was to widen the scope of the language, to increase its power as an instrument for the expression of thought. But language could not be so used without a certain sacrifice, and Virgil was forced to renounce qualities which have been the chief glory of other writers: speed is rarely a characteristic of his work, and glitter never. He could never—partly because of his fondness for long periods, partly because, whatever the length of his periods, he loved to linger by the way—have written such lines as these of Ovid (*Met.*, V. 648):

> Jam super Europen sublimis et Asida terras
> Vectus erat iuvenis: Scythicas advertitur oras.
> Rex ibi Lyncus erat; regis sublit ille penates;
> Qua veniat, causamque viæ, nomenque rogatus
> Et patriam, Patria est claræ mihi, dixit, Athenæ;
> Triptolemus nomen.

Such rapidity may have been in Virgil's power; it became less and less in his inclination. Nor would he have painted thus the following scene (*Met.*, VII. 835):

> Egredior silvasque peto; victorque per herbas,
> Aura veni, dixi, nostroque medere labori.
> Et subito gemitus inter mea verba videbar
> Nescio quos audisse. Veni, tamen, optima, dixi.
> Fronde levem rursus strepitum faciente caduca,
> Sum ratus esse feram: telumque volatile misi.
> Procris erat.

Here is a picture painted with the utmost economy; with the fewest and deftest possible touches: each touch is definite; each word performs its own clear task. How rightly is Ovid made the

study of those who know but little Latin, and wish to learn themselves how properly to use it! But economy of words has its drawback; it cannot well indulge a luxury of feeling (*Met.*, VII. 694):

> Procris erat . . . raptæ soror Orithyiæ,
> Si faciem moresque velis conferre duarum
> Dignior ipsa rapi. Pater hanc mihi iunxit Erectheus;
> Hanc mihi iunxit amor. Felix dicebar, eramque;
> Non ita dis visum est; ac nunc quoque forsitan essem.

A frugal tongue is the inadequate servant of a tender heart: hard, clear words are ill-fitted to express a gentle and a vague emotion. Virgil, where he erred, erred in the opposite direction. He used language as an instrument for expressing *nuances* undreamed of by earlier or coeval Latin writers: his verbal sensibility was expressive of an equal sensibility of the emotions. It is not surprising that his manner differs from that of Ovid: he had so much more and such very different things to say. What is surprising is that to an age for which Latin is a dead language his art should be, of the two, the more deeply appreciated and admired.

V

It has justly been observed that certain books 'have stood the test of time, and been admired through all the changes which the mind of man has suffered from the various revolutions of knowledge, and the prevalence of contrary customs,' and that 'the long continuance of their reputation proves that they are adequate to our faculties and agreeable to nature.' The classics are endowed with this celestial stability: their beauties have been for twenty centuries before the world, never changing, ever open to those who are willing to undertake the labour of discovering them. Virgil's art will always bring the same delight to those who know his language well enough to appreciate his manipulation of it; but because he himself expended much labour on these matters he claims an equal diligence from his readers. It is the forecast of no irrational pessimism that, as time proceeds, the number of those willing to sacrifice the hours and shoulder the burdens demanded by classical study, simply for the sake of appreciating the gifts which only a knowledge of classical languages can confer, will undergo a steady diminution. The desire for worldly success and for the accumulation of wealth, the passion to keep abreast of current affairs in their ever-increasing complexity, to obtain acquaintance with the swelling volume of the literature of subsequent ages, and to conform to the degraded canons imposed upon literature and æsthetics by a pseudo-scientific criticism—all these operate, and have never

one so more potently than they do at present, against the study nd appreciation of the classics.

Such are the enemies of classical study. It has some-ing also to fear from its own injudicious partisans; for the real ualities of classical literature are never more effectively distorted an by its own misguided and enthusiastic admirers. Their anks, unhappily, show no sign of diminishing, and they assure e classics a prolonged if vicarious existence; 2000 years hence is possible that Virgil will still live—but only in translations, nd only by means of the artificial respiration so often practised pon his works to-day: the breathing into them of a spirit lien to that of their creator.

JOHN SPARROW.

EUGENICAL REFORM

III. The Intelligentsia

Among the social problems of the day none is more difficult than the question, What to do with the Intelligentsia? None also presents greater difficulties to the eugenist. This problem is often overlooked because the intelligentsia is nowhere numerous, its members are not often held in personal esteem, and they are rarely to be found amongst the ruling circles (or rings) of modern societies. So it is hastily assumed that the intelligentsia is a negligible quantity. But the influence an intelligentsia exercises is quite disproportionate to its numbers and personal distinction, and for some purposes is decisive. The purveyors of new ideas of a social or political sort can do little without its aid. The eugenist therefore must seek, if possible, to propitiate the intelligentsia.

Even numerically a more or less extensive intelligentsia is found in all 'civilised' societies. True, it is nowhere dominant, and its treatment varies. Sometimes it is treated brutally, as by Russia, which has made the interesting but hazardous experiment of driving out most of her intelligentsia, and is trying to crush and extirpate the remainder. Nevertheless, the non-Russian intelligentsia is so little 'class-conscious' as to show a good deal of sympathy with the Russian experiment. In Anglo-Saxon countries little intelligentsia is grown, and it is usually treated with tolerant contempt. It is stupidly overlooked that the intelligentsia performs an important social function, well or ill, and may do invaluable public service. It should not be taken for granted, therefore, that an intelligentsia is necessarily worthless or contemptible.

Indeed, it may even be suggested that, as every country has the Jews, so also it has the intelligentsia, it deserves. The Russians should have remembered this, even though their intelligentsia was such as their novelists described, and partly justified their Revolution. Certainly the intelligentsia is a social product, a resultant of social conditions, a by-product of the prevalent education. It is not born, but made, and may be made well

ill. So its *quality* is quite variable. And whether or not a
:iety recognises its responsibility for the quality of its intelli-
ntsia, it can hardly disclaim responsibility for its *quantity*. For
numbers in every country clearly depend on the sort of educa-
m with which the young are nourished.

I have already remarked on one of the characteristics of the
glo-Saxon world, that it does not breed much intelligentsia.
is too healthy and healthy-minded, or too Philistine. It is
o too much addicted to keeping its eye on the main chance,
the pursuit of the almighty dollar, to the making of a career,
support a flourishing intelligentsia. Lastly, it takes itself
all its pursuits too seriously, especially its sports; whereas
intelligentsia is more prone to play than to work, and disposed
make fun of the idols and conventions the masses worship.

It is true, however, that nowhere does the intelligentsia amount
more than an infinitesimal minority. Not that on this account
social importance should be under-rated. It is very important,
ıch more than the rest of society realises, though not perhaps
important as it thinks itself. Not that we should grudge it
good conceit it has of itself. For to think oneself important
the beneficent illusion which sustains and stimulates us all.
ll, the social function which the intelligentsia performs is beyond
ıbt vitally important. For its co-operation is essential to the
:cess of any social movement and to the introduction of any
w idea. If it likes, or rather if it likes it not, it has the power
strangling it, of interposing an impenetrable screen between
ıew idea and the many whom it concerns, and so of preventing
unthinking masses from ever hearing of its existence. That
s is so will appear if we ask the question, What after all *is*
intelligentsia?

I

The intelligentsia may best be defined as a collective term for
people who are interested in ideas. Now most people are not
interested. They have not a mind for ideas, and so are devoid
the personal equipment needed for joining the intelligentsia.
oreover, they cannot *afford* to do so, being far too busy making
eir living. So the intelligentsia presupposes a certain degree
leisure and laxity of attachment to the basic needs of life. Or,
ernatively, a profession or mode of life which entails encounters
:h ideas and demands a certain interest in them.

The idle rich do not supply many recruits to the intelligentsia.
ere are too devoted to sports, too absorbed in the routine of
:ial 'functions,' to spare it more than a few eccentrics. Artistic
d literary circles are more prolific and yield most of those who
uld pride themselves on belonging to the intelligentsia. The

higher journalism also is a great recruiting and play ground for the intelligentsia.

Journalism, moreover, ministers, not only to the economic needs, but also to the intellectual vices, of those who compose the intelligentsia. In other words, journalism not only helps them to make their living, but also titillates their intellectual interests. That is, they have the sort of intelligence which naturally assumes a journalistic attitude towards its objects. So the journalist becomes the typical mouthpiece of the intelligentsia. To understand the latter we must study the journalist.

II

Now the journalist is a very prominent, important, and formidable factor in modern affairs, though he is not, of course, devoid of weaknesses and vices. He has not usually the very highest order of intelligence. Indeed, he is almost bound to be superficial in his judgments, because he has to cultivate a certain facile and flashy but rapidly responsive intelligence, and particularly *because he has no time to think*. He has, no doubt, a certain interest in new things, being more or less of a newspaper man. But not all novelties are news, and they cannot as such reckon on a sympathetic reception by journalists. For one thing, novelties are not always easy to understand, especially at the first and superficial glance, which is usually all that the journalist can afford to bestow upon them. For as we saw, he is often a superficial thinker, and always has to make up his mind in a hurry. Also he has, of course, his prejudices and inveterate habits of thought like other men, while his experience of the world has probably rendered him cynical, and his experience of the manufacture of news sceptical.

So he usually finds it the path of least resistance to ridicule a new idea in an airy, irresponsible but ignorant way, rather than to take the time and trouble to expound it seriously, or even to report it fairly. Especially if he is in the employ of an established organ of conservative public opinion, he will inevitably feel that this for him is the path of safety. For in such an organ everything is cut and dried and must be handled in the traditional and customary manner, lest it should shock the old women of both sexes among its readers. At most a new idea may be ventilated, tentatively and apologetically, during the silly season. For then the strenuousness of close attention to politics or business or athletics may be relaxed a little, and a new idea may occasionally be allowed to disport itself a little in the public Press, especially if it is gaily and suitably arrayed in cap and bells. But usually the journalist will realise that in the eyes of his *clientèle* it is enough for an idea to be new and unfamiliar

it to be regarded with suspicion. It may really be quite rmless and anything but revolutionary. It may even be the y thing the public wants and the salvation, could they but cognise it, of the very people who distrust it and are groaning ider oppressions which it would relieve. It is just the freency of this situation which justifies the description of the Convatives as the stupid party. But the journalist of course ly understands all this, and as a rule he finds that it pays him st to make fun of any new idea he reports. It was for reasons this sort, no doubt, that Aristophanes deluged with ridicule new ideas of the most creative age the world has ever seen, ideas of the Sophists and Socrates, of Euripides and Plato.

Nevertheless, if he conforms a little to convention, the jourlist is in a very strong position intellectually. He has the r of the whole public, and not merely of its long-eared section. r he is the only writer whose writings are read by all, and what says goes. He reaches all, and not merely a small coterie. alone, moreover, is read by the people who matter. The ople who control affairs and really do things that determine course of events, the politicians, business men, and trade ion leaders, do not in general read: still less do they read oks dealing with new ideas. But they must, and do, read wspapers. Hence they become dependent on the journalist their intellectual provender, and hear only of such novelties as latter chooses to impart to them. This may in part account their growing poverty in ideas, their incapacity for construc change, and their pathetic insistence in reiterating wornt and worthless nostrums. A secondary reason for the k of ideas in modern politics is that the enormous size modern States calls for the standardisation of programmes d for machine-made politics, and crushes out practically all lependence and originality of mind. Also the specialists who casionally stumble upon new ideas find it much safer and more igenial not to emerge from the seclusion of their laboratories d lecture-rooms and the obscurity of their technical termiogies, and do not often give the journalist interviews in which can expound and exploit their views. At present it seems to be efly the astronomers who are willing to provide the journalist h 'copy'; but then it is so much safer to express opinions out what is happening at a distance of many thousands of it-years than about the unemployment statistics of the next ish or the prospects of the Lancashire cotton mills.

III

In these circumstances, can the journalist be expected to e an intelligent interest in questions of eugenics? It seems

very doubtful. For the subject seems naturally to lend itself at first to ribaldry of the Aristophanic kind. And even admitting that in time this sort of thing is bound to wear itself out, as a member of the intelligentsia the journalist belongs to a class which is naturally biassed, by its origin and mode of life, against any thorough-going scheme of eugenical reform.

IV

To understand this, we should consider how an intelligentsia grows up in a modern society. It has already been remarked that an intelligentsia is a social product and relative to a definite type of education. It springs up as a natural reaction from the educational methods practised in a country. Now, educational methods are necessarily adapted, in the first instance, to the masses to be educated; consequently they are not altogether suited to the exceptional few. Or, alternatively, they may foster in the latter an excessive consciousness of their superiority, and incite them to look down on the masses with contempt. For both these reasons there is likely to arise an antithesis and antagonism between the masses and the intelligentsia, such that an idea which appeals to the former is not likely to be approved by the latter, and *vice versâ*. Further, it is natural that the educational systems, and generally the social conventions, of any society should arouse criticism, and be seen through by the more penetrating minds in each generation, as they grow up. These minds, moreover, form the natural recruiting ground for the intelligentsia. The outcome is that the intelligentsia is always disposed to be critical of the institutions under which it has grown up, and often is in more or less open and serious revolt against the social order.

Usually, however, the roots of its criticisms do not strike very deep. They apprehend the superficial incongruities and stupidities of social conventions, but not their underlying wisdom. They resent the harshnesses and absurdities of social control and the hardships of hard cases, without realising that some control of individual vagaries is necessary and beneficial: hence they are little disposed to welcome self-control, even as an ideal, and shrink from anything that involves prolonged or 'ascetic' training. Consequently in all affairs of the sexes they are all for 'liberty.' Let everyone do as he pleases, regardless of the future and of the consequences of his acts. Never mind about posterity, which has done nothing for the present generation that it should curtail its freedom. Even as it is, insufficient for the day are the pleasures thereof. So eugenics appears to be merely an addition to the silly restrictions which cramp the style, and stimulate the revolt, of the young intellectual. No doubt he subsequently finds it

expedient to modify these convictions as he grows older, sobers, and settles down to the business of making his way in life; but they are evidently antagonistic to the eugenical concern with the recruiting of the race as a highly responsible undertaking, calling for long views, forethought, and self-sacrifice from all the parties to it. Even after sowing his wild oats the former rebel is hardly likely to be converted to the eugenical ideal; he is much more likely to turn materialist, restrict his family, and to sacrifice his progeny to his ambition.

V

Nor are the other items of the eugenical programme much better suited to appeal to the intelligentsia. The eugenical ideal demands the highest possible development of all human faculties—physical, mental, and moral. So it will look with favour on the bodily exercises and sports which play such a prominent part in our bringing up of the young, and are rightly considered salutary. It will not, of course, content itself with athletics or value them for their own sake; but it will ever bear in mind that the original meaning of 'asceticism' was simply 'training,' and that the ascetic's severities were originally admired (as they still are in India) as athletic feats of spiritual endurance. The intelligentsia, on the other hand, is composed merely of intellectuals. It abhors athletics. Indeed, many of its members probably became intellectuals precisely because they loathed the 'compulsory games' they were made to play at school. Nor have they since learned to love the outdoor life and exercises. Their habitat is urban, or at most suburban; they move and have their being in Fleet Street or on the boulevards. What suggestion, then, could be naturally more repulsive to them than a summons to humanity to go into training to transcend itself, in order that it might attain the far distant end of a superior race? Hardly even the eugenist's reprobation of sexual licence and promiscuous breeding.

There is every reason to fear, therefore, that our regular intelligentsia can never be induced to take up eugenical ideas with any degree of enthusiasm. Most of them will feel that these ideas are too discordant with their mode of life, however cogently they are put forward. Only negative services, therefore, to the cause of eugenics can be expected from most of the intelligentsia. They may be induced to perform their normal social service of taking note of new ideas. They may be willing to talk about them, and to damn them with faint praise. They may even be goaded into disputing and denouncing them. And they may thereby draw attention to them in more important quarters,

in which ideas are not usually noticed at all and which depend on the intelligentsia to become aware of new ideas at all. We should not, therefore, despair of eugenical reform merely because neither the journalist nor the other components of our present intelligentsia can be trusted to provide the motive force needed to bring the case for eugenics effectively before the public. We may get it taken up by other, stronger, and more earnest, social forces.

VI

In what directions shall we look for such support? In the first place, it should be made quite clear that no practicable scheme of eugenic progress should rely at all on politics. It should not presuppose to start with any appreciable amount of State support. It should not require legislation in any notable or revolutionary measure. It should not appeal for help or favours to politicians of any party. For the politician is a broken reed for any real reform to lean on. Considered as a class he is not, in modern democracies, a leader of public opinion, but a follower, even when he is popularly hailed as a leader. He will not, therefore, blaze a trail into unexplored regions of thought or action, though when someone else has pointed out the way he may sometimes be prevailed upon to advance along it, cautiously and timorously, if he can be persuaded that not too many of his adherents will become stragglers by the wayside. He is too keenly conscious that his primary duties are to keep his party together and to repeat its slogans, to keep his ear to the ground and to keep a sharp eye on the impending saltations of the electoral cat, just round the corner and outside his range of vision. Consequently his political programme is essentially composed of ground-bait for votes and ephemeral devices for evading pressing problems and tiding over the week-end. When he *has* to adopt a new expedient he is more likely than not to clutch at any nostrum that promises to extricate him from a difficulty of the moment. In short, in a democracy at any rate, he has to be more or less of a humbug and an opportunist, who cannot afford to look far ahead, and who most of the time has as little knowledge of what waters he is steering the Ship of State into as his blindest followers. The eugenist therefore should not look to politics for aid; he may, however, rest assured that *when* he has proved his case and converted the public, politicians will be ready enough to advocate any legislation that may be requisite or desirable.

In default of the politicians, the journalists and the intelligentsia proper, in what directions shall we look for the necessary social support of eugenical endeavours? There would appear to be two great professions which it should be possible

to interest in eugenics and whose support might prove sufficient. Though not normally to be numbered among the intelligentsia proper, because too much preoccupied with their professional work to have much attention to bestow on ideas in general, they might perform the functions of an intelligentsia for the purpose in hand, because of the great affinity of the eugenical idea for their professional work, and its very direct bearing upon their problems.

Hence if any considerable proportion of these professions could be converted to eugenics the case for eugenics would be effectively brought before the public. The professions in question are the doctors and the teachers. The former even now are probably in a latent sympathy with eugenics, which needs merely to be organised and rendered vocal: for their professional work must have made them very extensively aware of the evils which result from the dysgenical practices of our present civilisation. And they know, of course, the many defects of man's bodily machine, the limitations of the medical art, and the need for a radical improvement in our physical endowment if the possibilities of a healthy and happy existence are to be widely realised. Many of them must know also that, in spite of the many and magnificent achievements of modern medical science, they are fighting a losing battle with disease, simply because the material upon which they exercise their art is progressively deteriorating. This deterioration, doubtless, makes more work for doctors, and work for more doctors; but the medical profession as a whole may surely be credited with rising above a narrow professionalism and with willingness to bring about an improvement in the human race.

But their sympathy with this cause is nevertheless subject to certain professional limitations. Because the defects they encounter and are called upon to cure are primarily *physical*, they are inclined to lay a somewhat exclusive and one-sided stress on the physical items in the eugenical programme. They hardly realise that it would be vain to turn man into a better *animal*, if one did not simultaneously develop in him a better *mind* and better *morals*. Further, the ordinary doctor has to be careful how he assumes the part of a social reformer. He must not affront the prejudices of his patients, he must be cautious in advocating anything which is very much in advance of public opinion. It is only the leaders of the profession, the big specialists and consultants, who are in a position to speak out and to give the public a lead. Happily, some of them have already done so, and others could no doubt be persuaded to follow suit.

VII

In this respect what is true of the doctors holds also largely of the teachers. They, too, have to be circumspect, and many of

them, especially headmasters, are apt to carry circumspection to the pitch of complete conventionality. But in other respects they have several advantages over the doctors. In the first place, they have direct access to the young, the hope of humanity when it is a question of progressive change—that is, to minds which are still plastic and receptive of new ideas, and not yet fossilised and sunk in ruts of habit. Moreover, they are more directly, and quite specially, concerned with the intellectual and moral features of the eugenical programme, for intellectual training is almost entirely, and moral training is very largely, in their charge. Finally, in this country at least, they have not a little to say also about the bodily training of the young. If converted to eugenics, and properly instructed, therefore, they could transform public opinion with almost miraculous rapidity. They could impress on their pupils the unitary nature of education as a harmonising of all faculties, a realising of all possibilities, a training for all-round fitness. They could develop and expand youthful admiration for physical prowess into aspiration to all-round excellence—as, indeed, they already often try to do. In short, they could put to shame the sordid reality of our actual conditions by holding out to the young, and through them to their cynical seniors, the glittering ideal of a better world inhabited by *intrinsically better* men, stronger, healthier, cleverer, nobler, more self-controlled and more beautiful, than the accidents of evolution and the incidents of history have allowed us to become.

VIII

If the teachers and the doctors can be converted to eugenics, we shall hardly need any further help. But of course they will need to be instructed by the 'pure' scientists, primarily the biologists, but also the physiologists, psychologists, and sociologists. But in social affairs too much must not be expected from pure science. For the pure scientists are too deeply corroded with 'scientific caution' to intervene in social questions. This means, mostly, that they are so specialised that they are not interested in the applications of science: also that they are not heroes, and shrink from taking responsibilities. Moreover, few of them are able to free the expression of their thought sufficiently from technicality, to render it intelligible to those that do not share their specialty. Lastly, it should not perhaps surprise us to find that many of them should insist on postponing all action upon undisputed scientific knowledge until some distant day when certain purely technical controversies which engross them have been finally settled. These do not reflect that it makes little or no difference to the practical applications of eugenics

ether the Lamarckians or the Darwinians or the Mendelians right about the disputed points in their several theories of edity, and that meanwhile the people are perishing, because hing is done to stop their deteriorating in a suicidal social order ich prefers to recruit itself from its admittedly inferior stocks.

IX

:t may excite surprise that there should not have been in this nexion any mention of a great profession to which in former 's any question involving moral issues would most certainly .'e been referred for authoritative decision. But it is precisely matters of faith and morals that we can no longer look for dance to the clerical profession. Unfortunately for us and for elf it has been reduced to silence and no longer ventures to ce heard its voice in the discussion of the new problems which et us. Its declared policy has been so rigid a conservatism t it has lost its intellectual initiative. For over 1500 years : Christian Churches have not seen fit officially to introduce alteration into the Creeds in which they stereotyped the elations with which they had been entrusted. By so doing y have intimated not obscurely that the immense growth of ular knowledge during this period has been totally devoid piritual significance, and has added nothing to our under-nding of the nature and meaning of life. In this they may have n right, though it does not look probable.

But it is obviously false that the enormous changes in social ditions and in the organisation of human life which have taken ce since the decay of the Roman Empire have made no differ-e to Christian ethics. Though all the Churches are reluctant admit it, the contents of morals change, and moral valuations slowly but surely adjusted to the conditions of life, even though forms of obligation persist. So the clerical claim that morals immutable and unprogressive is not maintainable in practice, i in face of the facts. Actually striking changes have occurred moral valuations. The 'contemplative' life of the hermit l the monk is no longer regarded as the highest ideal of conduct, n in Catholic countries, and the Promised Land of the ascetic been shifted to Tibet. Nor is indiscriminate alms-giving ounted a virtue any longer. Of the Seven Deadly Sins two east are practically obsolete; for no one now would seriously kon 'acedia' and gluttony among the seven worst of moral ings, while the reprobation of avarice has been tempered by a ognition of its affinity with the saving disposition which is a valuable asset in modern economy. In many countries the and customs of marriage and divorce are in constant flux, and

no one can foresee in what institutions their evolution will end. The Church of Rome, which has most prided herself on her rigid adherence to apostolic tradition, has come nearest to upholding the ancient standards; but even Rome has woefully failed to preserve a decent length of the feminine skirt, and is fighting a losing battle against the practice of birth-control to which the Anglican bishops have just made a graceful but unavoidable surrender. The fate which has overtaken the dogma of Papal infallibility, however, most signally illustrates the drawbacks of a 'standpat' policy. The Pope is infallible in his pronouncements *ex cathedra* on matters of faith and morals; but this privilege is so dangerous to use that he never divulges *when* he is making such infallible pronouncements!

Thus by their unprogressiveness the Churches have lost control over the movements of opinion and the changes of valuations. They have incurred also the more serious charge of a lack of faith in their own mission. For ought they not to have *used* the capital of truth with which they were endowed to advance to *further* truths? Have they not acted exactly like the man in the parable who to preserve his talent buried it, instead of using it to earn more? So the social reformer finds himself forced to neglect the Churches. He cannot expect any active support from them; but neither need he fear any effective opposition. He may rest assured that if and when he succeeds in carrying through a salutary change in social ethics without their aid they will discover that it is quite in order, and by no means contrary to Scripture.

X

To conclude: the prospects of eugenics, though anything but assured, are not hopeless. For though there exist great masses of dulness and inertia to be moved, and though nothing more than partial and half-hearted support will be forthcoming from our present intelligentsia, there exist also social forces which can be effectively enlisted in a eugenical crusade, which will convince the country of the very urgent need for eugenical reform. For such propaganda the Eugenics Society is not unlikely to be equipped with the necessary means. For, happily, the fortune left to it, very appropriately by a successful farmer, Mr. Henry Twitchin, enables it to make a vigorous beginning in the arduous enterprise of converting an ignorant and unbelieving world.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

SOME AFRICAN ANIMALS

THIS article is not intended as a fragment of a technical zoological *opus*, nor as a recital of the detailed adaptations or strange life-histories of a few of the continent's hundreds of thousands of animal species, nor yet as a bit of popular natural history concerning its larger mammals and other prominent creatures, already almost too well, and certainly too much, described. It is merely an attempt to set down some of the most striking facts of animal life observed by a three-months' traveller who happens also to be a biologist, and some of the trains of thought to which they give rise.

In the first place, Africa is the continent most remarkable for the number and variety of its large mammals. Where else can you see a hundred great aquatic beasts, like hippo, in one glance, find creatures like giraffe, as tall as watch-towers, see herds of a thousand head—zebra, gnu, gazelle, and all the other various buck—or hear the roaring of lions so often and so readily ? Where else can one still discover big animals new to science, like the okapi, the giant forest-hog, or the strange hyena-like creature only this year sent back from Uganda ? Africa boasts the largest of all living land animals, the largest fresh-water mammal, and two of the three lone survivors of man's nearest kin, the higher anthropoid apes.

Many have marvelled at this abundance of large life, so spectacularly displayed to the traveller arriving from the coast before his train windows : but why is it so ? We can marvel, partly because at home in temperate countries we have killed off all the big creatures until there is little left to marvel at. Partly, too, because Africa is tropical ; for though in sheer numbers of animals temperate regions may rival the tropics, yet the tropics, with their richness and their permanent luxuriance, will always excel in variety. And partly because Central Africa, though tropical, is largely dry. Where the tropics are not dry, all the solid ground in them is covered with forest. And forest is bad country for seeing game. Game there may be in abundance, but it will not be in large herds ; nor will it ever be conspicuous. But Africa east of the Congo basin and the western Rift is largely a

dry country, with broad arid plains, 3000 to 5000 feet above sea level. Here you can readily see any game that exists. And though the grass may often be scanty, and much of it dries right up in the dry season, yet the extent of the country is so vast that the great herds can simply migrate from one plain to another, from open plains to river-banks, from river-banks to foot-hills, as the need arises.

The pampas and other plains of eastern South America might show us a fauna almost equally amazing; but during the last Ice Age some strange fate overtook the great majority of its members, and the horses, the tank-armadilloes, the giant sloths, the toxodonts, and other queer ungulates of many types no longer found upon the earth, were all mysteriously extinguished, at most a few hundred thousand years ago.

But if climatic changes in other parts of the world have helped to leave the African zoo unique, man has also helped. He has cleared the lions out of the lands north and east of the Mediterranean, the elephant out of the North African littoral, the wolves out of England, the bears and urochs out of Central Europe, the bison out of the great American plains. And he has been at it since the old Stone Age; it is quite likely that the extinction of creatures like the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros was due as much to human destructive skill as to change of climate. Whatever the multiplicity of causes, the East African fauna of large animals is unrivalled. May man at last turn from destroyer to preserver and keep it in its full glory.

But in many ways the birds and small creatures of Africa are more remarkable than the large mammals, and certainly less well known. I will begin with a fact about flowers which links on to animal life. Even the most casual observer in East Africa must be struck by the abundance of red flowers—not pink, like our temperate campions or thrifts or pinks, nor mixed with blue to give a purple-red, like our foxgloves or milkworts, knapweeds or dead-nettles—but real red, pure scarlet or pure flame. The erythrina tree lights innumerable hillsides with its tufted fires of scarlet, all the more conspicuous because every leaf is shed before it blooms. Then there are the flame-trees and the flamboyants which make Dar-es-Salaam so violently bright in their season. There are the leonotus, common plants of the wayside, tall herbs with a series of round balls of flame-orange flowers; there are scarlet frizzy-headed lilies in Uganda woods; there are the magnificent hibiscus, big red trumpets with stamens and pistil protruding far and proudly like the trumpet's jet of sound made visible; red-hot pokers, orange-red aloes, and many other red-flowered plants.

I had been struck by this riot of red, but had not troubled my head to ask myself why. However, I suppose the habit of looking

for reasons gets so ingrained in the scientist that I had asked the question subconsciously. Anyhow, one day the answer flashed into my mind unsought. It is because of the many flower-visiting birds, the abundant members of the family Nectariniidæ, or sun-birds, which get most of their nourishment from nectar, supplemented by the insects they find in and by the corollas. Now bees have eyes which are sensitive to some of the ultra-violet rays invisible to us: but to red they are not attuned—it is no colour to them at all, but merely blackness. Birds, on the other hand, are sensitive to red; and whether they actually prefer it, or whether the flowers that set out to attract birds have developed a colour invisible to insects so as to remain unvisited by creatures to which they are not adapted, and by which they cannot be fertilised, it is certainly true that, just as the generality of moth-flowers, destined to be visited at night, are white and scented, so the generality of bird-flowers are red. And this scarlet of the bird-flowers, forced on them by natural selection, is in itself further dependent upon tropical conditions. For birds to exist whose staple of existence is provided by flowers you must have a land where flowers can bloom all the year round. Not only that, but birds small enough to visit flowers must live in a warm climate, for in a cold one the relatively huge amount of surface which they expose would make it very hard for them to keep up their temperature.

If tropical warmth is one of the chain of causes which gives rise to sun-birds, honey-eaters, humming-birds, and the red flowers with which their existence is bound up, it has other more direct and more serious consequences. It encourages reptiles and insects at the expense of birds and mammals. Birds and mammals share a peculiarity which is one of the triumphs of evolution: their tissues are no longer subjected to the varying temperature of the outer environment, for they live in an internal environment whose temperature is constant. They possess not only their own heating system, but one whose heat is regulated. It is on account of this that mammals and birds can penetrate far up into high latitudes, while reptiles and amphibia cannot. To take but one example, the British Isles possess half a dozen species of amphibians and all north Central Europe only a dozen; East Africa about 200. The difference of mean annual temperature between Northern Europe and Central Africa is about 20 degrees C.: and as a result the mean annual activity of a cold-blooded animal is about six times as great in Uganda as it is in Yorkshire. Thus it is no wonder that mammals and birds, while pre-eminent in temperate latitudes, have to share their supremacy with reptiles and insects in the tropics.

It is perhaps the insects that impress one most of all in Africa

—the mere numerical quantity of them (where but in the tropics could you have lights put out by insects and run the risk of suffocation by them, as is narrated of the lake-fly ?), their appalling variety (the layman perhaps does not grasp the fact that the number of kinds of African insect is to be reckoned, not by mere thousands, but is of the order of magnitude of a hundred thousand; nor that dozens of new species are being discovered and described every year), their ceaseless activity all the year round (for there is no winter, and the dry season is only a very relative check to their activity), and the number of them that are engaged in spreading disease, attacking crops, or otherwise damaging man and his property.

Africa's big animals have been photographed almost *ad nauseam*. I endeavoured to get pictures of some of these smaller creatures. One should, of course, have a great deal of time and patience for any sort of nature photography, but with a fixed programme I had no chance of searching for subjects, and could only take the rare opportunities that presented themselves. And even these I sometimes missed. I bungled a fine chance of five dung-beetles making themselves balls of dung out of a single piece of excrement, and, owing to sheer laziness (no one who has not walked a long way under an equatorial sun knows the distaste for further expenditure of energy which one can thus acquire in Africa !), I failed to walk a quarter of a mile to get my camera for a picture of a river—there is no other word—of driver ants, and another day another quarter of a mile for about 200 butterflies of about twenty different kinds, all drinking at one little patch of wet mud. But a very large praying mantis having flown into the rest-house one night, I secured him in a glass and made a portrait of him next morning. The mantids are among the relatively few carnivorous insects—a fantastic epitome of miniature but cruel voracity. And later I got a photograph of a large caterpillar still crawling about though covered with the white cocoons of ichneumon-flies, and therefore eaten out inside to little more than a walking shell—another horrible product of Nature's amorality, confutation in itself of all the sentimentalism about a purposeful and beneficent Creator.

It is, however, the ants and the termites which are the most wonderful small creatures of the tropics, and I secured one or two pictures of these. One of the most familiar sights in East Africa is gall-acacia scrub. Gall-acacias grow in dry, barren country; they are pretty when in leaf, and still more when covered with their little scented flower-balls; but for most of the year they are nasty little trees, anywhere from 3 to 30 feet high, armed with formidable spines 1½ inches long, and dotted over with peculiar black swellings the size of a large chestnut. These

rellings are the galls, and they are almost invariably inhabited living colonies of ants. Tap a gall, and out of the little entry-s which they have gnawed there swarm a couple of dozen tle black ants, to rush about angrily, with abdomen stuck :aight up in air, looking for the intruder. There must be many illions of gall-acacias in East Africa; each acacia will bear ores, or even hundreds, of galls; and most of the galls will .rbour dozens of ants. There seems little reason to doubt that e ants help in protecting the plant. The thorns keep bigger imals from the leaves, while the ants deal with lesser enemies. nere is also no doubt that the ants take on the *rôle* of guardians erely because they find convenient houses provided for them in e shape of the galls. But nobody knows for certain whether e acacia grows these structures unaided, or whether some :itation or secretion of the ants is needed to set the plant proli-ating the gall, as that of other animals is needed for other galls. . favour of the latter alternative is the fact that now and again u see a gall-acacia without galls, though growing in the midst gall-bearing trees.

Termites are more essentially tropical than ants; one has idea of their prevalence till one goes to a hot country. Coming .ck from the Congo through western Uganda, we came round a rner into view of a plain extending several miles and apparently vered with corn-stooks. Corn-stooks, on the Uganda plains— gave one a queer feeling of unreality; but then suddenly we .mbled to the fact that they were all termite-nests, hundreds on hundreds of them, 5 or 6 feet high, spaced over the plain at gular intervals of about 30 yards. These were comparatively nall nests; other kinds of termites built nests 15 feet high or ore. One biggish nest was dug open for me. It was exciting see their little underground gardens, chambers filled with the hite mass of the special fungus which they cultivate. And most :citing of all was the royal chamber in which lives the bloated ieen, repulsive beyond all belief in her flabby pink-whitishness. er stretched skin is so translucent that you have sight of tubes id strings floating about in the liquid interior: one thanked God r the opacity of the human abdomen. By her side is the king, er spouse, not a hundredth of her bulk, but yet bigger than any the other misshapen specialists that make up a termite nation. ne natives call him the *askari*—the policeman. I took the ieen out and put her in a soap-dish for the night. She is so ined up to egg-production that she cannot restrain herself; efore morning well over 1000 eggs—little long-oval whitish things -had been laid by her.

Another peculiarity of ant and termite life in the tropics is at, with the intensity of competition, many species have taken

to the trees, where they make compact nests either of rammed earth or of carton—chewed wood-pulp. None of the tree-termite nests that I examined had any of the typical soldiers, huge-jawed and massive-headed, which defend the ordinary ground nests. In their place there swarm out as defenders the most fantastic creatures, their heads swollen and drawn out into a neck like phials. In point of fact, their heads *are* phials. They are filled with glands which secrete a horribly adhesive material, and their method of fighting is to squeeze some of this out at the hole at the tip of the phial-spout, thoroughly gumming up their enemies. They thus share with a few other insects, modern men, and skunks the distinction of having invented chemical warfare. All worker termites—another fantastic and rather horrible fact—are white and pigmentless and cannot stand the light of day. In order not to waste any working time, however, they build tunnels of wood-pulp down the trunk of the tree so as to get at decaying wood and other food on the ground below. Break open one of these tunnels, and you will see the double file of these wretched gnomes hurry away into safe obscurity.

Then protective coloration and mimicry, with the greater intensity of competition in the tropics, runs to a pitch beyond what one is accustomed to at home. Grey-brown grasshoppers pulled out to look like sticks, green grasshoppers striped like grass leaves, brown grasshoppers with their bodies and legs all distorted to give them the semblance of a dead leaf on the ground, bugs modelled to seem like thorns or like seeds, spiders like bird-droppings, spiders mimicking ants, with their one-too-many pair of legs held out to simulate the antennæ which they lack—the most casual search reveals wonder after wonder.

It is a matter of great surprise that more people in Africa do not take up some branch of natural history as a hobby. If you have the collector's instinct, there are still thousands of new species waiting to be discovered and described. There is always the chance of enduring fame—*ære perennior*—in having a new animal baptised *Smithi*, or whatever your name may be. If you are more interested in the habits of living things and the meaning of natural phenomena, the unexplored field is much more vast and rich. And yet ninety-nine out of every hundred white men and women in Africa neglect all this, prefer to spend their superfluous energies on golf, tennis and bridge, and when not pining for their next leave home make their lives as faithful a copy as possible of what they would have been in a London suburb or an English county town, instead of taking advantage of the unique opportunities which Africa spreads before them.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY.

EMILY BRONTË

It is perhaps easier for the imaginative biographer to write about Emily Brontë than about almost any other literary celebrity, for the simple reason that so little is known about her, and he is therefore able to re-create her in his own image, or in any other image that he may happen to prefer. More than one such writer has of late taken full advantage of this fair opportunity for conjecture, even to the length of finding in her greatest poem, *No Coward Soul is Mine,* 'Satan's hymn to God!' It may be well, therefore, to get back for a moment to the hard facts which underlie the problem of that strangely arresting personality.

Next to her genius, the most astonishing thing about Emily Brontë is the silence which surrounds her life. Charlotte and Branwell both made bosom friends who kept their letters and treasured their sayings; Anne won the affection of her pupils and employers; but Emily made no friends, and shunned acquaintances. Even in the intimacy of the family circle she kept back a large part of herself. When she was dead and famous, those who had known her searched their memories for revealing traits, and found, possibly to their own surprise and certainly to our loss, that they could remember nothing that was really worth remembering. 'She was taller than her sisters; she lived on porridge and milk-puddings; she played the piano; she did the house work and helped in the kitchen; she was fond of dogs; she walked on the moors'—and that was generally all. Long after Charlotte's death, Miss Ellen Nussey, who had enjoyed special opportunities, revived the memories of her first visit to Haworth in 1833. She was writing to a literary acquaintance about her famous literary friends, and she strove to be worthy of the occasion. Whenever Ellen Nussey tried to write worthily of her famous literary friends her style and diction are 'things to thank God for'; but she comes nearer than anybody else to telling us something significant about Emily at the age of fifteen. She describes her as having a 'lithesome, graceful figure,' naturally beautiful hair, unbecomingly worn, 'no complexion,' and 'kind kindling eyes,' which were sometimes dark grey, and

at others dark blue; 'but she did not often look at you: she was too reserved.' Then Miss Nussey continues:

In fine suitable weather delightful rambles were made over the moors, and down into glens and ravines that here and there broke the monotony of the moorland. The rugged bank and rippling brook were treasures of delight. Emily, Anne, and Branwell used to ford the streams and sometimes placed stepping stones for the other two. There was always a lingering delight in these sports. . . . Emily especially had a gleesome delight in these nooks of beauty—her reserve for the time vanished.

'One long ramble in those early days' had brought the party to a remote spot 'familiar to Emily and Anne, which they called "the Meeting of the Waters."'

Seated here, we were hidden from all the world, nothing appearing in view but miles and miles of heather, a glorious blue sky, and brightening sun. A fresh breeze wafted on us its exhilarating radiance; we laughed, and made mirth of each other, and settled we would call ourselves the quartette. Emily, half-reclining on a slab of stone, played like a young child with the tadpoles in the water, making them swim about, and then fell to moralising on the strong and the weak, the brave and the cowardly, as she chased them with her hand. No serious cloud of sorrow had so far cast its gloom on nature's youth and buoyancy, and nature's simplest offerings were fountains of pleasure and enjoyment.

Thus Ellen Nussey; and because of the beautiful kindling dark-grey dark-blue eyes, because, too, she was said to have been a pretty baby, and because it would heighten the pathos of her early death, some sentimental writers have persuaded themselves that Emily Brontë was beautiful. It would be unfair to judge of her appearance from existing portraits. No beauty, however brilliant, could have survived the ordeal of being painted by Branwell. But none of her contemporaries found Emily beautiful or even attractive. If they had, they would certainly have said so. We should probably have thought her ugly—at all events, at first sight. The Brontë nose did not make for beauty. As for the reserve which Miss Nussey noted as a salient characteristic at fifteen, it grew with years into an almost impenetrable aloofness. Did Anne ever penetrate behind it and read her sister's soul? It is impossible to say, for Anne died within a few months of Emily, leaving no records except her simple poems and her two novels. Ellen Nussey says that in their childhood the two youngest of the Brontë girls were like twins, always together and always in harmony. They had collaborated over the Gondal stories, and paced arm-in-arm round the parlour table. Probably Anne understood her sister's moods better than anybody else; but it is difficult to believe that she could have sympathised with, or even understood, that sister's deepest and most daring thoughts. Their minds were cast in very different moulds. At all events,

in her last, grim, obstinate, struggle with death Emily held both her sisters at arm's length, and wrung their hearts by refusing to accept their aid or sympathy.

As for Charlotte, it was not till 1845, when she discovered the little washing-book, in which Emily's poems were written in a microscopic hand, and took the liberty (fiercely resented by the owner) of reading them, that she even guessed the depths which lay behind her sister's reserve. From that moment her sisterly affection was tinged with feelings both of admiration and remorse—remorse for her failure to appreciate Emily at her true value and win her confidence. She tried hard to bridge the gulf which time and habit had dug between them, and of which she herself was now acutely conscious. But it was too late. In December of 1848 Emily passed for ever beyond her reach. 'Death stepped tacitly and took her,' and Charlotte's grief was all the more poignant, because it was so full of 'might-have-beens.'

That is the impression which one receives from Charlotte's letters at this period. But it seems more than doubtful whether the 'might-have-beens' could ever have been realised. Charlotte was, though she did not know it, just the kind of elder sister to whom a rather shy and sensitive genius could never have opened its secret doors—practical, critical, and quietly, kindly, but persistently, dominating. She and Emily could never have been kindred spirits. Their minds and imaginations moved on different planes. With all her insight into character, Charlotte could never have understood, or entered into, the poetic temperament of her sister.

So Emily Brontë died at the age of thirty, an enigma in her own generation and in her father's house, and all that we really know about her inner life and thoughts is contained in her writings—some poems and a single novel. We may be quite sure that she did not reveal the whole of herself in what she wrote, and reasonably sure that she did not always herself understand whither the spirit was driving her. We cannot reconstruct her, as she was, from the glimpses which she gives us into the workings of her mind; but we can at least draw certain inferences which help to explain both her reserve and the nature and quality of her work.

All children, when they are thrown much upon their own resources, create for themselves an imaginary world which becomes as real as, and far more exciting than, the actual facts of everyday existence. The Brontë children were thrown much upon their own resources, and the happiest hours of their childhood were spent in dreaming dreams. For most people this imaginary world fades into the distance with adolescence, partly because the wings of their imagination are incapable of further

expansion, and partly because their everyday life becomes either too full or too absorbing to leave time for dreams. But Emily was a poet, and her wings continued to expand. For her, the life of the imagination remained the most real, and the only truly satisfying, part of existence. She could feel significance and beauty (on the moors, for example) with an intensity which was rapture, and, what was peculiarly characteristic of herself; she continued to feel them in those vague, but passionate, yearnings which are the experience of childhood. Two things seem to stand out clearly from her poetry.

(1) She was conscious of a sense of loneliness, sometimes terrifying, and sometimes exhilarating; terrifying, when it made the world seem bleak and empty; exhilarating, when it made her feel in harmony with the elemental forces of Nature.

(2) She had a craving for some absorbing kind of love, of which possession was the essence, though the body counted for little in it—a love that was at once passionate and sexless.

But Emily did not only dream; she thought, and she had a powerful and original mind. We do not know how much she read of contemporary poetry—probably not much. But she must almost certainly have been familiar with *Adonais*. Here is Shelley:

> He is made one with Nature: there is heard
> His voice in all her music, from the moan
> Of thunder to the song of night's sweet bird;
> He is a presence to be felt and known
> In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
> Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
> Which has withdrawn his being to its own:
> Which wields the world with never wearièd love,
> Sustains it from beneath, and kindles it above.

And here is Emily Brontë:

(*a*)

> And thou art now a Spirit pouring
> Thy presence into all:
> The essence of the tempest's roaring,
> And of the tempest's fall.

(*b*)

> With wide-embracing love
> Thy spirit animates eternal years,
> Pervades and broods above,
> Changes, sustains, dissolves, creates and rears.

The plagiarism was no doubt unconscious; but the resemblance is almost too great to be a mere coincidence. Possibly Branwell had recited the lines to his sisters, and Emily had assimilated them. He seems to have been fond of spouting Shelley.

Be that as it may, *No Coward Soul is Mine* is a great intellectual, as well as a great spiritual, achievement.

And that was the trouble. The inner life of Emily Brontë, the thoughts which she thought and the dreams which she dreamed, had no relevance to 'that state of life into which it had pleased God to call her.' This was true to some extent of Charlotte also; but it was much harder for Emily to adjust herself to the claims of real life, because she lacked some of those normal sympathies and affections which help to make life interesting. She could feel significance and beauty in the wildest forms of Nature, but not in the lives, loves, joys and sorrows of those amongst whom her lot was cast. She was fond of animals, but not of children. She did not care for people. She had no curiosity to enter into, and explore, their minds; and her own she instinctively bolted and barred in their presence. She was more alone in company than in a solitude which she could people with her fancies, and only on the moors did she feel herself wholly in communion with something outside herself.

Such a clash between the demands of the inner self and the claims of life would, in many, have ended in revolt. But Emily Brontë was no rebel. Grimly and stoically she accepted the facts of life, and to the daughters of the Rev. Patrick Brontë, until the publication of their novels in 1847 had opened up new vistas, the facts of life meant the ultimate choice between a situation as governess in a private house and teaching in a school. Sooner or later—and it always seemed likely to be sooner rather than later—Mr. Brontë must die. There would no longer be a home at Haworth or anywhere else, and they would all have to earn their daily bread. To be prepared for the inevitable, to acquire useful knowledge, in order to be able to impart it to others—that was the plain duty which the Brontë girls felt to be imposed upon them by the circumstances of their life. For Emily it involved a very stern self-discipline. She must sacrifice the life of the imagination with its fearful joys and 'rapturous anguish,' and learn to live 'without the aid of joy.' She tried; but, courageous though she was, both physically and morally, it is interesting to note that she twice had to admit defeat. The first occasion was when, at the age of seventeen, she accompanied Charlotte to Roe Head (a particularly friendly, cheerful and happy school), pined for three months, like a wild bird in a cage, and had to be sent home. The second, when, three years later, she went as mistress to Law Hill School, Southowram, near Halifax, and resigned her post after six unhappy months. Whilst there was still a home at Haworth, Emily could not live anywhere else. But the future must have loomed very dark for her, for the pathetically futile idea that the three sisters, without adequate

capital, could set up a school of their own, could only have been envisaged by her as a mitigated form of bondage. In this connexion Charlotte wrote to M. Héger: 'Emilie n'aime pas beaucoup l'instruction, mais elle s'occuperait du ménage, et quoiqu'un peu recluse, elle a trop bon cœur pour ne pas faire son possible pour les enfants.'

Thus far Emily Brontë seems to explain herself. But there is one poem which, if it is really autobiographical, would make nonsense of the foregoing analysis of her character. Familiar as the lines are, they must be quoted in full.

Cold in the earth—and the deep snow piled above thee,
  Far, far removed, cold in the dreary grave,
Have I forgot, my only Love, to love thee,
  Severed at last by Time's all-severing wave?

Now, when alone, do my thoughts no longer hover
  Over the mountains on that northern shore,
Resting their wings where heath and fern-leaves cover
  Thy noble heart for ever, evermore?

Cold in the earth—and fifteen wild Decembers
  From those brown hills have melted into spring;
Faithful indeed is the spirit that remembers
  After such years of change and suffering.

Sweet Love of youth, forgive, if I forget thee,
  While the world's tide is bearing me along,
Other desires and other hopes beset me,
  Hopes which obscure, but cannot do thee wrong.

No later light has lightened up my heaven,
  No second morn has ever shone for me;
All my life's bliss from thy dear life was given,
  All my life's bliss is in the grave with thee.

But when the days of golden dreams had perished,
  And even Despair was powerless to destroy,
Then did I learn how existence could be cherished,
  Strengthened and fed, without the aid of joy.

Then did I check the tears of useless passion,
  Weaned my young soul from yearning after thine,
Sternly denied its burning wish to hasten
  Down to that tomb already more than mine.

And even yet I dare not let it languish,
  Dare not indulge in memory's rapturous pain,
Once drinking deep of that divinest anguish,
  How could I seek the empty world again?

Most people, apparently, take this poem literally, and believe that, at one period of her life, Emily was passionately in love with somebody whose identity has never been divulged. The lines must almost certainly have been composed in Brussels, when she

: twenty-four, for at no other time was Emily far away (as poem implies) from 'that northern shore' and its beloved ıntains. The theme, it should be noticed, is fidelity to a and only Love *after a long lapse of years*—'fifteen wild :embers.' We need not be pedantic about the number '15.' if 'severed at last by Time's all-severing wave,' and 'After h years of change and suffering,' mean anything, they mean a stantial period of time, and any substantial period of time we may fix on takes Emily back to her early teens. But .rt from this, is it credible that, if there had been any love ry in her life, Emily, most reticent and reserved of women, ld have published to the world a secret so intimate and so red, even under an assumed name? That there is passion in poem, nobody will deny. But Emily was a poet, and poets feel passionately about imagined experiences, as well as about ir contacts with real life. If they did not, Tennyson (to take instance only) could never have written *Maud*. There is sion and romance in *Maud*, yet in his actual relations with nen Tennyson was never either passionate or romantic. It ıs reasonable therefore to suppose, though Romance would h it otherwise, that this poem is true only of that imaginary ld in which Emily lived her happiest and also her most gnant hours, and still to see her, as she appeared to her conıporaries, unapproachable by mortal man.

For those who live by the imagination, and find the real world ıty of delight, there is a supreme joy in filling its emptiness h the creations of their own brain. Emily must have known joy when she was writing *Wuthering Heights*. Yet, judged ıny ordinary standards, she was singularly ill-equipped for the of novel-writing. Charlotte, from the age of five, had been a ical, and rather censorious, student of character, but Emily's uaintance with human nature, as it existed outside herself, of the slightest. She did not even know the people in her ı parish. She had heard them talk, and she had listened to father's strange stories about them—which must have sug:ed the prevalence of a harsh brutality—but she had never d to enter into their lives. 'My sister's disposition,' wrote rlotte in the preface to a second edition of *Wuthering Heights*, ıs not naturally gregarious; circumstances favoured and ered her tendency to seclusion; except to go to church or a walk on the hills, she seldom crossed the threshold of home. ugh her feeling for the people round was benevolent, interrse with them was never sought; nor, with very few exceps, ever experienced.'

Nelly Dean is, no doubt, a more or less faithful portrait of ıby Brown, the devoted friend and servant at the parsonage,

but for the other characters in her story Emily had to draw upon her own imaginative experience of life, which is a very different thing from 'holding up the mirror to Nature.' Most of her characters have the unreasoned loves, hates, and cruelty of children, and in Heathcliff are incarnate the loneliness and the yearning for a passionate yet almost sexless love which haunt her poetry. At any moment the story might become ridiculous; but there is a strange power behind it, which makes it always fascinating and sometimes terrifying. In hardly any other book are we so constantly aware of genius, for we see it continually at work transforming the potentially absurd into the poignant or the horrible. And the effect is immensely heightened by Emily's gift for creating atmosphere and background—an atmosphere in which we cease to ask, 'Is this possible?' It matters not what house is the original of Wuthering Heights; we know the place in all its moods as well as we know our own home; and what Emily felt about the moors she has conveyed to us in a prose which, at its best, is unsurpassed in its effortless beauty.

If the 'Dear Sir' of Mr. Newby's letter, found in the rosewood desk which was once Emily's, was addressed to Ellis and not to Acton Bell (which seems unlikely), Emily had contemplated a second novel. One would guess *a priori* that she could only have repeated the Heathcliff theme in a different and, probably, a less convincing form. But it is of the essence of genius to confound the wise. As a poet, certainly, she still had much to say. The range of her genius had its obvious limits, but within those limits what might she not have achieved!

G. F. BRADBY.

THE LETTERS OF NAUSICAA

I. HOW THE *ODYSSEY* WAS WRITTEN

A FANTASY

Ithaca.

HERMIONE DARLING,

I loved your wonderful long letter all about your time in Argos. How wise of Daddy to teach us both to read and write. It must be fun being a princess in a great kingdom in the middle of things, entertaining envoys and travellers from all over the world and seeing reviews of fleets and of armies. And how splendid your Menecharmus must be in his own home, as a leader of his people in peace and war! And most wonderful of all, your very own little Laertes. How could he help being a marvel with Agamemnon and Odysseus as ancestors, not to speak of me as Aunt!

All the same, you haven't had a more wonderful year than your little sister has had, here in quiet little Ithaca. And now you shall hear all about it. You know how proud Daddy is of being a scholar, much prouder than of being a King, and above all how proud he is of his friendship with the great poet Homer in the old days when, as a younger son, he travelled and traded and fought in Ionia and the Euxine and Heaven knows where else, making the money which enabled him to restore the fortunes of our house, and rebuild the old palace of Odysseus. Nor need I tell you how often he has assured us that Homer would some day come and visit Ithaca in order to fulfil his promise to write another great poem specially about our ancestor's return from Troy. You know we never believed it would happen. Well, he came, he stayed with us for nearly a year, he wrote the most divine story ever imagined, and your own little Nausicaa helped, and figures in it. There's immortality for you!

You hadn't been gone a month and we were still all as flat as flat after the wedding, when a letter came by a Phœnician ship to say that he was just starting on a tour of visits and recitations to Sicily and Italy and the land of the Tyrrhenians, and would come to stay with us on his way back next summer. But nothing was

more surprising than his actual coming. He was rather earlie than we expected, and the Tyrrhenian captain who brought hi seems to have got a scare that Taphian pirates were in the offin and dumped him and all his belongings after dark on the shore the little cove of Phorcys on the other side of the island. Th poor Poet hadn't a soul to help him. He had lost one of h servants and his secretary at the court of King Polyphemus, as shall tell you presently, and the other servant ran away jus before he left Tyrrhenia. There he was, with a great treasure gifts, gold and silver cups, jewelled brooches, marvellous embro deries, and no small weight of precious metal, not a notion whe he was, alone, and barely able to see—for, poor dear, his sight failing him fast. By luck he seems to have stumbled across ou little Naiad's cave, where he carried the stuff into what I suppo he thought was hiding. Luckily the honest peasants who looke in to pray thought the packages all belonged to the attendant, an he, happily, seems to have been away for a few days. He the headed straight away for the remotest end of Ithaca, climbin the heights and luckily not falling over the cliffs before ol Eumæus—or rather his dogs—sighted him and took him into th farm. There he stayed a day or two, learning something of ou old legends and still more about pigs, and then Eumæus brough him along to the Palace. I gather the Poet did tell him who h was, but, of course, his name meant nothing to Eumæus, w only knows of poets and minstrels and jugglers as people wh earn a living of sorts by helping the digestion of the great.

Anyhow, not wishing to enter the banqueting Hall in his wor ing clothes, Eumæus passed him on to a servant who, followin Daddy's standing orders about minstrels and suchlike, gave hi plenty to eat and drink, but, evidently not impressed by his ol travelling clothes, sat him down at the bottom of the hall at th table over which that old loafer Irus usually presides—rath tipsy and offensive too that evening, for which the Poet, w otherwise thoroughly enjoyed the joke, has had his revenge.

At the end of dinner Daddy, hearing that a new minstrel ha turned up, asked him to play. Homer replied that he had bee shipwrecked and lost his lyre, and when Daddy called out to as if anyone could lend him one, he said: 'O King, have you non of your own on which you played in your youth, for, believe m I have a kingly touch?' Then Daddy, remembering the golde lyre which Homer himself had once given him, had it broug down and handed to the Poet with many instructions to treat carefully. The Poet began lightly on some story or other abo Ares and Aphrodite—the kind of thing, I suppose, that you a quite accustomed to now you are married and come into hal Then, when the men had done laughing and the women gigglin

he began a song which he had once composed for Daddy to console him for the loss of his helmsman and best comrade, Eurybates, in a great fight against the Carians. He hadn't got very far before Daddy broke down and cried; and then he broke down himself; and while everyone stood staring Daddy jumped up from his throne, ran all the way down the hall between the tables, and fell on the Poet's neck, and you never heard such an excitement, and they sat up talking nearly all night and would have talked for a month if Mummy hadn't packed them off to bed.

I wasn't there, of course, but Mummy told me everything, except the story of Ares and Aphrodite, and promised I should be introduced to the great Poet very soon. But while our parents thought Homer had more urgent things to do than seeing me, I introduced myself to him on my own, and in the very queerest way. He hadn't been with us a week, when I went off with three of the girls for a big family laundry—you know the little meadow, below Laertes's farm, where the stream runs into the sea. Well, we had done washing, and had a swim, and were playing ball in the sun to get dry before lunch, when suddenly one of the girls gave a shriek and they all bolted to cover for dear life. I looked round and saw, coming from the sea, a mighty great man, stark naked, with long dripping hair and beard and shaggy breast, like the God Poseidon himself, peering round eagerly for something as he advanced. I guessed at once who it was and what had happened, and sang out 'Turn round, dear friend of the Muses, while I throw a cloak round you, and then you can find where you left your own garments when you went in to bathe.' And, quickly slipping into my own tunic first, I threw a clean but slightly damp cloak over his broad shoulders, and called back the girls and told them to help him find his clothes and then bring him back to join us at lunch. And such an afternoon we had together. He made us sing him songs, and recited himself and made me recite—and I picked his own favourite bit of the *Iliad*—and told us the most lovely stories. And then we all drove back, but before we came in sight of the Palace, he slipped off and went in on foot, to avoid scandal, and I told the girls not to breathe a word to a soul, and no one knows to this day, though I think Daddy guessed something when the great poem was read out—Mummy only thought it not quite nice even to borrow my name for such an incident!

Two days later we were really introduced, and both acted the part perfectly. The Poet paid me a charming compliment, addressed to Mummy, comparing me to a slender young palm tree. I blushed furiously—not from mere maiden modesty, as Mummy thought, but it suddenly struck me that he had after all seen more of me than I had suspected. He went on to ask if it

was true that I was a scholar, and could recite all kinds of poetry, not only ancient Mycenæan but modern Achæan like his own, and had I really read the whole of his *Iliad* and *Return of Agamemnon*? I replied ever so gravely and demurely, and the introduction was over. But its consequences were not long in coming. The very next day, passing Mummy's room, I heard the sound of argument, and Mummy's voice saying, 'The idea of a girl acting as a man's secretary! And a King's daughter at that. It isn't decent.' Daddy muttered something about a King of poets and forty years difference in age, to which Mummy retorted: 'Yes, and there's no age so capable of foolishness as sixteen, unless it's fifty-six.' That got both Homer and Daddy with one arrow, for they are of the same years! I heard no more then, but the parental debate went on, and a day or two later I heard Mummy saying, 'Anyhow, I had arranged everything for her to spend the next few months learning cookery and household accounts and slave management. The girl is quite unfit to be married with nothing in her head but classics and modern poetry and music.'

When I heard that I knew it was all right, for if there is one thing that Daddy hates and wants to put off, it's my wedding. So sure enough I was started next day as the Poet's secretary to help with the new *Odyssey*, with Daddy's old nurse Eurycleia told off by Mummy to preserve the proprieties, which she did sleeping happily most of the time.

My chief duty was to take down the lines as Homer recited them. But I soon got beyond that. Often when he was stuck, I would suggest an ending to a line, or even two or three lines at a time. And then he consulted me all the time about the plot, and such fun we had over it. You see, he came here thinking there would be lots of detailed local legend about Odysseus's return. There were miles of doggerel about the Trojan War, all from the Ithacan point of view, and Homer said he felt quite inclined to scrap the *Iliad*, cutting out Achilles, Agamemnon and all the rest of them, and rewrite it as the *Ithacan Siege and Capture of Troy*. But there was precious little of what he really wanted. So we just set about inventing it, and putting in ourselves and everybody we knew.

Daddy and Mummy and our new Palace came in as the King and Queen and Court of the Phæacians. The Poet's own arrival and his meeting with me fitted in quite beautifully; even the young men who are supposed to be casting sheep's eyes at me, all figure among Penelope's suitors. Irus I've already mentioned, but the person who comes off really worst is King Polyphemus. Everywhere else in Sicily and the other places he went to the Poet had the most marvellous welcome—far exceeding anything he had ever received at home in Ionia or even on the Achæan

ainland. The King of Alba Longa, who is a descendant of
ıneas the Trojan, gave him the most wonderful chased bowl of
ectron, which Hephæstus himself is said to have made as a gift
· Anchises. The only person who treated him shabbily was
olyphemus, who invited him, not from any real love of poetry—
· chief interest being the breeding of prize rams—but only for
rank. He poisoned the Poet's favourite servant with his bad
od; stole away his secretary by the bribe of a higher salary;
ortally offended the Poet at table by telling him that he could
e better with his one eye—he lost the other in a drunken brawl
than the Poet could with both; worst insult of all, he asked the
oet at his going how much he owed him for his recitations! The
oet's reply was that he was the debtor for so much hospitality
d would presently repay in verses celebrating his visit. How
chuckled over that part of the *Odyssey* which settled this score,
d over the joy it would give to all the rest of Sicily!

Sometimes we dropped work and just gossiped, and he would
lk to me about his favourite authors, especially the old Classical
ets, or about his travels. He seems to have wandered almost
erywhere, after finishing his studies in Athens—his childhood
s spent in Argos and Salamis—seeing life and sitting at the
et of all the greatest scholars and historians and poets of the
ne. After he had written the *Iliad*, which he did partly at
oy itself, he went to Crete, wishing to discover what there might
ll be found there of the old Minoan poetry and philosophy,
om which our own Mycenæan literature borrowed so much, and
ssibly to write a poem on Theseus at Gnossos. He found very
tle, the island having been upset by so many wars and invasions
d earthquakes since Minos' day, but heard that more might
ve survived among the Philistinians, who are Cretan colonists
d have lived undisturbed for centuries on the Syrian coast
uth of the Phœnicians.

So he visited Philistinia, gathering much of interest histori-
lly, but somehow never finishing the intended poem. From
ere he went up to stay with the King of Hierosolyma, who had
st completed building a magnificent new temple to Zeus, who
the only God worshipped by his people. This King was a
eat scholar and lover of literature and philosophy, and Homer
id his library was the finest he knew out of Egypt, and con-
ined, besides innumerable works in Eastern languages which he
uld not read, many important Minoan and Mycenæan manu-
ripts. He was also himself a poet and musician, though
t as celebrated as his father, some of whose hymns to Zeus
omer had translated for him, and himself put to verse,
apting the melodies to our modes. Among the guests at that
me court was a Queen of the Sabæans, who, he said, was the

rest and most fascinating woman he had ever met, except
I From there he went to Egypt—but it would take a book,
not a letter, to write all about that wonderful country, and I
: say you in Argos meet many travellers who have been there.
[once asked him why he did not put all the wonders he had
: and heard into his poems. But he said he was a poet and
a historian or writer of guide books. Did I think the *Odyssey*
ıld really be improved if he described Odysseus as having
ted all the places in Western lands which he had himself seen ?
all he knew, Odysseus had voyaged to them all, as far as the
ars of Heracles and beyond. But how would these real places
e fitted in with the isles of Circe and Calypso and the entrance
Hades ? Wasn't it much better to keep everything west of
:ca in fairyland ? He didn't read the ancient poems in order
ınd out what their authors knew about history or geography,
, while he hoped some of his own works might survive with
rs, he couldn't imagine anyone ever studying them in order to
.'e how much or how little he knew of these subjects.

. know you have been bursting with curiosity all this while
ısk whether I fell in love with the Poet or he with me. Of
:se I did, even before I met him, at the mere thought of his
ıing, and he from the moment he saw—whatever he did see of
:hen. But we were both ever so good—especially the Poet—
Eurycleia's slumbers unlocked no doors to golden Aphrodite.
: or twice he patted my head or stroked my cheek when I had
.e bright idea. But he always counteracted this little tenderness
ıastily talking about his daughters, thoroughly uninteresting,
:dly young women, I gathered, or about his wife. I asked him
: if he expected to find her, like Penelope, besieged by suitors,
. he was always so concerned about her. He said, certainly,
:e would be scores of them, not wooing the old soul for her
:s, but taking advantage of her soft-heartedness and guile-
ıess in money matters. Still I wanted no more, happy in
king for him and with him, and seeing his great poem shape
f from day to day. Only towards the end did I feel a terrible
;ing to be able, like Penelope, to wipe out all the lines of each
's work from my tablets at night. Then came the dreadful day
n he told me that he must leave in a few weeks, that he had
'et back to his home, set his copyists at the manuscript of
Odyssey, and then, if the state of his affairs allowed it, go to
ɔt to see if any of their wonderful doctors might still save his
:. We got through the last book and a half somehow, but
hearts were not in the work. Then came the great recita-
. for which I was allowed to come into hall, and for a day or
all other feelings were lost in the pride and joy of having
ed even in a small way. And then the awful last days and

the great farewell feast before he went down to the ship to sail with a fair wind at full moon. I said goodbye to him in the afternoon. He blessed me very tenderly and wished me a noble husband and lovely children and all good things in life.

But I had my own plans. Daddy had given him a servant boy, with many other wonderful gifts, to look after his things—Iolaus, you will remember he played with us when we were children. I persuaded Iolaus to get me another slave boy's kirtle, helped him to carry things down to the ship at dusk while they were feasting, and then got on board and hid under the gunwale. Presently they all came down to the quay and there was much wishing of farewell, and then Daddy and the party went back to the Palace and the Poet came on board. He went straight to where I was, groping with his hands, and when he touched me, said 'Dearest Nausicaa, you must return,' and gently led me on shore and up the road, telling the captain he still had a message to send back by me and would be gone only a few minutes. When we were out of sight he said : 'I knew you would come, and I wished you to come, for I still have my farewell token to give you.' With this he unfastened from his cloak a curious old brooch of gold with flowers of lapis lazuli and cornelian, which he always wore. I once asked him if it had a story and he said, 'No,' which I knew was not true. Now he told it me. It had been given hundreds and hundreds of years ago by a Chaldæan Queen to her lover, who was killed in war by the Cappadocians, whose King gave it to his favourite, from whom it passed through many hands, till it came eventually to Paris the Trojan, who gave it to Helen as the very first of his gifts, to fasten her cloak on the night they fled from Sparta, she having forgotten her own brooch in her haste. Homer himself received it as a youth in Athens from one whom he loved, who, on her deathbed, made him promise never to give it to anyone he loved less than herself. And he had worn it for thirty-five years without telling the story to a soul. Then he gave me a kiss—worth a year's waiting and a lifetime's remembering—turned me towards the Palace, and hastened back to the ship. I stumbled on a few steps homewards, and then turned and climbed up a little height under Neion and sat watching through my tears the ship sailing out in the moonlight, and prayed to all the Gods for his safety and for his dear eyes. When I crept home, long after midnight, Daddy was waiting for me, having looked in my room and guessed, but having said nothing to Mummy or the servants, and put me to bed with hot wine and spices, bless him, for I was as cold in body as in heart.

So there, Hermione, is the narrative of my wonderful year, for your very own eyes only. And now for my tuition in house-

hold matters, and after that, I suppose, one of the young lords of of the isles—not Antinous, he swaggers too much; but Eurymachus is brave and kind and his old parents are charming, and the Poet liked him best. It will all be postscript, anyway, to the real story of my life. But I have helped the most divine of poets in his work, and helped our great ancestor to live in the best story ever told. And to what girl before have Athena and the Muses given such a privilege, even if Aphrodite frowned?

Your own loving
NAUSICAA.

II. SALVING HOMER'S EPICS

THE LAST PHASE

Colophon in Ionia.

DEAREST HERMIONE,

At last a letter from you, the first to arrive of many which must have gone astray in these terrible years. But the Gods be thanked, you and yours have reached Athens in safety, and are far better off as free citizens in a civilised community than if you had stayed on in Argos as underlings of these Dorian savages. What a splendid campaign your Menecharmus must have waged before the desertion of his allies lost all, and how proud, as a mother, you must be of Laertes's gallantry in the field. What you know of our happenings since Father and Mother died I am not quite sure of, for I have no idea which of my letters may have reached you. Happily they closed their eyes upon the peaceful and cultivated world in which they lived and which they adorned. That other dreadful world of savagery and ruin which we have been through since they could hardly have guessed.

Our troubles began five years ago with a general attack by the mainland barbarians on all the islands. Our brother Autolycus got all our ships together, waited till they had landed and then sank their fleet. Having separated and cut them off, he then destroyed them on each of the islands, but lost his life himself in the clearing of Dulichium. On the death of the last male of the House of Odysseus they elected my Eurymachus King, and we went back to our old home for a last anxious winter. In the spring they came with a new fleet and countless warriors. We were outnumbered everywhere, and had to fall back into the City and see Father's beautiful Palace become first the headquarters of the barbarians and then go up in flames after one of their orgies. Luckily we had got away most of his treasures and the best part of his library. For months we were besieged, and in the end, when further resistance seemed impossible, we decided

to abandon dear, sacred Ithaca, put all we had on our ships and sail for Asia. Father had made his fortune there, and I suggested to Eurymachus that we could create a new Ithaca somewhere in Ionia until the day when our children might regain the old.

We made the voyage in safety, found some of Father's old friends to advise and help us, joined up with other refugees from the Peloponnese, and, after two years of fighting, bargaining, and discussing, have established our home here in a fair land, far richer and more spacious than Ithaca, though to me it never can be the same. For me, as for Odysseus of old, no sight could be so dear as even the distant smoke from a beacon fire on Neriton. Still we are all safe; Eurymachus is prospering in trade and farming, and is the recognised leader of our new community; the children grow in beauty and understanding.

There is one other of our household now, a sacred and revered guest. If you cannot guess who it is, think of a long letter I wrote you more than twenty years ago after Homer stayed with us to write his *Odyssey*. I heard from him after his return home of the great success of the poem throughout Ionia. I heard again, a sad letter, after he had been to Egypt, that his eyes were incurable and that complete blindness was settling upon him. The last news I had was a few years later, that his wife had died and that he had accepted a friend's invitation to go and settle in Rhodes. Naturally my first thought, once we had arrived safely, was whether he still lived and where to find him. But in those confused days no one seemed to know or care. It was thought that he lived, but traders from Rhodes told me that he had left that island some years before, but whither no one could say.

One day Eurymachus brought in to dinner the captain of a Smyrniot merchant ship with whom he had dealings, saying, 'I think this is an old friend of yours, Nausicaa.' Who should it be but our old playmate, Iolaus, whom Father had given to Homer when he left us, and whom the Poet had afterwards freed, and started in business. He told us the sad story how the Poet's affairs had gone from bad to worse after his blindness, largely owing to his wife's extravagance; how after her death his daughters had made home impossible for him, and how a wealthy Rhodian friend had in pity taken him away; how after his friend's death his heirs had put him on a ship for Smyrna, where his daughters refused to take him in, and where Iolaus found him. At first he had lived in Iolaus's town house, but as Smyrna had become hateful to him, Iolaus had afterwards given him a cottage on a little property he had bought in Chios, and assigned a trusty old couple to look after him. There he had now passed some years, forgotten of the world at large, but occasionally visited by those who, even in these troubled times, retained an interest in poetry.

You can think how moved I was—never so much, perhaps, since the day I first heard he was really coming to Ithaca. Iolaus's ship was due to sail for Smyrna and Chios the very next day, and Eurymachus made no difficulties about my going: he is such a dear and so understanding, though books and poets, as such, mean very little to him. We landed at Chios and made our way out from the city on mules. At the end of a three hours' ride we came to the cottage, a humble little place, but on a terrace with a view towards the sea, and there, under an old plane tree, sat the King of Poets, unchanged except that his noble head and beard were snowy white. I ran up to him, took his hand and kissed it, telling him who I was. But my sobs must have made my words inaudible, for he only shook his head, so I put his hand on my shoulder, on the brooch he had once given me. He knew at once and said, 'Nausicaa'; and then, quoting a line—one of my own suggestions—from the *Odyssey*, where his mother meets Odysseus in Hades, 'My child, how came you to me in this darkness,' and went on to say that he could die happily now, like Odysseus's faithful hound when his master returned. I replied, 'No, but you must now live again and live with us.' In a few minutes it was all arranged, and before the next evening the Poet and all his scanty belongings were on the ship. At this moment, as I write, he is sitting at the other end of the portico, chanting whimsical little nursery ditties to my small Penelope.

With us he is supremely happy. He loves talking of old times and retelling old tales to me. He is very fond of Eurymachus, and they have long discussions about the future of Ionia, and of our poor ruined, barbarianised Achæa. And he never tires playing with the children, who adore him. What he refuses to worry about, but what greatly worries me, is the future of his own wonderful poems. In the days of his vogue his wife seems to have sold many volumes which were his only copies; others appear to have been lost; less than a quarter of all his writings went with him to Rhodes, and of these only a remnant had survived Chios, where the old couple who looked after him had, it seems, drawn on the priceless rolls freely for any purpose for which parchment could be used in kitchen or garden. My own manuscript of the *Odyssey*, the first of two fair copies I took from my notes, was one of the few things saved, for he had kept it in a special case always close to him. Luckily my library, or rather Father's, but Eurymachus gave it me, contains a few of his works: besides my copy of the *Odyssey*, a copy of the *Iliad* and a volume of hymns and shorter poems. *The Return of Agamemnon*, which we were so fond of as girls, is lost. If you have a copy, or can get one made, do send it me and I will gladly pay for the cost of copying. I am trying now to collect manuscripts of his

works up and down Ionia. Iolaus has standing orders to buy at any price asked.

But the price is not the difficulty; it is to find the copies anywhere. It is dreadful how in these distracted times the most precious things get lost or thrown away. So far he has got me nothing but rubbish, clearly not Homer's work, though the owners seem to have thought so. I have the same trouble with the professional reciters, such few of them as can still make a living. I had one here for a week, whom Homer had himself taught years ago, and he gave us what he declared was the Poet's own *Fall of Troy*. But Homer, after hearing it, only shook his head, and smilingly said that the reciter had ended by dealing as effectively with his poem as the Achæans with Troy. He himself, though quick enough to detect what is not his own, has no longer the power to reconstruct any long passages from memory, though I have by coaxing retrieved some shorter poems, and a few favourite bits from the longer ones.

Is it possible that the Gods can be minded to allow all that wonderful treasure-house of music, of poetry, of prose literature, which grew up in our beautiful Mycenæan and Achæan world, to perish utterly, as so many of our cities and palaces have perished at the hands of the barbarians, and to be blotted out as if the thoughts that inspired them had never been? If so I pray to them that at least something—and I cannot help hoping that it may be something of Homer himself—may be permitted to survive, and rekindle, in some later generation, the torch of the spirit that may have been all but quenched. If so many exquisite works of art have been melted down lately, yet a few may remain to teach the goldsmiths of another day to refashion beauty in the metal that has known it once. And if nothing but the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* survive from all the wealth of that literature in which we were nurtured, our own creative speech, or even the speech of others, might yet, from them as a starting point, create anew all that may have been lost. At any rate, I am bringing up the children to regard our rolls of manuscripts as our greatest treasure. You may have something no less precious from the past to hand on to your young Athenians: the statecraft of Agamemnon and the eloquence of Odysseus. Who knows but what some descendant of yours and theirs may yet sway a great people with weighty words 'whirling like winter snow'? So be of good heart, dear Hermione; worse things have happened before.

Your own loving
NAUSICAA.

L. S. AMERY.

CORRESPONDENCE

'MOSUL OIL AND THE PIPE-LINE'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER.

DEAR SIR,—In the September issue of *The Nineteenth Century* there appears an article on 'Mosul Oil and the Pipe-Line,' by Sir Henry Dobbs. In that article it is stated that I am, along with other leading financiers, backing the business. May I say that this statement, so far as I am concerned, is not according to fact? Indeed it is untrue, and I shall be glad if you will have it corrected.

Yours faithfully,
INVERFORTH.

Baltic Exchange Buildings,
21, Bury Street, London, E.C. 3,
12th September, 1930.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, *10 & 12, Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

Letters as well as articles will be considered for publication, but letters should be confined to criticism or amplification of articles which have already appeared in the Review. No anonymous contribution is published.

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AND AFTER

1877 1930

Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

NOVEMBER

LONDON: CONSTABLE & CO., LTD., ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE

Annual Subscription

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

CONTENTS FOR NOVEMBER

LONDON: CONSTABLE & COMPANY LIMITED, 10 & 12 ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C. 2.

Registered for Canadian Magazine Post.

Price Three Shillings.

THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
AND AFTER



No. DCXLV—November 1930

THE LABOUR GOVERNMENT AND ITS PROSPECTS

At the beginning of the new parliamentary session friends and opponents alike are asking the question, 'How long can the Labour Government continue?' Nevertheless, in the absence of unforeseen catastrophes in India, or a still less likely division of Labour opinion on Imperial tariffs and food taxation, it is difficult to conceive of any disintegrating factor which would precipitate the resignation of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister definitely stated at the outset that the only adverse vote which would necessarily and inevitably lead to a dissolution would be a vote of censure. Up to the present such a vote has been once attempted and decisively negatived. On the other hand, there exists more than one sound reason why the Labour Government will endeavour to maintain its position and resist all attempts to dislodge it prematurely. Many members of the party are under the impression that an appeal to the country in the immediate future might result in the loss of fifty to sixty Labour seats and the return to

power of a Conservative Administration. It is obvious, they maintain, that the efforts of the Government to deal with the terrific problems of unemployment and its unprecedented expenditure upon relief works have not forcibly struck the imagination of the general public, nor even satisfied the majority of their own supporters inside, and still less outside, Parliament. Go where you will, they say, the voice of discontent is heard in any gathering of Labour men and women, often peevish and illogical, but none the less a factor to be reckoned with. Extravagant anticipations were aroused during the last General Election of a wholesale diminution of unemployment It must be admitted that many Labour speakers, including even some of our present Ministers, declared that Labour was the only party which could ever cure unemployment. This dictum would be accepted as quite valid by, say, a gathering of the Fabian Society or any other collection of convinced and educated Socialists, but among those who listen to Labour speeches and vote for Labour candidates only a small percentage either understand the full bearings of Socialism, or grasp the idea of a co-operative commonwealth so well organised that unemployment might be reduced to a minimum. When, therefore, the ordinary voter is faced with a record of over 2,000,000 men and women out of work, he is apt to refresh the memory of a Labour speaker on the subject of these confident assertions about Labour's special capacity for banishing the evils of unemployment.

It is probable, therefore, that any election in the near future might be fought under strong disadvantages to the party in power. Until some visible improvement in our trade comes to pass, or, at any rate, some striking evidence of a great increase in the provision of relief work, it is assumed, and probably with good reason, that large abstentions would be found in the ranks of our working-class supporters. The fact must be faced that in the nine by-elections since the General Election the Labour poll has decreased by 33,273 votes, an average per seat of no less than 3697 votes. It may be true that the party has already set aside for public works the gigantic sum of 123,000,000*l.* as compared with the four and a half year's Tory figure of 6,000,000*l.* odd ; it may be true that Mr. Lansbury promises enough extra employment in a few weeks for 180,000 men. Nevertheless, little tangible impression is made on the awful total, and Mr. Bromley even predicts another 1,000,000 or so by next spring. Any election to-day would, perhaps, be rendered almost farcical by the cloud of apathy which has settled upon millions of our countrymen and their families, condemned to live indefinitely amid penury and discomfort in a world of over-production and shrinking employment. The narrow defeat of the Mosley resolution at Llandudno reflects the general anxiety felt by our party organisations.

There is another consideration which might deter the Government from any precipitate surrender of power. The financial position of the party is always published in audited form, and from the figures it is obvious that in times of such widespread poverty the position of the party funds must cause very real anxiety. The impoverishment of the trade unions resulting from the disastrous events of 1926 has been cruelly exaggerated by the political levy clauses of the Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act. In 1929 the total contributions received from the unions amounted to 25,500*l.*, a decrease of no less than 15,000*l.* since 1927, and the accounts were only balanced by the receipts from two special efforts embodied in the 'Bid for Power' and 'Victory' funds, no repetition of which could be confidently anticipated in the event of an election this year or next.

The main financial resource upon which the older parties rely is, of course, the private contributions of individual supporters. But this method of obtaining revenue has little meaning for the Labour Party. One can almost count on one hand the names of known supporters who could be described as rich, and the virtual sale of honours which has disgraced the political history of the older parties is absolutely foreign to the whole spirit of the Labour movement. *Domini providebunt* is not our official motto. And while the devotion of local members can generally be relied on to finance the candidate for whom they have rendered themselves responsible, it is doubtful if the funds of the trade unions available for political purposes will be adequate for the provision of panel candidates to anything like the same extent. So important a union, *e.g.*, as the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers only ran one candidate out of its panel of eight last time, and its resources are now lower than ever; nor is it reasonable to expect that the Miners' Federation can subsidise so large a number of candidates as formerly. Sound reasons of finance, therefore, would deter the Labour Party from incurring the heavy expense of a General Election until the finances of its trade union and other supporters begin to show improvement.

There is, moreover, one measure of such vital concern to the party that failure to pass it into law might react disastrously upon our electoral chances in the future. For many years past the rating and taxing of land values has figured prominently in Labour speeches and programmes. Again and again the present Chancellor of the Exchequer has stressed the obvious necessity of such a measure and pledged himself in advance to place it upon the Statute-book if and when opportunity permits. The rank and file of the party have failed to understand the reason

for the absence of such taxation from the last Budget, or, alternatively, why the presentation of a short Bill could not have been made at a much earlier date. The principle of land values taxation has long been accepted by the Liberal Party, and a considerable number of municipal councils with non-Labour majorities advocate the taxing, at any rate for local purposes, of this hitherto untapped source of wealth. In these circumstances it is possible (though by no means certain) that such a Bill would be accepted by the Peers. But in any case, the absence from a Labour Government's record of any determined attempt to carry perhaps the most generally popular of our proposals would create a feeling amongst our urban electors of bewilderment and bitter resentment. I remember well what thousands of Liberal voters said in 1910 when the Government of the day went to the country without even a serious effort to pass a 'one man, one vote' Bill, despite the fact that this proposal, perhaps more than any other, enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Liberal electors.

In view of the almost certain opposition of the Upper House, two years would probably be needed for the passing into law of Mr. Snowden's Land Taxation Bill, and also some measure of electoral reform to which we may be pledged.

Of all the problems and perplexities which beset the Labour Government, the most formidable is that which falls to the lot of our courageous Chancellor. The Unemployment Fund, already heavily burdened with debt, will require at least 20,000,000*l.* more before next April. Rising unemployment and diminishing incomes might drive to despair any other Free Trade Chancellor who realises that the limits of direct taxation are being rapidly reached. Will Mr. Snowden for once—*neque semper arcum tendit Apollo*—relax his rigid Budget principles by ignoring for the nonce the claims of posterity and suspending the Sinking Fund for two years in these evil days of economic distress?

Another formidable difficulty in our path is the demand made upon the Government by Mr. Bevin and other trade union leaders for the repeal of the Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act—'a complete restoration, without any equivocation, of the position before the Act was passed in 1927.' The Act was, in some of its provisions, a clever party measure of a peculiarly mean and ungenerous character. A great political party, amongst whose members are counted the overwhelming majority of the rich and well-to-do classes, deliberately and successfully set itself to cripple the political resources of the Labour Party, derived almost entirely from the coppers of our manual workers. The passing of this contemptible measure undoubtedly aroused a feeling of bitter resentment at the time, for it was evident that there was no appreciable volume of discontent against the existing methods

of levying political contributions, and our people, as a rule, readily sense any display of political or social injustice inflicted by the more privileged classes upon their poorer fellow-citizens.

Nevertheless, it is, I think, obvious that the demand for repeal proceeds mainly from certain trade union leaders; the rank and file of the party evince little enthusiasm for the drastic reversal of the 1927 Act. The financial problem involved has, for the time being, stabilised itself in practice; the keen men contract in, the indifferent or antagonistic do not. Nor is it certain that the provisions of the Act directed against the recurrence of a General Strike are so keenly resented by a generation which has experienced the social disasters of wholesale strikes and lock-outs, and the devastating effects of such disturbances upon the resources of the unions. The leaders, however, are brought face to face daily with the staggering diminution in the funds available for political purposes, and have good cause to realise how their bargaining power in negotiations with employers is weakened by the depletion of their resources.

If the full demands made by Mr. Bevin and his friends are brought before the House of Commons, the rejection of the Bill is almost inevitable. In view of the fact that Sir John Simon has declared the General Strike illegal, few, if any, Liberals would bring themselves to contradict their distinguished colleague by a vote in the House. Nor, indeed, could we expect from the Liberals any ready support for a measure which would *ex hypothesi* again rope into the political levies of trade unions affiliated to Labour a certain number of Liberal workmen.

In short, the best that the Government could hope for would be the abstention of some or all of the opposition 'below the gangway.' In these circumstances it is possible that this repealing measure might scrape through the Commons, with the absolute certainty of rejection by the House of Lords. The defeat of a measure enjoying so limited a popularity would not be regarded as fatal to the Government, for an appeal to the country against the Lords on such an issue would be an act of sheer political folly.

The pressing needs of agriculture have forced their way to the front once more, and the Government are faced with this *quæstio vexatissima* during the coming session. The devotion of a Labour Government to agricultural reform involves a certain element of political chivalry. From a very long and intimate knowledge of rural England I am convinced that any hope of electoral advantage based upon the zealous efforts of a Labour Ministry for the benefit of agriculture are quite futile. At this moment, up and down the length of rural England, the Labour Party and its proposals are the theme of hostile and contemptuous

criticism. The Conservatism of our country areas is so deeply rooted that even if the present Government established corn and meat tariffs to-morrow they would not necessarily receive the suffrages of the rural population. It was among the people of the *pagi*, or villages, that the dying embers of heathendom were kept alive, and decades will pass over rural England before the political pagans of to-day find the tenets of rural Toryism obsolete and replace them by something better.

This fact, however, will not deter the Government from doing its utmost towards discovering some palliative or solution of the present state of very real depression in the countryside, though the path is strewn with difficulties. The *crambe repetita* of small holdings, fixity of tenure, experimental farms, etc., leaves the average farmer or labourer quite cold; nor will it be an easy task for any Government to convert forcibly to the undoubted merits of co-operative marketing the most obstinately individualist class among the King's subjects. On the other hand, it is difficult to envisage a vote for protective tariffs on agricultural imports given by—to go no further—Messrs. MacDonald, Snowden, Alexander, or Graham; nor can I bring myself to believe that the Labour Party as a whole, apart from certain of its trade union leaders who may have been talked over by Imperialist Tories or weak-kneed Liberal Free Traders bent on securing a reduction in wages by indirect methods, will ever consent to a direct tariff on imported corn, meat, or raw material. Another alternative proposed—the creation of Import Boards—might prove more seductive. Socialists may be attracted by this example of State action, and its flavour of indirect protection might not seriously trouble a party beset by the unexampled miseries and difficulties of present-day unemployment. These possibilities are being explored at the present moment, but it is difficult to believe that the Dominions will accept Bulk Purchase as a substitute for their beloved tariffs, and, if the scheme became a *fait accompli*, he would be a bold man who would confidently predict the smooth sailing of such colossal commerce amid the violent changes and chances of international trade. If the people of these islands in times of economic stress were forced to pay 55*s*. a quarter for Canadian wheat when the world price fell to 45*s*., or Canadian or Australian farmers, after selling us all their wheat and wool, found, in a few months, that they had made an atrociously bad bargain, would any Government be strong enough to face the furious discontent of the populace and the virtual demand to treat the purchase agreements as 'scraps of paper'?

A difficulty of minor importance which may again confront the Government in the coming session is the trying attitude of

some 'left wing' members. It is no exaggeration to say that a small group of Independent Labour Party members, including certain discontents from the Clyde, has adopted for some time past an attitude of keen hostility to the Government. This disloyal band have not only abused their colleagues in the House and on various occasions voted against the Government, but have in their journals, in public speeches, and even in the columns of the 'capitalist' Press, denounced and belittled the Parliamentary Labour Party and its leaders. A minority of Independent Labour Party members in the House have at various times formulated the outrageous claim to act in practical disregard of the Cabinet's plans and policy, and this unexampled indiscipline has at times even infected the ranks of the parliamentary private secretaries.

There can be little doubt that these rebels, fresh from their rebuffs at Llandudno, will maintain in the new session this critical and hostile attitude. But the party as a whole has learnt to estimate at their true value a small body of men who, possessing neither tactical nor constructive ability, have, apart from their personal sincerity, so little to recommend them. Possibly the rebels themselves are beginning to realise their own futility: Mr. Maxton's speech at Llandudno was both mild and conciliatory.

The Government and its supporters are, I believe, ready and anxious to continue in office for at least two more years. By that time an admirable record of wise and humane legislation will have been completed. One thing, however, is vital to this continuance in office and brighter prospects of electoral success later on. The relations between Labour and Liberalism must be continued and, if need be, improved and defined. The facts of the case are perfectly clear. From the first moment we took office in 1929 we have been compelled to adapt ourselves to our parliamentary environment; our policy and our prospects have been throughout coloured and conditioned by the fact that the Government could only rely on a minority of votes as against the combined Opposition, and, on the other hand, that the Liberals were ready and willing to co-operate along moderate and reasonable lines.

As a result of these conditions the Government has been able to pass a number of admirable measures and present to the country a record of its first session's work, of which it is justifiably proud. Now and again, it is true, some Liberal members have purposely abstained from important divisions, or even gone into the Tory lobby; but such incidents are comparatively rare. In one remarkable instance—the case of Lord Hunsdon's appointment—the Liberals helped to save the Government from defeat

through the reckless and discreditable defection of a large body of its own supporters.

For many months, then, there has actually existed in practice, if not in theory, definite parliamentary co-operation between Liberalism and Labour. Neither one party nor the other has been always ready to admit the existence of this obvious fact; Liberals and Labour men alike have been generally shy of indicating to their constituents that they were working together at Westminster to secure certain measures mutually acceptable, or recalling the admitted request for such co-operation made by the Premier in regard to the unemployment problem and duly accepted by Mr. Lloyd George on behalf of his followers. Amongst many of the rank and file of the Labour Party, more especially in areas where Independent Labour Party influence is strong, 'Lib.-Lab.' co-operation is grievously suspect. Without recognising the true facts of the case and all that such co-operation has already meant, and will in the future mean for our party, there are many Labour speakers who rarely miss an opportunity of denouncing the theory and practice of any understanding between the two parties. A recent issue of the *New Leader* quotes a passage from the *Daily Herald* of September 19 to the effect that not only the problem of unemployment but other items of proposed legislation were being discussed between the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George, and adds the editorial comment that 'such an agreement would run counter to the prevailing opinion of the whole Labour movement.' The writer seems quite oblivious to the fact that the extension of widows' pensions, the Unemployment measure, the Road Traffic, Housing, Coal, and other Bills—in fact, almost the whole legislative output of the last session—was only rendered possible by the support of Liberal votes. It is no doubt true that the Independent Labour Party has no claim to represent 'the opinion of the whole Labour movement'—its discomfiture at Llandudno is a recent indication of this; but it is worth noticing that Miss Susan Lawrence, who presided over the Conference, also went out of her way to emphasise the fact that the 'most galling experience' of Labour members in Parliament was their forced reliance upon 'the support of doubtful and uncertain allies.' Many Labour men, in fact, not only predict, but earnestly desire, the rapid extinction of the Liberal Party; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the wishes or anticipations of those who predict the speedy disappearance of Liberalism as a political force are at all likely to be fulfilled. The Liberal Party in the House of Commons possesses, in relation to its numbers, a greater amount of ability and experience than either Toryism or Labour. The significant record, moreover, remains that in 1929 no less than 5,250,000 electors deliberately

bestowed their votes on Liberal candidates. Is it at all probable that this vast volume of political sentiment, closely connected as it is with the Nonconformity of Great Britain and rooted in the traditions of British commerce, will, in succeeding elections, either surrender its principles to those of a party largely controlled by brewers and protectionists, or sink its identity in the politics of the Labour Party, which, apart from certain differences of policy, may have to bear, however unjustly, the popular stigma of failure to reduce effectively the number of our unemployed millions ?

Two alternatives lay before the Government at the close of the 1929 election. The new Cabinet might have followed the inept advice of the Independent Labour Party to have no truck with either of the older parties, state boldly its ambitions, bring forward full-blooded measures such as the nationalisation of the land or family allowances, and then, after the inevitable defeat of these proposals, appeal to the country. This crazy and suicidal plan would have ruined our prospects for a decade. The 'left wingers' who urged it upon our leaders habitually live in a world of political unreality. They entertain the delusion that the electors of Great Britain are in the mass keen Labour politicians like themselves. But of the 8,000,000 votes (out of 22,000,000) accorded to Labour at the last General Election the vast majority came from men and women who had never joined the party, read the *Daily Herald*, or attended a political meeting. Dr. Salter, speaking from a very long political experience, asserts that not 10 per cent. of Labour voters are actual Socialists. The fact is that we were mainly returned in our present strength because the country was heartily sick of the Tories for doing so very little, while the sincerity and idealism of the Labour Party appealed, as it always will appeal, to large sections of both manual and middle-class workers. The average Englishman is essentially a practical person ; his idea of Parliament is a machine for action of one kind or another. If he is a Tory, he wants a consistent effort, not necessarily to avoid reforms, but to eliminate proposals which threaten to encroach on what he alleges to be public liberties or knows to be private ones. If a Labour man, he requires—vaguely enough sometimes, but none the less keenly—some betterment of the lot of the vast majority, some fairer distribution of the national wealth, a better chance for his children in the life-struggle. The first Labour Government of 1924 collapsed with subsequent defeat and the loss of forty seats, not on account of the Zinoviev letter, but because we had been able to accomplish next to nothing, and had finally, thanks to the almost incredible blundering of the Attorney-General, been driven to fight the election on a hopeless issue.

The Government chose the saner and more patriotic course, and its action was definitely endorsed by the overwhelming majority of its followers. Fully recognising the limitations attaching to any minority government, Mr. MacDonald's Cabinet addressed itself to a series of measures, including the provision of work for the unemployed, which, in nearly every case, would either receive the cordial support of the Liberals or else escape their parliamentary opposition.

The real explanation of a widespread disinclination to accept Liberal co-operation in a spirit of goodwill and appreciation may probably be sought in the relations between the two parties outside the House of Commons. In the field of municipal politics there exists too often a bitter enmity between Labour and Liberalism, which is rare at Westminster.

A further reason for the deeply-rooted suspicion directed against Liberal co-operation in Parliament is probably the fact that we are generally without experience of any form of government except that carried on by two parties. In the course of time we may no doubt accept a three or four party Government as quite a normal phenomenon, and agree that under such conditions alliances and concordats between different parties are sometimes necessary and desirable if the government of the country is to be carried on. Over and over again Socialist parties in Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden and other European countries have had no hesitation in accepting a working agreement with another non-Socialist party. Half or more of a political loaf is regarded as better than nothing at all, no surrender of basic principles is offered or expected on either side, and no suggestion arises that such temporary *ententes* are treacherous or discreditable. Great Britain has already in the 'eighties had experience of a three-party Parliament, when the Irish members held the balance; and it may be that the course of British politics in the future may lead our Labour Party to modify its present dislike of co-operation, when necessary, with a third party, and to accept a position frequently adopted by our fellow-Socialists in Europe.

The appointment of the Electoral Reform Committee was a significant factor in the Labour-Liberal *entente*. The exploration of electoral reform had been promised in the King's Speech of 1929, and an exaggerated importance was attached to the work of the Committee by the rank and file of the Liberal Party, for it was clear at the outset that practical unanimity was to be regarded as the sole ground for a joint recommendation to Parliament and that such unanimity was obviously out of the question. The net result of ten interesting sittings was that the representatives of Labour and Liberalism were in practical accord in favouring a combination of the alternative vote plus

a number of valuable reforms in electoral procedure acceptable to both parties.

Although the proceedings of the Committee were of a strictly private character, and its members pledged themselves accordingly, a series of most misleading comments appeared in the Press during the continuance of the discussions. Even after the close of the Committee authorities of such standing as the *Liberal Magazine* and the *Manchester Guardian* contained statements and conjectures very wide of the mark. It was, *e.g.*, mischievously suggested that the Liberals had by Labour subtlety been 'led into a trap,' tricked into the surrender of their vital demand for proportional representation, and left stranded with no results of any practical benefit to their party. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Liberals played their cards well and wisely, and at the close had secured from the Tories an acceptance of the principle of a partial experiment in proportional representation and from the Labour representatives a definite basis for future legislation in the shape of the alternative vote plus several minor reforms, just in themselves and of great practical value.

In view of the Committee and its results, the question arises whether the promise of an Electoral Reform Bill will not be found in the coming King's Speech. Apart from other considerations, it is obvious that the Liberals, in return for their invaluable assistance in the passage of first-class Labour measures, may reasonably expect some *quid pro quo*, and demand that the Government should implement its earlier pledge of discussing electoral reform by the introduction of an actual Bill. It is a practical certainty that any such Bill would be summarily rejected by the House of Lords. In order, therefore, to secure its passage into law before the next election, the Bill would have to be introduced this session with the assured prospect of two more years of Labour in office.

The Labour Party has on hand an ample programme of legislative work, and no urgent reason exists for any serious curtailment of its full term of office. The rise of the party has been phenomenal, and its future appears to be assured. Power came to it in 1924 before it was ready for this trying responsibility, but many useful lessons have been learnt since that experiment in government; and it is worth remembering that, although the first Labour Government fell to pieces in nine months and lost forty seats in the following election, more than a million new voters rallied to its standard.

The position of the Labour Party to-day is infinitely stronger since the *primitiæ miseræ* of those earlier experiences. Never again will a Labour Government tolerate dictation from an extremist minority: Llandudno has proved this, if proof were

needed. Mr. MacDonald, more strongly established than ever before, enjoys the unique position to-day in British politics of a leader who merits and receives the practically undivided esteem and loyalty of his party. Our foreign affairs are safe in the hands of Mr. Henderson. Messrs. Snowden and Graham will be towers of strength when the inevitable fight against protective tariffs is once more upon us. Mr. Morrison has shown the way by a proposal of unprecedented magnitude and courage towards that conception of practical Socialism which will replace the 'feverish fancies' that rocked the cradle of the Labour Party and render Collectivism acceptable to millions who were repelled by the Socialist slogans of earlier days.

We hear of fresh activity in the Conservative organisation and of Tory plans ready for an election in three, six, or nine months. But it is difficult to believe that our opponents would deliberately seek to incur the *damnosa hereditas* of over 2,000,000 unemployed. We must, however, anticipate a determined effort to oust us directly a gleam of returning prosperity penetrates the surrounding gloom. Yet if the Government bravely faces the increasing terrors of national unemployment, if it pursues its course with sweet reasonableness, accepting any help the Liberals can usefully offer it in debate and in the voting lobbies, and recognising the implications of mutual good-will, no Tory vote of censure can hold any terrors for the Labour Party.

E. N. BENNETT.

INDIA AND THE WORLD

First to fit India for freedom and then to set her free was the noble policy set before his country by a great Englishman seventy years ago. It was a distinct and intelligible policy for England to pursue, he maintained, and a way for both countries out of the embarrassments of their twisted destinies. It might take years—it might take a century—to fit India for self-government, but it was a thing worth doing and a thing that might be done. And the man who put forward this idea, and saw the possibility of its realisation, was not an idle dreamer with no practical common sense and no knowlege of the risks that those who pursued this policy must run. He was a man who had just gone through the Indian Mutiny and would be returning to India himself to run, if might be, all the risks of the policy he recommended. But he was a man of vision. He had had the reputation of seeing further ahead than his fellows. He had perhaps more of a touch of genius than any other Englishman who had served in India. And he knew how to handle Indians. As a lieutenant on the frontier, he had, on his own initiative and responsibility, raised an army of 6000 men and put down a revolt while the lumbering headquarters machine was only beginning to get into motion. He had served through the Sikh wars. And in 1857, as Commissioner of Peshawar, he had resisted the proposal of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab to withdraw to the Indus; he had kept Peshawar secure all through the Mutiny; he had even recruited thousands of men to aid us; and, most valuable service of all, he had by his far-seeing policy and skilful diplomacy been able to keep the Amir of Afghanistan friendly throughout all this critical period. This was the man—Sir Herbert Edwardes—who in 1860, while still only forty, put forward in a speech in England the bold policy of first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free.

And he was not the first of those who had served in India to express this view. More than 100 years ago Sir Thomas Munro, in an oft-quoted passage, had said the same thing. So, later on, had Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone. None of these great men had any desire to dominate over the Indians and keep them down

and under as a permanently subject race. Such an idea wa wholly repugnant to them. They had respect for the Indians They knew the history of our dominion in India. They knew that we had never gone there for purposes of conquest: we ha gone there for trade, and it was only because on the break-up the Moghul Empire all security for our trade had disappeare that we had been forced to provide that security and thereby ha been drawn on into establishing dominion. They were awar that in those early days the London directors of the old Eas India Company had again and again enjoined their representative in India to abstain from war and politics and stick to their legit mate business, or otherwise the Company would be bankrupt But they knew also that when there was nothing but war al round those small trading settlements, and when they had to hold their own against French and Dutch rivals, the British in India had either to engage in war or retire to England, and that even if they had retired, India would all the same have com under foreign dominion: if it had not been British it would have been French or Dutch, as Indo-China is now under th French and the Malay Archipelago under the Dutch. Thes Anglo-Indian statesmen knew all this—knew that wherever i was possible to leave Indians in rule they had so been left, as in the 600, great and little, Indian States which exist to this day And knowing this, they desired in time to see dominion retrans ferred to Indian hands. Indians, in their view, were not to be kept in permanent subjection. They were to be fitted, and eventually left, to govern themselves.

And this idea of fitting Indians for self-government was not confined to certain individuals; it gradually became the nationa policy. A century ago it was laid down by Act of Parliamen that Indians should be educated and taken into the administra tion of the country. And in 1861 a few were admitted as 'addi tional' members of the Viceroy's Council to advise Governmen in the making of laws. So successful was the experiment, tha in 1892 more were admitted and they were given more power Then in 1919 came the Morley-Minto reforms, when the Council of the Governor-General and of the Governors of Provinces were very considerably enlarged and their powers increased, and when a number of the members were elected by public bodies instea of being nominated by the Viceroy. But the most important advance of all was made in 1917, when the British Government definitely took up the idea of self-government for India and through Mr. Montagu, announced that their policy was 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.'

Further, Government took big steps forward in the declared direction. By the Government of India Act of 1919 embryo Parliaments were set up in the Provinces and at the centre, and the Governor-General and Governors did not preside at their meetings: members elected their own presidents. Most advance was made in the Provincial Legislatures, and there such subjects as education, agriculture, local self-government, health, were handed over to Indian Ministers responsible to the Legislature. But in the Central Legislature also Indians were given increasing opportunity of influencing Government, of criticising and passing resolutions.

And all this time Indians were being admitted to higher and higher posts in the administration, till now half the Executive Councils of the Governor-General and Governors are composed of Indians; an Indian has held the post of Governor of a Province and even of Under-Secretary of State for India in London, and been given a seat in the House of Lords. The higher posts of the general administration are held by the Indian Civil Service, which used to be exclusively British, but now there are 367 Indians to 894 British. And in the lower posts of the administration there are 5500 Indians and only 630 Europeans; while the Judiciary is to an even greater extent manned by Indians. A stranger might go into the High Court at Calcutta and hardly see a single Englishman: the bench might be entirely Indian. From the High Courts downward there are only 230 British out of a total personnel of 2500. In the Irrigation, Engineering, Police, and Forest services the same process of Indianisation is going on. It does not make for efficiency—in the initial stages, at any rate. There is a perceptible slip backward. But the hope is that in the long run it will be the means of training Indians in the art of government. If we had continued to hold the higher posts in our own hands the Indians would have slowly atrophied and become less and less, instead of more and more, capable of carrying on the administration of their own country.

Now the Simon Commission is recommending yet further steps in the direction of the declared goal. They recommend little change at the centre and would retain the control of the Army in the hands of the Governor-General and retain his present powers of enacting any measures which he may think necessary for the peace and tranquillity of the country. In the hands of Governors also would be retained (under the general supervision and control of the Governor-General) certain emergency and over-riding powers to save the situation should a breakdown threaten. But apart from these powers, for the present held in reserve, a great advance is recommended in the Provinces. There the whole administration—including even the police—is to be in the hands

of Ministers responsible to the Provincial Legislature. In the Provinces it is recommended that Indians should now be given real responsibility in all subjects—not only education, agriculture, etc. These suggestions have now been considered by the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. They will be discussed at the Round Table Conference. Eventually a Bill to embody the result of all this discussion will be submitted to Parliament to be debated there. In due course another Government of India Act will issue, and India will start forward again with the latest model of constitutional machinery.

So now we are on the brink of the final, and by far the most risky and delicate, stage in the process of first fitting India for freedom and then setting her free. And here and now it is more than ever necessary to know how Indians themselves regard what is going on. And if we seek that knowledge we must be prepared for a shock. For to them we are not the benevolent, sympathetic, high-minded, trustworthy people we appear in our own eyes. To them we are the hard oppressors whose word is not to be trusted. We make promises, but we do not carry them out unless forced to—if necessary, by bombs. In spite of our protestations of freedom we keep the essential power in our own hands. And we continue to drain the country of its wealth. And this very year, while we talk of giving them responsible government, we at the same time adopt the most brutal repressive measures. Innocent persons are seized and tortured by the police. The most cultured people in India are thrown into gaol, and there treated with the utmost cruelty. And when trouble arises on the frontier we send hundreds of armoured cars and drive over the people, while defenceless men, women, and children are mown down in droves by our fire. This is what is believed by Indians—at least, by immense masses of them—and believed with all the greater firmness of conviction because of the control over the Press. At this moment, when more than at any other calm judgment is required, the Indians are ready to believe anything. They have firmly made up their minds that the British are tyrants and British rule Satanic, and nothing will make them believe otherwise. Lord Irwin, they admit, means well by them, but he cannot have his own way: he is in the hands of reactionaries. So they demand that we shall name a date—and a pretty near one—when we shall leave India, otherwise what happened in Ireland and Russia will happen in India. And if it is suggested to them that if the British Army were withdrawn the frontier tribes and Afghans would invade India, they reply that the Afghans and tribesmen would do nothing of the kind, for they are the friends of the Indians. These, it is true, are the views of the extremists. But the extremists only express with their voice

what is in the secret minds of many a moderate and what spreading all over India. It probably represents, too, what m people on the Continent and in America believe about India a about our attitude towards Indians.

Now, if this is the state of opinion in India, it shows that must be a great deal quicker in the up-take than we are at prese The Simon Commission eventually hatched out a first-r Report. But the despatch of a vast Commission to India wa most cumbersome method of acquainting Parliament with progress of the reforms during the last ten years. We are t heavy with organisation. 'Simla' is bad enough. But when the top of 'Simla' is piled 'Whitehall' and 'Westminster' need not be surprised at the Indians being exasperated and patient. And while they have sat through three years of Sim Commission they have another year or two of Conference a Parliament to possess their souls in patience through. question is whether they will do it. Bombers are there to fo the pace. Gandhi himself has been forced forward by them fas than of his own free-will he would have gone. And less paci men than he might go further and faster.

We British might well despair. Honestly we have meant w by the Indians. The way they responded in the war touch us deeply. In making the announcement that responsil government was the goal of our policy, in passing an Act Parliament to enable great steps towards it to be taken, sending out Queen Victoria's last surviving son to inaugurate t new Assembly and the Prince of Wales to thank India for t part she had taken in the war, we had meant in practical form show our good-will. And if, in spite of this, we are regarded tyrants and every evil thing is believed of us, we might feel d posed to repent us of the concessions we have made and be actual fact what we are believed to be. We might feel inclin once again to show the stern side of our nature.

But for my own part I believe there is not the slightest reas to despair and much cause for rejoicing. We have made m takes. Who would not in such a gigantic task as ruling 320,000,c people of differing religions and degrees of civilisation and speaki dozens of different languages? Would the Indians themsel have done any better? Would the French or the Dutch? Bı with all our mistakes, we have done much for India. We ha brought India into a single political unity; we have establish peace and order where before was chaos; and we have broug one law and one administration for the whole. During the la half-century the population has increased by 20·1 per cent., t exports have risen from 60,000,000 to 4,000,000,000 rupees a the imports from 40,000,000 to 3,000,000,000, and the mileage

railways has increased from 5300 to 40,940 miles. There are now 27,500,000 acres under irrigation by Government works and 67,000 miles of main and branch canals and distributaries; there are 9,247,617 pupils in the schools; and we have steadily trained Indians in the administration. And if Indians now think they can get on perfectly well without us, that should not give us cause for regret: it should be the very thing we should most desire. On the first shock it may be galling to our self-pride. We may also fear for the 1,000,000,000*l* we have invested in the country. But if we take a steadier view of the situation we shall find ground for an immense satisfaction. A splendid result of all our efforts is in sight if we will but keep our patience and our faith.

We are too prone to set excessive store by organisation and order. Order and organisation are essential, but only as a condition for freedom and expression. Freedom for progress, freedom for expression of all a nation's highest aspiration, is what is really wanted. Order and organisation are only a condition for freedom; and freedom itself only a means to the higher ends of expressing all that is most noble and beautiful in life. And when we look at present-day India from that point of view, who would not thrill at the sight? Life, and more abundant life, has come to her. She is being born again. As from the ancient land of Rome a young Italy has come to birth, so is it with India. Out of the old India a new India is arising. She, too, has been caught up in the more vigorous life which is pulsing through the whole world. With all the impetuosity of youth she is panting to express herself. They have to come out of her—all the new hopes, the high ideals, the ardent expectations, the eager straining after the heavenly visions. And she will not be restrained. She chafes at every delay and impediment. The solemn Simon Report she will not even open. She is straining far away beyond that. Her sons and daughters fear neither death nor imprisonment if only she can be free—be rid of the great leaden alien Government which is lying so heavily on her. As at the outbreak of the Great War a high exaltation spread through each country uniting all parties and sweeping men up to unbelievable heights of sacrifice and devotion, so is India now aflame with a lofty patriotic fervour. The very measures which Government have had to take in the interest of order have had the useful effect of combining factions. India is united as never before. Young Moslems join with young Hindus in devotion to the common motherland. The cities are thronged with processions singing and praying and bearing aloft the national flag. Even the imperturbable villages are stirred. They, too, feel the thrill of the new life. India is in the full throes of budding nationhood.

Now this is a splendid spirit to have abroad. It has i' sinister side. There is an underworld which revels in any chanc of disorder. There are dark passions which may be unloose beside the loftiest. There are red revolutionaries at wor who care nothing for nationhood, who look on Gandhi as simpleton and the whole intelligentsia who lead this movemer as contemptible 'bourgeois.' And these rank revolutionaries ai out to harm England, not to benefit India. They would reduc England, India, and every other country to the level of Sovi Russia. This sinister side has to be counted on and guarde against—especially as it is the factor which forces the pace an by threat of bombs drives Indian leaders along faster than the know they ought to go. But, apart from that, the glowing spir of nationality with which India is now on fire is all to the goo And what we British, with our unrivalled political experienc have now to do is to devise means of capturing this spirit an finding for it a body in which it can adequately express itsel In our history we have been engaged on many political ente prises. In some we have failed. In more we have succeede But this is the greatest and most delicate and intricate of the all. For we have to deal with 320,000,000 human beings. Ar it is into a palpitating body, not an iron machine, that the spirit must be harnessed—a living body, not a rigid unyieldir mechanism, a pliable, adaptable body capable of giving prop expression to the young and ardent spirit which is now surgir through India.

So the dream of first fitting India for freedom and then settir her free is fast coming true. And now seems the auspiciou moment for stating more openly and definitely what is implic in the announcement of August 1917. That declaration said th the policy of His Majesty's Government was 'the gradual develop ment of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressi realisation of responsible government in India as an integr part of the British Empire.' The formula was drafted by Lo Curzon and the announcement was made by Mr. Montagu. is not so plain and direct as Sir Herbert Edwardes' definition our object. But it amounts to much the same thing in the lon run. For if self-governing institutions are to be developed ti responsible government is realised, presumably India would be a free as Canada or Australia. And what is wanted now is a clea declaration that when India actually has realised responsib government she shall also have the responsibility of decidin whether she will remain within the Empire or go her own way.

What India really wants is standing—an honourable positio in the world. She resents being subject to Great Britain. Me like Tagore and Gandhi are winning for her a position of hig

honour among the nations. And a statement now that when the declared goal of British policy is achieved no attempt will be made to keep her within the Empire by force, but that if she remain within the Empire it will be of her own free-will, should be of advantage to her and to us: to her because from the moment it is made she can say that no one is in permanent dominion over her and that her destiny is in her own hands; and to us because we shall have satisfied our own conscience and be able to acquit ourselves of any intention to keep India in subjection a moment after she is capable of being mistress in her own house. Before ourselves and before the world both we and the Indians will stand in a better position directly that announcement is made.

But if we say this thing we shall be surrendering the whole position, some will argue. We shall be deliberately handing over India to the same chaos that prevails in China. India may decide to secede from the Empire. Then she will be overrun by Afghans and Afridis; Hindus and Moslems will again be fighting for supremacy; adventurers will be arising and carving out kingdoms for themselves; chieftains, great and small, will be warring with one another; marauding bands will be roving over India as they did on the break-up of the Moghul Empire, and as the bands of brigands are now ravaging China; and foreign Powers will be sending fleets and armed forces to India for the protection of their nationals. Most certainly there are these risks to be run in eventually leaving India to decide her own fate. But—and this must be specially marked—Indians will be at least as aware of these risks as we are ourselves. For they will stand to lose far more than we shall. It will be their country, not ours, that will be ravaged. And they have the example of China close by to show them what may happen. Besides which, for many years past Indians have been holding high positions in the administration and have become aware what government means. They have also attended Imperial Conferences and meetings of the League of Nations. They know, therefore, something of the risks which going outside the Empire may entail and the advantages of remaining within; and they have seen how willingly French Canadians and Dutch South Africans remain within the Empire. And we may presume that they will influence their fellow-countrymen to give no hasty or ill-weighed decision. So if there are risks which we may incur they are far less than the Indians themselves will have to run, and no greater than we, too, have had to run again and again in building up our Empire. And we may be sure that with India in its present state we shall never succeed in getting on without running some risk.

And is it quite so certain that India will never be able to govern and defend herself? China is indeed a melancholy

example of the incapacity of a people for government on the huge scale demanded of her and of India. India might be no better. Japan has only 40,000,000 inhabitants, and even the United States only 120,000,000. And these as well as China are fairly homogeneous people. But India, with her 320,000,000 of all degrees of civilisation, with her innumerable caste divisions, ıer antagonistic religions, and her variety of races, might find it vastly harder to hold herself together in one coherent whole and defend herself against outside attacks by sea as well as by land. The Congress Party think India could do all this to-morrow. I am not so hopeful. But I do think we may look forward to a not so distant time when India will be just as capable of governing and defending herself as, say, South Africa now is. The Indian States have all along governed themselves. And I do not see why British Provinces and Indian States should not steadily ,pproximate to each other—the Governors of the British Provinces becoming less and less direct administrators and more and more like the Residents in the greater Indian States, not interfering in the administration, except in case of gross mismanagement, but forming a connecting link with the Central Authority. India would then consist of a number of self-governing units, some of which would be governed by hereditary rulers and some .y Ministers responsible to an elected Legislature, and all looking :o a Central Authority dealing with matters of common interest ınd the defence of the whole. This Central Authority might be lependent for some time yet on British support; but so were Canada and Australia in the early days of self-government, and o they are to-day to some extent, for neither of them is yet fully elf-defending: they are both dependent at least upon the ritish Navy. And India, with a Constitution approximating to hat of one or other of the Dominions and with the Viceroy ecoming less and less the Governor-General and more and more ike a constitutional monarch, might reasonably be expected to ıold herself together internally and to protect herself against ıfghans and Afridis though still depending, like all the Dominions, ıd like England herself, upon Imperial support when attacked y a European Power. The Indianising of the Indian Army ,ould have to be taken up with much more of a will than has so ar been put into it, and India be provided with a National Army apable of maintaining internal order and of holding the frontier ainst all but European attacks. But if this could be done the ritish troops in India might be held in reserve, like the British lavy, for defending India against any European attack; and ndia would then be on much the same footing as a Dominion.

We may not yet be able to see the time when so vast and aried a country as India would be able to hold itself together any

better than China. But that time may be nearer than we think. For these are days of rapid development. World conditions which have so mightily affected India in the last quarter of a century may equally affect her in the next quarter. The League of Nations and world opinion may have so advanced as to render attack by a European Power upon India well-nigh impossible. The Indian States, the British Provinces, and the Central Authority may have kept the necessary stability by employing Englishmen and other Europeans in their service, as Indian States, of their own accord, do this day. And the young India, like the young Italy and the young Labour Party, may by her zest accomplish in a few years what for centuries has been impossible to the old India. The possibility of India governing herself as independently as Japan and many another Asiatic country may be greater than we think. In any case, we can quite easily see the time when she will be as capable of governing and defending herself as South Africa. And for our own honour and her self-respect we should now without any further waste of time declare that when that time comes we shall leave her free to make her own decision as to whether she shall remain within the Empire or not.

In exercising dominion in India what we are chiefly concerned about is that there is proper security for our trade and that the material resources of this vast tropical country are properly developed. And if Indians themselves can furnish this security and develop the resources we have no need to cling on to dominion for its own sake: we may leave Indians to enjoy the rights of being masters in their own house.

Having fitted India for freedom, we would then set her free. And if she choose to remain within the Empire, it will be of her own free will. This is the only satisfactory basis for the political relationship between the two countries. The sooner it is declared that this is to be the relationship when responsible government is realised, the better it will be for both India and the Empire. And what more appropriate moment for making this announcement could be chosen than the opening of the Round Table Conference?

But whether within the Empire or without, there will always be connexion between this country and India, and the looser the political connexion becomes, the more important is it to strengthen those fundamental connexions which must be permanently maintained between us. Even if India eventually went completely out of the Empire, there would still be trade relations, and diplomatic, social and cultural relations. And those relations might be as warm and happy as they are with Japan or as cold and restrained as they are with Soviet Russia. Also, if she remained

within the Empire the relations might be warm, as between England and Canada or England and Scotland, or cool, as between England and the southern half of Ireland. And both for England and for India it is obviously desirable that the relations between us should be warm and cordial whatever happens. We would like to see the basis of our connexion so acceptable that political differences at the surface would readily compose themselves. Rather than allow political differences to poison the springs, we would like to see welling up from that fountain source something that would sweeten the acerbities of political contention. What, then, should that basis be ?

I have long held that our relations with India should be based on the sense of comradeship. We did not come to India as conquerors. We intervened in the affairs of India to establish order and security, and in doing so we always had the majority of Indians with us. For *they* also wanted security. Even in the Mutiny the greater part of India was with us. And always we have employed more Indians than British in our service. We and Indians have fought together in many a war. We and they have worked together in many a labour of peace. And we are striving to work together now in building up a Constitution which Indians themselves may work. Comradeship, therefore, should be of the essence of our relationship.

But comradeship itself should be based on something deeper still. And here again we may profit by the advice of that far-seeing Anglo-Indian, Sir Herbert Edwardes. He sought for a link between British and Indians and he found it in Christianity. And in this I would agree with him, except that I would prefer to find it in Christ. For Christianity has many forms, but Christ one. Christ, with the example of his life—and an Asiatic life, well understood by Indians ; Christ with his teaching of love ; Christ with his injunction to seek first the Kingdom of God—readily appeals to Indians ; and all that is required is an acceptable way of presenting him and his message. The most religious Hindus are deeply impressed both by the life and the message. And from their intuitive understanding of the Gospel we have often much to learn ourselves. In matters of religion they have a genius such as is only dimly developed in ourselves, and from this we might well profit.

Reciprocally, the fundamentals and the aspirations of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and new movements springing up from within all three of these great religions, are also of intense interest to us. And we are reminded that God is, and always has been, at work in India as well as England. He has given us a mission in the world But to the Indians also He has given a part to play. We have each our part in the great world-drama.

In religion I believe we shall always find the closest bond between us, because in religion we are in nearest touch with that Creative Spirit which is animating the world, and with that vision of the kingdom of heaven—of better things to come—which has been attracting all creation upward from all time and been shaping every activity to that supreme end.

But not only in religion: in philosophy, in science, and in art we can tighten the growing ties between us and the Indians. The poet Tagore has for years been working to develop a university at his home in Santiniketan which would be a meeting ground for men of culture from all the world over. And philosophers, men of science and men of art, from whatever country, are always welcomed in India. So also are men of culture from India welcomed in England. And here is a great field of activity for those who care for improving the relations between Great Britain and India. What the literary world has done in welcoming Tagore, and the universities in welcoming the philosopher Radhakrishnan, the Royal Society in admitting Sir Jagidis Bose and Sir C. Amman, and the India Society in showing their appreciation of Indian art, might be greatly extended in coming years as the present Renaissance in India grows in strength.

And the presence of so many leading men from India in the capital of the Empire affords an excellent opportunity for such a demonstration of the interest we British take in other and more fundamental aspects of life than the political connexion. We should like these Indians to go back to India realising that, much as we desire a happy solution of the present political problem, we desire still more intensely the strengthening and deepening of those spiritual relations which must always subsist between us whatever the outcome of the present political discussions.

Those assembled in conference must needs have their attention concentrated on the details of the political problem. But we outside it may emphasise the more enduring aspects of our relationship with India, and in so doing impart a temper to the Conference which will aid them to reach a solution agreeable alike to patriotic Indians and earnest-minded Englishmen. May we never forget how India stood by us when we were fighting for our lives. Through this crucial testing time of peace may we always bear that remembrance with us, and, like true comrades, stand steadily by her in the growing pains of nationhood. And in the midst of political controversy may we stay ourselves on those deep and spiritual foundations which must be the final basis of our permanent relations with India.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

THE MELTING-POT OF CENTRAL EUROPE

The Great War brought about the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by upsetting the balance of a structure that held together a diversity of races and religions, of political, social and economic interests, during the reign of a King-Emperor whose whole being was wrapped up in the tradition, prestige, and power of the ancient House of Hapsburg. From the opening scene at Olmütz in 1848 till the curtain of death fell at Schönbrunn in the late autumn of 1916, Francis Joseph was guided by the single motive of preserving and, if possible, of extending his imperial heritage; and the means which he eventually employed, during varying forms and degrees of autocracy, was the dualist system favoured by Andrássy whereby Magyar domination in Hungary was balanced by German centralist domination in Austria, and any federal concessions granted to the nationalities in the western half of the monarchy were likely to upset the prevailing system in the eastern half, and *vice versâ*. Hence the reign of this unhappy monarch was one long endeavour to protect an equilibrium against the pressure of political, religious, and economic forces striving to attain what they claimed to be their rights. Structures relying solely on balance must, however, eventually topple over when subjected to excessive pressure, and this pressure must come sooner or later. In the case of Austria-Hungary it came with the Great War, which let loose strong national forces—Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Slovaks, Roumanians, Slovenes, and others—which had long been straining the fabric of the monarchy owing to the failure of attempts to solve their problems. If the war and its consequences upset the balance and caused the crash, the Peace Treaties collected the fragments and threw them into the 'melting-pot' of Central Europe, which now constitutes a situation greatly increasing the danger to peace created by other so-called 'peace settlements.' In the first post-war decade continuous efforts have been made to smooth over the dangers and difficulties arising out of the redrafting of the map of Central Europe, but these efforts have tended to obscure the true position and to delude the peoples by high-sounding words and phrases which are without any real meaning. I should, indeed,

be surprised if anyone can explain what is meant by 'a new moral unit, accompanied, perhaps, by a new political policy in Europe, a new political, economic and moral system of co-operation.'[1] Such ideas, whatever they mean, may exist in what the late Lord Cromer aptly described as 'political Cloud Cuckooland,' but they have no relation to the conditions which I have found to prevail in Central Europe, composed of newly formed territories some of which are mere miniatures of the old Austria-Hungary bearing the name of national democratic states. Having received the blessing of President Wilson and of a large number of ignorant idealists, these rudely formed territories have adopted the name of the 'New Central Europe,' although not one of them can be termed a complete national entity. They are merely broken fragments of a geographical and economic unity, based on the Danube and practically coinciding with the former frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Many high authorities maintain that the dismemberment of the monarchy was a serious mistake, and this view is not confined to representatives of the Central Powers. Jean Pierrefeu writes of Marshal Petain that

> il avait une ampleur de vues qui dépassait beaucoup les perspectives habituelles aux militaires. Ainsi il n'était pas partisam de la dissolution de l'Autriche. Après les réformes nécessaires que l'Entente aurait imposées à l'Empereur en ce qui concerne l'autonomie des peuples de la double Monarchie, il pensait que l'Empire était seul capable de maintenir l'union et l'ordre entre les races naturellement hostiles qui, livrées à elles-mêmes, ne cesseraient pas de se faire la guerre et de compromettre la paix de l'Europe.[2]

The notice of M. Briand was recently drawn to this quotation by Dr. Schober, the former Austrian Federal Chancellor, who assured me in Vienna that this view was shared by the French Foreign Minister. It must, however, be admitted that nothing could have saved the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that it is now impossible to rebuild what has been broken beyond repair. The Hapsburg Monarchy has, for better or for worse, passed away never to return, and has given place to a Central European imbroglio which cannot be regarded as durable, and will need the most skilful handling if further disaster is to be avoided.

In dealing with the new states of Central Europe I will confine myself to those forming the Danubian area, and endeavour to show some of the political, social, and economic changes resulting from the Peace Treaties, the problems arising out of these changes, the conditions at present prevailing in these states, and the impressions which I have acquired as to the possibilities of the future. During my two visits to Central Europe during the last

[1] Dr. Beneš at the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations.

[2] *Grand Quartier Général* ,by Jean Pierrefeu. (Paris, 1920.)

six months I made every effort not to be pessimistic and to see things from a confident and hopeful point of view, and in recording impressions I have tried to avoid making unnecessary statements that might be disheartening to those who are sincerely working in the interests of peace. At the same time, I believe it to be a crime against humanity to attempt to disguise unpleasant truths, or to wrap them up in phrases which please the ear of the peacemaker but only deepen the obscurity in which he has to work. Let us now consider the group of states which have lost territory as a result of the war, and are therefore in favour of treaty revision.

When the peacemakers in Paris proceeded to break up the monarchy they left Austria a small territory, chiefly Alpine, with a population of just over 6,000,000 and a large capital quite unsuited to the needs of a small country. The remainder of the old Austria was parcelled out to various succession states. Roughly speaking, Italy received the South Tyrol (with 250,000 Germans), Trieste, Istria, the Cherso Islands, and Zara ; Galicia went to Poland ; Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Silesia (with 3,100,000 Germans) were handed over to Czechoslovakia ; Carniola, Dalmatia, and the condominium of Bosnia-Herzegovina were ceded to Yugoslavia ; and the Bukowina was absorbed in Roumania. Whereas Austria was formerly a heterogeneous state, it is now a German state with negligible foreign elements in the population.[3] Hence, by a radical proceeding in the course of which all districts with mixed nationalities were allotted to Austria's neighbours, German Austria became most uniform in nationality, and has been spared the minority question which stands out so prominently beyond her frontiers. But, while the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was an economic unit largely self-supporting and protected by customs tariffs against outside competition, Austrian industries are now deprived of their former markets and sources of supply within the old Empire, and have to face the difficulties of tariff barriers within this same area. A great economic unity has been broken up, and Austria has been left as a top-heavy fragment separated from the other essential parts that went to make up the economic whole. During the last decade Austria has passed through a period of great uncertainty and difficulty. Political differences, want of capital, new tariff barriers, and want of confidence abroad have hindered progress, but the Austrians are now gradually overcoming their difficulties, and their future looks more assured provided that political antagonisms are set aside. Dr. Schober had a firm grasp of the situation, possessing all the qualities necessary to influence the

[3] About 90,000 Czechs, most of whom have migrated to Vienna ; about 3,000 Slovenes, remaining by *plébiscite* in Southern Carinthia ; and about 70,000 Croats and Magyars.

contending parties in the right direction, and it is hoped that his successor will follow in his footsteps; but it is essential that all Austrians should realise that their future largely depends on economic factors, and that without peace at home and the disappearance of political armed forces the financial confidence of foreign nations cannot be expected. There has been much talk about union with Germany, and it is difficult to see anything that can prevent a realisation of the *Anschluss* in the more or less distant future; but, as far as the present is concerned, Austria is trying to build up a small federal republic, free of external commitments and as far as possible self-supporting. Much has been done in recent years to increase agricultural production; great efforts have been made to produce electricity from water power, in order to reduce coal imports from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to provide power for export to neighbouring countries; and attempts to improve the quality of manufactured products have been largely successful. Indeed, considering the miserable conditions which prevailed in Austria just after the war, it is surprising what the people have succeeded in doing with the small resources at their disposal. The Hapsburgs have faded away, and there seems little in Vienna or elsewhere to show that they have left many regrets behind them. Dr. Schober assured me that there was no question of their return, but emphasised the fact that there was great need in Central Europe of one strong Power incorporating the smaller nations on a federal basis with local autonomy. As far as the Austrian minority in the South Tyrol is concerned, there has recently been some improvement, partly owing to Mussolini having realised that his former policy was unwise and partly to the success of Dr. Schober in concluding a treaty with Italy on the occasion of his late visit to Rome. Indeed, Austro-Italian relations are now on a better footing than they have been for a very considerable time.

While Austria has suffered severely as a result of the Peace Treaties, the heaviest burden of all has fallen on Hungary. This state has been reduced to less than one-third of its former size, and has lost over 3,000,000 Hungarians, thereby constituting in the neighbouring states large minorities in varying degrees of dissatisfaction, many of which are actually adjoining the country of their origin. Croatia and a part of the Banat, with 500,000 Hungarians, were ceded to Yugoslavia; the whole of Slovakia and what is now known as Carpathian Ruthenia (in fact all former Hungary north of the Danube), with 750,000 Hungarians, have been incorporated in Czechoslovakia; Transylvania, with its neighbouring districts and part of the Banat, with 1,700,000 Hungarians, were handed over to Roumania; the Burgenland (close to Vienna), with 65,000

Hungarians, was given to Austria ; and the port of Fiume went : Italy. This dismemberment of former Hungarian territory has iot only broken up by unnatural frontiers a geographical and conomic unity composed of interdependent territories, but has reated in the orographic area of the Carpathians and Danube asin an ethnographical and economic situation contrary to the est interests of the constituent states and disturbing to the peace Europe. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the methods dopted at the Paris Conference have furthered the formation of ational states. In the territory given to Roumania only 53 per ent. of the population is of Roumanian nationality ; in that ceded Czechoslovakia only 48 per cent. is Slovak ; and in that handed ver to Yugoslavia only 37 per cent. is Serb and Croat. Hence, hese three succession states are burdened with a great mass f Hungarians, whose whole interests are bound up with their ompatriots across the frontier and whose feelings for their ew rulers are characterised by varying degrees of dislike and istrust. In Hungary, on the other hand, the population is bout 90 per cent. Magyar, with small minorities confined to a ew Germans and Slovaks with a sprinkling of Roumanians, erbs, and Croats.

As a country, Hungary may be described as a rather conserva-ive monarchy, the perpetual sovereign of which (according to ediæval tradition) is the Holy Crown of St. Stephen. All the ower of the nation is concentrated in the Holy Crown, from which manate all rights and to which is due the allegiance of all Hun-arian subjects. The king is but a trustee of this royal symbol. : therefore follows that, as the person of the King of Hungary is onsidered only as the bearer of the Holy Crown, it makes no ifference constitutionally whether there is a king or not. Hence e present regency of Admiral Horthy serves to tide over a ifficult time when dynastic questions may develop into serious iternational disputes, without in any way prejudicing Hungary's *atus* as a perfectly constituted kingdom. Although the legiti-ists claim that the Archduke Otto is the lawful heir, the fact emains that the Hapsburgs ceased to be kings of Hungary when e late Emperor Charles was deposed by law, and the Hungarian overnment declared that before electing a future king they ould agree previously with the Great Powers represented on the onference of Ambassadors and would not act without their onsent. Hungary is, therefore, still free to elect her own king, d influential circles in Budapest are of the opinion that at resent the return of Otto would be neither wise nor even opular. Meanwhile there is a strong form of government nder the able statesmanship of Count Bethlen, whose wise policy as guided Hungary through the most troubled times ; but it

seems that the majority of the people want a change, chiefly owing to the inability of the Government to improve the economic situation, and that with free elections a new Government would come into power. As, however, the system of secret ballot is the exception and not the rule in Hungary, a change of Government is most improbable. Out of 245 constituences only 46 have the secret ballot, 25 being in Budapest and the remainder in other towns. The system prevailing in Hungary is behind the times, although considerable efforts are being made to improve matters in this respect; agrarian reform has been carried out to a limited extent, and the country is less under the control of the landowners than previously, although the old system has not disappeared. Relying almost solely on agriculture and her remaining agricultural industries, Hungary is suffering severely from the present agricultural depression, brought about by the increased production of the American continent, the new tariff barriers, and the dumping policy of Soviet Russia. Yet the Hungarians are little subject to Communist tendencies, which are practically confined to Budapest, the only really large town in the country.

As political feeling in Hungary and in the Hungarian minorities of the succession states forms one of the most important factors of the Central European problem, it is essential to realise that treaty revision and rectification of frontiers occupy the uppermost place in all Hungarian minds. The Treaty of Trianon is held to be the most unjust measure ever committed to paper, although Lord Rothermere's propaganda has been detrimental to Hungary in accentuating certain weaknesses in the Magyar method of claiming redress. The fact, however, remains that a large and influential body of objective opinion in Europe regards the treatment of Hungary as a grave injustice. I went to Central Europe with an open mind, with an earnest desire to form an objective opinion in this matter; but, hard as I have tried to find justice in the Trianon award, I have completely failed to do so, and I found that my view was shared by many statesmen and diplomatists of disinterested countries. Although no offer has ever been made, it is unfortunate that many Hungarians say that they could not accept the return of the wholly Magyar territories as a final settlement, contending that this can only be achieved by the return of all the territories of the former Hungary; and it is difficult to visualise the Czechs, Roumanians, or Yugoslavs being prepared even to consider the return of any territory which they have acquired; but I shall return to this question later. A further Hungarian grievance, and a legitimate one, is that, while Hungary is almost totally disarmed and Budapest is within the range of Czech artillery, the three succession states of Czecho-

slovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia possess highly trained and well-equipped armies with a total war strength of 4,500,000. Although the Hungarian demands are, perhaps, excessive, a claim to sovereignty over wholly Magyar territories would be quite in harmony with the principles which are supposed to have guided the Peace Conference of Paris, and should be aimed at as the basis of an eventual solution. How far this is practicable, and how it could be achieved, is another matter involving the difficulty of separating Hungarian minorities from other racial territories contiguous to them; and this is only one of the many complex questions standing in the way of treaty revision. But one of the most outstanding features of the situation is that by far the greater number of Hungarians (about 2,000,000) are only separated from Hungary by a frontier line, although an important *bloc* in Transylvania is cut off by territory containing a large Roumanian population, and other smaller groups are so numerous and so scattered that their re-incorporation in Hungary would involve the re-establishment of some of the very conditions which the Peace Conference set out to eliminate. Yet it is quite clear that the period of time during which present conditions can continue in peaceful surroundings is limited, and the most one can hope for is the absence of neighbouring friction, which might infect and seriously disturb this palpitating region before national and social antagonism have a chance to subside. Let us now turn to the group of states which have acquired territory and, as the Little Entente, is working for the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Czechoslovakia, with all her admirable qualities, possesses few of the characteristics of a national state. Although the Czechs are the dominant race, they compose less than half of the population[4] and only 65 per cent. together with the Slovaks; while the Germans, nearly a quarter of the population, occupy an area in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia amounting to over one-fifth of the entire country, and the Hungarians, numbering about 750,000, inhabit the southern boundaries of Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia. Indeed, the Czechs now dominate two highly cultured races to which they were formerly subservient as well as the Slovaks, a more backward race which now shows signs of clamouring for autonomy, and the Ruthenians, a primitive race which has been assured autonomy[5] although quite incapable of exercising that privilege. Efforts are being made to raise the people of Carpathian Ruthenia to a higher degree of civilisation, the Czechs claiming that their backward state is due to former Hungarian rule, but progress must be slow where half the population is illiterate. For her size Czechoslovakia has inherited great

[4] The army is mainly composed of non-Czechs.

[5] Guaranteed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

industrial resources cut off from their former markets and compelled to find new outlets, with an access to the sea confined to the waterways of the Danube, Elbe, and Oder and special harbour facilities at Hamburg, Stettin, and Trieste; but agriculture plays an equally important part in her general economic life, although the Germans are more industrialised than either the Czechs or Hungarians. It is not too much to say that, with all her disabilities, the agricultural, industrial, and social progress of this state is one of the most remarkable achievements of the last ten years. Agriculture is carried on according to the most modern scientific methods, with adequate provision for the instruction of the rural population. Industry has been revived and adapted to changed conditions with an energy and resource which has astonished foreign observers, so that an area which formerly served the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy now exports to all parts of the world. The vast and thriving industries of Plzen[6] bear ample testimony to the enterprise and perseverance of the Czechoslovak people, and in social development the same qualities are everywhere apparent.

If Czechoslovakia may be described as a geographical and political deformity, these disabilities have been somewhat counterbalanced by the personality of President Masaryk, whose wise and far-sighted policy has succeeded to some extent in moderating racial differences and animosities, but the Czechs still suffer from their sudden change from a position of subserviency to that of domination. Experience has taught me that, where minorities are concerned, it is impossible to draw satisfactory conclusions from the evidence and statistics available, and that all one can hope for is a general impression based on national characteristics and local conditions. In this case I found that the Czechs and Germans get on moderately well together where it is in their mutual interests to do so, and that Czech policy aims at welding the two races into one homogeneous whole, but that the Czechs have a natural desire to 'get their own back,' while the Germans have difficulty in realising their new position. Where a former ruling race has become subject to a former subject race, the one being a Teuton and the other a Slav, political harmony is scarcely to be expected, and the same principle applies in a greater degree in the case of the Czechs and Hungarians. At Brno,[7] the capital of Moravia and an important industrial centre, the German minority has few real grievances and is on fairly good terms with the Czechs; and at Bratislava,[8] the capital of Slovakia, there is little to show that Germans,

[6] Formerly Pilsen.

[7] Formerly Brünn.

[8] Pressburg in German and Possony in Hungarian.

ungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks cannot live and do business gether. Yet, although some Hungarian farmers may have aterially benefited by the Czech agrarian reform, there is a strong olitical antagonism and sense of grievance throughout the whole inority. The Hungarians are not a material race, and the social ictor plays an important part in the frontier question. A high-pirited race deprived of former superiority cannot see the point view of successors whom it regards as lower on the social and ultural scale. But, whatever may be the actual conditions of ie Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, they are admitted to e better than those of the corresponding minorities in Roumania nd Yugoslavia.

President Masaryk is in the habit of making statements to eign journalists to the effect that he has considerable sympathy the Hungarians and their difficulties, and that he would in vourable circumstances be prepared to consider a modification the present frontiers, but before this is in any way possible the ungarians must change their tactics. The President made such statement to me on August 13 last. As, however, such statements are always followed by denials from the Prague Foreign inistry, one is reluctantly forced to draw the conclusion that the echs wish to create abroad an impression of generosity and of vouring a pacific settlement with Hungary, but that they are reful to safeguard themselves from any such commitment by eans of an amended statement which they know will pass noticed.* I only mention this as an example of the methods ed to confuse public opinion abroad by states which have no tention of parting with any of their acquired territory, and echoslovakia comes under this category.

Roumania, greatly enlarged by the addition of Transylvania, ie Bukowina and other territories formerly belonging to the ustro-Hungarian Monarchy, is essentially an agricultural country hich may be said to have passed the ultra-nationalist stage of high tariff policy based on the principle of 'Roumania for the umanians.' Indeed, this policy was reversed not many months o to lower the cost of living and to make the necessities of the asants cheaper, but any good results that might have been the tcome of this change were swamped by the world depression in ricultural produce. Sound in principle as was the policy of rarian reform carried out in Roumania, the methods used have used severe hardship to the new peasant proprietors, who are in eat need of agricultural credits and other facilities to enable em to consolidate their position and carry on their cultivation.

* *Sunday Times*, November 28, 1929, followed by statement in Prague amber. *Neue Freie Presse*, May 16, 1929; May 17, 1929; *Neue Freie Presse*, tember 27, 1930; September 29, 1930.

Although there is discontent on this score, the Roumanians are naturally a contented peasant people with few needs, a considerable degree of culture, and moderate education. The return of King Carol, who has now been generally acclaimed except by the Bratianu Party, has done much to stabilise the political position, but this very wealthy country, full of agricultural and mineral resources, has no money with which to exploit her natural riches. Fortunately it is now recognised that foreign capital and enterprise are essential, and there is talk of a British Trade Delegation shortly proceeding to Bucharest. Roumania's greatest needs are internal improvements and external credit. When King Carol, who is seriously applying himself to the work of consolidation, was gracious enough to receive me in audience at Sinaia, he admitted that previous Roumanian Governments had renounced commitments undertaken by their predecessors, which had produced want of confidence abroad. His Majesty then emphasised the point that he undertook to see in future that all contracts signed by one Government would remain obligations of the Roumanian State and would be honoured by that Government's successors in office. The King assured me that this would be guaranteed, which is an important step in the right direction.

Although the great problem in Roumania to-day is to find the necessary means to keep the country on its feet, the Government are also faced with a discontented minority of over 1,500,000 Hungarians in Transylvania whose eyes are ever set on Budapest, and who have no interests whatever in the country to which they have been transferred. While M. Vaida, Minister of the Interior, led me to believe that he had in preparation a general law for all minorities in Roumania which would go as far as possible to satisfy their grievances, the Hungarian leaders in Transylvania show no signs of collaborating with the Roumanian Government, whom they consistently accuse of bad faith. It is necessary, however, to view this minority question in Transylvania from a broader angle and to realise that the root of the trouble lies, not with the Roumanians, who, I believe, are trying to the best of their ability to administer justice, but with the Peace Treaty, which transferred to Roumanian rule a highly cultured community completely out of harmony with Latin-Oriental ways and methods. While it is generally contended that it is impossible to satisfy the Hungarians, and that they enjoy conditions better than those of any other minority in Roumania, it is interesting to note that even the Roumanians of Transylvania [10] are dissatisfied with the treatment they receive from their compatriots of the 'Old Kingdom,' which is probably due partly to the superior culture of the former

[10] Transylvania has at different times throughout history enjoyed considerable degrees of autonomy.

nd partly to a tendency on the part of the latter to treat them returned émigrés. Of all the states watered by the Danube Roumania is the only one sharing a common frontier with Soviet Russia, yet Communism is a negligible factor, and even in Bessarabia there seems to be no danger at present, partly owing to the strong desire of the inhabitants to remain within the Roumanian state and partly to Russian fears of an autonomous movement in he neighbouring Ukraine. Roumania's external troubles lie at resent rather to the west, and it is unpleasant to have to record at her most intimate domestic difficulty has been aggravated y the indiscretion and bad taste of the more irresponsible Press this country. On the subject of Yugoslavia I do not feel ompetent to express any opinion owing to lack of first-hand nowledge, but it is sufficient to recall the fact that, while the erbs as a fighting race have earned the respect of some Hunarians, their treatment of the Hungarian minority is alleged to e so harsh as to provoke the strongest resentment.

The foregoing account is sufficient to show that the Little ntente states contain within their frontiers powerful forces cially forming part of, and to a large extent contiguous to, a ighly dissatisfied neighbour, and constituting a grave source of eakness to these states. Hungary, the home of these forces, in sympathy and friendship with a progressive and overpulated Italy pressing for expansion and looking for an opporunity to improve her position; while the Hungarians have also een looking round for other European forces to which to attach eir claims for treaty revision. It is here that the Central uropean question, pivoted on the present distribution of the ungarian people, has a direct and serious effect on the gravity the question of the Polish Corridor, which is admitted by the hest European authorities to be the most dangerous menace the peace of Europe. In Budapest I was recently informed at Hungary was inclined to look to Germany's opening of the orridor question as the best opportunity for putting forward r claims, and a few weeks later events in Germany tended to ow that the younger generation means business in its determinaon eventually to upset the *status quo* of Versailles. Whatever e's views may be in this matter, it is difficult to visualise coming enerations of young Germans continuing the payment of huge ms in reparations, thereby crippling the honest efforts of those o never knew the Great War; and it is equally difficult to see e German nation, restored to its normal position in Europe, ntinuing to tolerate the settlement by which the Reich has been ided into two parts. Obviously, the Hungarians, divided up d reduced to practical impotence by the Treaty of Trianon, nnot hope to obtain redress by single-handed action, but events

are gradually developing which point to the fact that Hungary's future interests lie in the direction of Berlin in the north and Rome in the south. On the other hand, the maintenance of the *status quo* is a fundamental precept of French policy, and consequently the Little Entente states enjoy the full friendship and support of France, as well as the more indirect support of a strong and progressive Poland supremely interested in the preservation of newly acquired territory.

Hence it looks as if Europe may again be confronted with division into two opposing camps, namely, the discontented nations of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and possibly Austria,[11] *vis-à-vis* France, Poland, and the Little Entente as defenders of the *status quo;* while the divergence of these two groups may well be intensified by Franco-Italian differences and the struggle of these two Powers for political hegemony in the Balkans. I have stated in another place that 'the battle of the *status quo* has got to be fought out sooner or later, and on its result the future of Europe will depend.'[12] Hitherto, nothing has been said about Russia, which may play a deciding part in the decision of these issues. It is impossible any longer to remain blind to the fact that sooner or later Russia will recover her former position as a great European Power, and that pressure from that quarter will be an important force with which to reckon. There have already been indications of a tendency for Germany and Russia to co-operate, chiefly owing to the Polish question, and it is possible that a situation will arise where Russia may enable the dissatisfied states to force the issue of treaty revision.

The peace of Europe does not depend on the small states of the Danubian or Balkan areas, but on the Great Powers and their influences in these smaller states. Serbia did not cause the Great War, nor will the responsibility of any future war on a great scale be laid on the shoulders of countries such as Hungary, Roumania, or Czechoslovakia, although the conditions prevailing there can be used by the greater Powers for good or evil. But Central European differences can do much to aggravate situations where the Great Powers are at variance, and therefore every effort should be made to dissipate hatreds engendered by the great upheaval of 1914–18. In Central Europe great changes have taken place in the social order, and it is extremely difficult for a generation accustomed to the old *régime* to see the point of view of those who have deprived them of their possessions. In the territory now represented by Czechoslovakia power was formerly in the hands of the German and Hungarian aristocracy, high army

[11] There are close relationships between Vienna and the German minority in Czechoslovakia.

[12] *Britain and the Baltic*, p. 144.

lers, Church dignitaries and wealthy capitalists, who have w been replaced by a race of ordinary working people. It not possible for the present generation of Germans or Hungarians, many of whom are now reduced to poor circumstances, negotiate with the leaders of the new *régime*; and, therefore, e former ruling generation must be replaced by others before oblems which now seem insoluble can be approached with y degree of confidence. Much also depends on whether war norance produces in the coming generation a conciliatory titude arising out of freedom from war hatreds, or whether ck of appreciation of the horrors of war leads to national nbitions. Numerous ready-made solutions have been put ward for the consolidation of the Danubian states, most them based on the federal principle, political or economic, d ignoring mutual animosities which make these systems possible of realisation. Yet there is more chance of some asure of success in economic collaboration than in any other rection. Roumania and Yugoslavia have taken the lead in this atter, which may prepare the way for an eventual *bloc* of the rarian states of north-east and south-east Europe, arising out the feeling that some regular co-operation is necessary to tide er the present world crisis.[18] At present this is the most peful sign in that discordant region. Fortunately, the first t-war decade has drawn to a close, and with it we hope will appear its idealistic folly, its meaningless clouds of words and rases, and its everlasting talk of 'goodwill,' which only exists a gaseous form at Geneva. New forces are already coming into ty which may blow away the cobwebs of fictitious values. these new forces are wisely guided, they may well restore a r-shattered Europe by reintroducing a sense of reality and ll-balanced judgment; but, if opposed, they may lead Europe the brink of another catastrophe, in order to undo what many nsider should never have been done.

Europe is faced with two alternatives:

(*a*) Maintenance of the present frontiers, with efforts to bring out economic co-operation in the hope of reaching political operation later on, but with the ever-present danger of crisis another quarter which would be intensified by the situation in Danubian states; or

(*b*) Anticipation of events by a general reconsideration of the ce settlements, thereby introducing a fresh atmosphere into whole European system.

The former course would be an effort to maintain, in the hope improving, a thoroughly unsatisfactory structure, which may

[18] This was somewhat foreshadowed by the conference of representatives of agrarian states at Warsaw in August 1930.

collapse at any time. The latter course would be to meet grave difficulties half-way; to take into consideration the development of new forces; and to realise that, while Europe of to-day has solemnly renounced war as a means of settling disputes, the whole matter may appear in a different light to the Europe of to-morrow. I leave my readers to form their own conclusions.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

ƆRKISH POLITICS: PERSONS AND PARTIES

HE westernisation and reform of Turkey is a subject which has oused great interest among all students of Eastern and foreign fairs. Extraordinary changes have been put into force there th in constitution, in law, and in the national habits of life, and is with great suddenness. The sequence of these events is ite familiar, but it is not so easy to learn, either from books or wspapers, the currents at work in political circles in Turkey. this sphere important events have recently occurred. From e point of view of day-to-day observation it may be useful and teresting to be informed as to the background of these; and as nts of this order determine from time to time in whose hands actual powers of government reside, their reaction, even on a ng view of the country's history, cannot be ignored. The extent the influence exercised by such events, confined though they pear to be to the circles of politicians on their happening, can suggested by a single wide example: if Mustafa Kemal Pasha d not established for himself a dominant position in Turkish litics, reform in Turkey would not have taken the striking urse which it has.

Down to the end of the Great War the dominant party in rkey was the Committee of Union and Progress (whose sup-rters are generally known as 'Unionists'). The three most werful personalities in this group were Talaat, Jemal, and ver Pashas: the last, although his name is the most familiar the West, was not the brain of the party; he was a man of e private character, and of great personal courage, who attained position which he did because he was ready to take the risks utting into action what his associates planned. He was the rty's man of action: Talaat was perhaps its leading brain. other member of it, who was in one department of the greatest ility, was Javid Bey, who became Minister of Finance: he was of the sect of Crypto-Jews of Salonika (who are Mussulman in me and externals, but are of Jewish blood and are said to ctise Jewish rites in secret), and he was an economist and ancier of talent. Minor figures, but men of importance who y also be mentioned for what follows, were Dr. Nazim Bey and

Ismail Jambulat Bey. It is, further, of interest to remember that Mustafa Kemal Pasha (who himself comes from Salonika, but is of pure Mussulman family) was, like every other educated army officer, a supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress, but for personal reasons, on account of his powerful and domineering character, was not on good terms with its leaders.

At the Armistice the power of the Committee of Union and Progress was broken. Its leading members fled abroad: Talaat and Jemal Pashas were later assassinated, and Enver Pasha was killed fighting the Bolsheviks in Bokhara. At Constantinople the reins of government passed to the Sultan and to the party in opposition (in the previous Parliaments) to the Unionists, which was known as the *Entente Liberale.* These elements were later wholly discredited and eliminated, and no further reference need be made to them. In Anatolia the movement towards a fresh national resistance began almost immediately. From this emerged the persons and parties now dominant in Turkish politics.

Far and away the best known of the leaders who emerged from the period of national resistance is Mustafa Kemal Pasha (generally known as the Ghazi Pasha), but it must always be remembered that he had not at that period the unique position which he has now. The first seeds of resistance were sown by Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha: the first Nationalist manifesto was signed not only by these two, but also by Rauf Bey, a naval officer turned politician. As the struggle continued other generals came in for their share of popular respect; such were Ali Fuad Pasha and Refet Pasha, who led the Nationalist troops into Constantinople amid scenes of unparalleled enthusiasm. Until 1921 the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha was merely that of the generally acknowledged leader of the Nationalist forces; in 1921 he was officially appointed commander-in-chief at the crisis of the war, the battle of the Sakkaria. From then till the conclusion of the war at Smyrna in 1922 he remained the supreme commander, with Ismet Pasha as his chief of staff. It should be noted that Rauf Bey, one of the co-signatories of the Manifesto aforesaid, returned to Constantinople and led a Nationalist Party in the last Parliament there, which secured the adoption by that body of a pact embodying the Nationalist demand. He was then arrested and deported with a number of other Nationalist deputies of that Parliament. It may also be recalled that, in Angora, Fethi Bey, whom we shall meet later, was fulfilling prominent duties; he was the Nationalist emissary in London.

The result of the campaign which ended at Smyrna placed the Ghazi Pasha on a pinnacle in the eyes of his countrymen. He was regarded as the saviour of the country and was the object of

quite universal gratitude and admiration. He became a name to conjure with, a personality who towered in the eyes of the Turkish people, and especially in the eyes of the army, far above all the other leaders and members of the Government and Assembly at Angora. But this did not apply so much to political circles: there were many among the leading men in Angora, both military and political, who considered that they or others were equally well entitled to take a leading share in the future government of the country.

From 1922 to 1923 the sovereignty of the country was vested in the National Assembly; and the Conference of Lausanne, where the Turkish delegation was led by Ismet Pasha as Foreign Minister, was in progress. After its conclusion the Ghazi Pasha, in October 1923, secured the establishment of a Republic and his own election as President. This was the first step towards securing an absolute predominance for himself.

Ismet Pasha then became Prime Minister. The Sultanate, but not the Caliphate, had been abolished, a member of the house of Osman, Abd-ul-Mejid Effendi, having been appointed Caliph. This arrangement was upset in March of the next year, 1924, when the Caliphate was also abolished and the members of the house of Osman exiled. This was accomplished by the passing of laws of secularisation, the first step of the subsequent reforms; and the following month the Assembly passed the new Fundamental Law or Constitution. The country acquiesced. There can be little doubt that this foretaste of reform came as a shock to the uneducated masses. On the other hand, the bulk of the educated and upper classes, still mainly located in Constantinople, were then solid for the Ghazi Pasha; but in definitely political circles the first hint of opposition was already to be heard. This came from the men of acknowledged position who already felt themselves being pushed into the shade, such as Rauf Bey. The Constantinople Press began to sing the same tune. Its leading figure at that time was Husein Jahid Bey; he should have been mentioned before as a prominent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress. He was a man of really fine intellect. The writer recalls now with admiration a leading article written by him at that time in his own newspaper, a brilliant exposition of the function and value of opposition parties. In the latter part of the year 1924 ill-health forced Ismet Pasha to retire: he left Angora and came to reside in Prinkipo. Fethi Bey became Prime Minister. Then the growing opposition to the Ghazi Pasha took shape, and an opposition party, the 'Republican Progressive Party,' was formed. Its most prominent members were Rauf Bey, Kiazim Kara Bekir, Refet, and Ali Fuad Pashas, and Adnan Bey, formerly the Government's diplomatic representative in

Constantinople. It should be noted that the disgruntled element among the politicians was here combined with three officers whose prestige with the army stood very high, and thus a bid was made for the all-important support of the army.

The party of which the Ghazi Pasha was president, and which had loosely embraced all the members of the Assembly in Angora, was then known as the 'People's Party': upon the formation of the new party, almost openly as a bulwark against the growing power of the President of the Republic, the People's Party also adopted the epithet 'Republican' and assumed the name it still bears, the 'Republican People's Party.'

The Republican Progressive Party was not destined to long existence. Early in 1925 a serious rebellion broke out in Kurdistan. The Ghazi Pasha seized the opportunity to strike three blows. On the score of weakness in administration he procured the fall of Fethi Bey and the return of Ismet Pasha to the premiership. On the score of encouragement of reactionary elements in connexion with the rebellion he procured the suppression of the Republican Progressive Party, the new opposition. Thirdly, he had all the most prominent Constantinople journalists arrested and brought to trial; in the result they were let go, except Husein Jahid Bey, who was exiled to Chorum, in North Central Anatolia. His paper was suppressed, and, though he has since been released, he now lives in retirement. Since that date the control of the Government over the Press in Turkey has been complete: still more stringent Press laws were subsequently passed, as will be mentioned. But apart from these the chief papers in Constantinople and Angora have been in the hands of the Ghazi Pasha himself or his close associates, and in other cases the owners have made their peace with the dominant party.

The Ghazi Pasha struck swift and hard. His prestige in the country was still unimpaired. Educated people supported his reforms and were determined to have no truck with reaction in a religious sense. Some suspicion of this undoubtedly ruined the propects of the newly-founded opposition party. There was, besides, no member of the opposition party who inspired a fraction of the regard which the Ghazi Pasha did at that time: even the pashas concerned in its formation, though popular and admired officers, held no such place as he in the army's esteem. It must always be remembered that, among military men in Turkey, the Ghazi Pasha is regarded as a very great soldier: he has to his credit a heroic resistance at Anafarta in the Dardanelles campaign, the equally heroic victory in the critical campaign of the Sakkaria, and the triumph of the advance to Smyrna. His prestige is held to stand high with foreign soldiers, and his life is reckoned to be worth an army to the country.

The Ghazi Pasha, after this further consolidation of his position, proceeded forthwith to put into effect a series of reforms. The Dervish orders were abolished and their property confiscated, while further secularisation of education took place. The fez was forbidden and the whole people were forced to wear hats. This perhaps not very essential reform struck people's imagination more than anything else. It had been debated by the Committee of Union and Progress, but never had they dared to attempt it; its sudden enactment was a further example of the resolution and audacity of the Ghazi Pasha. The Assembly thenceforward devoted itself docilely to current business and the adoption of new codes of law for the permanent organisation of society on a Western basis. It must be emphasised that, without the clear determination and the tremendous driving power of the Ghazi Pasha, the effective reform of Turkish life would never have been thus swiftly and decisively brought about; and on this ground it is fairly certain that history will eventually regard his personal success as the best thing that could happen to his country.

The final blow against his political opponents was struck by the Ghazi Pasha in 1926. It was reported in June of that year that a plot against his life had been discovered in Smyrna. Tribunals of Independence, a form of special court, had been set up at the time of the Kurdish rebellion, and one was now constituted to try the persons involved in the alleged plot.

The net was spread wide. A prominent deputy named Shukri Bey, a former Unionist Cabinet Minister, was deeply involved; Ismail Jambulat Bey, a deputy and already mentioned as a former well-known Unionist, was also drawn in. The remainder of the Unionist Party, men who were not deputies, held more or less together in Constantinople and revolved round Javid Bey: such were Dr. Nazim Bey, Kara Kemal Bey, and Abdul Kadir Bey, who also had been governor of Angora under the present *régime*. It was said that they had funds and an organisation, and that an offer of their support upon terms had recently been conveyed to the Ghazi Pasha and rejected by him. They were all arrested. As to the defunct Republican Progressive Party, Rauf Bey and Adnan Bey had gone abroad; but Kiazim Kara Bekir, Refet, and Ali Fuad Pashas were arrested. In the result, these three pashas were acquitted—it is said, at the instance of the army. The other persons named and taken were all executed. A Press law of extreme severity was passed. This was the highest point that the personal power of the Ghazi Pasha reached. It may be said that he was finally secured against all opposition outside his own party. But there was a feeling of terror throughout the country, and what had occurred may be

said to have shaken the unique position he had acquired in the hearts of his countrymen. At the same time the necessity for the enactment of grand reforms was almost past: what was required had been mostly done, so he may have felt himself that his prime objects were attained, and it may be that thenceforward he began somewhat to relax his grip. He retired more into a narrow circle of personal favourites and intimates; the Assembly went on with the pedestrian work of passing the new codes. At the same time the Republican People's Party was thoroughly organised throughout the country, and it was unwise not to be a member of it. In 1927, the following year, general elections were held. The candidates of the Republican People's Party were personally approved by the Ghazi Pasha alone out of lists submitted to him by his intimate advisers, and these candidates were all elected; only one vote was cast in the whole country for an opposition candidate. In that summer, for the first time since 1919, the Ghazi Pasha returned to Constantinople, and since then this has been his yearly habit. The era of spectacular reform ended in 1928 with the adoption of a European alphabet.

An observer cannot but be aware that since 1926 a current of opinion has set against the Ghazi Pasha in the country. In the first place, the masses of the uneducated people have been shocked by the extent and suddenness of the reforms, although willy-nilly they have acquiesced. In the second place, what is even more important, the events of 1926 and the manner in which the governing clique have conducted themselves has to a very large extent alienated the sympathy and regard of the educated classes, at first ardent supporters of the Ghazi Pasha and his reforms. A circumstance may be recalled which emphasised this. It was announced in 1927 before the elections that a Congress of the Republican People's Party would be held in Angora and addressed by the Ghazi Pasha: his supporters gave out that this would be the occasion for an inspiring and grandiose vindication of his policy and actions. The Congress was held and the speech delivered; it lasted for several days, was largely occupied with depreciation of his opponents, and it fell completely flat. Again it was said at that time that further far-reaching reforms were in contemplation; there were hints of a borrowing from Fascist sources. But nothing occurred. Either some effective element vetoed the intention or the Ghazi Pasha was content with what he had achieved and, as already suggested, relaxed his effort.

Neither the uneducated masses nor the educated classes in general can exercise any immediate influence on affairs in Turkey. The events, however, recently reported suggest that some unseen but important processes have been at work since 1927. A newspaper in Constantinople early in the year began to make violent

attacks on Ismet Pasha, and was actually allowed to continue to do so for some days before the editor was arrested. Fethi Bey has now returned from his post of Ambassador in Paris, has been in consultation with the Ghazi Pasha, and has formed an opposition party, known as the Liberal Republican Party. To permit this is for the Ghazi Pasha to go back on the whole trend of his policy. There can only be one reason for his doing so, and that is that his own position has been undermined and that this appears to be his wisest move. How may this have come about? If the ordinary classes of the population have no influence on affairs there are elements which have very great power—the army, the deputies, the officials. As already observed, since 1926 the Ghazi Pasha has withdrawn more and more into his own circle. Ismet Pasha has remained Prime Minister. He is a man of ability and hard-working, at the same time withdrawn by deafness from the distractions of Angora's social life. He has no doubt remained in close contact with the Assembly and the Administration; by now many a prominent man and many an official must owe opportunity or place to him and be ready to support him personally. He is well regarded by the army as an officer of talent and a man of high character and worth. The same odium on account of the reforms does not attach to him. It cannot be doubted he has come to occupy a position of far greater power and ascendency than formerly. Hence it may be surmised that the Ghazi Pasha has felt his own position threatened, and has awoken to the fact that Ismet Pasha is, and is regarded as, the indispensable man. It may be also that he has gained a sense of the opinion of the country and has realised how much of his own popularity he has forfeited, while Ismet Pasha enjoys in general a high regard. Rumours of dissension between the two men have been rife for a year or more.

One more element may also enter into this situation. Since 1927 the era of spectacular and simple reform has been virtually closed. The present Assembly has been grappling with current legislation and the exigencies of a prolonged economic crisis, which the Government has failed to solve. An uneconomic point of view is responsible for this; unsatisfactory State monopolies have been created, and a strong strain of xenophobia as well as unwise taxation have discouraged commerce. It does not appear that Ismet Pasha can provide a solution of this; a man of talent, he is not a man of brilliant or powerful intellect, pliant to political needs. On the other hand, the Ghazi Pasha is undoubtedly a man of outstanding intelligence, and it may well be that he sees further than anyone else in the country into its future and its necessities. He also has the resolution to reverse a policy and yield an outworn conviction. It may well be that

a sense of the country's needs combines with his personal policies to set him on the new course just adopted. This has, after all, been the case all along.

A special session of the Assembly has recently been held to pass temporary measures dealing with a phase of the economic crisis. Fethi Bey was previously elected a deputy for a vacant seat, and spoke in criticism of the Government. Some secessions had been reported from the Republican People's Party, but those who had declared themselves for the new party did not desert their usual seats in the Assembly nor sit together as a compact opposition *bloc*. Eventually only thirteen votes were cast against a motion of confidence in the Government. Ismet Pasha, however, had resigned and reconstructed his Ministry, introducing three new Ministers and taking back as Minister of Education Mahmud Essad Bey, one of his closest supporters, who had recently resigned from the Ministry of Justice. These events tend to confirm the estimate here made of the forces at work. If the Ghazi Pasha was satisfied with Ismet Pasha as Prime Minister, the new opposition party could never have been formed : if Ismet Pasha were not in a strong position himself, he would, in the circumstances, have already fallen. Nevertheless, his majority on the vote of confidence mentioned above must not be taken to represent the relative strength of the parties. It can well be imagined, in view of the history here related, that the joining an opposition party requires courage in Turkey, and that a great number of the present deputies may wait to see which way the cat jumps.

Besides this, the term of the present Assembly is coming to an end. Elections are due next year. There may well be a disinclination to hasten them. It would not suit the opposition, as yet unorganised, to do so. Nobody is in a hurry to give up the amenities of deputyship, which are considerable in Turkey. The Assembly will meet for its usual session at the beginning of November. There is, of course, always the possibility of sudden events in Turkish politics ; but, at any rate, it is certain that the real trial of strength must come at the elections, whether next year or at an earlier date. The Ghazi Pasha is still president of the Republican People's Party. Will he remain so ? Will he stand again with that label for the Presidency of the Republic ? Or will he do so independently of any party ? In all probability, the latter will be the course ostensibly adopted, though in fact that might be almost equivalent to standing in the opposition interest ; for if true party government is little understood in Turkey, non-party politics are still less so. It may be expected, however, that some definite and unequivocal declaration of the neutrality of the presidential office will be made. If the Ghazi

Pasha stands for the Presidency, he will be elected; that is a safe prophecy, for, apart from considerations of the temporary degree of his popularity, he stands out as a personality so far above all others. It was rumoured in 1926 that he did not desire the Presidency again, but would prefer the activities of the Premiership. This, however, did not prove to be so, nor is it likely to be so now. He has elevated himself too far to care to come down to the arena again. Neutrality between two parties is doubtless the wisest course for him; but if the scales are to be weighted fairly between them, the party and the Government at present in power must first give way to the new opposition. Such a change may safely be predicted at no distant date, if, indeed, it is the desire of the Ghazi Pasha that it should occur.

JULIAN PALMER.

GREAT BRITAIN'S INTEREST IN FREE TRADE

I

If a modern Rip Van Winkle interested in economics who had fallen asleep a quarter of a century ago woke up to-day, conscious of the time which had elapsed since he last looked upon the world, his first impulse would be to say to himself, 'Bless me! Are they still discussing Protection and Free Trade?' He would find the same arguments on the one side and on the other being again adduced as they were between 1903, when Mr. Chamberlain began his campaign in favour of Colonial Preference at Birmingham, and 1906, when the General Election gave it its quietus. He would have overlooked the fact that folly, like hope, springs eternal in the human breast, for he could not fail to be surprised that, after the crushing defeat of Protection twenty-five years ago, the matter was again in debate.

The following document, which there is every reason to believe came from the competent hand of the late Mr. Huth Jackson, may be adduced in proof of what has just been said. No record can be found of it having been published. It might have been written yesterday, and is to-day as appropriate in defence of Free Trade as it was in 1904:

1. We, the undersigned, Merchants, Bankers, Brokers, Traders, and others engaged in business in the City of London, members of both Political Parties, desire to place on record the alarm with which we regard the agitation now being carried on throughout the Country, for the re-imposition of Protective Duties.

2. It is proposed to abandon the existing policy of import duties for revenue purposes only, and to revert to Protection, including the system of Preferential treatment of the Colonies, both of which prevailed during the first half of the last century.

3. No Fiscal change could be more momentous in its effect upon the Commerce of the Country, upon the position of London as a Clearing House of the World, and on the condition of the Working Classes, in respect of their employment and cost of living. It would be a Commercial and Fiscal Revolution which would affect industry and commerce in every branch, and in countless details. If the policy is erroneous, if instead of

enlarging and improving our industries, it restricts and weakens them; the result must be disastrous to the nation.

4. At such a time the commercial Capital of the Empire should speak in no uncertain tone; and accordingly we feel it to be our duty to place before our fellow citizens our views, founded on long experience of our trade under the existing system.

5. The advocates of Fiscal change admit that in the conditions which prevailed during the thirty years from 1842 this Country prospered under the policy of unrestricted Trade. They contend, however, that during the course of the last thirty years the conditions affecting our external trade have changed in many respects, and it is upon this ground that they appeal to the Nation to revert to Protection.

6. That the period in question has witnessed developments widely affecting the commerce of this Country and of the World, is beyond dispute. New Markets have been discovered, new demands have created new industries. New inventions have opened fresh channels for trade. On the other hand, new and well equipped competitors for the World's Trade have entered the arena. Such changes result directly from the growth and consolidation of other nations and are inevitable. They can, in our judgment, be met only by the energy of our people, by improved education, by better organization both of production and distribution, and by attention to the teachings of economic science.

7. This truth becomes of special importance to a manufacturing country like our own whose exports are hindered by hostile tariffs, since it is only by importing the raw materials of its manufactures at the cheapest rates, and by reducing to the lowest point the cost at which it can export, that such a country can hope to maintain its position. The policy of Huskisson and Peel was the expression of the necessity of extending our manufactures by freeing them from Fiscal restrictions. Cheap food and cheap raw material were essential to our prosperity and progress. What was true then is more than ever true to-day, when five-sixths of our food supply are drawn from abroad, and are mainly paid for by the products, and manufactures which, in turn, depend on an unfailing supply of cheap raw material. It follows that recent changes in the condition of trade render adhesion to a system of Free Trade more imperative than ever.

8. We believe that the following maxims remain as true to-day as when submitted to Parliament by the Merchants of London in their Petition of 1820.

9. Foreign commerce contributes to the wealth of a country in proportion as it enables that country to import commodities for the production of which the soil and climate and industries of other countries are best calculated.

10. Freedom from the interference or restraint of the State assists the extension of Foreign Trade, and the profitable employment of the capital and labour of the country.

11. A country which excludes the production of others in order to encourage its own producers inflicts on the bulk of its subjects, who are consumers, a disproportionate sacrifice in the increased cost or inferior quality of the articles which they consume. The importation of a foreign commodity does not in the long run injuriously affect the total home output. Importation cannot continue without corresponding exportation. A particular home industry may suffer from free foreign competition, but

in the result, the capital and labour displaced find more beneficial employ-ment in new or increased production better suited to our situation.

12. It is not possible permanently to limit Protection to a few selecte branches of industry. Claims to similar treatment of kindred branche are immediately advanced, and each concession makes more difficult th refusal of subsequent appeals. The personal interests behind them ar too strong and too persistent to be long resisted by general consideration of the public benefit.

13. A further and very grave danger is the effect on the tone of politica and commercial life which the experience of Protectionist nations shows follow inevitably from the pressure brought to bear, directly or indirectl on members of the legislature in order to secure the admission of an industr within the tariff wall.

14. It may seem possible, by the imposition of high Protective dutie against an offending Country, to compel her to reduce her Tariff agains us, as a condition of more favourable treatment at our hands; but, i practice, no such arrangement can be made when, as is almost universall the case, the hostile Tariff has been fixed at a rate assumed to be necessar to protect a native industry against foreign competition, or to provide sufficient revenue.

15. The history of commercial diplomacy between foreign countrie during the last thirty years is an unbroken record of failure. In each cas a preliminary Tariff war cripples the trade of either country, and th ultimate agreement arrived at, when both have become exhausted by th struggle, bears no proportion to the sacrifice made to attain it. Such as i is, however, it has been always secured automatically, and without an sacrifice to this country, by the most favoured nation clause which w enjoy with every country, by virtue of a system of free imports.

16. Apart from the argument that the proposed changes are necessar to save the country from commercial disaster, they are advocated essential to the preservation of our Colonial Empire. We yield to none i our sympathy with any legitimate effort to draw tighter the bonds whicl unite the Colonies and the Mother Country. But we cannot ignore th fact that the satisfactory relations now existing between us and them ar largely due to our concessions of their right as free communities to adop their own Fiscal Policy. It is admitted that Free Trade within the Empir is an impossibility at present; but the difficulties in the way of preferentia tariffs are equally insuperable. Home interests will conflict with Colonia interests, those of Colony with Colony, and even in the same Colony, thos of one industry with another. The attempt to establish a uniform systen cannot fail to produce mutual jealousies, and to imperil the relations affection and loyalty which now unite Great Britain and her childre beyond the seas.

17. The experiment to which we are invited is not forced upon us b any falling off in our external trade, or in the well-being of our people There is of course no escape from the ill-effects of War expenditure or c the periods of commercial depression which visit each country in turn but, apart from such temporary fluctuations, our prosperity, judged b every test that statistics can apply, has been great and progressive, and i associated with a more equable distribution of wealth than has ever bee witnessed before.

18. In view of these facts and considerations, we desire to enter ou

protest 'against every restrictive regulation of trade not essential to the Revenue, and against all duties merely protective from foreign competition.' 15th February, 1904.

Let us examine the present circumstances. See how closely they compare with those of a quarter of a century ago. Mr. Chamberlain based his attack on the fiscal system of Great Britain chiefly on Imperial grounds. 'Empire Free Trade' is the cry of to-day. In 1904 he had against him an array of the bankers of the United Kingdom, all persuaded that freedom of commercial intercourse was the best solution of the economic problem then. That fact, and the innate common-sense of the then electorate, knocked the bottom out of the movement in favour of Protection. Great Britain adhered to the belief that in the freedom of commercial intercourse was to be found the best solution of the economic problems of that day. But now a different situation presents itself.

In July 1930 a distinguished group of gentlemen, bankers and others, engaged in business in the City of London, signed, in circumstances which are rather obscure, a document of a very different character from the various manifestoes, not only of a quarter of a century ago, but even of the last decade. It contained the following remarkable propositions: 'that urgent measures for the promotion of inter-Imperial trade are needed to secure and extend the markets for British products both at home and through the export trade'; that 'the hopes of four years ago for the removal of restrictions upon European trade have failed to be realised'; that 'these restrictions have materially increased and the sales of surplus foreign products in the British markets have steadily grown.' The document goes on to state that the signatories 'retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of Free Trade throughout the world,' but believe that 'the best way to realise this hope would be to restrict our open market to Empire products, imposing duties upon imports from all other countries.' They belong to the species which may be called 'Free Traders, but——,' and the blank is always filled by measures of Protection.

What, it may reasonably be asked, is the cause of this continued tendency to put forward old and discarded remedies for a recurring malady? Examine the circumstances of each case, and it will be found that, with one significant exception, the clamour for Protection has always arisen during times of trade depression. Free Trade was adopted in Great Britain after a series of years of terrible depression. The generation of to-day has almost forgotten a phrase which was very prevalent seventy years ago. The 'hungry 'forties' was an expression often heard then, for the

memory of that disastrous decade had not faded out of men minds. It had taken more than twenty years to bring people the mind that this was the true solution of the difficult problem The events of the next half-century proved the wisdom of th decision. It is true that with each subsequent depression trade the quack remedy of Protection was prescribed. It equally true that it was systematically turned down. The leade of the Conservative Party in Great Britain declared after one c these discussions that 'Protection was dead and damned.'

If anyone wants an unanswerable defence of Free Trade, h may get it from the experience of the war. Britain alone of a the contending nations adhered to her fiscal policy. Every on of the other combatants modified theirs in the direction of Fre Trade. That the war would result in a period of acute depressio had been foreseen by many people. It is impossible to destro wealth counted in thousands of millions of pounds without pro ducing a bitter result on the condition of the world. Sanguin hopes were expressed during the currency of the war that it woul result in greatly improved conditions for this country. Thes have been grievously disappointed, as sounder judges felt they would be.

No question is here raised as to the justification or otherwis of the war, or as to where the blame for it rests. Its results alon are under consideration. As many foresaw, they have proved t be disastrous. The warnings which were raised during the wa and after its conclusion were and are still being systematicall disregarded. The first duty when impoverishment comes t individuals or to nations is economy. The literature of the las fifty years and more abounds in warnings as to what mus result from extravagance. These have been entirely unheeded We are now called upon by the bankers to abandon a polic which four years ago they blessed and to adopt one which, in th judgment of many, will produce disastrous results.

Before leaving this part of the subject, reference must be mad to the most recent manifesto which was published on Septem ber 26. It states that a number of distinguished business men pro pose to form a non-party body to be called a 'National Council o Industry and Commerce,' of which the aim shall be 'to emphasis the necessity for the Government of this country to be run on business lines.' Every business man would be prepared t become a member of such a Council. He would fully sympathis with the following words from the text: 'The British people o to-day are tired of the waste and extravagance of successiv Governments'; but when they go on to add that they 'are tire of slavish adherence of political parties to economic theories whic have lost all relation to the fact of modern business life,' many

business man would pause before he accepted the views of the proposed Council. The next paragraph intimates the intention of the founders of the Council 'to secure the adoption of proper methods for protecting the home market and to advance the cause of inter-Empire trade by every possible means.' In a word, this new body is but a reproduction of Mr. Chamberlain's Tariff Reform Commission, of which, we ardently hoped, we had heard the last.

But a new generation has arisen that knows not Joseph, nor the way in which the electorate twenty-five years ago banished all his ideas. We are called upon again to struggle to retain the freedom won so painfully for us nearly a century ago.

Neither in the resolution passed by those gentlemen who propose to form this new Council nor in the earlier Resolution of the Bankers are any new arguments adduced to reply to those set out in the Petition of the Merchants of London presented to the House of Commons in 1820; nor to their virtual restatement in the document of 1904 we have printed above; nor to the Bankers' Manifesto of 1926.

Sir Henry Morris, who presided at the meeting which formed the 'National Council of Industry and Commerce,' repeats, parrot-like, the arguments of twenty-five years ago. They, too, are 'Free Traders, but——' of a stranger kind than usual, for, they say, 'while the universal adoption of the policy of Free Trade may be as desirable as when first promulgated by Cobden, it is unattainable.' They go one better than the bankers, who went no further than to say that they 'retain the hope of an ultimate extension of the area of Free Trade throughout the world . . .,' and then proceed (very illogically, as it seems to the Free Trader) to propose accomplishing this hope by imposing still more extensive restrictions.

A weighty reply to the Bankers' Resolution of July 1930 was published early in September 1930. No attempt is made by Sir Henry Morris and his friends to answer this. These gentlemen and the bankers put their simple trust in the Dominions being willing to fall in with the ideal cherished by both those bodies of 'Free Trade within the Empire.' But are there any signs of this? Do not the Dominions with one accord declare themselves Free Traders indeed, but only as regards the policy of Great Britain? She shall forego a fiscal system which has proved of inestimable value for nearly a century. She shall impose tariffs against all the rest of the world, with which she has established intimate trade relations, and from which she draws large quantities of necessary supplies, in payment of the interest on her investments in those countries. In return for this serious hampering of her commercial relations with those countries, all that she is offered is that the

barriers against her shall not be raised, but those against every body who does not belong to the British Empire shall be made sti higher. May we not reply to this munificent offer in the words the Gallipot, 'Thank you for nothing'?

II

This brings us to what is the most vitally important questio before the country to-day, What is Great Britain's interest Free Trade?

The convinced British Free Trader, or, as perhaps he mig more properly be called, Free Importer, holds that in all circum stances the greatest advantages from commerce, whether nationa or international, can be obtained by providing as little hindranc as is possible to the free interchange of commodities. He holc that the imposition of obstacles must be justified by arguments a very convincing kind. None of those now being put forwar moves him from the belief that it is not by means of restrictio that intercourse between men or nations will be facilitated. He continues convinced that this is the true policy all the worl dove But he believes that, whatever policy may be thought desirable i other countries, in his own country freedom of commerci enterprise, national and international, is essential, for he mair tains that the peculiar circumstances of Great Britain make th free import of commodities of essential importance to her.

Put briefly, it may be contended that it is not what she want to *sell* that is of prepotent interest to this country, but what sh wants to *buy*. She must be regarded essentially as a buyer. Th Free Trader affirms that, in ultimate recourse, a purchase whic is of vital importance to her implies a sale by her of the product c her activities. This aspect of the case appears to be overlooke by all those who plead in favour of Great Britain's adopting policy of Protection.

A relatively small and densely peopled country is dependent f its means of sustenance on imports from overseas. In the specia case of Great Britain, extending now over a very long period, th indispensable requirements have been for food and raw materi for clothing. The latter requirement is not without interest, sinc there was a time when this country was, to a very considerab extent, the source of one particular article used for clothing b the rest of the world—namely, wool. Nevertheless, there wer far-seeing people who in the middle of the eighteenth centur, pleading for the free importation of bar iron from the Colonie of North America, dealt with the importation of wool in term which could not be bettered by the Free Trader of to-day. Th following quotation from their paper shows the attitude

those who addressed a petition to the House of Commons in 1756 :

1. There cannot be a clearer Proposition concerning Trade, than, that it is the interest of every Manufacturing Country to get as great a choice and variety of raw Materials, and upon as cheap terms, as can possibly be procured. For an error in this respect, is fundamental, and hardly to be corrected by any subsequent care or diligence. Therefore, the Legislature hath wisely ordained, That though Wool, for instance, grows in greater Plenty in England than perhaps in any other Country, yet the Wools of all Nations shall be admitted into England Duty-free ; justly considering, That we can never have too great a Choice and Plenty of that necessary Material of extensive and profitable Industry, or upon too cheap Terms.

2. A Second Proposition, not inferior either in Evidence or Importance, is, That unless some Commodities are taken from other Countries by Way of Barter in the Course of Trade, You can have but a small Vent for your own Manufactures ; it being impossible for any Nation to make all their Payments in Gold and Silver, even if they abounded with the richest Mines of those Metals. Nay, though it were possible, it may be greatly questioned, Whether it is not more for the Interest of a Manufacturing Nation to import sometimes raw Material by Way of providing for the future Industry of their People, than to be always importing Gold and Silver ; which, when they come to be unconnected with Labour and Industry (as in this Case they would soon be) have no other Effect, than to introduce Laziness, Vanity and Extravagance—and in the End Poverty.

3. A Third Proposition, by way of Preliminary, is this, That Cheapness in regard to Price, and Goodness in regard to Quality, are the Support and Prop of all Manufactures ; And that it is impossible, in the Nature of Things, for a Nation to preserve any Manufacture, if they strike off, or suffer to be struck off these two grand pillars, Cheapness and Goodness. They may indeed tamper for a while ; and seem to do something, not unlike a Quack in Physic, towards botching up a broken Constitution, but it will soon appear, that all they have been doing, was only to make bad worse.[1]

Let it be assumed that the proposition as to the necessities of Great Britain are admitted (and it seems difficult to deny them), we may proceed to consider how this affects the present controversy.

It is common ground that up to a certain date, which perhaps may be put as late as 1870, Great Britain was, in fact, the workshop of the world. Her manufactures had rapidly grown during the preceding generation. That growth continued as the demands for the product of her factories grew. To it may be attributed the enlargement of her outlook on international trade. Even 100 years earlier she was beginning to develop these views. It

[1] Quoted from *The Case of the Importation of Bar Iron from our own Colonies of North America.* 'Humbly recommended to the Consideration of the present Parliament by the Iron Manufacturers of Great Britain—London : Printed for Thomas Tyre near Grays Iron Gate, London MDCCLVI.' (Reprinted in the *Journal* of the Iron and Steel Institute, vol. ii., 1887.)

would not be impossible to substantiate a fair claim at even a earlier date than this, but, for the purpose of the present argumen it is enough to call to mind the fact that the principles to which w now give the name of Free Trade were already taking hold of th minds of thoughtful men. It took a long time to bring hom to men engaged in industry and commerce the true theory trade.

Reference has already been made to the Declaration of tl Merchants and Bankers of London of 1820. It is of great sig nificance in the present discussion. It was issued at a time whe this country was suffering from the expenditure incurred in tl prolonged conflict with France in the eighteenth and earl nineteenth centuries. The far-seeing person who prepared tha declaration was seeking, as a remedy for the condition of thing paralleled by the results of the late war, precisely the contrary c that which certain persons are now endeavouring to impose o Great Britain. It took more than twenty years and the bitte experiences of the 'hungry 'forties' to convince the statesmen c Great Britain and the then electorate that the abolition of th Corn Laws was essential to Great Britain and a further con siderable period to bring about the triumph of sound fisca policy as the surest way to prosperity.

But we must not be led away from our main object by thes very interesting considerations. Great Britain three generation and more ago, availing herself first among civilised nations of th power given her by the application of steam, became the work shop of the world. She proceeded to confer (on purely selfisl grounds, it must be admitted) the advantages, such as they are of this enhanced power given to men. The wealth which resulte from her activities at home she used wth great, but entirel selfish, liberality in foreign countries. She proceeded to develo their industries as she had developed her own. She built railway She did everything in her power to promote the 'industrialisa tion' of the rest of the world which was proceeding apace in th British Isles. Her population grew with extraordinary rapidit and speedily outstripped her powers of providing it with food an clothing. The capital she had sent abroad produced revenue which, brought home in the form of needed commodities, kept he growing population in a continually increasing condition of well being, enabled her to devote her energies to the provision c manufactures required for the populations overseas, and brougt about the immense foreign trade which, it may be said, continue to be the index of her growing prosperity.

But the lessons she had taught the populations outside th British Isles had produced their inevitable results. These peopl embarked on manufactures. As time went on they began t

overtake Great Britain in her special business. That this was inevitable will probably not be denied. Would it have been possible for the rail manufacturers of the third quarter of the nineteenth century to have refused the orders for rails sent them from the united States? They might have argued, with some plausibility, that every rail so sent was encouraging the manufacture of goods in America which otherwise might have been manufactured in Great Britain and carried on British railways, and so with every other article of commerce. Merely to state the proposition is to show the untenability.

In passing, another comment is that Great Britain, as pioneer, showed the way. Those who followed her in the race had the advantage of profiting by her experience. Sometimes they did better than their teacher, though as the years went on their teacher willingly learned by their experience. The mere fact that she was pioneer redounded to her disadvantage.

The net result of all this has been that there has been a growing tendency to import into this country commodities which some of the inhabitants think would be better made here. All sorts of plausible reasons are produced in favour of this view. Can we properly disregard it? Ought we not to take the larger view which says, 'There shall be left to the choice of the buyer the commodity which he thinks will best serve his purpose.' In the long run, if the country is to progress, a surplus must remain on any transaction which, over a sufficient time, we follow to its ultimate end. It may be that in the process some participant has been unable to meet the necessities of the case and an industry of some kind may be extinguished.

A somewhat cynical example of this may be found in the introduction of Free Trade about the middle of the last century. There *was* an industry which entirely disappeared—smuggling. When there was no tariff, no profit resulted on smuggled goods. He will be a very hardened Protectionist who will be prepared to affirm that the community at large was greatly harmed by the disappearance of a person who, in bygone days, was called a 'Free Trader.' If the present tendency continues we may perhaps see the revival of that industry. We may present it to our Protectionist fellow-countrymen and ask them whether they think that is a desirable product of a Protectionist policy.

Do not let us live in a fool's paradise! If the population of Great Britain is to be maintained, it must be by the import of large quantities of materials for use as food and clothing coming from abroad. These must be paid for, either by past savings, which count only for a relatively small proportion of the whole income of the country, or by present earnings. If these are insufficient, there is only one alternative—a diminution of the

population until a balance is secured and Great Britain is able to buy what she requires.

We come back to the proposition with which we started—that Britain, of all countries in the world, has to consider herself, not as a *Seller*, but as a *Buyer*. The proposition of the petitioners of 1756 is of universal truth, but is truer of a community like that inhabiting Great Britain than of almost any other. Our one hope of salvation lies in the production of commodities which shall be cheap, good and abundant, which is the ideal of the Free Trader. Whatever sacrifice may be necessary to accomplish this will have to be made by the nation at large. If we are to prosper, there must be a surplus over and above our prime necessaries to maintain any increase there may be in the population, but (what is perhaps of more importance) to continue to add to the national income and so to improve the standard of life. All members of the community must bear their share in bringing about this state of things. The larger part of the income of the country goes in the reward of the labour of living men and women. It is therefore not surprising that the appeal now being made should be addressed to all members of the community, but most insistently to those who by their daily labour of hand and brain can most effectively contribute to the recovery of the prosperity which was destroyed by the war and its consequences.

HUGH BELL

OF CHEAPNESS

I. What it Is

Cheapness, as twin sister to Plenty, used to be welcomed by unsophisticated folk in castle as in cottage. But changed conditions have brought the two into high financial circles, where life is more complicated, and if Plenty is still to find a welcome, she must come without her sister—a most troublesome person. The paradox merits examination.

'Cheap' means low-priced; but what is price, and when should it be called low? Price is the measure in money of a thing's value in exchange, not of real or intrinsic value—if, indeed, the latter is measurable. Exchange value at any time depends on psychological factors: the strength and distribution of desire to possess the thing, irrespective of its intrinsic worth or the rationality of the desire. The original blue twopenny postage stamp of Mauritius, intrinsic value *nil*, is to-day worth some thousands of pounds, because specimens are very rare and the stamp-collecting craze, intelligible at its birth, has unaccountably survived and developed a trade employing appreciable capital. Purely artificial though such values be, they are economic realities as long as the fashion holds.

Price at a particular time and place is determined by Supply and Demand. Supply, the quantity of goods seeking sale, depends not only on the quantity in existence but on the price offered. If the price rises, more existing things come on sale or fresh supplies are produced; on the other hand, Demand (money seeking to purchase) is choked down. If price falls, supply shrinks and demand grows. Unsatisfied demand raises prices and unwanted supply lowers them; and price settles at the level where supply equals demand, for there is then no unsatisfied buyer or seller to move it. Thus, an excess of supply corrects itself by lowering price and so creating fresh demand to absorb it; cheapness is the visible sign of plenty, explaining their association in the public mind, and the whole supply-demand-price system has that most valuable quality, automatic stability. But there is another valuation of goods which, in the

long run, largely affects prices; the Cost of any product is not psychological valuation, but an arithmetical fact, and fixes point on the valuation-scale below which the market prices averaged over a period, cannot fall without causing a crisis in production, threatening to drive the producer out of business and so choke down supply. Two points about cost here claim attention.

(*a*) In manufacture it is ascertained by accounts which divide all the expenditure into two main classes: 'direct' expenditure (wages and materials) on manufacture of each kind of product and 'indirect' ('overhead'), comprising all items not chargeable against particular products, such as maintenance of buildings and plant, depreciation, interest, supervision, etc. When the indirect expenditure has been spread rateably over the direct, the total for each kind of product divided by the numbers produced gives the cost per unit. Since the direct expenditure is proportional to output while the overheads are mainly independent of it, representing the standing charges of the factory, cost rises as output falls, and *vice versâ*. If, therefore, a manufacturer, beginning to lose his market, is driven to reduce output, his costs go up and make it still more difficult to sell profitably—a position of cumulative instability. For the merchant, who has to distribute his standing charges over what he has paid for his stock, cost is similarly related to turnover; but as in practice he employs the manufacturer to make, not the manufacturer him to sell, he can generally reduce his cost in slack times by cutting the hapless manufacturer's price.

(*b*) In the successive stages by which an article is made and distributed for consumption, the finished product of one industry is the raw material of the next, and if we carry back through the whole series the analysis of cost into wages, material and overheads, we see that at each stage everything but remuneration of persons (wages and salaries) and of capital (interest, rent, profits) admits of further analysis on similar lines, so that ultimately nothing remains but remuneration of Labour (in the widest sense) and Capital. Of these two ultimate components of cost, labour will be found far the larger, so that, apart from a small capital element, the cost of anything represents the wages paid to two sets of people, the producers (Industry) and the distributors (Commerce).

But what if money, the measure of value, be not a fixed standard, but variable? Leaving China aside, the moneys of all the principal nations now bear fixed ratios to gold; but gold is a commodity with its own variable cost of production, and the mere fact that civilisation has made it the medium of exchange—the stuff for which everything is sold because for it everything

can be bought—and the measure of value, does not prevent its own value from changing. Its *price* cannot change substantially, being by definition its value in terms of itself; but its value in terms of other things, *i.e.*, its purchasing power, changes under the operation of supply and demand, with this special feature, that money seeking to purchase, generally called demand, is now supply, and *vice versâ.* Value, like motion, is relative; and a fall in the price of a single commodity might be described as an appreciation of gold, just as in the world of relativity a man approaching a train might be described as a train approaching a man. But we only say our train is moving (west) when we see things in general appearing to move (east); and it is well to speak of gold as appreciating only when prices in general are falling; not necessarily all prices, for some may be rising, just as a man running after the train may be coming nearer, though the platform is slipping away. Of this more anon; but meanwhile note one consequence of changes in the value of money. We no longer regard labour as a thing the price of which (wages) is fixed by supply and demand with small regard to its adequacy for human needs, but go behind the money to the things that it will buy, called 'real' as distinct from 'money' wages; and when price-levels move, the distinction between these two meanings of 'wages' is apt to be overlooked. Another common ambiguity is failure to distinguish between the time-rate for a class or individual and the weekly earnings as modified by such factors as payment by results, overtime and short time. Trade union speakers are of course fully alive to this distinction, but they often seem to think less about weekly earnings than about maintaining or raising the nominal weekly rate.

Finally, when is a price to be called low? No price can be high or low in an absolute sense, but only relatively to some other price, such as that of the same thing at a different time or of a different thing, serving the same purpose, at the same time. We can confine our attention to the former standard, price-movement of the same thing; and in fact our main concern is not with cheapness (static), but with cheapening, or price-fall. So much by way of definition.

II. What Causes it?

While the mechanism bringing buyer and seller together at a new price is always supply and demand, the underlying cause may be a change in any of three things: the physical conditions affecting production or distribution, the value of money (gold), or the psychological conditions of the market. To follow the operation of these causes we must take each singly, on the

assumption *ceteris paribus*, though in actual experience *ceteris* never are *paribus*, but several causes may act together and mask one another's effects. Hence arise those popular statistical demonstrations that water runs uphill, which belong to the world of political economics rather than of Political Economy, and illustrate the saying that 'statistics will prove anything,' just as a thermometer will 'prove' that lighting a fire in a room lowers its temperature—if the windows are opened wide about the same time.

Changes in physical conditions that may lower prices are such things as new inventions or discoveries which reduce the cost of production or transport, or increase the supply obtainable at the old cost; and in agriculture the bringing under cultivation of new lands, improved strains of livestock or plants, and bumper crops. Such 'real' cheapness (as it may be called) does not affect everything simultaneously, and though bumper crops are incalculable, on the whole these causes, only in part offset by exhaustion of old lands or mines, may be expected to make for a gradual and permanent lowering of the average price-level. We saw that the automatic corrective of unwanted supply is the stimulation, through lower prices, of increased demand; but unless cost falls with selling price, a crisis in production will follow, contracting supply until price links up with cost at a new level. But in a world of increasing specialisation of plant and labour, overshadowed by the unemployment that it almost deliberately cultivates, the crisis solution is unacceptable; and many attempts have been made, some with Government aid, to peg prices and reduce supply by special combinations, either rationing production or, since in cultivation crops cannot be controlled like output in a factory, holding stocks off the market. If there were a Joseph to foresee accurately bumper and famine years, such plans might have the merits and success of the earliest recorded Government wheat-pool; but the cost of holding back large stocks (involving physical storage) is very serious, and if the second crop, added to a large carry-over, is again a bumper, failure is assured. The weakest point of such schemes is that, instead of utilising the natural corrective of lowered price, by pegging they encourage larger free-lance production and so defeat themselves; and such recent examples as rubber, Brazilian coffee, Egyptian cotton, North American wheat, are not encouraging.

The second cause of cheapness, a rise in the value of gold, brings us to the accepted 'Quantity Theory' of money (of which only the crudest outline can here be given) by which the general price-level is determined by the ratio of the total quantity of money and credit at the disposal of the public to the total

quantity of goods for sale. Since banks keep the total amount of credit, in the shape of loans, etc., within a certain proportion to their reserves, and hence ultimately to the gold they hold, the whole fabric of currency and credit stands upon, and is limited by, a base of gold. Consequently, as the total stock of monetary gold increases or decreases, the price level tends to rise or fall correspondingly. *Tends* only, and of course *ceteris paribus* again; and the possibilities of variation in *ceteris* are so infinite that close correspondence must never be expected; but the truth of the theory is not destroyed by that. The world stock of monetary gold is not growing in proportion to the increased volume of business done by a larger and busier population; and a Delegation of the League of Nations has lately reported that after the next few years the output of the mines will shrink, and ten years hence there will be a serious shortage, even on optimistic estimates, thus portending a continuous fall in prices, accentuated by any failure to distribute to the best advantage what gold there is among the business centres of the world. A further report is promised on consequences and remedies. Sir Henry Strakosch (a member of the Delegation) has published an important paper [1] showing that gold has appreciated (*i.e.*, prices have fallen) by 32 per cent. since 1925, including 17 per cent. between January 1929 and May 1930 (*Economist* Index); and holds that the action of the United States and France in sterilising (withdrawing from active monetary uses) 110,000,000*l*. worth of gold during 1929 'sufficiently explains the catastrophic fall of the general level of commodity prices in 1929 and the beginning of this year.' We shall return to the question how far the present fall in prices is to be attributed exclusively to shortage of gold.

The third cause, change in the psychological conditions of the market, is seen in what economists call the Trade Cycle, of which, again, space allows only a bald outline. In modern business, production starts with the merchant, who, having decided how the consumer-cat is going to jump, starts the manufacturer on an order of appropriate size. Both merchant and manufacturer draw working capital from their banks, obtaining short-period loans, the latter to pay wages and other outgoings until he delivers to the former; when the former borrows to pay the latter and himself repays the loan as he sells goods from his stock to the retailer, who in turn borrows and pays off as he rakes in the wages, the manufacturer is by this time paying out of a fresh loan. So money circulates, and the banks, who make an important part of their profits by so employing it, can regulate the total of their loans by varying the interest rate or by calling some of them in. Starting from a time of depression

[1] 'Gold and the Price-level' (supplement to *The Economist*, July 5, 1930).

like the present, the cycle begins by the feeling that things have touched bottom, aided by the cheapness of bank loans, inducing the merchants in some trade to begin ordering from manufacturers. More wages are paid and spent in shops, consumption of many things goes up and produces fresh orders to other trades, to make it good: more bank loans, and so *da capo*. As consumption presses on production, prices rise and profits increase; shares rise and new ventures are floated, causing orders for capital goods. Buoyancy spreads and a belief that years of good profits are assured. The pace quickens. *Possunt quia posse videntur*. At last, the banks' loans reach the limit permitted by their reserves: interest is raised, perhaps some loans are called in. Some weak firms, finding profits vanishing, must pull in and sell off stock to reduce their liabilities. This starts a downward movement, faith in higher prices departs, and the rising market, in which any fool can make profits just as any fool can govern in a state of siege, changes to a falling one. Nobody wants to order things to sell months later at lower price-levels. Less money circulates. The imprudent begin to fail, and the downward movement gathers pace until things touch bottom again.

The cycle is in fact an inflationary movement which, pulled up by the banks, leads to deflation; and the higher the rocket has soared, the further the stick will fall. Danger lies in the absence of any automatic regulator; the turning-point is fixed by the banks at their discretion, at the expense of their immediate profits. We cannot here discuss whether they should intervene earlier than they did (*e.g.*) in the recent American boom, but that experience will long be remembered.

There are thus two causes now acting on the general price level—gold scarcity and the slump; but how much of the fall is due to each? Though gold scarcity may have intensified the slump, it is not helpful to call the whole phenomenon 'appreciation of gold,' as it tells us nothing about how much we may hope to recover on the next upstroke of the cycle, with a stationary gold position. We have no good index of retail prices, but, taking the official cost-of-living figures, there was a drop from 167 on January 1, 1929, to 157 on September 1 last, or about one-seventeenth. In the same period the *Economist* (wholesale) index fell from 136 to 109, or about one-fifth. Is the price-level determined by the Quantity Theory the wholesale or the retail? It can hardly be both, if one moves three times as fast as the other? The fact is that the theory does not measure price movements, but static conditions, and in its *ceteris paribus* lurks the postulate that nothing should have happened to change the relation of wholesale to retail prices. Sir Henry Strakosch gives the monetary gold stock at the beginning of 1929 as

2,382,000,000*l*., and shows that during that year 110,000,000*l*. of gold was 'sterilised.' The theory, as outlined, tells us nothing about the way in which the disappearance of gold sets in motion supply and demand so as to produce the predicted result, but time must be allowed for the process to work out. The gold shortage of about one-twentieth in a year corresponds not too badly with a price fall of one-seventeenth in twenty months; but it cannot be claimed that this is more than a coincidence. We may, however, provisionally conclude that there is nothing to prove that more than the retail fall is due to gold shortage, leaving us a hope that two-thirds of the wholesale fall may be recoverable.

III. Where the Pinch is Felt

However a price-fall may be compounded of real cheapness, gold appreciation and slump, its effect on business may be well shown on the lines of Sir Henry Strakosch's paper. Starting from the analysis (1927) by Professor Bowley and Sir Josiah Stamp of the national income for 1924, he gives the figures shown (with slight rearrangement) in column I of the table below:

Redistribution of National Income by Price Fall

Sources of Income.	Money or Quantity (£1 = 1 cwt.). Millions.	After Price Fall of 1/11th. Millions.	
		cwts.	£
	I.	II.	III.
1. National Debt holdings . .	405	*445*	405
2. Other debt holdings, pensions, rents	665	*732*	665
Total fixed money obligations (A)	1070	*1177*	1070
3. Other Government expenditure.	285	*285*	259
4. Enterprise (profits of *entrepreneur*)	685	*376*	342
5. Work (wages and salaries) .	2020	*2222*	2020
Total residue (B) . .	2705	*2598*	2362
Grand total . .	4060	*4060*	3691

Items 1 and 2 represent fixed incomes, including pensions and rents. With 3, representing all other Government expenditure, these are the prior charges on the national earnings, and the residue goes to 4, the entrepreneurs, who reap profits and fluctuating dividends according to the state of business, and 5, the workers, operative, clerical and managerial. The figures in columns II. and III. are designed to show the effect, on this distribution, of such a fall in price-level as we are experiencing. Neither the wholesale fall of one-fifth nor the retail fall of one-seventeenth represents this, because the incomes at 1, 2, and 5 of the table, though mainly spent at the retail level, include savings invested, which means spent on capital goods (buildings, plant, etc.) bought direct from makers at (or near) the wholesale level. As a convenient and possible figure we may take an average fall of one-eleventh for the total of 3,090,000,000*l.* The italic figures, representing the consequences of this assumption, are got as follows: Look at the column I. figures as representing, not money, but goods—' real ' incomes—as though the average price of all products were 1*l.* per cwt.; and suppose that the total weight remains at 4,060,000,000 cwt. while price falls one-eleventh, remembering that with such a fall a sovereign will buy one-tenth more goods. The first result is that the fixed incomes (A) get one-tenth more in quantity, as shown in column II. The King's government must be carried on regardless of price-levels, requiring the same quantities of goods, and item 3 therefore remains at 285, though, as this means lower estimates (column III.), it may seem unduly sanguine. It follows that the 107,000,000 cwts. additional taken by (A) must be deducted from (B), leaving only 2,598 for enterprise and work together. This reduced sum might be shared on three different principles: (*a*) both parties share the loss; then real wages fall and money wages (lower prices of less goods) fall more; (*b*) real wages stand fast, money wages then falling with prices; (*c*) money wages stand fast, *i.e.*, the workers join the fixed incomes and the 2020 rises to 2222. In spite of falls of money wages here and there, (*c*) represents present facts much more nearly than (*a*) or (*b*)—indeed, some politicians contend that the cure for present troubles is to *increase* even money wages; and for simplicity the figures in column II. are calculated on (*c*), reducing 4 from 685,000,000 cwts. to 376,000,000. The figures in column III., representing the new distribution in money, are the weights in column II. priced at ten-elevenths of 1*l.* per cwt. The total national income has fallen from 4,060,000,000*l.* to 3,691,000,000*l.*, 9 per cent., but the profits of enterprise have fallen from 685,000,000*l.* to 342,000,000*l.*, or just 50 per cent. But, further, these profits cover both industry and commerce: how much has each of them lost?

The gross receipts of producers, paid at the wholesale level, have dropped one-fifth. Wholesalers have bought at this level and retailers have dropped only one-seventeenth. Where has the difference gone? Not wholly or mainly in extra profits; the cost of goods at any point between producer and consumer is a summation of the wages paid up to that point, with a small element of capital, and the wholesale fall has tapered off to less than one-third at the consumer's end because money wages in the sheltered distributive trades are pegged fast, and capital in those trades is doing better than in production. Having no figures separating production from distribution under 4, we are in a region of conjecture, and it can only be said that if what remains to enterprise is now going mostly to distributors, we should expect to see exactly what we do see: among producers, widespread inability to get their costs down to buyers' limits, dividends passed, bankruptcies, large capital losses written off by firms of the highest standing; and among distributors, modest satisfaction (*vide* chairmen's speeches at company meetings) that the admirable team-work of management and staff has produced not unsatisfactory results, as things go.

All that is claimed for these figures is that they show, not the actual proportions of the damage recently suffered, but the way in which, under our system, the whole strain is concentrated on the rewards of enterprise and, above all, on industry rather than commerce, explaining how a wholesale price-fall of the dimensions actually experienced, with a retail fall on a much smaller scale, may dislocate industry catastrophically.

IV. The Real Cause of the Mischief, and Remedies

Is this mischief the logical result of falling prices? Our table plainly indicates that its principal cause lies elsewhere. Money, the good servant, has become a bad master. Theoretically a counter in the distribution of wealth, which should disappear when the pool is divided, without affecting the result, it is found to leave behind it errors which in unacknowledged ways vitiate the whole share-out. The fault is not that the purchasing power of money may rise, but that its rise, however well recognised in theory, is forcibly and most illogically prevented by our wages system from producing its rightful effects. Could anything be more absurd than that, when industry is depressed and losing ground, the workers should *ipso facto* take out of the concern an ever-increasing part of the shrinking total product? The old political economy postulated that, as prices fell, money wages would be kept close to real wages by the harsh natural operation of supply and demand on labour. We rightly desire,

in this as in other matters, to improve on Nature's methods by more humane courses; but these should bring us to the same sensible and equitable position—that every reasonable expectation of the workers is satisfied when real wages stand fast, unless increased productivity should enlarge the total for distribution; and that when, with unemployment and short time chronic and increasing, there is no such enlargement it is not the time to stand out for a larger share. Some workers, on full time at high wage rates, may be sharing out prematurely a prosperity they have still to create, but they do this at the cost of their fellows on the dole. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.* Enterprise in the plight shown by our table cannot go on working at a loss, and the maintenance by political force of fixed money wage rates only injures the general body of workers and impoverishes the community by lessening employment, to say nothing of ruining many employers. Entrepreneurs and workers have at last come to see that their true interests are not, as the old lie would have it, irreconcilable, and are beginning to lay their heads together. Has not the time come when they should recognise that wages which stand fast while prices change are wrong in principle, and should set themselves to work out together a general system stabilising real wages at a level rising with productivity? No extension of sliding scales based on the conditions of the worker's own industry will do, because regard must be had, not to the trade in which wages are earned, but to the innumerable trades in which they are spent. Two characteristics any such system should possess: it should work with equal freedom in either direction, rise or fall; and it should operate automatically and promptly. The method of special *ad hoc* negotiations on each occasion is discredited; it always pays one or the other side to protract discussions and defer the operation of the settlement; and while the fiddling goes on, the city burns. No automatic stability mechanism is efficient unless it operates before a displacement has had time to gather momentum. But it would not be necessary to counter every petty movement, for it is an essential function of capital to absorb and smooth out minor fluctuations in a way wages ought not to be asked to do. At present, as we have seen, retail prices have fallen comparatively little, because wages have not fallen; and wages have not fallen because retail prices have fallen so little—Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan mutually expectant; but with such a system in operation retail prices and wages in all trades would keep step with wholesale prices; costs of production would be reduced, enabling industry to be carried on profitably at lower price-levels; and the stimulation of demand by cheapness should

set in motion the upstroke of the cycle before the downstroke has become a slump.

There would still remain the drain on enterprise by the increased real incomes of the fixed-money men. But this amount, only half the increase in real wages, would be corrected by a falling rate of interest on National and other debt, such as that which enabled Goschen to reduce the interest on Consols to 2½ per cent.; and such a fall would naturally follow from the restoration of the national savings to a prosperity level when enterprise was no longer bled by rising real wages; for the saving out of wages is far smaller in proportion than the saving from other kinds of income.

As to the 'real' cheapness due to the progress of knowledge and what used to be called the Divine favour, to make it a grievance puts us in the attitude of Bastiat's candle-makers petitioning against the sunlight, mental and physical; an attitude only possible to those who in their devotion to the interests of the producer in all circumstances forget those of the far more numerous consumers. Unlike the other two kinds of cheapness, this does not have the effect of transferring larger shares of a fixed or shrinking pool to persons who have done nothing to earn them, but it actually increases the pool for the general benefit, though the distribution is often unfortunate. In agriculture in particular, owing to world markets, the loss by price often falls severely on persons who do not share in the profit by larger crops—frequently from the folly of new producers rushing into a profitable market without calculating how far their combined action may turn profit into loss all round. Nature's corrective is the blind one of 'healthy bankruptcies'; and the world is still seeking an efficient substitute for it.

There are reasons for hoping that the terrifying shadow of ever-intensifying trouble from continued appreciation of gold may be something of a Brocken spectre. The cost of production from gold mines must fall with the price level, or faster if the miners' real wages are stabilised, and this combined with the fixed price of their particular product must stimulate production of gold by making it more profitable. There are also unexhausted possibilities of improving the distribution and economising the use of monetary gold by banking changes. Moreover, with stabilisation of real wages and a fall in interest rates, the difficulties due to price-falls would not be cumulative, *i.e.*, they would depend on the rate of movement, and not on the total fall below a fixed point. If a single event reduced the gold stock by a quarter, prices would after an interval settle down *ceteris paribus* at 75 per cent. of their former level, the same volume of goods then bearing the same parity as before to the diminished

gold, and the system would function painlessly until a further change should occur. The evils now experienced during the settling-down process are those shown by our table—the transfer from enterprise to fixed-money men (including workers) of so large a portion of the product; but with these eliminated, the 'growing- (or shrinking-) pains' would be greatly assuaged, and a slow continuous fall would not develop into a crisis. Let no one, while awaiting the further report of the League Delegation, allow himself to be persuaded that Humanity is irrevocably destined to be (in Jennings Bryan's phrase) crucified upon a cross of gold.

C. Harris.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE BRITISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT?

I

We have long been accustomed to regard with an assured complacency the supposed virtues of our system of government, and to compare its smooth and efficient working with the instability of the Continental systems which were modelled upon it. The course of events since the war has brought a great disillusionment. Our system has failed to grapple with the difficult problems which have faced us, and, more particularly, with the crucial problem of unemployment. It has failed to give us competent leadership in which the nation can trust. It has failed to achieve any real continuity of national policy, with the result that there is a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about everything that we do.

Meanwhile, some of the Continental Governments have come through the ordeal of the post-war years with far greater success —France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland. Some of them have had frequent Ministerial changes, and occasional deadlocks. But in spite of, and perhaps because of, these, they have succeeded in pursuing a coherent and consecutive national policy. Perhaps the most remarkable success in this respect has been that of Germany, if we consider how enormous were the difficulties which she had to face, and how completely her politicians lacked experience of responsible government when her new constitution was hurriedly instituted in the dark days of 1919. It is easy to point to defects in the German system. But at least it has carried the German people, as a united nation, through a decade of extraordinary difficulty.

What is the explanation of the surprising contrast between the working of the British system and the working of the various Continental systems? I submit that the root of the matter is to be found in the fact that, in all the Continental countries I have named, there are a number of political parties, representing different bodies of opinion in the nation, no one of which ever possesses an assured majority, or can wield dictatorial power,

With the exception of France, all these countries have adopted proportional representation, which assures to every substantial body of opinion a strength in Parliament corresponding to its strength in the country. Indeed, apart from France, which is likely to adopt the system before long, there are only six countries in Europe (including Italy and Russia) which have not adopted proportional representation as a necessary element in true democracy; and in all these six there have been either dictatorships or revolutions during the last few years as protests against the misuse of power by casual and unrepresentative 'majorities.'

The consequence of the existence of several parties is that politicians are forced to seek the greatest common measure of national agreement. This is often difficult to attain. But it is worth attaining; because it means real national assent, and a real continuity of national policy.

We, on the other hand, cling to the notion that parliamentary government cannot be efficiently conducted unless power is entrusted to a party which has a majority in Parliament. The majority in Parliament may not, and commonly does not, represent a majority in the country, even of the votes actually cast; and under our system a large (though undefinable) proportion of the votes cast for any one party are given to it only because in many constituencies there are no candidates who truly represent the opinions of these voters, or, if there are, because they seem to have no chance of election, so that votes given to them will be wasted. It may safely be asserted that, under our system, no party having a majority in Parliament has ever really represented a majority in the country.

Nevertheless, our system prescribes that once a party has obtained a majority in Parliament, however accidental and unreal, it should be endowed with dictatorial power, so long as its majority is loyal; and it should be enabled to enforce the loyalty of its followers by holding over them the threat of a dissolution (which means a fine of perhaps 1000*l*. all round) if they dare to differ from their leaders. The powers wielded by a party Cabinet are almost unlimited: it is responsible for all legislation, all administrative work, and all finance. Other parties are reduced, in effect, to the function of criticising the Government, and endeavouring to discredit it in the eyes of the world, in the hope of replacing it. Even when a Government does not possess a clear majority, its dictatorship is scarcely qualified, because the power of dissolution enables it, in nine cases out of ten, to dragoon Parliament into submission.

Thus, while the Continental system may be described as government by discussion and compromise, aiming at the greatest common measure of national agreement, our system may be

scribed as party dictatorship; and while, in the Continental ystem, Parliament controls the Government and often unseats , in our system the Government controls Parliament, and can issolve it whenever it becomes restive. We share with the 'ascists of Italy and the Bolsheviks of Russia the doctrine that ne party ought to wield dictatorial powers. But while the 'ascists and the Bolsheviks insist that the dictatorship of the one arty should be permanent, in order to ensure continuity of olicy, we hold that the ideal form of government is a violent eriodical oscillation between parties which hold sharply opposed iews on national policy, and which spend their time in denouncng and striving to discredit one another. We also hold that the ecision between these violently opposed parties should be made y means of an appeal to the electorate, conducted in such a way s to disregard and override, as completely as possible, all the aried shades of moderate opinion. Since, in these appeals, the ecisions are made in single-member constituencies, where a few otes may make the difference between success and annihilation, he decisive voice is given to a wavering margin of voters, often nthinking, who can give the powers of dictatorship to one party r another. To these the party managers must devote their ttention, disregarding solid bodies of instructed opinion (which, n our system, count for little or nothing); the hope of capturing hese voters by promises and catchpenny slogans, and the fear f alienating them, are necessarily the governing motives of our oliticians.

It is perhaps not surprising that this system of party dictatorhip, wielded alternately by parties which seek power by appealng to a wavering margin of the electorate, has not been strikingly uccessful in guiding the nation through a very troublous time.

II

We call our system 'parliamentary government.' This is a nisnomer, because Parliament has no real control over governnent. The most it can do (and this it often does very effectively) s to delay and harass the work of government, and to provide e Opposition with an arena in which to carry on its incessant ut purely negative work of discrediting the Government and rying to oust it. Parliament is in practice limited to this function, ecause it is denied the power of doing anything else—the Opposiion party (or parties) being confined to the negative function of riticism, in accordance with the doctrine that 'it is the duty of n Opposition to oppose,' while the Government party is tied own, by all the force of party discipline, as well as by the fear f dissolution, to support the group of its leaders who form the abinet.

Parliament has no real control over legislation. No Bill has a chance of passing into law unless it is introduced by the Government. Government Bills are, of course, amended; but only to the extent which the Government is willing to accept; if an amendment is pressed which the Government dislikes, even though it has the support of many in the Government party, the threat of a dissolution is usually enough to ensure its defeat. Thus the Acts which are passed in any session may include provisions which a large majority in Parliament (if they were free to vote) would have condemned. This was so, for example, in the case of the Coal Bill, the only important enactment of the last session of Parliament.

Parliament has no control over administration. If any act of administration is challenged, it is defended by the whole weight of the Government majority, under the threat of dissolution. This applies not only to the main decisions on policy, in which the Cabinet has really taken part; it applies also to the whole range of administrative action, most of which is due to the permanent officials. Under the cloak of party dictatorship bureaucracy thrives and grows.

Parliament has no control over expenditure, in spite of the time-honoured formula (now mere cant) which ascribes to it 'the power of the purse.' The estimates of expenditure are put forward by the Government, having been framed by the bureaucracy. Nominally Parliament devotes twenty days in the year to the discussion of these Estimates, which cover an expenditure of 800,000,000*l.*; but these days are used for discussions on general policy, raised on motions to reduce the salary of this or that Minister, which are always either defeated or withdrawn when they have served the purpose of regularising a debate. No attempt is ever made to criticise or reduce expenditure; if such an attempt were made, it would be treated as a vote of no confidence, and defeated under the threat of a dissolution. For more than twenty-five years no Estimate has ever been reduced by Parliament. The control over taxation is almost equally ineffective. Taxes can only be proposed by the Government, and are enforced in the usual way. There is no Parliament in Europe that has less control over expenditure or taxation than the British Parliament.

Thus it may truly be said that Parliament is an almost impotent body, except in so far as its debates, by showing that some proposed measure will be unpopular, may persuade the omnipotent Government to modify its decisions. Debates are for the most part a waste of time, except as a means of advertising to the public the rival ideas of Government and Opposition. Their results are almost always foregone conclusions. This must

continue to be the case so long as the Government is held to have the right of forcing a dissolution whenever it is defeated. Hence it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the most important power which remains to Parliament is that of delaying and harassing the work of government. Its procedure, which is inconceivably cumbrous and slow, might have been devised for this purpose. But if its procedure were revised—if an efficient committee system were set up—Parliament might begin to do real work, and to exercise real instead of merely formal control. For this reason neither the Government (which enjoys dictatorship) nor the Opposition (which looks forward to enjoying it) is likely to agree to any such change. They would unite in chorussing that this would 'undermine the responsibility of the Cabinet,' which is another way of saying that it would qualify the dictatorship of the ruling party. And party dictatorship is the ark of our constitutional covenant, as it is in Italy and in Russia.

For the same reason the most powerful parties are opposed to any reform of our electoral system. To the idea of proportional representation, in particular, they offer, as the fate of Lord Ullswater's Committee has shown, a unanimous resistance, describing it as a new-fangled idea, a risky experiment, a doctrinaire theory which would never work: nobody seems to be aware that the system has been adopted in the great majority of the States of Europe, and that it works quite smoothly. The real reason for the failure of the Ullswater Committee on electoral reform is that any electoral reform, by representing fairly all the main bodies of opinion in the nation, would put an end to the dictatorship now wielded by the managers of one party or another; and one of the two larger parties is already enjoying this dictatorship, while the other looks forward to enjoying it. Electoral reform would make Parliament representative; and, according to the prevalent doctrine of this country, it is essential for the efficient working of representative government that it should *not* be representative.

III

The essence of our system, then, is the dictatorship of a party Cabinet, and the reduction of Parliament to something little more than a debating society; rival parties, of sharply opposed views, taking turns in the exercise of this dictatorship, so that there is never any assurance of continuity in national policy.

But the Cabinet which wields this dictatorship, and is jealous of any encroachment upon it by Parliament, is quite incapable of exercising it. The score or so of men (often not very able men) who constitute a Cabinet cannot possibly perform the vast and variegated functions which they have arrogated to themselves.

Individually, as Ministers, they are supposed to exercise control over huge Departments of State, which are not subjected to any other control; naturally they cannot in any real sense perform this function, especially as they usually know little or nothing about the work of their departments before they assume control; so the departments are uncontrolled and bureaucracy thrives. Collectively they have to determine the line of policy which is to be pursued on every crucial problem that arises, at home, or in the empire, or abroad: this alone (if the task were to be adequately performed) might well occupy all their time. They are also the national board of directors, who have the spending of an income of 800,000,000*l.*, and can raise as much more as they think necessary: if they do not supervise this colossal outlay nobody else will do so, for (as we have seen) Parliament is impotent. Further, they alone are responsible for the whole body of legislation, both the laws passed through Parliament and the vast complex of administrative orders and regulations having the force of law which now form an even larger part of our legal system than the actual Acts passed by Parliament. Parliament will, of course, discuss some of this legislation; but it will only discuss seriously one or two controversial measures, and it will only be allowed to alter these within narrow limits. If the Cabinet does not thoroughly discuss this vast body of legislation as a whole, nobody else will do so. And alongside of these colossal responsibilities, which are so vast that no group of twenty men could possibly do justice to them, the members of the Cabinet are engrossed in the endless game of politics, in party management, in electioneering, in propaganda on the platform, and in the thousand social and other activities in which the leaders of the nation are expected to engage. How can it be expected that the Cabinet should be able, amid such multifarious occupations, to think out the broad lines of national policy? And why should they trouble to do so, seeing that their decisions, if they arrive at any, are likely to be reversed as soon as the gamble of the next election brings their opponents into power? So distracting and so various are the demands upon them that every Cabinet must in fact live from hand to mouth, and from day to day, never able to see the problem of national government as a whole.

In truth, the functions which are imposed upon the Cabinet by our system of party dictatorship are so enormous that they cannot be performed in any adequate way. And because of this, the reality of power in every sphere—legislative, administrative, financial—falls to the bureaucracy. Now bureaucracy has many virtues. But there are two vitally important functions which it cannot perform, precisely because it consists of experts

and specialists who must necessarily take a disproportionate view of the importance of their own work. A bureaucracy can never pursue economy; and it can never see the problems of government as a whole, or shape a coherent policy in a time of difficulty.

The rapid growth of bureaucracy, which is now less effectively controlled in this country than in France, is not the only consequence of our system of party dictatorship. Since Parliament (which ought to exercise control over government on behalf of the nation) has been deprived of any real power over administration, finance, and even legislation, it is inevitable that other forces should fill the vacuum. The power of the Press—now largely wielded by a handful of irresponsible millionaires—has become very formidable, precisely because the Press can influence that wavering margin of voters who can give dictatorship to one group of party managers or another; and we have even seen a newspaper magnate claiming that he must be consulted before a Cabinet is formed. The great financial interests and the huge trusts—now more powerful than ever—find directorships for party leaders, and otherwise exercise a powerful but unseen control; the trade unions, which finance the Labour Party, are the power behind the throne whenever a Labour Government is in office. These formidable forces, unrecognised by the Constitution, which are concerned only with sectional interests, are insensibly annexing the authority and control which in theory belongs to the representatives of the whole nation.

IV

If what I have here written is even an approximately accurate description of the way in which our system of government is working, there is surely ground for misgiving about the conduct of our national affairs; and there is little ground for surprise at our failure to deal courageously and intelligently with our post-war problems.

It would appear that if we are to emerge from our troubles, and to tackle with confidence the enormous and complicated problems that surround us, one of the first necessities is that the need for constitutional reorganisation should be seriously faced, and the best ways of remedying the defects of our system earnestly studied. It is, indeed, surprising that so little attention is being given to the subject. The decline of public confidence in our methods of government is very apparent. It is, in truth, one of the main causes of the spread of a spirit of pessimism and defeatism among the people, which is one of the greatest of our dangers. The people feel the need of resolute leadership; and they do not get it. They feel that Parliament, if

it is to be worthy of its great name, should be playing the part of a Council of State, in which every serious body of opinion should have an opportunity of making its contribution to the framing of a vigorous, united and coherent attack upon our difficulties; and they see it as an impotent debating society, a mere arena for the endless acrimonies of parties.

If we do not take care, the outcome of this disillusionment will be a reaction against representative or parliamentary government. But it is not representative or parliamentary government that is failing, for our system is not in any true sense representative, and in it Parliament wields no real control. What is failing is party dictatorship, and the system of violent oscillation between opposite points of view; because this system is the very negation of the idea of government by reasonable discussion and compromise. The defects of our system, which have only become gross and flagrant within the last generation, can easily be rectified, if we are willing to rectify them. It is not possible, within the compass of a review article, either to analyse these defects adequately, or to indicate the remedies. On both heads there may well be wide differences of opinion. In another place[1] I have tried to give expression to the ideas both as to the evils and as to the remedies which many people now entertain. But the first necessity is that we should think seriously about the problem; and, above all, that we should ask ourselves whether we really believe that national affairs can be healthily conducted under a system of party dictatorship, with periodic oscillations between violently opposed points of view.

RAMSAY MUIR.

[1] *How Britain is Governed*" (Constable, 12s. 6d.).

THE PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLIC SCHOOLS

As the withdrawal of the Education Bill, 1930, has been attributed to a large extent to the organised opposition of the Catholic body in this country, a brief statement of the present position of Catholic schools in relation to the Catholic attitude towards the Bill may interest those who have followed recent discussions in Parliament and elsewhere.

Catholics, as a small minority in this country, recognise that, whilst they are entitled to put forward their views on the education question and to endeavour to influence to the best of their ability their fellow-countrymen regarding them, the settlement of the matter rests with the majority. They are encouraged, however, by the new spirit prevailing since the war, which has already swept away practically every religious disability remaining, to hope that if they can convince the public generally that their schools are suffering financial injustice, redress will surely follow. The concern of Catholics as Catholics is for their own children, for whom they desire intensely Catholic religious instruction in schools with a Catholic atmosphere, which can only be secured with Catholic teachers under Catholic control according to the present or some equally effective system. Catholics have always advocated the fullest freedom to other parents as to the religious education of their children.

As long as the State by law compels Catholics to pay taxes and rates towards public educational purposes upon exactly the same basis as other citizens, and to send their children to school, Catholics consider that they can in justice claim adequate aid from public funds for Catholic schools, to which alone they can conscientiously send their children. They appreciate, of course, that this claim must be exercised reasonably. They believe that they have evinced their willingness to do this in any applications made by them for new Catholic schools and in the readiness shown by them repeatedly to co-operate, with much self-sacrifice on their part, in sound movements for general educational developments in this country.

The Education Act, 1921, a codification of all previous Educa-

tion Acts still in force, which at present regulates the organisation of public education in England and Wales, derives its main principles from the Education Act, 1902, as extended in some respects by the Education Act, 1918. In the discussions upon the recent Bill 'the compromise of 1902' has proved almost a sacrosanct expression, a boundary on the way of educational development in a certain direction, beyond which, it is alleged, it was originally intended never to go, even in a happier post-war period. It may be well, therefore, to examine this 'compromise' to ascertain what it was intended to do and what it really effected. To begin with, Catholics did not look upon the 1902 Act as a 'compromise,' as far as they were concerned. As a minority they accepted it as the best terms then available, and as long as the general circumstances in which the 'compromise' was intended to apply have continued, they have endeavoured loyally, and even not ungenerously, to co-operate with the public authorities in its application. This the following table of figures, showing the position of Catholic elementary school accommodation at various stages since the passing of the 1902 Act, will readily demonstrate:

Year.	Number of Schools.	Accommodation.
1905–06	1,077	413,964
1910–11	1,088	379,115
1913–14	1,105	391,867
1919–20	1,123	399,894
1920–21	1,125	401,108
1921–22	1,129	404,162
1922–23	1,132	407,317
1923–24	1,136	409,182
1924–25	1,136	410,265
1925–26	1,141	413,575
1926–27	1,143	417,417
1927–28	1,144	418,061
1928–29	1,164	426,665

The decrease in accommodation between 1905 and 1910 does not indicate a diminution in the number of schools, but a willingness on the part of these schools to adapt themselves to the higher standards demanded by their closer association with local authorities.

The Balfour Act conferred the following substantial benefits upon Catholic schools as compared with their pre-1902 position:

(1) It gave them a firm place in the national system of education in this country.

(2) It placed upon local education authorities an obligation

of maintaining and keeping efficient any Catholic elementary schools within their respective areas, deemed to be necessary by the Board of Education.

(3) It secured for them many educational advantages, scholarships, centres for practical work, social services and the like, arising from co-ordination, development and other schemes.

(4) It gradually raised the standard in these schools with regard to the number and qualifications of the staff and equipment to that of the Council schools.

(5) It obtained for local authorities for higher education the *power* to aid recognised Catholic secondary schools.

Many critics of the dual system, however, appear to have forgotten that the 'compromise' of 1902 was by no means one-sided. Whilst giving voluntary schools for the first time a share in rates raised for educational purposes, it severely restricted and delimited the former powers of the managers of these schools, setting up a system of public control which the experience of the past quarter of a century has proved effective :

(1) It placed upon their managers the duty of providing at their own expense the sites and buildings of their schools and of keeping them in structural repair to the satisfaction of the local authority and the Board of Education.

(2) It transferred to the local education authorities the control of secular instruction in the schools.

(3) It gave the authorities the right to fix the numbers and qualifications of the staff in each school, together with, subject to an appeal to the Board of Education, the power to veto on educational groundsthe appointment of the individual teacher, and the duty of nominating one-third of the managing body of each school, charged under the Act with the appointment of the teachers therein.

(4) It secured for the authority the right to inspect the schools, to direct the dismissal of teachers upon educational grounds, to order alterations or improvements in the school buildings, and generally to exercise such supervision over the work of the schools, save religious instruction, as to enable them adequately to provide for their effective maintenance.

(5) It deprived the managers of their former right of acting as treasurers or controllers of the schools, insisting that payment of all grants from public funds for them should be made direct to the local authorities, upon whom it imposed sole responsibility for allocating and disbursing these grants.

In view of the free use of the expression 'public control' in the discussions on Sir Charles Trevelyan's Bills, especial attention is directed to the last-mentioned change, which, it is not generally appreciated, withdrew from the managers of voluntary schools

the power to determine or to handle the smallest item of pu expenditure upon them, except with the expressed sanction of local education authority. As in recent discussions, howe the question of the appointment of teachers has been emphasi in connexion with 'public control,' it may be well to expl more in detail how the 1902 Act deliberately circumscribed power of managers of voluntary schools in this respect. concrete example, the practice of a large authority as to appointment of head teachers of non-provided schools, will se to illustrate best how effective in this direction public con is under the Act.

The authority, which requires the teachers appointed, whet heads or assistants, ordinarily to be trained and certificat fixes limits of experience for appointments to headships of schc of varying sizes. The managers are instructed to advertise vacancy and to use forms of application prepared by the autho for the purpose. In order to test his personality, acade qualifications and experience, the candidate nominated by managers is interviewed by the authority's three princi officers, who afterwards report on the application to the committee of the education committee charged with the con of the teaching staff. This sub-committee itself also intervi the teacher before arriving at a decision to give or withh consent. This particular authority has withheld consent several appointments, and appeals against its decision to Board of Education, which have been very few, have always b dismissed.

From a consideration of the facts relating to the initiat and working of the principles of the 1902 Act, contained in 1921 measure, Catholics are of opinion that:

(*a*) The obligation placed upon the managers of these schc of providing from their own resources the sites and bu ings was fixed by the Act in relation generally to financial circumstances existing in 1902.

(*b*) The system of public control set up by the Act sho satisfy all reasonable advocates of public responsibi and oversight for public expenditure.

Since 1902 three main series of events have completely chan the financial circumstances then prevailing. Educational devel ments not anticipated twenty-eight years ago have substantia increased the financial burden placed upon managers of n provided schools by the Act. The war and its aftermath h entirely altered the pre-1914 value of money, multipl by about two and a half times the financial demands u managers under the Act and decreasing materially the po bility of obtaining help from voluntary sources. Furthermore,

huge post-war problem in particular, the housing problem, has cast upon managers of Catholic non-provided schools, in practice, the unreasonable burden of providing from voluntary sources at enhanced post-war prices new school buildings upon new municipal housing estates, which, with assistance of large grants-in-aid from public funds, have sprung up in various parts of the country.

Few words will be necessary to explain these three sets of conditions. Standards of school buildings readily approved a quarter of a century ago have now become out of date. Larger classrooms, practical workrooms, larger halls and corridors, more spacious playgrounds, modern sanitary arrangements are now rightly expected. In a report issued a few years ago by the Board of Education substantial fundamental changes were suggested in many non-provided school buildings, which have been accepted since 1902 as part of the recognised school accommodation of the country, and these changes, under the Education Act, 1921, will have to be paid for from private sources at enhanced post-war prices. The advent of the selective central schools and of the Hadow Report has again added to the burden of these managers, demanding automatically further improvements, additions and rearrangements in school buildings, costly in character, but certainly never contemplated by the 'compromise' of 1902.

The difficulties for managers of non-provided schools arising from the changed spending value of money must be obvious. Where prior to 1914 they had to raise 1*l.* for their schools, they now have to find nearly 2*l.* 10*s.* merely on account of the war. As everybody knows, the cost of building has increased beyond proportion. A school place which sixteen years ago cost 10*l.* to 12*l.* now costs about 30*l.*, or even more. All this additional expenditure, caused, as has already been stated, entirely by the war, has to be obtained by the managers from voluntary contributions, without any assistance from public funds, although all increases in public educational expenditure due to the war in other directions, falling upon local authorities, have been defrayed from taxes and rates, to which Catholics must contribute on exactly the same basis as other citizens.

As to the burden of providing new schools upon recently erected municipal housing estates, London, as an illustration, is, of course, the most impressive. New Catholic schools, all of which must be calculated at enhanced post-war prices, have been erected or projected thereon as follows: Becontree (two schools), Downham (two schools [1]), Bellingham (one school), Watling (one school), St. Helier (one school)—seven new schools upon the housing estates of one authority! It cannot be suggested that

[1] In [illegible]

this special form of school provision was contemplated in 1902. The situation, too, is provocative for Catholics, for whilst every house upon these estates has been erected with generous assistance from public funds under the post-war Housing Acts, Catholic schools, which form part of the necessary school accommodation for certain children resident in them, cannot obtain similar aid.

Of course, twenty-eight years ago Catholics must have realised that time would bring changes in educational standards and developments, but neither parties to the 'compromise' of 1902 then contemplated that the results of a great war would multiply about two and a half times every charge, old and new, fallin upon the managers.

On account of the changes mentioned above, especially the alterations in financial standards caused by the war, Catholics consider that they have a just claim for a readjustment of the financial arrangements of 1902, in order that Catholic schools may be replaced in the financial position with regard to private and public funds generally intended by the Balfour Act.

Within the past eighteen months, since the advent of Sir Charles Trevelyan to the Board of Education, further urgent difficulties for Catholic schools have arisen, which will again increase substantially their financial burden, if Parliament adopts the suggestions of the Government. The President of the Board of Education has already introduced two Bills with the object of raising the school-leaving age to fifteen years from April 1, 1931, and, although both have been withdrawn, the Prime Minister has given a pledge that a Bill with a similar purpose will be introduced early in the new session. Nobody can suggest that the raising of the school-leaving age from fourteen to fifteen years was contemplated by the 1902 Act. If a new burden of this character is in practice placed on Catholic schools, should not further help from public funds be granted them *ad hoc?* It is difficult to estimate accurately what the additional burden will be. Whatever the cost, whatever the self-sacrifice demanded, Catholics will not allow their young people of fourteen to fifteen years to attend non-Catholic schools. From the present average attendance at Catholic elementary schools Catholics will probably have to provide for about 30,000 additional children, if Sir Charles Trevelyan's project receives the sanction of Parliament. A large proportion of these will probably require new school places. At 30*l*. a place on the average—a conservative estimate, as the new age group will demand smaller classrooms, more space per pupil, practical workrooms, additional sanitary accommodation, larger playgrounds and consequential improvements to older buildings which always follow additions on modern lines—the Catholic body will have to find from about 750,000*l*. to 1,000,000*l*. capital

xpenditure by April 1, 1932. How can Catholics hope to raise his large sum from private sources in such a short period?

Furthermore, Catholics venture to ask whether it is just to use this additional burden, admittedly, as has already been stated, never contemplated in 1902, as a reason for reopening the ordinary educational conditions with regard to non-provided schools then laid down.

The matter does not end here. The responsibility of providing or the new age group at an equally short notice will also be placed by the promised Bill upon local education authorities as ar as children in attendance at Council schools are concerned. trangely enough, without any suggestion of reopening the ducational arrangements for Council schools as fixed by the Education Act, 1921, the President of the Board has officially dmitted that the emergency legislation proposed places such ndue responsibility upon local education authorities that they ave a claim upon the Treasury for additional financial aid to nable them to meet the new demands in the short period proposed.

So eager, apparently, was Sir Charles Trevelyan to recognise ie claim of Council schools and to compensate the local educaon authorities in this respect, that on September 24, 1929, before e had introduced his first Bill into Parliament, the Board of ducation in Circular 1404 made the following statement:

> The Government recognise that in view of the nature of the task which ie Local Education Authorities are called upon to undertake and the omparatively limited time at their disposal, they are entitled to look for ome special assistance from the Exchequer beyond that which they ormally receive in respect of their ordinary expenditure on school uilding.

nd proceeded to announce that it had decided:

> increase the grant payable in respect of all expenditure on the rovision of Elementary Schools to which the Authority become conactually committed after the 1st September, 1929, and before 1st Sepmber, 1932, subject only to the condition that this expenditure shall present an effective contribution to an approved scheme of reorganisaon and development. In the case of any such expenditure the rate of ant will be raised from 20 to 50 per cent.

In these circumstances, if the raising of the school-leaving age April 1, 1931, gives Council schools a claim for a special grant *hoc* from the Treasury, which the Government at once recognise, thout reopening any of the ordinary conditions for grant under e Education Act, 1921, are not the Catholic body entitled to ask hy (1) a similar grant is not available for Catholic schools, and) the proposed development is being used as a reason for opening the arrangements of the 'compromise' of 1902? If ouncil schools receive an emergency grant, practically without

conditions, for emergency action, why should not Catholic schools be treated similarly?

The power to aid voluntary secondary schools, conferred upon local education authorities by the 1902 Act, would not have been affected by the Education Bill, 1930. In this respect, however, Catholics would appeal to the authorities concerned, in the interests of secondary education, to consider the generous attitude adopted by London, Birmingham, Middlesex, Bradford, Cardiff, and some other authorities towards Catholic secondary schools by aiding them upon a deficiency grant basis, if they are recognised by the Board of Education and conform to its grant regulations, thereby applying to these schools the principle underlying the compulsory maintenance of non-provided elementary schools under the Act. An examination of the educational results achieved by the adoption of the deficiency grant system would, Catholics are confident, convince authorities of its value for secondary education.

This paper, it will be noted, does not deal with the principle of raising the school-leaving age. Catholics, as a body, have no common view as to the educational or social value or otherwise of the proposed development

JOHN GILBERT.

THE IDEAL OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND[1]

THE subject of this article is 'The Ideal of the Church of England.' In order to appreciate this ideal we must be prepared to go back to first principles. What is the function of a Church? By what are we to test its progress? Do we still need a Church? There is to-day in many quarters a revolt against what is called institutional religion. But I would suggest that in reality the need of a Church, the need of embodying religion in some form of institution, is to-day greater, and not less, if religion is to survive as a force in public life. There is a danger that it may get crowded out. Religion has not been disproved. It has not been consciously rejected. It has not been tested and found wanting. Rather, the competition of other interests has become so overwhelming that the deeper and less obvious and immediate needs of the soul are in danger of being neglected. This world, as enlarged and elaborated by the resources of physical science, has become a fascinating place. It is easy to become absorbed by its attractions, so as to live without any real thought of the eternal and the unseen. In former days, even though there was widespread neglect of public worship and much indifference to practical Christianity, it still remained true that by all but a small proportion of the community the main beliefs of the Christian religion were taken for granted. Men lived in an atmosphere created by Christianity. There was in the background the assumption of the truth of Christian principles. They were implied in all forms of education. If, for instance, we turn to the novels of such a writer as Jane Austen, at first sight we find singularly little reference to, or appreciation of, religion for one who is known to have been a devout Christian. But a closer examination of her writings suggests the reason for this apparent silence. The general Christian position is not made more explicit, because in the circumstances of the time it could be assumed. There was no need for a more explicit assertion of Christian principles.

[1] Being the substance of an address given at a meeting of the Westminster Group on June 18, 1930, by the Rev. E. J. Bicknell, D.D., Professor of New Testament Exegesis, King's College, London.

To-day the position is very different. A large number of the most popular writers are in opposition, not simply to Christ an dogma, but to Christian morality. There is hardly a Christian principle that is not disputed by somebody. More than this, a large number of novels are full of the suggestion that the restraints of religion have now been abandoned by all sensible people. Owing to a variety of causes England is rapidly drifting into the condition of a heathen country containing groups of Christians. It is true that the majority of the nation still retain a vague affection for the religion of their fathers and are in no way actively hostile to Christianity. There is a deep reverence for the person of Christ. But they have scanty knowledge of what that religion actually teaches. They have a vague belief that the Bible has been overthrown by modern knowledge. They have still scantier inclination to accept the moral and spiritual discipline of the Christian Church. The solid background of agreed beliefs on moral and religious matters, which supported the Victorian era, has disappeared. As Dr. Gilbert Murray has told us, the Cosmos has been succeeded by a Chaos. In short, we are reverting to the conditions of the New Testament, conditions that have never been outgrown or transcended in the mission field. There is a close parallel between the religious confusion of the Roman Empire and the condition of Europe at this moment. In the mission field it is plain that some form of organisation is indispensable, not less for the building up of Church members than for forwarding missionary enterprise. The solitary Christian is unthinkable, and would soon cease to exist. If his religion is to survive and hold its own against the pressure of a dominantly hostile environment, he must have the support and companionship of his fellow-Christians. There must be regular common worship and common life. In pagan lands Christ is seen to be inseparable from His Church. And England is in danger of becoming again a heathen land. So, if men are to retain a living faith and build up a Christian character, they need the support of Christian fellowship and worship. If a Christian atmosphere is to be created, if our social traditions are to be interpenetrated by Christian principles, there must be a society. A specially devout individual here and there, or a specially gifted thinker, may retain his religion in isolation, but the ordinary man requires a community of some kind. If Christianity is not to be limited to a small and select band of mystics and philosophers it must be embodied and expressed in the ordered life of a Church. At the very moment when organised religion is most widely repudiated it is most urgently required.

This need, we believe, offers to the Church of England at once

a challenge and an opportunity. We claim that in its ide it represents the noblest attempt hitherto made to fulfil th mind of Christ. It is content with nothing short of the endeavou to embrace within the life and fellowship of a single body t fulness of Christian worship, thought and service. It refuses rest in some easier ideal which promises immediate advanta It strives to realise that wealth of ordered devotion and sacr mental life which is the mark of Catholicism, to express tho Evangelical and prophetic values which are the glory of Prote tantism, and also to give full recognition to the claims of moder knowledge. Let us consider these points in order.

The Church of England claims to be the Catholic Church this land. It enjoys unbroken continuity with the Church the Middle Ages. It has been reformed—not for the first time— but not refounded. In its Prayer Book it has preserved all t essentials of Catholic worship in face of Puritan attempts reduce it to a Protestant sect. It has maintained the histor ministry. The Preface to the Ordinal makes it as clear as wor can make it that there was, and always has been, the full intentio to continue the orders of bishop, priest, and deacon which ha existed since the time of the apostles. In its doctrine the Chur of England has never ceased to appeal to the authority of scriptu as interpreted by the teaching of the Fathers and the practi of the primitive Church. It is impossible to point to any da and say that at that moment the old Church was abolishe and a new Church set up by the State or any other body. W frankly admit that the ideal of Catholicism as expressed in th worship and life of our Church is not identical with that of t Church of Rome. We are not in the least ashamed of the fac For in the Church of Rome, as it now exists, we do not fir a sufficient and satisfactory embodiment of the principles Catholicism. In the Orthodox Churches of the East we obser in some points a far more faithful adherence to the true Cathc position. Ever since the breach with the Eastern Church t Church of the West has suffered from the loss of the Gree tradition. The counter-Reformation tended to emphasise an increase this defect. Faced with the revolt of half Europe, th Church of Rome was fighting for its life. Victory could on be secured by military methods, by unwavering obedience an the acceptance of orders without criticism. These militar methods have left an abiding mark on the life and outlook the Roman Church. As has been recognised by a writer lil von Hügel, the Church of Rome to-day is in many ways les liberal and comprehensive than the Church of the Middle Age There is less free investigation and discussion. It has nev been able to lay aside its attitude of exclusiveness and intoleran

born of fear. We gladly recognise the many excellencies of the Church of Rome. Its massive and unwavering witness to the reality of spiritual things is most impressive. It has never ceased to produce saints. It has great power for training souls in devotion and personal holiness. We have much to learn from its methods in these matters. We can also admire the loyalty and self-sacrifice of its members. Would that those who are most eager in our own Church to imitate the externals of Rome would imitate it here! But with its many excellences there is a lack of moral and intellectual freedom. What many of us regard as an insuperable obstacle against joining the Church of Rome is, not the necessity of accepting just this or that dogma, but the whole ethos of the Church. There is no recognition of the fact that the one solid basis of truth is the free consensus of minds that are qualified to judge. The fundamental divergence between Romanism and Anglicanism is concerned with the attitude to truth and authority. We claim that in this matter the ideal of the Church of England is the closer to the mind of Christ. The methods of the Church of Rome represent a one-sided development. Moreover, as events at Malta are reminding us at this time, the Church of Rome seems unable to purge itself from political ambition. To deny absolution to members of one political party is a proceeding hard to reconcile with the methods of Christ. Rome uses the piety of its members to support its schemes for political power. We are not criticising the genuine piety of the ordinary devout Romanist, but the political intrigues of ecclesiastics, who exploit the simple faith of the multitude for their own ends. They get their reward, but at the price of spiritual degradation.

Again, the external unity of the Roman Church is in many ways attractive. But a closer examination of that unity, of the means by which it is maintained and of the real divisions that it conceals, diminishes its attractiveness. A careful study of Roman theology shows that under the compulsory and universal use of identical formularies and phrases there often lies concealed a real difference of thought and belief. It is the willingness to accept and use certain forms of words that is demanded, not intellectual sincerity. Equally, too, behind outward unity worship there are to be found many religions. The real religion of educated English Roman Catholics is not identical with that, say, of the South Italians or South Americans. A visitor to Sicily can give a graphic description of how he found himself engaged in a devil-hunt led by the local priests. That is an exciting religious pursuit not practised in the streets round Westminster Cathedral. There is little wonder that English Roman Catholics who find themselves in such regions for the

first time have difficulty in recognising their own religion. When anyone is about to be converted to Roman Catholicism it is a pertinent question to ask whether he is being converted to the religion of the English Roman Catholics, or to that of Southern Ireland, or to that of Mexico. For these are by no means the same. In short, to criticise the Church of England as un-Catholic, merely because in details of worship or doctrine it does not agree with the Church of Rome, is to be false to the true standards of Catholicism. Whatever is Roman is not necessarily right.

Secondly, the Church of England aims at embodying in its own life the spiritual values of Protestantism, using that much abused term in the proper sense. Protestantism is not mere negation, though it may be true that certain perverted forms of Protestantism would seemingly lose all reason for their existence if the Pope and the Church of Rome should come to an end. Nor, again, in spite of many assertions to the contrary, is it merely a watered-down Catholicism. As a matter of history Protestantism has stood for the freedom of the Gospel. It has often battled for the cause of liberty. Above all, it represents the prophetic side of religion, which finds inadequate expression in the Church of Rome. Yet to-day, Protestantism in its old forms is in a bad way. Its danger has always been an exaggerated individualism. Formerly it was preserved in large measure from the perils that beset individualism by its adherence to the Written Word. The individual felt that he needed to cling to a power outside himself, and he found that power in the Bible, regarded in the most literal sense as the Word of God verbally inspired. Now modern knowledge has shattered for ever the old conception of literal inspiration which underlay the popular Protestant use of the Bible. The full results of this, especially in relation to the New Testament, have yet to be worked out. But already the effect is plain. In Protestant circles large numbers even of ministers have no clear idea of what they believe or where they stand. We are faced with a crisis not less momentous than that of the Reformation itself. Hence at this moment, as the Bishop of Pretoria has recently told us, Protestantism is largely engaged in 'living on its wits.' Here, and still more in America, it resorts to stunts to hold and attract members.

This is in large measure the explanation of the Fundamentalist movement. It is an attempt to defend the spiritual authority of the Scriptures by mistaken methods. In the long run it cannot succeed, and it can only sow a harvest of infidelity. Much as we may sympathise with its motives, it is false to the very principles of Protestantism. It refuses to trust the light that we have received. The true remedy is rather to be sought

in that which Catholicism can supply. What is needed to train and support individual piety is the ordered life and spiritual tradition of the Catholic Church, that approach to reality which can only be found in the atmosphere of worship and devotion. The New Testament itself is the literature of a worshipping community, and its truth can never be rightly understood apart from Christian life and worship. It was never intended to stand by itself. It is the glory of the Church of England that it consciously and deliberately strives to hold together the two sides of religion, the prophetic and the priestly, in the life and fellowship of a single community. For in truth each needs the other if it is to be strong and healthy. Protestantism is seen demonstrably to be lacking in certain elements of permanence. A Catholicism which leaves no room for free and full development of the prophetic side of religion tends to go bad. It is no accident that the Roman Catholic Church is to be seen at its best precisely in those countries where it has had the competition of Protestantism. Where it has had the field to itself, or succeeded in destroying Protestantism, as in Portugal or South America, it tends to become decadent. The tension between the institutional and prophetic elements in Christianity is a condition of soundness and vigour. And the ideal is that this tension should be found within the one Church, and not between two or more separated and competing bodies. We may fairly claim that the Church of England alone affords the opportunity for the development of a truly evangelical Catholicism.

Thirdly, there is the problem of modern knowledge. We are living in days when fresh knowledge has come in with a flood, and it is still coming. Never has there been such an age before. Abroad, in the mission field, we can see tribes passing from the Stone Age to the conditions of our modern civilisation in a few years. We forget that in matters of knowledge we ourselves are being compelled to make an almost equally rapid transition. There is more difference between the intellectual outlook of an educated man of to-day and of one, say, fifty years ago than between a man of fifty years ago and a scholar of the Middle Ages. No wonder that the adjustment of our religious thinking to these new and still changing conditions is difficult. Here we claim that the Church of England is able to provide an atmosphere in which these problems can most successfully be faced. It can furnish that background of Catholic devotion and evangelical fervour against which alone such questions can be discussed on a Christian basis. We are all aware of the danger of a barren intellectualism. Our complaint against a certain type of Modernist teacher is that he is too negative. He destroys, but he cannot build up. He has no Gospel. He forgets that

because a man learns that, e.g., Moses did not write the Book of Genesis he is not necessarily any nearer to God. Correct information on critical matters does not necessarily augment the love of God. If we are to have a truly Christian theology, the intellect must work on materials supplied by the life of devotion and missionary zeal, individual and corporate. Otherwise it will be thin and barren. There must be spiritual experience behind the activity of the intellect if it is to be fruitful. Here in the Church of England there is the real attempt to form a synthesis between modern knowledge and Christian life and worship. We dare to be both Catholic and critical. There is a vital distinction between saying that the Church teaches a doctrine because it is true and saying that a doctrine is true because the Church teaches it. But the distinction between the two sayings often wears thin. It is the glory of our Church that it always proclaims that doctrine is to be believed because it is true, and for no other reason. It matters enormously whether we put truth in the first or in some lower place. Many of the difficulties of the Church of England at this moment spring from the fact that it seeks to put truth in the first place.

So, then, the ideal of the Church of England is to combine these three elements into a living whole. It is an ideal difficult of attainment. There is the constant temptation to sink into a mere compromise, to tolerate opinions that are mutually exclusive, without making the effort to see whether any of them happen to be true or not. There is the temptation to drift. The position is all the more difficult because, owing to circumstances of past history, the power of discipline has been grievously impaired, and, what is even more serious, the very idea of the Church as possessing the inherent right to order its own worship has been obscured in the minds of many of its members.

On the other hand, there is the opposite temptation to be impatient, to distrust the power of truth and goodness, to use the methods of this world in the supposed interests of spiritual advance. There are those who would rush to some simple and clear solution of all problems. The refusal to make an immediate decision is not necessarily due either to sloth or cowardice. The wise man often pauses, because he believes that opinions and policies that appear divergent are not so in reality. The present Bishop of Oxford has pointed out in one of his books that if a field of corn was surveyed by a farmer, a botanist, and a painter they would say very different things about it. In some sense—with due apologies to the philosophers—they would all be contemplating the same field. It would be easy to conclude that their descriptions of it had nothing in common. Yet each would be true. Further, each would

miss the fuller truth unless he had the patience to listen to what the other two had to say. So, as Mr. Malden has lately reminded us, when men complain that the Church of England does not know her own mind it often means that the Church of England knows more than is present to their minds. All would agree that the Church of England to-day is in difficult waters. In very large measure this is due to the exaggeration of party differences. The situation affords a challenge to all its loyal members to think and to encourage others to think in terms of the whole, and not only of the parts. A new group, the Westminster Group, has been formed for this end. Its aim is to propagate and enforce this ideal, to hold up before the world the glory of the Church of England, to invite men of all parties to co-operate in giving of their best for the welfare of the whole. Strange as it may seem, there has hitherto been no society working for this end. Party organisations abound and expend unlimited energy, but there has been no organisation to work for the Church as a whole. Since the group was started there has been abundant proof of the need for its existence. Evidence has been collected from many quarters to show that for some time the Church of England has been made the object of a well-organised and subtle attack in the popular Press compared with which past attacks by the Liberationists may be considered as negligible. There is a persistent and determined effort to hold it up to ridicule, to set in the limelight any scandal or failure that may occur, to suggest that it is spiritually dead or dying, and that no up-to-date or intelligent being can possibly belong to such an effete and deplorable institution. It is only fair to add that this defeatist policy receives considerable support from certain members of the Church itself who lose few opportunities in speech or in print from sneering at the body to which they themselves belong. On the other hand, the Church of Rome is held up to unlimited admiration. It receives a quite disproportionate amount of space in the papers, while the activities of other religious bodies are largely ignored. Its functions are reported at full length, and every opportunity is taken of impressing on the public mind that the one hope of religion for the future rests with Rome. There is no need to develop this theme, except to say that the evidence for this widespread propaganda is incontrovertible. What has been done to meet it? Hitherto practically nothing. The local clergy have for the most part ignored attacks in the local Press. The leaders of the Church of England seem to suppose that everyone reads *The Times*, and that if its doings are reported there is nothing more required. They ignore the influence of the more popular journals and the local Press. They are often

strangely out of touch with what the man in the street is thinking and saying. There is indeed an official Press bureau, which issues at rare intervals dignified pronouncements of unimpeachable accuracy of interest to few outside ecclesiastical circles. Since the absorption of the Church Defence Institution no attempt has been made on any large scale to put the point of view of the Church of England before the public. The case is allowed to go by default. The ordinary man is encouraged to suppose that nothing particular is being done by the Church because nothing is reported. The Westminster Group has at least made a beginning. Letters have been inserted in a large number of papers. Misrepresentations have been corrected. There is no attempt at aggression, but simply at securing that attacks on the Church, direct and indirect, do not go unanswered. The task is not always easy. In more than one instance papers of the highest repute have published violent attacks on the Church of England, but have refused to allow even a short letter of reply to appear in the next issue. But a beginning has been made, and the Westminster Group has in many cases been able to get fair hearing. It is essential that our case should be presented in the spirit of charity and truth and that the people of our land should have the chance of learning that the Church of England is alive and striving to fulfil the mind of Christ.

But the best defence of the Church of England is the development of its own spiritual life in all its fulness. Its ideal makes a larger demand on human nature than a merely partisan ideal. To this end the Westminster Group aims at drawing together men of good-will of all parties. It does not ask them to surrender their own convictions, but to work for the good of the whole. It frankly recognises that in times like the present there are many points on which honest and devout Christians must agree to differ. The supreme duty is to endeavour to understand the convictions of others and to discern the truth for which they contend. It has been objected that this policy of co-operation is vague. The objection largely comes from those who definitely disagree with the declared policy of the group on certain points. Thus the group has put in the forefront of its programme the desire to draw together men of all parties to co-operate in the common cause. This is naturally distasteful to those who wish to gain possession of the entire Church for their own party and to make life intolerable for those who differ from them. Again, the group is prepared to 'Support the corporate episcopate acting constitutionally through the Convocations in every effort to secure order in all directions by insisting upon the observance of the Prayer Book Use, as defined by the Books of 1662 and 1928, and in an agreed policy of fairness and equity.' This pronounce-

ment at least is not vague, though it may not please all the world. The group has also pronounced against disestablishment under present conditions, though it is prepared to face it and all its consequences if all other attempts at reform fail. It also seeks to support candidates of all parties who sympathise with its aims, and to search out men and women who are unwilling to come forward as candidates on a party ticket, but whose abilities would be of great value to the Church. At present such are lost to the Church. In certain quarters unity centres have been formed to bring together lonely members.

But there is every reason to hope that the emergence and spread of the Westminster Group is only a symptom. There is abundant evidence that, especially in the provinces, there is a large body of devout Church-people distressed at the party spirit that is weakening the life and influence of the Church, eager to support any movement that will vindicate the ideals of the Church as a whole, but uncertain what should be done. It will take time to convince them that something more than sympathy is needed. History shows that small and active minorities can often enforce their will upon reluctant majorities before the latter rouse themselves to united action. If the ideal of the Church of England, to which the great majority of its members are loyal, is to be maintained there is need for immediate thought and action. It has been objected, very naturally, that the formation of such a group involves organised action, and that we are suffering already from an excess of organisations; that it must result in meetings, and we already have too many; that it must necessitate the spending of money, and of that we have too little. These are, indeed, formidable objections against the unnecessary starting of new societies. No one will deny that there are too many meetings and societies. The real question, however, is not so simple. All would agree that there are certain needs which are primary and fundamental. If the Church of England is to continue to exist, it must make plain to itself and to the world at large the principles and purposes of its existence. These are at this moment in danger of being obscured, with very dangerous results to its own unity and health. If the condition of the Church were sound there would be no need of the 'Westminster' Group or of any other new Group. But in the present critical state of affairs there exists no society to perform this necessary function. We have taken our position too much for granted. We have supposed that because we are convinced of the excellences of our cause the world outside is no less convinced. In the world of to-day that is a dangerous illusion. We are not in the very least ashamed of the Church of England. We do not apologise for its existence. We recognise its

deficiencies; we desire the quickening of its spiritual life. B
we hold that the ideal which it is striving, however imperfectly,
embody is the ideal which most fully represents the mind
Christ. It is therefore an ideal for which it is worth while co
tending, even if that involves time, money and organisation.

From this point of view the preservation and maintenan
of the Church of England is a more than local concern.
the world of to-day men need a Church. They are looking f
one in which they can be both religious and rational, one whi
can command the allegiance of free men. They are right
repelled by intolerance and obscurantism. The worship a
religion that they seek must be consistent with their highe
ideals. Hence all members of the Church of England are call
to rally to its support, to witness to its glory and truth, in t
interest, not only of the Church itself, but of religion all t
world over.

E. J. Bicknell

THE CRIPPLE: A SOCIAL PROBLEM

PLACE, however small, in the larger human scheme of things a *sine qua non* of human happiness. The ultimate tragedy of he cripple is that this has always been denied him. This is still ue to a great extent, even in these enlightened times. Enormous trides have been made towards preventing his existence, and emaking him into a normal man when prevention has been mpossible; but in spite of all that is being done along these lines, he cripple is still with us, and must remain so, so long as the human ody continues liable to accidental injury, congenital deformities, nd the various crippling diseases. He is in our midst, but too ften not absorbed by us—he is among us, but not of us; and it is his feeling of being 'out of things,' together with the sense that e must always be dependent, which, quite as much as the nconvenience of his deformity, make life a hardship for the ripple. If he is to be saved from listlessness and depression he nust be made to feel that he has something to contribute to the ife of the community, and that he is in some real sense a part of t all. From the point of view of the community, also, it is of bvious importance that as many as possible of its dead liabilities hould be transformed into living assets, with a value of their own.

Thus may appear a truism; but, if it does, it is only within he last few years that it has become so. The subconscious ttitude that very little could be expected from those to whom so much has been denied has dominated a great proportion of the vork done for cripples in the past. Much in the way of comfort nd amusement has therefore been given and little asked, with he effect of increasing the cripple's natural sense of inferiority nd dependence.

It is gradually becoming recognised, however, that a great umber of cripples can be made independent if their special apacities are developed and they are taught to use them; and here can be no doubt that they must become better and happier uman beings if they can be given a chance to stand on their wn feet.

One of the earliest results of the dawning recognition of this rinciple has been the establishment of special schools for

physically defective children. These schools, which exist in most large centres, and for which the local education authorities are responsible, are doing extremely valuable work. In a school of this type which the writer was privileged to visit the curriculum included, in addition to the usual subjects, handicrafts, in which some of the more advanced scholars had reached a high standard of proficiency, and some elementary occupational instruction. There was also a clinic in connexion with the school where the physical progress of the children was carefully watched, and a massage and artificial sunlight department where treatment and exercises were given in accordance with the surgeon's recommendations. Hot baths were also provided for the children and an excellent midday meal for 1*d*. per child. Time for all these 'extras' must be found during the ordinary school hours; and this, coupled with the fact that every child requires individual handling to help him to overcome the mental and physical difficulties which are the direct or indirect result of his handicap, involves a positive miracle of organisation if everything is to be fitted in and every child is to have his most pressing needs fulfilled.

These schools inevitably vary in detail in different localities; but there can be no doubt as to the great value of their contribution to the mental and physical development of the crippled child. Less obvious, but even more important, is the excellent effect on his character of mixing with other children, some of whom are more severely crippled than himself and whom he can help in various ways, and the sense of responsibility and of *esprit de corps* engendered by life in a community to which he is made to feel that he has something to contribute.

There are, however, a large number of children whose disabilities keep them in hospital during a part of what would normally be their school life. Sometimes these months or years are lost so far as education is concerned; but those children who are fortunate enough to be sent to an up-to-date orthopædic hospital with a hospital school attached to it, or to one of the residential special schools under the local education authorities, are able to make at least some progress, if not to keep up with their more active fellows in the special school outside.

These hospital schools and residential special schools are increasing in number all over the country, but large areas still remain uncatered for. Like the ordinary non-residential special schools, they vary in detail. In the case of the orthopædic hospital schools the teaching staff is generally under the supervision of the Board of Education. Both in hospital schools and in residential special schools there must obviously be the closest and most sympathetic co-operation between the teaching and

x x 2

nursing staffs. Hours of instruction must be fitted in to suit the exigencies of treatment, and the success of the school depends very largely on the spirit in which these adjustments are carried out. The general rule is whole-hearted recognition of each other's claims on the part of both departments, and the children benefit both physically and mentally in consequence.

The hospital school teacher's difficulties, however, do not end with the adjustment of her time-table. Not the least of her problems is how to teach in a ward where nearly all the children are in bed, where their ages, and still more their stages, vary, and where many of them are on their backs on frames and are unable to change their position. There are generally some who are up, but they do not simplify the problem. Notwithstanding all the difficulties, however, some excellent work is done, and the children are at least kept occupied and happy and encouraged to think, and to do as much as they can.

So far, so good; but the real problem of the cripple begins at the age of sixteen when he leaves the special school. If his treatment is then unfinished he remains under the supervision of the out-patient department of a hospital, and there can be no question of any career for him until the hospital has finally discharged him. If, however, as usually happens, he has no further treatment to undergo, he finds himself confronted with the prospect of looking for work in competition with normal boys from the ordinary elementary schools who have started work at fourteen, and have two years' experience behind them and no handicap. He is prevented, in most cases, by his disability and the resultant lack of physical stamina from undertaking the type of unskilled manual work which is the resource of the untrained; his age prevents him from starting as a learner in many of the trades of which he would be physically capable, on account of the Trade Board regulations which decree that wages in certain trades must be scaled according to age, and he has no apparent means of acquiring sufficient training to enable him to take up a skilled trade or any type of office work. The cripple can and should be independent; and yet, confronted by a situation such as this, what chance has he of becoming so? If he is not too severely crippled, he can attend ordinary continuation classes or a Board of Education trade or commercial school; and, indeed, where suitable arrangements of this kind can be made for him, it is the best possible solution for the slightly disabled, since it brings him into contact and competition with normal youth and teaches him to meet normal conditions in after life and to regard himself as on a par with normal people. Where these facilities exist it is often possible for a far-seeing headmaster or headmistress of a special school to put these boys and girls in touch

with the proper authorities when they leave and encourage them to take some special training.

Too often, however, the facilities are lacking or are too inaccessible, and the cripple drifts home and sinks into vagabondage or dependence.

There remains, also, a large number of cripples who are too badly handicapped to train with normal boys and girls, and who, because they would necessarily be slower in reaching a degree of proficiency, would tend to be confirmed in their natural sense of inferiority by constant comparison with the normal.

The efforts of a few devoted pioneers are proving that many of these young people, if they are trained along suitable lines, and with proper consideration for their difficulties, can obtain normal employment and become self-respecting and self-supporting citizens. There is a very small number of cripples' colleges in England which are at present working in this direction, the majority of which are residential and directly connected with large orthopædic hospitals. This department of the work is admittedly in the experimental stage, and the problem of providing the most suitable training for each type of cripple under the best conditions remains for the future to solve. There can be no doubt that it must ultimately be considered and dealt with as a whole, and that it will take many years and much experience to solve it in any comprehensive sense. Some such scheme as that described below must ultimately be evolved and adapted to meet every need as it arises.

Excluding mentally defective cripples, who cannot be included under a scheme of the type described, the cripples to be dealt with will fall unto three main categories :

(*a*) Consisting of cripples who will be fit for employment under normal industrial conditions when their period of training is completed.

(*b*) Consisting of those who will never be fit for employment under normal industrial conditions, but who are fit for work under conditions where their disability is allowed for, and for whom some type of sheltered employment is therefore necessary.

(*c*) Consisting of those who are bedridden, or otherwise confined to their homes, but who can be given an interest in life and the possibility of at least a share in their own support by instruction in practical handicrafts and some assistance in the disposal of their products.

Any training scheme which professes to deal comprehensively with the problem must provide for these three classes of cripple. It must therefore include :

(1) Opportunities of training for the class (a) cripple which will give him a good chance of earning a livelihood on his discharge at the end of a reasonable period.

(2) One or more industries which may provide the class (b) cripple with the means of earning a livelihood under suitable conditions, which could not be duplicated in normal industry.

(3) One or more travelling teachers of practical handicrafts to give instruction to class (c) cripples in their own homes.

(4) An effective sales organisation to deal with the marketing of all products of any branch of the scheme.

(5) Some type of practical organisation for finding employment for class (a) cripples at the end of their period of training.

These five basic requirements will be found to apply in principle wherever the problem arises; they must inevitably be adapted in detail to the following local conditions:

(1) *Employment.*—This bears chiefly on the training of class (a) cripples. It is obviously ridiculous to train a man in a trade which offers no employment in his own district. In schemes applying to industrial areas, therefore, a close study should be made of the state of employment in the local industries before deciding on the type of training given, and the workshops themselves should be capable of adaptation to the requirements of some other type of training if any drastic change in the employment market should render this necessary. In schemes applying to country districts, where the principal openings for employment are for people capable of becoming agricultural labourers, it might be found more suitable to train the class (a) cripples in trades in which they might set up on their own in the villages. It would be nothing short of disastrous to train any country-bred boy or girl in such a way that he or she is driven into the already overcrowded urban labour market to seek employment.

Local employment conditions will also affect the methods of working of the employment organisation in connexion with the training scheme. In industrial areas this organisation should work in the closest co-operation with the existing juvenile employment bureaux, which are set up by the education authority in large towns to advise and help boys and girls from fourteen to eighteen years of age who are seeking employment. These bureaux receive information of all the openings suitable for young people; and their officers are generally most sympathetic with any attempt to help those who are physically handicapped, and very willing to do their best for any special cases which are drawn to their attention. Co-operation with the Ministry of Labour employment exchanges, which deal with cases over eighteen years of age, can also be profitably sought; indeed, in a scheme of the type under discussion, the great majority of discharged trainees

would fall under their jurisdiction in seeking for employment. A sympathetic relationship with large employers in the locality should also be cultivated, and every source of possible employment watched and, if necessary, canvassed. In sparsely populated areas, where the help of juvenile employment bureaux and employment exchanges must be dispensed with, the employment organisation must rely entirely on methods of this kind, and on building up a connexion and reputation of its own.

(2) *Markets.*—These affect the whole scheme to some extent, although only the industries conducted by the class (*b*) cripples, and the handicrafts taught to those in class (*c*) should be really dependent upon them. The market for goods is very often of quite a different type from the labour market, and the class (*a*) training must depend upon the latter. The class (*b*) industries will therefore, as a rule, be of a different kind from the trades taught to the class (*a*) cripples. Training colleges and industries which are organised in connexion with orthopædic hospitals and hospital schools have no difficulty in selecting suitable industries or in finding markets for them ; surgical appliance making, surgical and ordinary boot making and repairing, and tailoring can all be carried on in connexion with the hospital, and in time may be developed to a degree of efficiency where all hospital requirements along these three lines can be supplied by the college and workshops. The problem of the unattached industry, whether in the country or in an industrial area, is very much more difficult, and a close study of available markets and their possibilities is essential before the nature of the industry is determined. This applies equally to the development of home industries for the more severely handicapped. It is essential that all branches of the scheme should produce only work for which there is a genuine demand and which can be put on sale at reasonable prices ; there is nothing more fatal than to depend on bazaars, exhibitions, and an artificially worked-up market for the support of an undertaking of this type. The majority of the very small number of training colleges for cripples at present existing in this country are attached to orthopædic hospitals, which provide the principal markets for the products of the workshops. The industries described above as serving the needs of this type of community—*i.e.*, surgical appliance making, surgical and ordinary boot making and repairing, and tailoring—are taught to cripples of the (*a*) class as trades in which they may find employment on leaving, generally with the addition of carpentry and sometimes upholstery, two more trades for which the community itself can supply orders but which are not always entirely satisfactory as openings for normal employment. These colleges in general cater only for the class (*a*) cripple, although the occasional boy or girl who cannot be trained

to the necessary pitch on account of his or her handicap is absorbed wherever possible. On the whole, however, there is very little organised provision for the class (*b*) cripples, and almost none for the class (*c*), unless they are willing to go into an institution. None of the existing organisations would appear to have really come to grips with the problem of employment. This is perhaps because, being so few in number for the whole of England, they are compelled to take their trainees from all over the country, and it is almost impossible to keep in touch with the labour market in so many different localities.

The need is, therefore, for a number of training schemes combining the five points emphasised above and making the maximum possible use of existing facilities, each serving an area large enough to offer a wide field for marketing and employment, but sufficiently self-contained to enable a close touch to be kept with conditions over the whole field. This should not involve the provision of a large number of new colleges. What is needed, and what is in process of development, is an increase in the scope of existing colleges, and a much greater degree of co-ordination and of co-operation with normal institutions for training to ensure adequate provision for adolescent and adult cripples in all areas.

It would seem that only some central authority, such as the State, can ultimately make such a far-reaching scheme possible or effective. In the meantime, much valuable experimental work is being carried out by private enterprise; and it may well be that, in years to come, the State, as so often before, will use its resources to perfect and complete the task, which would never have been attempted but for the pioneering spirit of a few individuals.

It is a social injustice that any physical handicap should be allowed to deprive a human being of his chance to make a place for himself among his fellow-men: it is in order to minimise the likelihood of such injustice that such schemes as these should be promoted to the utmost.

CHRISTINA CHAPIN.

BLIND-SPOTS IN ENGLISH CIVILISATION

I. Railway Stations and Poster Advertising

I

It is strange that the English (the word is used in preference to its disagreeable alternative 'British,' and not in order to exculpate Scots or Welshmen from what is yet to come), who lay so much stress on 'good manners' in personal relationships and contrive such a degree of comfort in their homes, should ignore the importance of manners as an element in national deportment, and endure the inconveniences and indignities to which, by their public and public-utility servants, they are considerably subjected. The Englishman's urge to dress for dinner, the Englishwoman's passion for gentility, are presumably expressions of a desire to preserve self-respect and to make a good impression on strangers. Similarly, the unrivalled amenities of English home life are a genuine expression of national genius. Yet why, with this laudable ambition to present themselves in the most favourable light and to surround themselves with complete but unostentatious comfort, are these same people apparently indifferent to those outward appearances of their country which most quickly and forcibly strike visitors from other lands? Why are they apparently prepared to tolerate lack of consideration and of imagination in persons responsible for their public services?

Possibly the first of these paradoxes dates back to the old days when foreigners were blandly assumed to be inferior folk, whose opinion of England was of no importance. If so, the more quickly we realise those days are over the better for everyone. Criticism of England in other countries is plentiful, potentially damaging, and in many respects unanswerable. Is it hopeless to suggest that we remove at least those grounds for it which can be removed easily, and not only easily, but even profitably?

The examples of bad taste, stupidity, lack of imagination and want of practical sense with which this plea can be supported are necessarily miscellaneous, and may at first sight seem trivial. But points of good manners are equally miscellaneous and in themselves often trivial enough; yet all have this in common,

that an individual who practises them creates immediately a good impression and strikes a stranger as a being at once thoughtful and intelligent, while an individual who does not, invites condemnation as ill-bred or unimaginative. Is it a trivial thing that such a judgment as this should be passed on a person or on a nation? Are we sufficiently aware that the cultivated visitor from France or Germany considers the outward aspects of English life as uncivilised and tedious? Are we in a position to consider his arguments and dispose of them? Or are we, alternatively, still complacent enough to put the onus of barbarism on to our critics, and decide that, if foreigners prefer their own countries to ours, they can stay in them? One envies such confirmed self-satisfaction, but reconciles it with difficulty to what is nattily described as the 'Come to Britain' movement.

Let us select in illustration of our thesis certain diverse phenomena of national life. Let us consider English, as opposed to Continental, practice in regard to railways and railway stations; advertisements and street manners generally; and postage stamps. Each one of these is sadly to the point, and, although not by any means the only illustrations pertinent to our present text, have the advantage of general familiarity.

II

The question of the architectural shortcomings of the English railway station has lately been ventilated by Mr. Frank Pick, of the Underground executive; and it is possible that, if so distinguished a propagandist of public good taste seriously intends to preach better railway stations, as he has preached *and achieved* better poster art and better lettering, something may come to pass. But Mr. Pick is too well aware of the immense impermeability of corporate intelligence in this country, too conscious of the imaginative sloth of ordinary individuals, to resent a humble word in his support; and there are aspects of the barbarity of English railway stations, in addition to the purely architectural, which merit all the reform and attention they can get.

Of course the most obvious (and therefore the most important) element of all is this very element of architecture. The architecture of the railway station should not only be suitable to its purpose, but worthy of the most vital public building of any town. Here is the gate through which travellers arrive, from which they issue forth; here is the place more utterly devoted to the service of the entire community than any town-hall or theatre or refreshment-house. It is impossible too lovingly to devise a railway station, because it is impossible to over-estimate its importance

in our urban scheme. And this is not quite all. The essence of good taste in architecture is what Mr. A. S. G. Butler, in his valuable monograph *The Substance of Architecture*, has called 'functional significance.' In other words, the right sort of building for a railway station is one which can only be a railway station; not one which is an adaptation of some extraneous grandiloquence to railway purposes.

Now, several of the London railway stations have elements of genuine station design; but in no one of them are these elements sufficiently powerful to dominate the whole. The train-shed at St. Pancras is an impressive and finely proportioned thing; but the ex-governmental hydro to which it is attached effectually baulks its claim to functional significance. Paddington has qualities of friendliness and harmonious design which, if the proportions of the station as a whole had not outgrown original intention, must have made of the terminus something individual and charming. But, as things now are, the central area of the old station has become like the ancient market-place of a town now industrialised—attractive, but no longer dominant. Euston has potentially one of the finest station entrances in Europe; but the place is so cluttered up externally with mean houses, and so subdivided internally into insignificant train-sheds, that the initial impression is first blunted and then dissipated altogether. As for King's Cross, it is not awake to the beauty of its own stark simplicity, or to the possibilities of its situation. Indeed, it contrives very successfully to evade notice by a dinginess and squalor which, for the sake of the efficiency of the railway staff, one can only hope to be intentional. It is a safe guess that, had the directors of the Great Northern, in the gay decorative days of long ago, been inclined to spend money on the embellishment of their main terminus, they would have produced a vulgarity almost classical. Perhaps, therefore, London is fortunate in that King's Cross should have survived, sordid and badly cared for though it be. One day the board may take a fancy to point the façade, or colour-wash it bright green or pink; to sweep away the futile hoardings which disfigure the space in front; to reglaze the train-sheds on modern lines, and create a splendid station at comparatively small expense. Of Waterloo more in a moment. Of Liverpool Street, Victoria or Marylebone nothing, either now or later.

It will be objected that any wholesale improvement in the great stations of England would be too costly a luxury for the now impoverished companies. Agreed—and no one but a visionary would seriously expect any such thing. But the fact remains that opportunities *will* occur (is it impossible that Charing Cross will supply one before very long?); that stations are so

enormously important to the self-respect of a great city and to its influence on visitors that such opportunities must be officially watched and officially used; and that a public subsidy to any really intelligent plan would be a subsidy wisely and profitably made. Unluckily, it has been proved useless to leave matters to the taste or good sense of the companies themselves. Only the Underground group from among all the railway companies of Great Britain have shown any sense of their responsibilities in this matter; and whereas they have created a system of stations and publicity without rival in Europe or America for practical convenience, beauty of proportion and artistic enterprise, their fellows have acted with reactionary ostentation, often combined with an indifference to the public good which is a poor return for their Victorian years of plenty. The tragedy of Waterloo is a bitter illustration of the capacities of a great company. A superb site has been sacrificed to a characterless jumble of degenerate classicism and bad statuary, which does not emphasise the upstanding line of the hill crest nor the sweep of the façade; which misses chances all along York Road; which wastes acres of valuable land in train-sheds and rails. The right place for these was, from the civic and (one would have thought) from the material point of view also, the now derelict expanse of Clapham Junction. Thence tubes could have carried the suburban traffic to the centre of the city, leaving only the long-distance trains to run through to a smaller, loftier Waterloo of glass and girders and towering concrete uprights, which would have served as diadem to the south bank of the Thames and, incidentally, have left the company with a lot of valuable land for disposal.

For the future are models and to spare. New York is a long way off, and I doubt whether it really offers the ideal solution. Beautiful though both the Grand Central and Pennsylvania Stations are, they are inclined to over-magnificence. Marble and gilding and such luxuries produce an ostentation greater than the occasion warrants and, indeed, one undesirable in a highly practical building. But Germany is much nearer at hand; and in Germany are to be found station designs of a deftness and sanity which could hardly be bettered. Königsberg, Karlsruhe, Darmstadt, and Stuttgart are the four newest and loveliest large stations of Germany. They rely for their loveliness on nothing but proportion and suitability. With arched girders and glass; with posters controlled and placed where they help the whole design and do not shatter it; with, externally, façades of the severest simplicity—these are the aids with which the latest station architects of Germany have triumphantly solved their problem.

Now, there are English architects as capable as any German of designing a modern railway station. But whereas the German

architect has authority behind him, traditional intelligence to support him, and a widespread sense of what is decent in urban behaviour to secure for his work a fair and independent survival, his English colleague has nothing. Nothing at all. His designs must be submitted to the wholly untrained opinion of so-called business-men who 'know what they like,' are out to save every possible penny and have never conceived of a railway station as a piece of public responsibility. Further, even suppose it to have been adopted, an architect's design is liable to be plastered with advertisements, obscured with hideous and miscellaneous lettering, and very inadequately cleaned.

So much for the stations themselves. But from a civic point of view they are not the whole story. Suitability and discretion in station design should extend beyond the actual sheds and booking-halls. And in this respect English practice is more behind the times than ever. Outside the area of the station, thought is hardly ever given to an open approach, to decent surroundings, or to a right relationship between the station and the town to which it belongs. Admittedly a midland manufacturing town (our manufacturing towns being what they are) is an almost hopeless subject for considered treatment. But there are cities which cry aloud for special handling, cities which so obviously merit (and would repay) a little imagination in their station planning, that their neglect is something more than folly. Oxford, for example, and Cambridge offer heaven-sent opportunities to the aspiring station designer; and one can imagine the thought which Germany, in her scrupulous wisdom, would bestow on corresponding towns. But for all we care, Oxford and Cambridge might be Swindon and Wigan. The gateways to two of the most interesting towns in England are at present mean, placard-littered places, approached through dreary streets, utterly without any suggestion of the ancient glories to which they lead, careless of the convenience of strangers, unworthy, characterless.[1] Of course, perfection cannot be conjured from imperfection with a wave of a wand; but a lot could be done forthwith. In the first place, every foul hoarding in the immediate neighbourhood could, within a shortish time, be swept away. Plain-grass plots (if flower-beds are too great a strain on the capacity of railway company or corporation) should fill the space before the main entrance and, as it were, usher the visitor to the city. The staff at smaller stations often contrive to make their platforms bright with flowers; why should our directorates be too proud or too apathetic to do similar service to more populous

[1] The D.I.A. *Cautionary Guide to Oxford* (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1930) should be obtained by everyone anxious for ocular proof of the squalor of the station neighbourhood in our oldest university city.

centres? Then, a large, well-designed map of the town (the Underground has shown what can be done in the way of maps at once decorative and useful) should stand immediately opposite the station exit, so that strangers may see their best way at a glance. Authority, apparently, has not troubled to realise that the visitor comes to see Oxford or Cambridge; he is not primarily interested in the programme of the local Theatre Roy. or the latest cereal, or the fact that a petrol station is vividly at hand, or that the cheapest boots or raincoats are available at th shop or that. Not only is he uninterested; he definitely resen having this irrelevant information thrust on his helpless notio And he goes away with a queer reservation in his enthusiasm fo these beautiful and historical cities, asking himself how it ma be that the English, with such a past, should be blandly capab of such a present. He may well ask; no Englishman can giv him a convincing answer.

It is, of course, only too plain that those responsible for Englis railway stations have never regarded themselves as servants of t community. Indeed, at one time railway authorities adopte the lofty tone of public benefactors, and expected their countr men to be grateful for any travelling facilities which were co sidered as likely to make money for their providers. Th time, at any rate, has gone by. The one-time autocrats are no suppliants at the public feet, and they must not be surprised the public take their delayed opportunity of trenchant criticisn For there is still plenty to be said in the way of fault-finding, an on subjects of more general interest than architectural beauty : local suitability.

It may well be, that at present the generality of Englishme and women (never having been taught to look at their towns an public buildings as potentially things of dignity and cleanlines care little enough for such urban good manners and intelligen as have been here discussed. But there is a further aspect station handling which should appeal forcibly and at once to t imagination of a practical and comfort-loving nation. How it that the English are so badly provided with those suppleme tary conveniences to travel which are regarded as the natur right of railway users in Germany? In every large statio there should be a post office, bath and dressing rooms, chemist fruit-stalls, tobacconists, book-stalls, and above all refreshmen rooms, which are not only clean, civil and stocked with desirab things, but actually open when they are wanted. Wherev in England some of these auxiliaries to travel *are* availabl they are crowded into huts along the platform edge and hav no area of the station specially designed for them. Po offices are rare; while there is yet to be discovered, anywhe

but in the great termini, a station restaurant which is even tolerable.

How can it be that such a state of affairs is still contentedly endured? One guesses that the railway authorities owe their freedom from complaint in part to compensations and to circumstances which are not of their contriving. In the first place, the helpfulness and friendly courtesy of the average platform staff (probably in no other country are those qualities more general than in England) incline the English public to overlook their many deprivations. In the second place, they do not in sufficient numbers realise what is done for travellers in other countries in the way of subsidiary conveniences. But if only thousands of English men and women could experience the organisation and facilities at, say, Leipzig, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Cologne, then indeed they might rise in their wrath and jar the home authorities from their sloth. Then no more should refreshment-rooms be open only when it suits those who make money from them; no more should sloppy tea be slammed on a marble bar and either swallowed standing or carried gingerly to a dispiriting and dirty table in a dark corner; no more should Sunday travelling be a sort of neolithic joke, with nothing open anywhere, and even the trains most grudgingly conceded[2]; no more should it be impossible to buy a stamp save by going out into the street. No more, in short, should important English stations be the barbarous, dirty and depressing places which by and large they are at present, nor the geniality of the porters, guards, and inspectors have a background quite unworthy of its quality.

III

The problem of advertisements, as part of a town's outward clothing, is naturally akin to the problem of the well-mannered railway station, because the station, as a place of great public frequentation, attracts advertisers as strongly as any other urban site.

Now, it is doubtful whether one (and perhaps the governing) element in the ethic of poster or placard advertisement has been properly thought out in England. A poster (be its material paper, wood or metal) is put up in a certain place so that the public (who are you and I) may willy-nilly see it. The more frequently you and I pass by that place, the more valuable it

[2] It will hardly be credited, but on Sunday nights when an important Continental train arrives in Victoria, the underground communication to two at least of the other great termini in London has closed down. If we must be Sabbatarian, let us at least be thorough. It were better to veto the Continental train altogether than to confront foreign visitors, on the very threshold of our capital city, with this prime evidence of English indifference to public comfort.

becomes to the advertiser. In other words, we—the public—create value in advertising sites, and by the very fact of our going to and fro put money into the pockets of the site owners or site renters and enable the advertiser (if, indeed, he believes in advertising) to put money into his own. What consideration do we receive in return for this creation of values? Not only none, but less than none. Goods we do not want, exhortations which do not convince, glowing descriptions we do not believe, are forced on our attention, probably disfiguring what we want to look at, certainly fretting our eyes and minds with their stentorian irrelevance.[3] Is it not the merest logic that what the public creates in value it should claim in tribute? Is it not obvious that poster and placard advertising should be taxed for the public good and taxed destructively? Yes—destructively. No matter if it be taxed out of existence; beauty and peace will be the gainers. While if poster advertisers prefer to pay their tribute rather than to cease their work, then the Exchequer is that much the richer, and so, indirectly, the public also.

This inescapable argument for the heavy taxation of poster advertising is the starting-point for any discussion of the means by which English public places and buildings may be rescued from their present degradation. Hoardings in the streets; field-advertising; the roadside clamour of publicity at the entrance to every country town; the detestable food and drink placards which add a finishing touch to the forlorn discomfort of nearly all our refreshment-rooms and publichouses; advertisements painted on blank walls and scrawled in huge letters across bridges; metal plaques screwed into railway cuttings—all these are not only offensive and destructive of something far finer than themselves, but are purely parasitic on the public, and should be made to pay heavily for the privilege of being so.

There is, of course, a distinction between advertisements of wholly extraneous products displayed on rented sites and advertisements set up on their own premises by a proprietor company. But the distinction is one of assailability, not of beastliness. For example, a jam manufacturer who paints his name and activity in giant (and usually ill-designed) lettering on the walls and roofs of his factory may as effectually destroy the dignity of an urban scene as any miscellaneous hoarding. But if attacked he would immediately (and successfully) invoke that sacred liberty of the individual which, however flyblown it may nowadays be in actual practice, is invaluable as an excuse for selfishness and indiscipline.

[3] A particularly blatant example of wanton bullying of passers-by was, at the moment when these words were written, on view in Coventry Street. A vast placard (proudly described as the biggest advertisement in the world) obliterated an entire street corner with the name of an American film.

man,' he would observe, 'has a right to do what he likes with own.'

But is he, in such case, indeed operating wholly with his vate property? True that, while speculative agencies liberately buy the right to disfigure a street corner or a roadside d resell that right piecemeal to various merchants, a factory ner uses his premises only secondarily for publicity purposes. at, inasmuch as he uses them for publicity at all, he incurs a ity toward the community because he is exploiting the community in the interests of his private trade.

There is, therefore, as much justification for public interence in advertising of this kind as in any other; the difficulty to decide how interference may be made effective. Taxation, hough logically applicable, could be so convincingly resisted to be virtually impossible. The only solution is to secure preme control by the local authority of the style and blatancy all proposed publicity within its jurisdiction.

Which brings us to the chief obstacle to any rapid improveent in English conditions, and the sad handicap under which , in contradistinction to Germany, perpetually suffer. Local thorities in Germany form a sort of lesser civil service. The ficials are trained for their job; are taught to consider the meanour of their town as in itself a thing to be cared for and tivated. Successful members of the service are promoted m one place to another, and are only exposed to the urgings self-interest in local administration to the extent that any cial is liable to be subjected to outside pressure. But in gland the elected local authority is often enough representative the very commercial interests whose ill-bred self-emphasis so lly needs control. The few trained officials in English local ernment—the city engineers, sanitary inspectors and the like— e not only far too busy with their specialised jobs to supervise e outward amenities of their towns, but have not the power to erride the council or to impose on it a general scheme of urban ness. Similarly the town clerks and the education directors ho already do much indirect but first-rate civic service by straining unwise display and diverting councillors along discreet d dignified ways) must rely on tact and persuasion, having, en these fail, no overriding authority. In consequence the glish town, in comparison with its German counterpart, has a hazard, un-coordinated and slatternly appearance; and the erent mental untidiness of its central organisation is in nothing re clearly shown than in the hotchpotch of discordant and rish advertisements with which it is spattered.

Let us, however, end on a note of optimism. In fairness to e local authorities of to-day and in glad recognition of the very

marked progress made in urban good manners during recent years, it must be said that, in so far as civic control of external amenities is concerned, our prospects are brighter than they have ever been. In numbers of places real attempts are being made to check indiscriminate and tasteless advertising; to improve the lettering on public notices and shopfronts; to secure new buildings in harmony with their neighbours; and generally to educate readers and public alike to practise and to value the deportment of their town as they value deportment in their families and friends.

Wherefore it is the duty of those outsiders who care for these things to hold up the hands of whichsoever individuals in authority are already fighting for better municipal manners. We can all help in our small way by showing an interest in matters of civic dignity; by applauding good moves on the part of the local authority; by trying to convince the still unconvinced that, because personal good manners are in the long run better business than bad ones, so also a town of well-bred appearance has an advantage over one which is careless of its demeanour, loud voiced in publicity, or selfishly chaotic in development. Further, by supporting such organisations as the Scapa Society and the Design and Industries Association, we can strengthen their growing effectiveness. In default of power to forbid or to censor, these societies, by judicious photography, by public lectures and by the wise use of an unofficial word in season, are contriving to put before a hitherto indifferent public the vulgarity of an advertisement-ridden town, the quiet dignity of one more fortunate. They are also performing the even more urgent service of educating suppliers of materials for public services to improve their designs and raise their standards of workmanship. The bettering of civic printing grows more evident every year. It is to be hoped that makers of metal-plate notices and advertisements will before long begin to substitute real lettering for the late Victorian horrors which are still their principal stock-in-trade.

MICHAEL SADLEIR.

(To be continued.)

THE ANCIENT ART OF THE APHORISM

HAVING reached that period of life which is not undeservedly termed anecdotage, I shall make bold to begin with a story. I am not sure of the precise year; it was either at the end of the effete 'eighties or at the opening of those decadent 'nineties in which a minor poet remarked that he had painfully conjugated the verb *Agnosco* in every mood and tense. I was walking alone along a country road when I beheld a strange mechanical contrivance coming towards me surmounted by the familiar figure of a schoolboy or undergraduate who has since served as a President of the Classical Association. Bicycles I had seen before, but never one like this; and inevitably I murmured—to myself, let me add, so that nobody can confute my tale—'Safety first!' It was thus that I unwittingly gave birth to the now too familiar formula which, at first proclaimed at street corners as a paradox to arrest attention, sank in process of time into a truism, and now through the inattention of mankind is become a paradox again.[1]

Everybody has heard of 'copy-book maxims,' but I wonder whether many people nowadays have really seen a child's copy-book with a maxim at the top of the page in a copper-plate hand. Even in my own childhood that sort of copy-book was going out of fashion. I cannot remember that I ever wrote in one myself, though I remember seeing such books, with 'Cleanliness is next to Godliness' at the top of the page, and the childish script getting further from both cleanliness and godliness all the way down.

There! I have made two attempts to begin this paper, and what I am aiming at is not yet clear to the reader, nor perhaps to myself. And at this juncture there comes into my mind—a little late, as you perceive—the wise maxim of the illustrious

[1] When, a few years later, I followed my old pupil's example in the process of acquiring the art I was several times reminded involuntarily of the Virgilian tag—*Antiquam exquirite matrem*. My skill was sadly behind that of another old pupil of mine, who mounted a 'safety' bicycle for the first time from his own doorstep and, being unable either to dismount or to turn except at a very gentle angle, rode for six miles by devious byroads till at last he found himself at his starting-point again, and fell off gracefully upon his doorstep, to the mingled concern and relief of an anxious and non-metaphorical *antiqua mater*.

Jowett, 'Never have a porch to your essay.' So I begin again, and this time without a porch.

I want to inquire what is the virtue of aphorisms, how they differ from truisms and from paradoxes and from slogans, and whether the art of the aphorism flourishes as much in modern times as it did in ancient, and if not, why not. Other questions may suggest themselves as we proceed, but here you have my main objective. And in following it up I propose, for my own pleasure and the reader's, to recall some of the most famous aphorisms of antiquity.

Let me attempt a rough definition of the aphorism at starting, and say that I mean by it a sentence of concentrated wisdom. It depends for its success equally upon its matter and its form, or rather, as in all perfection of style, form and matter are indivisible, indistinguishable. This perfection of style is one thing that differentiates it from the truism. I am disposed to think that one thing which marks the truism is the absence of any salt of style to save it from decay. It wearies us because there is nothing in it save its truth in which we can take an interest, and most of us have but a languid interest in truth. What says Bacon? 'This same truth is a naked and open daylight that doth not show the masks and mummeries of the world half so stately and daintily as candle-light. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure.' It is the mixture of a lie, surely, that makes the attraction of paradox. I exempt from this condemnation, of course, those sayings which are the paradoxes of one age only to become the truisms of the next. Any great writer who discovers a truth utters a paradox in the sense of something which is in conflict with current opinion. It was the special characteristic of Jowett, the dominant personality of my own undergraduate days at Oxford, that in conversation and lectures and sermons he was continually dropping quiet remarks so much as a mere matter of course that you had to turn them over twice in your mind to determine whether they were paradoxes posing as truisms or truisms masquerading as paradoxes. It was this which made them often so stimulating. But I still remember the disconcerting effect with which he would sometimes launch a quite unmistakable truism in those clear bell-like tones which seemed to demand that every word they uttered should be at least as precious as silver. 'It's a good thing to keep accounts' is one such utterance that comes back to me *verbatim* from a sermon in St. Mary's across a gulf of half a century. Even in the Plato introductions, a treasury of wisdom for which I can never be too grateful, there are sayings that have something of the ambiguity which the Delphic Oracle is credited with having deliberately sought. In the introduction to the *Sophist* there is a long passage

on Hegel which, as I have been told, Jowett submitted, in proof or in manuscript, to the criticism of T. H. Green. The story goes that the philosopher was reduced to despair by the vagueness of propositions which he could neither confirm nor dispute.

Few ancient authors are richer in aphorisms than Herodotus. This is the more remarkable because of the simplicity of his style. There is evidently something a little deceptive about his air of *naïveté*.

> Egyptian priests could gammon you—
> It was not very hard to do.

Do not let us be too sure of this. Think of the concentrated wisdom of *πάλαι τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι ἐξεύρηται* (I. viii. 5). A simple truth perhaps, but a truth that each generation in turn is in danger of forgetting. Is it not just here that the main difference lies between the aphorism and the truism ? I remember how on my first night in Rome a long-haired young man from Chelsea turned up in the hotel, and plunged into our midst with the question, ' Is there an exhibition of modern art here ? ' There was silence deep as death, and the boldest held his breath for a time. Then an American young lady, with more wisdom than all men would expect of her age and sex and country, answered him : ' Young man, you are beginning at the wrong end.' Those who saw the Italian exhibition at Burlington House this spring will agree that Herodotus and the American young lady were right. *Πάλαι τὰ καλὰ ἐξεύρηται.*

Simplicity and sincerity are two qualities that will go a long way towards the production of an aphorism. I knew a child of two and a half whom a goodly collection of toys could not save from *ennui* on a persistently wet day. Leaving the nursery, he descended to the drawing-room and flung himself into an armchair with a deep sigh and the ejaculation, ' Oh ! what's worth it ? ' Not a bad aphorism, that, born of a poignantly realised experience. My own longer experience of life leads me, it is true, to an entirely opposite conclusion. *Everything* is worth it, I am inclined to say, though I do not put this forward as an aphorism. But indeed the interest of life, of art and of books, of Nature and of humanity, is so inexhaustible that only Tithonus or Methuselah had any right to be bored. On second thoughts, I question whether even they had the right ; for neither of them was afflicted with public entertainments, the one legitimate excuse for boredom that I have encountered. Their libraries, however, must have been severely limited : proverbs they had doubtless, but hardly the consolations of the literary aphorism.

Let me return to Herodotus, though only to recall briefly one of his characteristic stories. It is the account of the Samian exiles who came to Sparta to appeal for help (III. 46). In their

intense anxiety they spoke at such length that the Spartans told them they had forgotten the first half of their speech and therefore could not understand the second. The deputation retired, but came again, carrying an empty sack, and merely said, 'Our sack wants corn.' But the Spartans answered them, τῷ θυλάκῳ περιεργάσθαι—that is, 'You might have saved yourselves the trouble of bringing a sack, for we were quite intelligent enough to understand so simple a metaphor without it'—but the Greek says all this in three words.

There is an equally striking example of this merit of condensation in Thucydides. But first—at the risk of boring the reader, or perhaps I should more truthfully say, with the purpose of boring him—let me present some lines by Walt Whitman. I will admit that they do not represent Whitman at his best: he can attain on occasion that concentrated force which is the glory of poetry, just as he can also attain the moving cadences which are of the essence of poetry. But there are times when he attains neither, and his admirers apparently do not miss them; for I have extracted this poem from a poetical anthology.

> Nothing endures but personal qualities.
> What do you think endures ?
> Do you think a great city endures ?
> Or a teeming manufacturing state ? or a prepared constitution ? or the best-built steamship ?
> Or hotels of granite and iron ? or any chefs-d'œuvre of engineering, forts, armaments ?
>
> Away ! these are not to be cherish'd for themselves,
> They fill their hour, the dancers dance, the musicians play for them,
> The show passes, all does well enough of course,
> All does very well till one flash of defiance.
> A great city is that which has the greatest men and women,
> If it be a few ragged huts it is still the greatest city in the whole world.

There you have Whitman; and now turn to Thucydides (VII. 77), the last sentence of Nicias's speech in the day of disaster at Syracuse:—ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί. ('Men make the city, not walls nor ships that are void of men.')

I suppose that for concentrated wisdom, the hard-won product of a dispassionate analytic mind brooding upon terrible experience, the two great chapters (82, 83) of the Third Book of Thucydides might challenge the literature of the world. To how many of us did their truth come home in the years of the Great War!—ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ. ('War, taking away the comfortable provision of daily life, is a stern schoolmaster and assimilates the characters of most men to their circumstances.')

I must pass over that whole class of Greek poets whose name of 'Gnomic' implies that they specialised in the art of the aphorism. But I do this the less reluctantly because the deliberately didactic and aphoristic poet inevitably tends to platitude, and the platitude is the deadly enemy of that vital force in language for which we are seeking. I prefer to turn to the three great tragedians, each of whom abounds in pregnant utterances. The *Agamemnon* is as full as *Hamlet* of phrases that stamp themselves upon the memory and apply themselves anew at every turn. Of the delicate and wonderful art of Sophocles I cannot bring myself to speak, because the exactly right words have been spoken already by Mr. Mackail: 'Ornament in it is reduced to the lowest dimensions; for the lines and planes of the composition are the ornament. . . . Language produces its effects by reserve' (*Lectures on Greek Poetry*, p. 149). And again: 'One hardly notices the words; they have become translucent; it seems as if the poet who could do these things with these words could do anything with any words' (p. 150).

The first play of Sophocles that I read as a sixth-form boy was the *Ajax;* and, though apt to be impatient at that age with the moralisings of Greek choruses and the forensic logomachies of Euripides, I recall the deep impression which some of the aphoristic lines of Sophocles made upon me: the solemn opening of Ajax's speech, for instance:

ἅπανθ' ὁ μακρὸς κἀναρίθμητος χρόνος
φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται.

('All things the long and countless years draw from darkness and bury again from the light');

or the moving words of Tecmessa,

χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ' ἀεί.

which I was delighted to find nobly rendered in a chapter-heading of *Felix Holt:*

Yea, it behoves a man
To cherish memory where he had delight.
For kindness is the natural birth of kindness.
Whose soul records not the great debt of joy
Is stamped for ever an ignoble man;

or the bitter reflection of Ajax:

τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ
βροτῶν ἄπιστός ἐσθ' ἑταιρείας λιμήν.

('For most men the haven of comradeship is unsure.')

Forty years ago I was a guest at a dinner-party at which several distinguished scholars were present. Mention was made of Sir Richard Jebb's translation of Sophocles, and with the

audacity of youth I ventured to criticise the style as unduly artificial. Challenged to make good my criticism, I quoted the rendering of a line in the *Antigone*: ''Tis witless to be overbusy.'[2] All, the ladies included, expressed admiration for the felicitous turn, and I was left in a minority of one, reduced to my proper insignificance. Either the next morning, or the morning after that, when I was recovering a little from my discomfiture, I opened my newspaper and found a leading article into which by a *tour de force* a reference to Jebb as a supreme translator was introduced, and as the convincing proof of his felicity was cited the epigrammatic neatness of ''Tis witless to be overbusy.'! It remains to add that I am unrepentant, and have not yet abandoned hopes of founding an United Empire Party to support my view.

I shall not linger over Euripides, because his aphorisms have never appealed to me as have the sayings of Æschylus and Sophocles. It is true that a striking parallel to two of the most beautiful lines in Keats has been found in the *Iphigeneia in Tauris*. This is the line of Euripides:

θάλασσα κλύζει πάντα τἀνθρώπων κακά

Everybody remembers the lines in Keats:

The moving waters at their priestlike task
Of pure ablution round earth's human shores.

I do not suppose that Keats knew the Greek line; but if he did all that is most beautiful in his version is still his own.

And here I think I must leave Greek literature; though, as you see, I have said nothing of Homer, nor of the lyric poets, nor of the Greek anthology, nor of Hippocrates, the learned physician who deliberately cultivated the aphorism, nor even of Plato. Aristotle I omit less reluctantly, because, though he abounds in sentences that might claim the description of aphorisms, I found most of his utterances unattractive in form and difficult to retain in the memory. As for the orators, I do not fancy that, either in Greek or in Latin or in English, one would go to them for the best aphorisms. Burke is a noble exception ('Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom, and a great empire and little minds go ill together'). Of course, the orators give us plenty of slogans, down to the 'Wait and see' of one Prime Minister or the 'Ninepence for fourpence' of another. And this reminds me of one more of my ancient memories—the return of Lord Beaconsfield from the Berlin Congress and his boast that he had brought back 'Imperium et Libertas.' I remember how loyal

[2] τὸ γὰρ
περισσὰ πράσσειν οὐκ ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα.

Conservatives sought vainly through Cicero for the phrase, till at last somebody lighted upon a sentence that contained both words and wrote to *The Times* to say this was doubtless the sentence of which his lordship had been thinking. But there were not wanting sceptical Liberals who opined that he had asked Lord Salisbury the Latin for 'empire' on the Channel crossing; and as for the other word, they whispered a calumnious rumour that he had pronounced it 'lĭbĕrtas.'

What is the difference between a proverb and an aphorism? Mainly, I take it, that the aphorism is literary, while the proverb is of popular origin. Sometimes, of course, a literary aphorism may become so familiar as to pass into a proverb. An example is 'The paths of glory lead but to the grave,' which, according to the schoolboy, a man called Wolfe died shouting at the capture of Quebec. And here I trust I may be pardoned if I digress for a moment to lament the decay in modern England of the popular proverb. Are there any circles where it is still current? Does any English farmhouse to-day possess a Mrs. Poyser? English country life is surely as much poorer for the disappearance of the old proverbial wisdom as for the disappearance of the old country herbal lore, the simples that were of sovereign efficacy for the healing of old-fashioned homely diseases. In part, no doubt, the decay of the proverb is due to the revolt against Victorian ethics or against all ethics, and also to the lessened authority of the Old Testament. That the Proverbs of Solomon should no longer carry to men the tremendous significance of Divine Law is not wholly matter for regret, for the wisdom of the Proverbs is often of a very mundane and self-regarding character and does nothing to lift its disciple into the loftier regions of the spirit. Still, on the lower human levels, what a marvellous collection of sayings have we there! How often must Solomon's teaching in days past have saved men from acts and words of irremediable folly! And as often success or failure in life is due to some quite trifling difference of behaviour, the little more or the little less of courage or tact or perseverance, how often must homely proverbial wisdom have had incalculable consequences for good. There are few of us who are not the better for reminding ourselves now and then of such humble oracles as 'Never cross the stream before you come to it' or 'Never trouble trouble till trouble troubles you.'

It would seem as if humanity must have its tags to repeat. Expel the proverb with a pitchfork, and it comes back in the slogan. Not an improvement, surely. What shall we say of the slogan, 'If it's so-and-so's, you know it *is* beer!' with its gratuitous insinuation that trade rivals do not provide the genuine article? Or of the reiterated injunction, 'Eat more fruit,' which

we follow so tamely that we are willing to pay fourpence apiece for large but juiceless oranges?

Come we now to the question, which of the two languages, Greek or Latin, is apter for aphorism. On the whole, I pronounce for Latin, mainly for a negative reason, the absence of particles. It is true that Greek particles are wonderfully rich in expressiveness. There was once a Clifton master who specialised in the endeavour to convey their full force; and still the wonder grew that one small head should carry all he knew and expected to be remembered about them. Γε, of course, was 'God wot,' but that translation was not a monopoly of Clifton; it was associated at Winchester with the honoured name of Morshead. But the palm belonged to ἄρα, which meant, as he assured his pupils, 'So it turns out after all.' There came a day when there was a cricket match, and one of T. W. Dunn's form was batting. He thought that he heard the impact of the ball on the wicket behind him, and turning round he exclaimed—no, it was not an English monosyllable, but ἄρα. Self-restraint, concentration, suggestiveness were all in that particle. What a triumph for the grand old fortifying classical curriculum! And yet I recall a phrase of John Addington Symonds—'the twittering reiteration of Greek particles.' He, if any man, had an instinct for style, form, moulded perfection of language; and I am inclined to think that he was right, and that Latin attains more monumental beauty than Greek because the simple dignity of its *sententiæ* is not broken in upon by particles.

Lucretius complained of the *linguæ egestas*, the poverty of Latin speech, with which he had to contend. Yet how magnificent are the aphorisms and the 'jewels five words long' strewn through his great poem. On the very first page are the noble phrases in his Invocation to Venus—'tibi suavis dædala tellus Summittit flores, tibi rident æquora ponti'—words which may have inspired the English nature-poet with the loftiest lines of his *Ode to Duty*:

> Flowers laugh before thee in their beds,
> And fragrance in thy footing treads.

And still in the First Book is that marvellous passage on Superstition which ends with the unforgettable lines,

> Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.

It was only the other day that an Englishman wandered through the streets of Vladivostok, sickened at heart by the misery he saw on the faces of the inhabitants. Why were they so unhappy? he asked himself; and came to the conclusion that the cause did not lie in the daily struggle for existence, the very real shortage

of food, but in 'the incubus of the State religion—the dogma that there is one sovereign, exclusive, precise and immutable panacea for all the ills that have afflicted the human race since man became man.'

Nobody can be more religious [he writes] than your militant atheist, though inevitably that is a truth which is hid from his eyes. Think how passionately religious Lucretius was! And there in that darkening room where we were waiting for the train there ran through my head those lines about human life lying abject before the eyes of those who had eyes to see—lying crushed to earth beneath the heel of Religion. Religion was showing her head high in the heavens and covering the earth with her feet. And then a Saviour arose—a Greek—who broke her power by daring to defy her. . . . As I picked up my bag to carry it down to the station I prayed that these poor people, whose harrowed and harrowing faces I should probably never see again, might find their saviour too.[8]

You will not think, I hope, that I have strayed too far from my subject in citing this example of the power with which the phrases of ancient poetry can come home to one of our own countrymen passing through that strangely moving experience of seeing the agony of a great multitude in a foreign land and being powerless to touch it. It would seem as if the only consolation vouchsafed to him in that hour was the thought of the Roman philosopher moved long ago by that same spectacle of human misery.

I must pass on, and yet I cannot help lingering just one moment more to remind you that to this closely packed passage, a triumph of concentration in poetry, belongs the marvellous phrase 'Flammantia mœnia mundi' which our English Gray, the most classical of all our poets save one, sought to make his own, yet could not quite equal in majestic brevity, 'the flaming bounds of place and time.'

How wonderfully, again, the aphoristic genius of the Romans is shown by this! Ovid is a poor, frivolous, effeminate creature, whose whinings for his well-deserved exile on the Danube draw down upon him at this day the bored contempt of northern schoolboys who flock to the Alps in midwinter to secure more snow than their own septentrional shore can be trusted to provide. Yet this same Ovid can achieve a monument more durable than bronze—five concentrated words of confession—'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor'—five words that contain all that his Jewish contemporary, the great apostle of the Gentiles, was saying in his own immortal sentence—immortal, yet lacking in the supreme concentration of the Latin elegist: 'The good that I would, that I do not; the evil that I would not, that is with me.' And here perhaps I should anticipate the ingenuous

[8] Arnold Toynbee in *Manchester Guardian*, February 20, 1930.

critic, and explain that I am quite aware that the Apostle Paul did not write his sentence in English.

It was mainly the Fourth Eclogue and the Cumæan Sibyl that led to Virgil's mediæval reputation as a magician, but his genius for aphorisms was at least a contributory cause. This it was which made the consultation of the *Sortes Virgilianæ* a hopeful proceeding. Charles I., according to tradition, lighted upon a dire prophecy of doom. But think how many must have drawn new courage from contact with such a line as

> O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem.

And here, as I omitted Homer in his rightful place, let me recall the wonderfully heartening line :

> *τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη · καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης.*[4]

Or, again, to return to Virgil :

> Tu, ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito.[5]

Or, more finely still :

> Aude, hospes, contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
> Finge deo.[6]
> ('Dare, my guest, to despise riches and mould thyself to like dignity of godhead.') [7]

Tennyson's praise of him is rightly remembered as among the finest compliments ever paid by one poet to another. It is less often recalled in our day that Bacon spoke of him as 'the chastest poet and royallest that to the memory of man is known.'

Whether we turn more readily to Virgil or to Horace for counsel is mainly a matter of temperament. The ampler ether, the diviner air, which 'lumine vestit purpureo,' 'invests with a purple light,' the magical leaves of Virgil, and which, we may feel, rendered so specially appropriate the invocation of the English statesman as he brought to a close his impassioned appeal for the abolition of slavery just when the first rays of dawn entered the windows of the House of Commons—that unearthly atmosphere is entirely absent from Horace. But this may be precisely the reason of Horace's greater power over a different type of mind. On the whole, there is no literature in the world which, in proportion to its small total bulk, furnishes a store of aphorisms

[4] *Odyssey*, xx. 18.

[5] *Æneid*, vi. 95.

[6] *Æneid*, viii. 364.

[7] Parenthetically may I pay my tribute of admiration to the aphoristic instinct of the English schoolboy who gave an unexpected ethical turn to Virgil's simple description of the preparations for an *al fresco* meal—'Subiciunt verubus prunas et viscera torrent'—understanding it to mean, 'They prefer plums to truth and burn their insides'!

equal in popularity to those which are drawn from Horace's Odes and Epistles. Time cannot wither them nor custom stale.

Another Latin poet who practised the art of the aphorism with signal success is Lucan. Had he survived only in quotations of single lines, I imagine that his fame would stand far higher than it does. May not this indicate that Matthew Arnold's favourite test of poetry by the great single lines is not as infallible a touchstone as he would have us believe? Lucan's single lines are surely unsurpassable in effectiveness.

> Victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni.
> Stat magni nominis umbra.
> Nil actum credens cum quid superesset agendum.

Perhaps I should call these epigrams rather than aphorisms, since they are shafts aimed at a particular situation. Yet the distinction does not seem very important; for in each line the particular is universalised, so that we apply it continually to fresh men and fresh occasions.

Persius and Juvenal I must omit, though both are rich in examples. Of Latin prose-writers I presume that Seneca would have supplied the largest number of aphorisms to the Middle Ages. He is out of favour in our own day, but his turn may come again. Four writers of Greek under the Roman Empire—Plutarch, Lucian, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius—hold their ground well under all changes of fashion; but we must not linger in their company now. Tacitus cannot be passed over even in the most cursory survey, for no greater master of concentrated phrase ever lived. Was more ever said in few words than is comprised in his epitaph on Galba—'Omnium consensu capax imperi, nisi imperasset'? Indeed, we have not to go beyond the first page of the *History* to come across so pregnant a phrase as 'rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quæ velis et quæ sentias dicere licet'—a formula that acquires a new poignancy when we let our thoughts dwell on the condition of both Russia and Italy to-day. Lord Morley has one sentence about Tacitus which puzzles me. He quotes a saying from an unnamed author that, of all writers, Tacitus has the supreme power of putting the reader himself into the confessional. I have walked through Tacitus's grim gallery of imperial poisoners, assassins and informers, and my withers are still unwrung. I hope this is not because I am too hardened a criminal.

Let us pass for a few minutes to the moderns. Lord Morley affirms that French literature is specially strong in the aphorism, English literature correspondingly weak; and I suppose this to be the general impression. In so far as it is well founded, I will hazard the conjecture that the superiority of the French in the

art is due to their greater faithfulness to classical tradition. It might also be maintained that this aphoristic excellence is merely one exemplification of that lucidity which is the characteristic excellence of French prose. It was a Frenchman, Joubert, who gave memorable expression to the aphorist's ideal: 'If there is a man tormented by the accursed ambition to put a whole book into a page, a whole page into a sentence, and that sentence into one word, I am he.' Joubert did not mean that he was a phrase-maker. 'I polish not my phrase,' he writes, 'but my idea. I linger till the drop of light I need forms and falls from my pen.' There we have the true ideal.

Is it possible to reach this ideal in English? The synthetic languages have an undoubted advantage over the analytic in impressive brevity. That is largely why it is easier to compose a satisfying epitaph or inscription of any kind in Latin than in English. Yet we should frankly admit, I think, that part of the advantage of the ancient tongues is just a little unfair. Nothing could be less attractive or effective as a motto than 'Avoid excess'; but say Μηδὲν ἄγαν instead, and the counsel is at once invested with music and dignity and the glamour of antique association. But English literature is far richer in noble aphorisms than most people imagine. Mr. Logan Pearsall Smith compiled a *Treasury of English Aphorisms* [8] two years ago, and I think that material could be found for more than one equally good collection without using any of the sentences included in his interesting book. His list of authors is as follows: Bacon, Selden, Browne, Hobbes, Ben Jonson, Milton, Donne, the two Fullers, Jeremy Taylor, Shaftesbury, Dryden, Penn, Halifax, Pope, Chesterfield, Swift, Johnson, Gibbon, Hazlitt, Blake, Coleridge, Keats, Shelley, Sir H. Taylor, Emerson, George Eliot, Arnold, Bagehot, Jowett, Stevenson, Samuel Butler, Creighton, Churton Collins, Santayana. I presume that Shakespeare and the English Bible are omitted because they might not have left room for anybody else. But there are other notable omissions: Ascham, Sidney, Steele, Addison, Gray, Goldsmith, Burke, Reynolds, Cowper, Lamb, Carlyle, J. S. Mill, Ruskin, Seeley, Arthur Helps, the authors of *Guesses at Truth*, George Meredith. In proportion to the total bulk of his writings Bacon perhaps yields the largest crop of aphorisms—not in the Essays merely, but also in the *De Augmentis*. But Hazlitt, in my judgment, ranks very high on the list. In spite of his lapses into prejudice, the splendid sanity and wisdom of his outlook on life and men and books are such that Charles Lamb must have been right in that generous tribute which he paid in a time of estrangement: 'I should belie my own conscience if I said less than that I think W. H. to be, in his

[8] London (Constable, 1928).

natural and healthy state, one of the wisest and finest spirits breathing.' Most of us have probably at one time or another given similar praise to R. L. Stevenson. For the courage and cheerfulness with which he fought heavy odds of illness one can never admire him enough. Yet it must be said that his philosophy wears somewhat thin as a man grows older. Rub the gilt off his aphorisms, and you are apt to find that nothing much is left. Let me take just one example—the last sentence of his admired essay on *Walking Tours*: 'And whether it were wise or foolish, to-morrow's travel will carry you, body and mind, into some different parish of the infinite.' Cancel the last three words, which are a felicitous and suggestive touch, and yet of the nature of superfluous trimming, and what remains? 'To-morrow's travel will carry you, body and mind, into some different parish.'

Although not a little prose-writing at the present time, especially descriptive writing, reaches a high level of competence, few would maintain that good aphorisms are at all common. The aphorism is, as a rule, the fruit of slow meditation; and few books of the present day are produced slowly. The journalistic practice of paying by the thousand words is not favourable to the aphorism. How much would Joubert, with his passion for condensation, have earned in a day? The Dean of St. Paul's has the temperament, the ability, and the literary taste that are wanted for the making of aphorisms; but he said good-bye to all that when he joined the staff of the *Evening Standard*. I am not disposed to be despondent about literature; but whilst this is a good age for experiment, it is not a good age for the maintenance of tradition. And I fancy the aphorism thrives best among those who read *multum non multa*, and train themselves on the great classical tradition.

It is time that I drew to a conclusion; and what shall it be? Lord Morley, in that delightful paper on Aphorisms to which I have referred, gently conducted his hearers to a conclusion more consoling to their modesty than stimulating to their ambition. Did any of them cherish the purpose of writing aphorisms? If so, his advice to them would be, Don't. I presume neither to follow nor to dispute so illustrious an example. I content myself with reflecting that it is better to read the aphorisms of the wise than to attempt to compose rival aphorisms of one's own. Πάλαι τὰ καλὰ ἐξεύρηται. It is not easy in this late age of the world to discover new truths; and to trick out old truths in new finery is but a sorry business, though it is less pitiful than the invention of paradoxes whose only claim upon the attention is their bold denial of the truth. But to seek out choice pearls from the literature of the ages is a happy employment of time, and the

wisdom that we garner in this way is not without its uses in life. It tends to serenity and to kindliness, not to cynicism. Perhaps its main drawback is that it does not conduce to fluen either in writing or in conversation. He who has learnt to lo such utterances of concentrated wisdom as we have glanced in our hasty survey will scarcely have at command the sm change which is the current coin of daily converse. It is proba something more than a coincidence that the great Jowett, wh I have mentioned as a notable practitioner of the aphorism, w apt to strike a chilly awe into social gatherings, not by bark shafts of caustic wit, but more often by perfectly amiable, wholly disconcerting, silence. And so, as I fold my manuscr I seem to hear my readers drawing from their oracles the hac neyed but appropriate comment: 'I knew 'twould be a ba conclusion.'[9]

[9] *Comedy of Errors,* II. ii. 110.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

CONTENTS FOR DECEMBER

LONDON: CONSTABLE & COMPANY LIMITED, 10 & 12 ORANGE STREET, LEICESTER SQUARE, W.C. 2.

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

No. DCXLVI—December 1930

THE IMPORTANCE OF STANLEY BALDWIN

The circumstances of the time appear to have placed Stanley Baldwin in a position of greater importance than that of any which has been occupied by an Englishman for many generations. For, if we dismiss from our minds all the petty details of present political and industrial controversy, the fundamental problem, to which an answer of some kind must be found almost immediately, is the question whether a democratic parliamentary constitution can be preserved in this country. It is at length becoming clear, even to those who have made no serious study of the matter, that democracy is a peculiarly unstable form of government, since it inevitably engenders the very bacilli which are ultimately fatal to it. In one country after another parliamentary government has putrefied, languished, and died. Nor is there any reason whatsoever to suppose that the more bracing atmosphere of Great Britain will enable democracy to withstand the auto-toxins which have destroyed it elsewhere, unless there is present a condition to which I shall make reference later.

The two main factors which inevitably destroy democracy are closely associated, and are respectively moral and economic. The overthrow of parliamentary institutions is practically impossible while any considerable proportion of the nation holds Parliament in respect. For, in such circumstances, any attempt to effect a *coup d'état* will be met with armed resistance by men who are determined to preserve an institution which they not only honour for its dignity and glorious traditions, but value as the symbol and guardian of their political liberties. But when those who compose the personnel of Parliament are such that they can rightly be regarded with indifference or even contempt, then no man will risk his fortune or his life in the defence of an institution which is manifestly dying through its own rottenness.

Again, if we regard the matter from the economic point of view, we find that unrestrained democracy based upon universal franchise almost inevitably produces a complete breakdown of credit and industry. Demagogues, for their own ends, teach the electorate that the nation may successfully consume more than it produces, and may continue this process indefinitely, provided that votes are used to maintain the charlatans in office. When the crash comes, when every form of inflation has been recklessly employed to avert the inevitable disaster, and when the most urgent thought of the citizens is not whether one political party or another shall receive their votes, but rather whether they themselves will receive their dinner, then their love of political liberty and their desire of self-government disappear in a night and any man who wishes to do so may enslave them, if only he will restore order from economic chaos and thus enable them to live. Why did the Russians welcome the tyranny of Lenin and the Italians that of Mussolini? Was it not that unbridled democracy under Kerensky in the one case, and hopelessly corrupt political parties in the other, had squandered the national capital in buying votes so recklessly that men at length understood that bread could be bought only at the price of liberty? If a further drunken helot is demanded, let the doubter regard the present position of Australia, where the locusts of the towns have devoured the crops of the primary producers, and now appear to be about to take a final plunge into the flaming trench by compelling the inflation of the currency. Can Australia ever regain her balance so long as the town proletariate dominates the real producers by its votes? and is there any escape from ruin except through unconstitutional action by the latter?

Yet many who now avert their shocked gaze from the wild orgy of political folly in Australia, and have held up their hands in horror at the similar folly whereby Russia was ruined, entirely fail to perceive that exactly the same drama is being played by

the politicians of their own country before their very eyes. They forget that inflation is a plank in the platforms of all three British parties. Inflation by tariff is now the accepted policy of the Conservatives ; the more pernicious form of inflation represented by borrowing for relief works is the latest of the national pestilences which we owe to the inventive genius of Mr. Lloyd George ; while the Socialists have their plan for ruin swift and sure in their advocacy of the policy of taking the printing presses from the control of the Bank and handing them over to the demagogues. In each case the object is the same. Each party wishes to gain the support of the ignorant voter by offering a political nostrum which will cure economic evils without any thought or exertion on the part of the patient, and enable the rake's progress to continue. The Conservative Party has discovered that small subcutaneous injections of cocaine gave relief from pain in sundry outlying portions of the body politic, and now prescribes similar injections over every square inch of its surface. The Lloyd-Georgian Party has observed that alcohol has a stimulating effect, and proposes, therefore, to nourish the patient entirely upon methylated spirit. While the Socialists wish to administer a gallon of prussic acid in order to induce a painless and calm condition.

In each case not the least attempt at diagnosis is made. Symptoms are treated, and we are assured that no one need have measles if he will consent to have the spots carefully whitewashed. Yet everyone knows where the real trouble lies, and knows also that it can be overcome at once if the patient can be persuaded to submit to the painful operation which alone can give permanent relief. Let us examine the origin of the trouble.

We have an unemployment crisis, and we industrialists are forced to turn our workmen out on the streets. Why ? Because we cannot sell our products. Why ? Because the price is too high. Why ? Because the cost of production is too great. Why ? Because political and trade union action has prevented wages from being lowered when prices fall, has cut off the replenishment of capital which might have been used to furnish the equipment required if artificially raised wages must be paid, and has added an immense burden of taxation to the standing charges of our industry. In other words, the unemployment crisis is the direct result of the solidifying of wage-rates. If wages were perfectly liquid, the wage-earner might sometimes fail to get a living wage ; but he would never be unemployed. If wage-rates were solidified at a high enough figure he would never be anything else but unemployed.

Before the period of real political corruption, which began in

1920, the trade unions were able to give wage-rates a degree of solidity which prevented the starvation of the worker. If, as frequently happened, the unions misjudged the situation, a certain amount of unemployment arose. But the depletion of trade union funds by the latter soon indicated where the mistake lay, and adjustments usually followed quickly. Wage-rates were liquid enough to render disaster avoidable. But the system of political corruption (termed with unconscious truth 'Unemployment Insurance,' because it insures that there shall be unemployment) has eliminated all possibility of adjustment. For its sole object is to prevent wage-rates from declining when prices fall. It achieves this object by protecting the wage-rate of the man who is in employment from the competition of the man who is out of employment. But it does this by forcing the former to provide for the sustenance of the latter. That is to say, only part of the product of the worker is available for sale, while a part is handed over to the non-worker. This, with a fixed wage-rate, naturally increases the cost of the portion available for sale, restricts its market, and forces more men out of employment.

In a country fully organised by trade unions, a really complete system of unemployment insurance, particularly if introduced at a period of inflation, must in the very nature of things ultimately and inevitably produce universal unemployment. In Great Britain at the present time we have reached the point at which an arithmetical progression in the unemployment returns is on the verge of becoming a geometric progression. We are nearing the complete breakdown of industry and the collapse of our credit system. Various methods of currency inflation may for a short time be useful for staving off the inevitable. But their utility depends entirely upon their effect in reducing real wages while leaving money-wages intact, and the recent history of Australian industry proves that political trade unionism will quickly sit upon that particular safety-valve and prevent it from giving relief.

Industry is powerless to save itself, and at length people are beginning to realise that the grip of politics upon it must be relaxed if economic chaos is to be avoided. But this is a matter of almost insuperable difficulty under a democratic constitution. The non-workers have votes and are gradually reaching a position where they will possess an actual majority over the workers. It is easy enough to start a great nation on the road to ruin with 'ninepence for fourpence,' but it is fearfully difficult to turn it back as it rushes to dissolution. Other nations, following similar policies, have saved themselves at the very brink of destruction by violently overthrowing democracy and depriving the people of political liberty. It may be that we shall also find revolution

the only possible remedy, and that, in spite of our long experience of parliamentary government, even we will be unable to make democracy other than fatal. If revolution is unavoidable, I am but one among many who are prepared to make it. In my humble capacity I have done my best to secure the lives and liberties of the workers, and, if democracy makes it impossible to preserve both, I hold the opinion that we must devote our efforts to preserving the former, even if it happens to involve the loss of our own.

Having now traced (I trust with perfect demonstration of the sequence of cause and effect) the connexion between Mr. Lloyd George offering ninepence for fourpence (or fivepence per vote—which is the same thing) and myself (or those who disagree with me, for the gods are capricious) hanged on a lamp-post, I would remind the reader that there is one condition under which the breakdown of democracy is no longer inevitable. The two main factors which induce an anti-democratic revolution are, as has been stated above, the loss of respect for Parliament owing to the contempt earned by politicians and the economic chaos produced by the earning of that contempt. If politicians are not contemptible they will not produce economic chaos, and, moreover, the people will ward off the attacks of revolutionaries on a Parliament which commands respect. The survival of democratic institutions depends, therefore, upon the character of politicians, as Plato pointed out some time ago.

Now, it is a remarkable fact that in Great Britain at the present time there is only one politician whose name is familiar to the general public and who is generally believed to place the public interest, as he understands it, before all other considerations. There are others equally worthy of confidence whose names are known to this or that section of the people. There are others who probably have more statesmanlike qualities and, it may be, a more correct appreciation of what is to the real advantage of the nation, combined with a no less genuine desire to pursue such a policy regardless of their own interest. Most of us could mention a few names of such persons. But they are not generally known, or likely soon to be known, to the public. Some of them will probably rise to high office in the future, and may even become great and loved leaders of the people. But this at least is certain, that the nation at the moment knows but one politician *omnium consensu capax imperii*, and is content to leave the future historian to add or to omit the rest of the quotation as he may think fit.

Let the reader understand that I express no opinion as to whether the public instinct in this matter is a true one or not. Indeed, that question does not really enter into the matter, and,

if it did, might be debated *ad nauseam* without final agreemen The importance of Stanley Baldwin at this juncture arises fro the fact that it was unnecessary for me to mention his nan when writing the last paragraph. If he were in reality t greatest charlatan that has ever deceived a nation with emp promises, the fact remains that the people as a whole have co fidence in him and in no one else. His position is singularly li that of Lord Kitchener in the early days of the war. The read will remember the feeling of genuine relief which came over when we learnt that Kitchener was to be placed in charge of ou military forces. His policy has since been the subject of drast criticism, which, in many respects, was perhaps justified. But th fact remains that his presence gave us confidence which woul otherwise have been lacking. In the same way, Stanley Baldwi has the confidence of the nation in the present crisis, and certainl no one else has it.

In August 1914 it was obvious that hundreds of thousand of us would be obliged to undergo hardships such as we had nev before imagined and that a stupendous national self-sacrifice wa demanded. We were willing to fulfil that demand, but we wante a man to give the order, and we got one. In December 1930 th nation is faced with what is perhaps an even more urgent deman for self-sacrifice. Whether we are equally willing to fulfil th new demand is doubtful. At the least, it is certain that we sha not do so unless we have a man to give the order, and for m part I know of only one who can do so with any hope of a effective response. It is doubtful whether even he can induce u to save ourselves. For it is an unfortunate fact that, althoug men are ready to suffer untold hardships and even death itse for the sake of their country's honour, they never show an equ readiness to live within their incomes for that same ideal. B surely the attempt should be made.

If political liberty is to be preserved in Britain, two thin must be done and done quickly. Confidence in Parliament mu be restored, so that men will defend it against its enemies fro whatever quarter they advance to the attack. And the poisono system of pauperising the people must be rooted out. The latt task can never be effected without revolution unless the form has first been achieved. How, then, shall the good name o Parliament be restored? The past records of the individua composing the Socialist Party are such that it is utterly impossib for them to be regarded with confidence, quite apart from th fact that they have rendered it obvious that they have no beli in the theories which they publicly advocate. Indeed, Socialism is to the Socialist Party no more than what Free Trade is the present degenerate remnants of the Liberal Party—a usef

election cry well calculated to produce a good number of votes: *vox et praeterea nihil*. Again, no sane man could look to Mr. Lloyd George for the restoration of Parliament's good name; such a suggestion would raise derisive laughter in any company. Hence we are driven to the conclusion that *only* the Conservative Party can cleanse the Augean stable of present-day politics. But that party is terribly hampered by difficulties which may prevent it from carrying out its task.

In the first place, it contains a considerable number of persons of acknowledged probity, tested courage, and by no means inconsiderable intelligence, but living in a world which has completely disappeared. They and their forbears have served the nation both in peace and war, but their service to the country has always been a form of service which has placed them in positions of authority and of privilege. They do not, and cannot, understand that the present crisis is such that all privilege, all right to take command over their fellows, and even all material wealth, may have to be surrendered if the people are to be saved from the ruin which unbridled democracy has prepared for us. There was a period during the war so critical that some of us gave up all the claims to commissioned rank which our military experience justified, and went back to the humblest positions in the Army. There was a period after the war so critical that some of us, who are owners of industrial undertakings, gave up for ever all claims to the profits of the concerns which we had built up out of nothing. Perhaps we were mistaken, and perhaps we threw away our own chances without in any way helping the country in its troubles. But, whether we were right or wrong in those past crises, I am convinced that the circumstances of the time and the safety, honour, and welfare of the people of Great Britain now demand entire self-sacrifice, and complete renunciation of privilege on the part of those who by birth and education are the natural leaders of their fellow-countrymen. This is no time for pointing out that the terrible position in which the working classes now find themselves is the direct result of their own greed and folly expressed at elections. Terrible suffering awaits them, and they are our own people. What, then, does it matter to us that the fault was theirs? We must help them, and above all we must eliminate the vile demagogues who have led them into this morass.

The second great difficulty of the Conservative Party is due to the existence in its ranks of a group commonly known as the 'Forty Thieves.' These persons are a constant menace to the party and to the whole system of parliamentary government. To my mind, there is only one way to extirpate this malignant tumour, and that is by the deliberate adoption of the policy of refraining from interference with the industrial and financial

affairs of the people. If there is nothing to be 'wangled' it is certain that the 'wanglers' will disappear, and the whole atmosphere of the Conservative Party will be cleaner and healthier. When the Liberal Party abandoned Liberalism and Free Trade twenty-five years ago it prepared a place in Parliament for the 'Forty Thieves' on the one side, and on the other for the trade union and co-operative society members who are likewise in Parliament with the sole aim of loading the dice to give unfair advantages to those sections of the nation which pay them to do this dirty work. A real Conservative Party should endeavour at once to repair the damage done by the Liberals.

As for the other enemies of clean politics, they are more of the nature of evanescent bug-bites than permanent dangers, for the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. And even in that sad event, canonisation is assured if we produce the files of the newspapers which they own. For the *advocatus diaboli* before the Congregation of Rites can do nothing in the face of such evidence, particularly as he will lack the moral support given by the presence of a client who will be otherwise engaged.

There is one more difficulty which the leader of the Conservative Party must surmount before he can hope to increase the confidence of the nation to a degree great enough to enable him to pass the drastic and unpopular measures which alone can save the country from ruin. This obstruction is what we know as the 'Old Gang'—which is to say, the colleagues who have proved their incapacity in high office. One, *laus Deo*, has gone to the limbo of incompetent Ministers, and another must surely be sent thither the first opportunity. Towards another the conventional attitude is that he is more damaging as an enemy than as a friend. But surely the history of the last Conservative Administration has finally exploded this legend by showing that it is impossible for him to surpass as an enemy his devastating effect as a friend. In addition, two, and possibly three, others must go before the 'Old Gang' can be regarded as effectively broken up. But will that infinite capacity for suffering fools gladly, which caused the *débâcle* in the election of 1929, again persuade the leader of the Conservative Party that he can fight successfully when hampered in every movement by the dead weight of the 'Old Gang'? Does he realise that the points of those knives, which at present produce a pleasant tickling sensation between his shoulders, will sooner or later be thrust home? The task before him can never be carried out with second-hand or shop-soiled colleagues, and the country, with a true instinct, is asking why no use is made of the splendid material to be found in the ranks of the Conservative Party. Indeed, the demand for younger Ministers is becoming so insistent that, in a year or two, even the

highest office in the State may be filled by a man who has not completed his eighth lustrum.

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. There is only one man in politics to-day whose name is familiar to the people and who is trusted by them, no matter how keenly they criticise him. If economic chaos and revolution are to be avoided, the whole corrupt system based upon the principle of ninepence for fourpence must be broken down at the earliest possible moment. No politician unknown to the public, and no politician who is distrusted by the public, can perform this task, and herein is to be found the importance of Stanley Baldwin. A second appeal to the better feeling of the electorate may meet with a more satisfactory response than the first encountered. But if it does not, the resources of civilisation will not have been exhausted. For if democracy cannot be cured, at least it can be killed.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

FROM REFERENDUM TO FREE HAND

FOLLOWING a previous article in this Review,[1] the more recent vicissitudes of the Preference movement are now to be discussed likewise in the light of its past history, which already extends to thirty years of continuous activity. In so long a period—with one political generation succeeding another and such an event as the Great War intervening to obliterate the past—it is inevitable that the earlier phases of the movement should be unknown to the new generation of electors and forgotten by most of the older. Yet the historical perspective is necessary for judging the practical importance of any fresh developments which may appear in the foreground from time to time. With this aid one may, for example, avoid mistaking a vicious circle for a line of progress.

I. THE VICIOUS CIRCLE

In contrast with all previous occasions, this year the British Government entered the Imperial Conference not only with trade worse than at any time within living memory, but when the policy of Preference had lately been approved by organised bodies representing all sections of our economic life. Besides the usual resolutions from chambers of commerce and others there were significant pronouncements from quarters previously hostile. The Trade Union Congress displayed the new attitude of the wage-earners; the Federation of British Industries at last could testify that not only by count of heads, but by analysis of trades, its members were now overwhelmingly in favour. Even Finance, the silent citadel of Free Trade, had emitted a manifesto confessing that, since foreign countries were plainly not going to abandon protection yet, Empire Preference was the right policy for us. While home opinion had thus been converted wholesale to the necessity of a new fiscal policy, the Dominions, desperately hard hit by the slump in prices, were more eager than ever before that Britain should give them a reciprocal Preference. In spite of all this, their earnest overtures have again met with a blank negation, again thinly disguised with the pretence that there are 'other

[1] 'Preference and the Referendum' (May 1930).

ways' than tariff preference still to be explored with the intention of doing something.

Surely the real issue is no longer the policy of Preference, but our party system itself, which alone now stands in the way of the consummation which all the Britannic peoples desire. Each of the three parties has now had its chance and proved its incapacity. Each in turn, while protesting its eagerness to develop Empire trade, has pandered to popular superstition by abjuring 'food taxes,' and has taken refuge in the pretence of 'other ways.' In 1902 the Conservatives began it, when they repealed the general duty on imported wheat, which was hurting nobody. But at that time their only notion of an alternative plan was to leave trade out of account and ask for naval contributions. In 1907 it was the turn of the Liberals. Championed by their new recruit, Mr. Winston Churchill, they let him shout to the world that they had 'banged and barred the door.' It was this session that witnessed the real birth of the 'other ways' fallacy, which has so often been revived. How absurd, have protested the embarrassed Free Traders time and again, to pretend that you cannot have an effective policy of Empire development without 'taxing food'! In 1907 their great idea was 'communications' —*i.e.*, subsidised steamship lines and on the 'all red route.' But nothing had been done when the next session came round in 1911. Then the Liberal Government played the usual card. A 'Dominions Royal Commission' was charged to investigate every possibility 'consistent always with the fiscal policy of each part.' So a select body of worthy gentlemen spent several years in touring the Empire at the expense of the British taxpayer. They produced a very voluminous and interesting Report. To it may be traced the origins of the Imperial Economic Committee, and of other 'Imperial' research bodies now existing; but nothing more substantial. Reading between the lines of their Report, the real conclusion of this Commission plainly was that while 'other ways' could be devised in plenty, none of them could be worth much except as supplements to tariff preference, implying duties in Britain on competitive food imports.

The War Conferences of 1917 and 1918, to which may be added the meeting in 1921, brought a belated recognition by Britain of the principle of Preference. The Government being a coalition, all three parties were nominally committed. Besides the old revenue duties on sugar, tea, etc., the new duties which had been put on in the war afforded the means of applying the principle at once. But the small range of imports so affected did not include the products most important to the prosperity of settlers in the Dominions; which are dairy produce, meat, corn, and fruit.

The Coalition having been dissolved in 1922, it fell to the Conservatives to conduct the Imperial Conference in 1923 on their own responsibility. Thus they obtained their second opportunity. They thoughtfully anticipated it by pledging themselves at the preceding election to introduce no 'fundamental change' of fiscal policy in the lifetime of the next Parliament. When the time came all they could do, by way of reciprocating the admittedly valuable fiscal preferences of the Dominions, was to promise preference on a few side lines, such as canned fish. That was better than nothing—had it ever been carried out—but hopelessly inadequate for a party which had gone to the country with Empire development in the forefront of their programme. Willing the end, they had renounced the means. Therefore at the Conference the quest of 'other ways' had to be resumed. The lead was taken by Australia, Mr. Bruce being ready to test the Socialist ideas which were so widely favoured in his own country and in Britain by the Labour Party. Accordingly a special Committee was appointed to examine in particular the policy of State control of imports through a licensing system and, in conjunction therewith, bulk purchase from the Dominions by the State in Britain of food imports required to supplement home production. Since similar proposals in another guise have been revived by the present Government as something new, it may be well to repeat a summary of the 1923 Committee's conclusions:

> Prohibition of imports, accompanied by licence or State purchase, would throw producers, merchants, shipping companies and everybody into perpetual and paralysing uncertainty; whereas 'if you have a tariff, everybody knows what the tariff is.' State purchase would tend to raise prices without any corresponding benefit to the Exchequer, and the responsibility of arranging what prices should be paid would be 'far too invidious to be borne.' In practice, moreover, as was seen during the war, State control of prices meant control at a level favourable to the least efficient producer; and the existing excessive middlemen's charges were, the committee observed, partly a legacy of the high prices fixed by the State in the war period. But while condemning these proposals the committee agreed 'emphatically' that, in the interest alike of producers and consumers, the profit margins should be kept as small as might be reasonably possible. The way to achieve this was to be found, they suggested, in the closest co-operation both between the Governments and between trade organisations in the Dominions and Britain. The Governments could help, for example, by furnishing better statistical information.
>
> Thus once more the fallacy of the 'other ways' theory was exposed, leaving the policy of tariff preference where Chamberlain had placed it twenty years before, as the *sine qua non* of Empire development.[2]

The conclusion after 1923 that in fact there are no 'other ways' did not require to be confirmed by another waste of time

[2] *The Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 148–9.

in 1930. No doubt there may be use for non-tariff devices, ranging from scientific research to subsidised transport, statutory quotas, and perhaps even State purchase. But none of these can bring any adequate expansion of Empire settlement and Empire trade unless foreign imports are to be restricted. And to effect that restriction the method of tariff preference alone has the advantage of being a proven method, familiar everywhere outside Britain. Moreover, it provides for its own expenses, generally at the cost of the overseas seller, instead of demanding a further levy on British taxpayers to finance it. For example, the Imperial Economic Committee, which was set up by way of compensating the Dominions for the unfulfilled promises of 1923, was endowed with an income of 1,000,000*l.* a year, to be provided by direct taxation of ourselves. It now appears that the present Government has promised some further assured income to the Empire Marketing Board from the same source. There is no 'equality of status' in this; but no doubt Dominion statesmen may regard it as something given in return for their unilateral preferences.

On the economic side the Imperial Conference which has lately ended appears a strange and tragic repetition of 1907. As though the clock had stood still for twenty-three years, the records of these two sessions might be changed about, without any obvious violence to history. In 1907 the Dominions were led by Australia; in 1930 Canada resumed at length her proper place; but that is the only difference. In 1907 Deakin's fervent and outspoken advocacy of Preference anticipated Mr. Bennett's. Deakin's exposition of the policy as National Protection modified by Imperial Preference put it on the same basis as Mr. Bennett's postulate of 'Canada First.' In both cases we find the leading Dominion well supported by the others, though Laurier, as a French-Canadian, was always restrained by the sense—which the others took for granted—that Britain, too, had a right to put her own interests first. In both cases we note the warning of the Dominion Ministers that persistent refusal must ultimately drive them to seek markets elsewhere, implying increased purchase of foreign goods at the expense of British. In either case one consequence of banging the door has been to stimulate the idea of inter-Dominion trade agreements apart from Britain—only to show, by the results hitherto, how comparatively little scope there really is for this.

On the negative side Mr. Snowden had already anticipated the Conference with his declaration that he intended to abolish all the existing import duties which enabled Preference to be given. Only an inability to sacrifice so much revenue at once prevented him in his first Budget from emulating the Conservative

Government of 1902 and actually putting Preference back to zero after thirty years. The sole success of the recent Conference is that it has contrived to exact from the present Government a promise to maintain these threatened preferences for another three years. An immediate response was made by South Africa, in Mr. Hertzog's promise to maintain likewise the British preference in South Africa for the same period, despite the implications of his recent treaty with Germany. This illustrates the spirit which was present, if only our Government had been intelligent enough to respond.

But it is not only in the vista of the Imperial Conference itself that we see Preference in the rut of a vicious circle. We have now to trace the reactions of the Conservative Party to events since the spring. In the previous article we have seen how the pressure of Lord Beaverbrook's crusade, with its single objective of a tariff on foreign food, had induced Mr. Baldwin to adopt the revived proposal of a referendum. Then we had the new comedy of Lord Rothermere trying to herd the simple crusaders into his own pen of '100 per cent. Conservatism.' Though labelled 'United Empire Party,' it gave quite a minor place to 'Empire Free Trade.' To disentangle the crusade from the awkward embrace of his friend—who had helped to enrol its members through the *Daily Mail*—Lord Beaverbrook was constrained to return all the subscriptions and, after a decent interval, solicit them afresh through his own newspapers. The fact that the movement seemed to emerge all the stronger from such shocks of ridicule and dissolution was surely a striking testimony to the strength of its popular appeal.

Meanwhile Lord Beaverbrook was complaining—though history could have warned him—that the referendum was being used by Conservative headquarters as a way of avoiding rather than facing the vital issue of taxes on foreign food. This charge being true, the party leader had to attempt further manœuvres. A weak point in Lord Beaverbrook's position was that he advocated the duty on foreign wheat as, incidentally, protection for the British farmer. At Worcester, on August 3, Mr. Baldwin argued, quite reasonably, that no duty less than 1*l.* a quarter could be effective for protection. A duty on that scale, he feared, might enable Dominion growers to corner the market and exploit the British consumer. He therefore proposed to protect the British farmer without any tariff, by imposing a certain 'quota' of home-grown wheat on British millers, who would be required to pay a guaranteed price for it, to be made up by a State subsidy. As for Preference, he repeated his proposal to negotiate a draft treaty with the Dominions and submit it to the people. Whether it would involve 'food taxes' he still avoided saying. But he

tacitly dropped the referendum, leaving it to be understood that the draft agreement would be submitted at a general election instead. Here, again, Mr. Baldwin was only following the footsteps of the pre-war leader, who likewise had slid from 'referendum' to 'double election.' The latter proposal avoided the constitutional objections to the former. But it did not meet the more practical objection, that you can hardly expect the Dominions to say 'exactly' what they will give in return for what, until you are equally in a position to fulfil your side of the bargain without undue delay. Lord Beaverbrook has been right all along in asserting that you must first get a mandate to tax foreign food. No doubt that is what Mr. Bennett meant when he stipulated, 'First, accept the principle.'

There was now no course open to the crusaders but to go straight ahead and run their own candidates for Parliament, wherever there might be any prospect of success. This would generally mean attacking Conservative seats, especially in the south and in rural areas. An opportunity came in September with the by-election at Bromley. Here the United Empire Party jumped the claim, putting up a candidate who was strong on Lord Rothermere's special points,[3] but a little ambiguous about food taxes. He polled better than expected; and might have got in, his supporters declared, had not Lord Beaverbrook refrained from helping him.

The Bromley experience was a jar to the party, but there was worse to come. A similar vacancy soon arose in South Paddington. The official candidate, a local alderman, failed to satisfy either section, apparently pledging himself turn-about to the official policy of 'no food taxes at the next election' and to the contrary demand of the crusaders. When the latter began to look for an independent candidate, party headquarters felt that something must be done. On October 16 was published a letter from Mr. Baldwin to the party chairman, Mr. Neville Chamberlain. The Imperial Conference, which had been in session a fortnight, gave him a convenient peg. In view of the 'extreme urgency' of Preference, so Mr. Baldwin wrote, he no longer had in mind 'any suggestion of a referendum or a second general election.' The party would go to the polls next time 'with a programme to which the electors will be asked to give their final and definite assent.' Although, as Mr. Bennett had stated, the details of an Imperial policy could only be worked out by consultation between experts, the Conservative Party accepted 'the principle of

[3] The list has varied at short intervals. Lord Rothermere evidently holds, with Mr. Baldwin, that policy is the prerogative of the party leader, who may change it from day to day if he likes. Hitherto his principal points have been: a high tariff on imported manufactures; drastic economy; and no more surrender in India or Egypt.

Imperial Preference contained in his proposals.' The case of each article was to be examined separately. But as to wheat he had a definite suggestion. This was that the quota system he had already promised to the British farmer should be supplemented by a quota of Dominion wheat, thereby not only giving a guaranteed market, but also 'a completely effective antidote, which tariffs alone would not supply, to the dumping of Russian or bounty-fed wheat from foreign countries.' It would have, he added, the additional advantage that it could be worked through the normal trade channels, avoiding 'import boards or bulk purchase by the State, to which we are unalterably opposed.' In regard to other commodities, 'the results of our investigations may well show that either in addition to or in substitution for tariffs there are other effective means of translating into action the main principle.' But the party would be willing to discuss 'in the most sympathetic spirit' any other proposals besides its own.

In now proposing a Dominion wheat quota Mr. Baldwin may have felt that he was not only serving 'party unity' by again dodging food taxes, but the interest of the country by indicating a plan which the Government might adopt with the prospect of Conservative support in the House. At any rate, at the Conference this plan was given special attention by the economic committee under Mr. Graham. Though their report is inconclusive, it hardly suggests that the quota would be quite so easy to work or effective in result as Mr. Baldwin asserted. To the layman its operation as outlined seems extremely complicated and bound to require some special machinery to supervise the 'normal trade channels.' The Dominion price would still be the world price, fixed by foreign 'dumping' as before. The only apparent advantage of the quota is that it might facilitate the direct exchange of so much Dominion wheat, at the world price, for so much British goods. But in comparison with this device the well-tried tariff method is simplicity itself. Naturally the Dominions prefer the latter because it would give them scope for capturing a larger share of the British market by their own enterprise, instead of subjecting them to the arbitrary decrees from time to time of a Board which, theoretically omniscient, could only guess at world conditions ahead and would inevitably be subject to political pressure.

In the party Press Mr. Baldwin's pronouncement was hailed as the policy of the 'free hand,' doing away with any vestige of excuse for 'splitting the vote' in future. But, once bitten, twice shy. The chief crusader was quick to sound the alarm. Mr. Baldwin had not yet said that at the next election he would seek a mandate to impose food taxes; and the quota could be no

substitute, anyway. As had so often happened before, ever since 1902, the Conservative leader's carefully chosen words were open to the suspicion of trying to have it both ways. Either the Food-Taxers or the Free-Fooders were *going* to be let down; and experience knew which. On the very next day a gallant Vice-Admiral was commissioned to carry the banner of the crusade in South Paddington. Meanwhile the United Empire Party had nominated a lady. But Lord Rothermere—who had lately handed over the new party to a committee—bade his friends in South Paddington support the Admiral, thus atoning handsomely for Bromley. Together the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express* rejoiced that there was to be 'no splitting of the Empire vote'—ignoring the official Conservative. As the contest proceeded the Admiral, vigorously supported by Lord Beaverbrook in person, was seen forging ahead. Once more Mr. Baldwin had to move another step. In a letter to the official candidate he wrote:

> In approaching the Dominions . . . we shall be free to adopt any and every method conducive to the development of Empire trade, including the taxation of foreign foodstuffs . . . as the greater includes the less, our policy embraces the Empire crusade proposals, and there is no excuse for dissensions within the Conservative ranks.

Still he had not said that at the next election (not the next but one) the party would seek a mandate to tax foreign food. The Admiral held his course. But there were also ugly signs further afield of growing discontent with Mr. Baldwin's 'weak' leadership. Accordingly a party meeting was held on October 30, being the eve of the Paddington poll, in hopes of both scotching the Admiral and stopping the rot. Mr. Baldwin was to give an address and then retire for a vote of confidence to be taken. Restating the policy—which he declared must always be a matter for the party leader alone—he complained, 'my hand has been forced throughout the year.' He had been unwilling to commit the party to 'taxation of food' until he was sure that 'we were going to get something for it.' But now the Imperial Conference had resolved his doubts. 'For the first time we learnt that the Dominion Prime Ministers were willing to do business.' So he had come to adopt the 'policy of the free hand.' Nevertheless, when he left the hall, out of the 578 selected representatives no less than 116 voted to depose him. It could only have been an angry gesture. There was no one to succeed him who could command throughout the country so wide a respect, not to say affection. And any new leader must soon have found himself equally helpless in the grip of 'party unity'—as the pre-war 'whole-hoggers' found out after they had discarded Balfour for Bonar Law. But if Caxton Hall failed to stop the rot, neither did it scotch the Admiral. On the morrow South Paddington put

him at the head of the poll, with a generous margin over Mr. Baldwin's henchman.

Those who like straightforward politics must hate the system that can choose a leader for his honesty in order to corrupt it. How else can one excuse Mr. Baldwin's audacious pretence that now 'for the first time we learnt that the Dominion Prime Ministers were willing to do business'? For the past thirty years they have shown themselves only too willing to do business whenever we might be ready. As to Canada in particular, Laurier's original offer of 1902 has been lying on the table ever since, awaiting our willingness to tax foreign wheat. It was on precisely the same lines as Mr. Bennett's. Let us recall that Laurier (*a*) specified the market for wheat as Canada's special interest; (*b*) required our Government first to 'accept the principle,' *i.e.*, of putting—or rather keeping—a duty on foreign wheat; and (*c*) offered on that basis to negotiate in detail an extension of British Preference in Canada. Mr. Bennett offered no more and no less.

But if a leader who is the slave of 'party unity' and can only move under its dictation is bound to disappoint some of his followers, he is equally liable to be let down himself. In October a vacancy occurred at Shipley, a Yorkshire constituency in the distressed area of the textile industry. It had been a Labour seat, gained, as usual, by a minority vote in a three-cornered contest, with the Conservative second. The local Conservative Association now brought out a candidate who concentrated on 'safeguarding' the textile industry, and declared quite definitely against taxing food. Just when Mr. Baldwin was hoping to dish the Crusaders with his new policy of the 'free hand' the party candidate at Shipley was flatly rejecting it; and won the election. This time the Crusaders had not intervened. Of course the local managers claimed that the repudiation of food taxes had done the trick. So we must expect that most of the party candidates in the north will follow this lead when the next election comes. What, then, will be the party's position if returned to power? It will still lack the 'free hand.' Mr. Baldwin, who has already approved Mr. Bennett's invitation, might go to Ottawa with a view to negotiating a detailed agreement. Either the negotiation would fail, or it would require the taxation of food. If he brought back a draft agreement he could proceed no further without another appeal to the country. Fully twelve months would thus be consumed. Such being the prospect, what becomes of his recent plea that Preference is now a matter of 'extreme urgency'? Nor can one forget that following the rebuff in 1907–11 came the great fight in Canada over the proposal of unrestricted reciprocity with the United States, which was barely defeated. If the

approach of the American election should give rise to a fresh proposal of that kind, who can be certain that Canada would reject it again?

Round the taxation of food, which has always been the key to Preference, the Conservative Party is seen to have wandered in a vicious circle. After thirty years of abject grovelling to the 'little loaf' it has lost capacity to confront the bogey which it has been content to accept from its opponents at face value. But Preference is, indeed, a matter of urgency, as never before. In its economic aspect it is the only still untried means of restoring our trade position; and already South Africa's treaty with Germany shows that Dominion warnings were seriously meant. Apart from that, among actual policies it alone—or, at least, pre-eminently—effectively asserts the unity of the Empire, by claiming for the Britannic Commonwealth *as an international entity* the privileged right of its member States to trade between themselves on privileged terms. Since in most other relations the Imperial Conference has virtually adopted the theory of divided or multiple monarchy, which legally implies independence, there is nothing substantial left except Preference to preserve the principle and practice of unity.

II. The Line of Progress

The same history which exposes the fact of the vicious circle indicates with equal clearness where the line of progress would lie. To move in company with 'Canada First' we must have a policy of 'Britain First'; not—as so many either demand or complain—'the Empire First.' To that extent the Free Trade diehards have really been sounder than the Conservative leaders, who keep on assuming that we must consult the Dominions before we do anything. Even Lord Beaverbrook, apparently, would not exercise the mandate he wants for taxing foreign food until he had consulted the Dominions. But in these thirty years, during which all the Dominions have established an effective system of Preference, there is no instance of any of them ever consulting the British Government before proceeding to revise its own tariff. Why should Britain alone be deemed unable to do the same without consulting the others?

The answer is, of course, that all three parties in Britain have hitherto assumed that, apart from Preference, we can have no need for a tariff on imported corn, meat, dairy produce, and fruit; and further, that any such duties must be a hardship on the consumer. Hence has arisen the doctrine, which has become traditional, that we can only put on these duties if the Dominions will make it worth our while. Surely the time has come to reconsider these assumptions. To-day it is common knowledge

that (*a*) a huge deficit of revenue is in prospect; (*b*) the ratio of indirect to direct taxation has been continuously falling as expenditure has increased; (*c*) this expenditure is largely represented by social services for the benefit of those who do not pay direct taxes, including many who, if they neither smoke nor drink, pay hardly any indirect taxation either; (*d*) the consequent weight of direct taxation has become an excessive charge upon productive industry, increasing its costs and preventing the accumulation of necessary reserves; (*e*) the world competition for the food market in Britain has become more intense than ever, foreign competitors shrinking from no sacrifice to obtain or retain it.

With these points in mind, let us consider the possibilities of broadening the basis of indirect taxation, and incidentally establishing Preference. The following estimate of revenue is based upon official figures[4] of the values consumed in this country, distinguishing home-grown, Empire and foreign supplies:

	Home.	Empire. (£ millions.)	Foreign.
Wheat (flour)	10·6	30·8	29·5
Meat	98·6	38·2	85·7
Poultry and eggs . . .	22·2	6·1	16·3
Dairy produce	62·5	32·6	33·3
Potatoes, etc.	31·3	3·2	10·0
Fruit (orchard)	8·5	3·4	7·4
Fish	15·2	1·9	7·7
	248·9	116·2	189·9
Preferential duty, 5 per cent. =		5·81	
General duty, 10 per cent. =			18·99
Total revenue = 24,800,000*l*.			

If we include also oats, barley, and maize we have in sight an initial revenue approaching 30,000,000*l*. There is no reason to suppose, considering the world competition, that a 10 per cent. duty would restrict the volume of imports, and thereby raise prices, which would stimulate further production at home. Since there is nowhere else at present for the world surplus to go, 'dumping' would continue as before, unless checked by special measures which lie outside the scope of a revenue tariff and the present discussion. At least until world consumption began once more to overtake production the main incidence of these duties would be on the oversea producer, who for his own part habitually assumes that this would be the result. If so, the new revenue would represent a contribution from the countries which

[4] *Report on The Agricultural Output and Food Supplies of Great Britain* (1929, p. 51).

export to our market; just as our own export trade, cutting profits to overcome tariffs abroad, is forced to subsidise the exchequers of the States concerned. In short, to an extent constantly varying with the conditions of supply and demand, the new revenue would be 'non-tax,' and therefore a real relief if used to reduce the direct taxation which inevitably comes out of our own pockets. But even without any rise in prices the British farmer would at least have the satisfaction of seeing his competitors, Dominion as well as foreign, paying a toll for the upkeep of the common market. As to the Empire rebate, the effect would certainly be a gradual increase of Dominion supplies at the expense of foreign. In proportion to this effect the revenue would decline. To maintain the revenue we should have to revise the tariff from time to time, increasing the preferential rate of duty. That would be an appropriate occasion to negotiate with the Dominions. But a generous measure of reciprocal Preference would have been established at once without the delay, trouble and uncertainty of any consultation at all.

No doubt the thirty years' history forbids the hope that any of the three existing parties will now adopt this fiscal reform which responds to the crying needs of Britain first and the Empire next. But all three are seen to be torn with internal dissension, and discredited in the eyes of the country. Surely the opportunity now exists for all advocates of either Protection or Preference to join forces in a campaign to return independent representatives to the next Parliament. The bold initiative and great resources of the much-abused 'Press barons' can hardly be taken as exhausted yet. Both Lord Rothermere and Lord Beaverbrook are manifestly patriotic, even if they lack faith in Mr. Baldwin; whose denunciations of them at least testify to his own belief in their power. Both are fully alive to the national emergency. Surely they could now unite their respective followers on an economic platform combining protection of manufactures, revenue duties on all imported food competing with our own, and drastic economy. The proposal *not* to exempt Dominion produce should secure the adherence of the National Farmers' Union, whose executive hitherto has stood aloof and suspicious.

But more is required than material resources. A new spirit in leadership is called for. After thirty years of the dear-food bogey, which was a purely political invention, it has come to be assumed by all party managers that the electorate consists mainly of a half-starved proletariat. Like the Roman rabble, it is held to be concerned only for free food and amusement, and certain to reject any policy which, however necessary to the national welfare, might conceivably exact the price of a glass of beer or a picture ticket. Thus do the politicians tacitly sum up the social

result of the expenditure we have lavished all these years on education and social services. In no other civilised country do they take so mean a view of the citizens they have created. Surely they are wrong; but at least let the British electorate be put once to the test—which has never yet been done—before the damning judgment is accepted. The due leader of 'Britain First' should venture the novel appeal to individual self-respect and national pride. Otherwise the old party leaders might as well be left undisturbed to compete once more in degrading the community with their pauper's gospel.

Given the new kind of leadership—known in the war—the suggested campaign should attract the support of many organisations and a host of individuals from all classes throughout the country. Considering the popular disgust with the three existing parties, 'Britain First' might emerge from the impending election numerically the strongest party in the new Parliament. Having passed a Budget on the lines indicated, the new Government could go to Ottawa for the Economic Conference next year with reciprocal Preference an accomplished fact, and with the means in hand to make agreements for extending and stabilising it on tariff principles which would at last be common to all the Britannic States.

RICHARD JEBB

POLICY IN PALESTINE

The Government's recent statement of policy on Palestine has been attacked by the Zionists and their supporters both at home and abroad. Little mention has been made of the basis of that statement, which is Sir John Hope Simpson's Report on immigration, land settlement and development. Criticism, however, always makes more savoury reading than policy, and it is probable that far more people have noticed the complaints than have studied the statement itself. Thus it seems worth while to examine the Government proposals in the light of the treaty obligations of Great Britain, and of actual conditions in Palestine up till now. Such an analysis proves that the Government's view of our obligations does not vary from that of its predecessors, and that its political plans are also the same. What is new is an economic programme designed to fulfil a part of our duty in Palestine which hitherto we have neglected.

It is impossible to ignore the importance of the ante-natal history of our treaties regarding Palestine, for the war pledges created in the Arab and Jewish races hopes and claims still maintained. From 1915 on the Arabs were incited to disaffection from their rulers by promises summed up by the Allies in their War Aims Note to Washington of January 1917 as 'the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks.' Messages were dropped in Palestine from 1917 on, calling upon the Arabs to fight for their liberty. The correct interpretation of the famous McMahon letter of 1915 would provide a nice textual problem—even if it had been officially published. Admittedly it promised Arab independence, but while the Colonial Office in 1922 declared that a reservation excluding the district west of Damascus applied to Palestine, the Arabs argue that the western boundaries, named as the Red Sea and Mediterranean, included Palestine. It must be, incidentally, one of the queerest geographical aberrations even of the Staff, if a British general meant the Jordan when he wrote the Mediterranean. What is not in doubt is that the Palestinian Arabs believed that we promised them independence, a belief confirmed by the Covenant of the League.

The war promise to the Jews of November 1917 was public, since it was designed to enlist the support of Jews everywhere, and especially in the United States. This was the famous Balfour Declaration, promising a 'National Home in Palestine for the Jewish people,' it being understood that the rights of non-Jews in Palestine should not suffer. In view of the immense variations of interpretation given to the Declaration, it is interesting to note that the English Zionists asked for a text promising 'The reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people,' and that this was refused. Many aspirations, however, from a religious foyer to a Jewish State, have found cover under the Balfour Declaration, and it is embodied in the Mandate.

Treaty texts are dull, but the main provisions governing Palestine are so seldom correctly quoted that it is necessary to give them in full. Even Sir John Simon and Lord Hailsham, in writing to *The Times* in support of the Zionists, quoted selected chips of the Mandate—a method appropriate, perhaps, to the great advocate seeking authority to prove his case, but scarcely so proper to a judge whose business it is to marshal the whole relevant law.

The treaty texts which concern the present controversy are:

The Covenant of the League of Nations (1919)

Article 22.—(1) To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

(4) Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.

The Mandate (1923)

Preamble.—Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them, and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Manda-

tory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

Article 2.—The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 6.—The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 11.—The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country, or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish Agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as those matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration.

The objects of the Mandate, therefore, are the welfare and development of the native people and recognition of their independence, and the National Home for the Jewish people. The means detailed are the development of self-governing institutions, Jewish immigration and settlement, limited by the provisoes that the civil and religious rights and the economic position of the non-Jews are not to be prejudiced, and administrative control of natural resources and the land system in the interests of the whole community.

Both the Covenant and the Mandate which embodies the pledges of native development and adds the National Home are solemn international engagements. It should be added that the Covenant is the senior and governing treaty, by virtue of Article 20, which abrogates all obligations inconsistent with itself and pledges members of the League not to enter into inconsistent future

engagements. Added provisions of the Mandate, therefore, a
valid only in so far as they do not clash with the Covenant.

Those people who talk glibly of the Balfour Declaration
though it were the only British engagement regarding Palesti
are greatly under-estimating our pledges. And the difficulti
involved in those obligations leap to the eye. They can only b
simplified by arguments such as those used by the Arabs—th
the Balfour Declaration is incompatible with the welfare of the
people, and that its inclusion in the Mandate is therefore illeg
under the Covenant and should be denounced by the Mandator
The Zionist simplification is to assert that the Balfour Declaratio
supersedes the Covenant and that the pledge of native welfare,
it should impede the establishment of the National Home, is nc
meant to be carried out. This reasoning inverts the Mandat
which limits every National Home clause by the proviso that it i
only to be established in so far as it does not damage nati
interests.

The British Government has always, however, affirmed tha
both sets of promises existed and must be carried out. Th
October statement adopts the definition which the Permaner
Mandates Commission formulated last June as the essence of th
Mandate:

(i.) 'The obligations laid down by the Mandate in regard to th two sections of the population are of equal weight';

(ii.) 'The two obligations imposed on the Mandatory are in n sense irreconcilable.'

This position tallies exactly with that held by British Govern
ments since 1922. None has denied the Covenant or Mandate
Mr. Churchill, in the 1922 correspondence on Palestine, explaine
to the Arab Delegation that the Balfour Declaration involved a
interpretation of the 'independence' clause of the Covenan
different from that adopted for Irak and Syria. Seeing that th
majority of the Palestinian population opposed the Balfou
Declaration, a national Government would render the fulfilment c
that pledge impossible. But Britain was ready to grant to th
people of Palestine the greatest measure of independence con
sistent with fulfilment. Thus he recognised the Covenant a
binding, although its application was deflected from the norma
course by the Balfour Declaration. The Government then issue
a statement defining its interpretation of the National Hom
under the Mandate, of which the key-sentences are:

The Government 'would draw attention to the fact that th
terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate tha
Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish Nationa
Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*

'... But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance.'

The reception of this statement was significant. The Arabs rejected it, claiming still that the Balfour Declaration was inconsistent with the Covenant. The official Zionist Organisation accepted it, welcoming the statement that the Jews were to be in Palestine 'as of right.' The more extreme Zionists, those who say that a National Home means nothing if not a Jewish State, split away from the official policy of acceptance, and, because of their desire to revise the statement in a more Jewish sense, are called the Revisionists.

Lord Balfour, when the Mandate was approved by the League of Nations Council in 1923, said that it had been represented that the interests of the Arabs were not sufficiently safeguarded; but the most anxious attention had been paid to the position and interests of the Arab populations by the British Government, and there was no wish or intention that the provision of a Jewish Home in Palestine should in any way injure the best interests of the Arabs. Every precaution had been taken that the provision of a Jewish Home should not encroach upon the interests or susceptibilities of any section of the population. The material prosperity and moral interests of all the people concerned could not fail to be advanced by the course which the British Government intended to pursue.

The duality of Palestine obligations has been clearly defined by the Mandates Commission. In its first Report on Palestine in 1924 it said that 'according to the fundamental principle of Article 22 of the Covenant the paramount duty of the mandatory Power was to ensure the development of the mandated territories by administering them in conformity with the interests of their inhabitants. On the other hand the Mandatory was instructed to fulfil the Balfour Declaration.' The Mandate was a 'two-fold duty.' This Report was accepted by the Conservative Government then in power. It is therefore fair to say that the present Government's acceptance of the 'double obligation' does not vary by a tittle from the doctrine of previous Governments.

But treaty obligations must be applied, and there's the rub. The October statement makes concrete proposals, both political and economic. On the political side it proposes to carry out the intention announced by Mr. Churchill in 1922 to foster a full measure of self-government by gradual stages. The Legislative Council suggested is exactly the same as in the 1922 scheme: eleven official members, including the High Commissioner, and

twelve elected members, consisting of eight Moslems, two Christians, and two Jews. The Government say sternly that they mean to defeat attempts to circumvent the plan by appointing councillors if the elections fail; and the High Commissioner is to retain power to keep order and fulfil the Mandate.

Much water has run under the bridge since 1922. At that time the Jews took part in the elections; the Arabs largely boycotted them, and they had to be declared null. Then an appointed Council was tried, which also failed because Arabs would not serve on it. An Arab Agency similar to the Zionist Agency was offered and rejected in 1923. The Administration fell back upon purely bureaucratic rule, with its advantage of oligarchic efficiency (power was concentrated in the hands of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, and the Attorney-General) and its drawback of lack of contact with the feelings of the people.

Meanwhile an interesting change-over of racial attitude to this situation has happened. The Arabs have always claimed a democratic constitution in fulfilment of the Covenant. This would, of course, enable them to control immigration and the National Home. It was refused in 1922 and again in 1930. But, while their first reaction was to refuse any share in working the Mandate, they have come to feel that even a restricted measure of self-government is desirable to counter-balance the influence which they all believe is exercised against their interests by the Jewish Agency in London and Palestine. They seem inclined now to accept the Legislative Council. The Palestinian Jews, on the other hand, welcomed the abortive elections of 1922. Their mood was then one of assured optimism, voiced by their chairman, Dr. Eder, when he told the Commission of Inquiry on the 1921 riots that there could only be one National Home in Palestine, and that a Jewish one, and no equality in the partnership between Jews and Arabs, but a Jewish predominance as soon as the members of that race were sufficiently increased. Later, however, the doctrine of the ' Jewish majority ' evolved—an aim voiced by Mr. Sacher, the chairman of the Zionist executive, as well as by Mr. Jabotinsky, the Revisionist leader, in evidence before the Commission of Inquiry on the 1929 riots. This ideal presupposes, as Mr. Jabotinsky explained, that self-government will be delayed until the Jews have attained the majority of the population, so that under a democratic constitution the Jewish policy will always prevail. The settler Jews seem, on the whole, to dislike any self-government at present, and they have threatened to boycott the elections. The international Zionist Organisation, beyond a statement regarding the 1922 policy that nothing was further from its purpose than to prejudice in the smallest degree the civil

and religious rights or the material interests of the non-Jewish population, has preserved a discreet silence on its further political aims, and is also silent upon the present policy.

To sum up the political problem. There is little doubt that the limited interpretation given to the National Home is a disappointment to most Zionists, and totally inacceptable to many. They cannot be expected to surrender their dear dream of the Jewish State. This must account for their frequent misquotation of the Mandate, which is an attempt to convince others, and possibly themselves, that their full claims are justified. It is the basis of the policy of trying to create a Jewish majority by immigration. On the other hand, the maintenance of the National Home policy certainly involves a breach of the Covenant. No definition of independence known to history is compatible with holding down a people by military power in order to force upon it an immigrant nation to whose presence and claims it is solidly opposed. So say the Arabs, and with justice; nor can final autonomy in a mixed State, when the National Home is securely rooted, be considered a fair compensation for the denial of the right of all free peoples to control entry to their country of an alien race. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry was right in saying that one of the fundamental causes of the 1929 riots was the disappointment of the Arab political and national aspirations. The disappointment is final, for the Arabs never can be independent; the National Home prevents it. In this difficult situation the British Mandatory has to do as best it can. Its compromise of a Council with limited powers is necessary, because bureaucratic absolutism in a land whose very babies lisp politics, in Arabic and Hebrew, is an impossible form of government. The people must have some responsibility and outlet for their opinions. Alternatively we must line Palestine with troops and have military rule, which is repugnant to modern political ethics; and most expensive.

It is on the economic side that the Government statement marks a new departure. Three reports of recent years have thrown light upon the economic obscurity of Palestine. In 1928 the Report of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission—the Report on which the enlarged Jewish Agency was constituted—examined the situation from the Zionist point of view. The Shaw Commission of Inquiry into the 1929 riots, persuaded that the anti-Zionist Arab feeling was due to economic fear as much as to political disappointment, asked for an expert inquiry into the possibilities of land development in order to check the creation of a landless peasantry. The Government accordingly sent Sir John Hope Simpson to examine the situation on immigration, land settlement and development. His Report contains far-reaching

recommendations on which the Government has founded its land policy. The basis is a verbal quotation :

> It can now be definitely stated that at the present time, and with the present methods of Arab cultivation, there remains no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish agencies hold in reserve.

The statement goes on to say that it is the duty of the Administration to ensure that the position of other sections of the population is not prejudiced, and, subject to that condition, to encourage close settlement of Jews on the land. To attain these objects a more methodical agricultural development is called for.

> Only by the adoption of such a policy will additional Jewish agricultural settlement be possible consistently with the conditions laid down in Article 6 of the Mandate. The result desired will not be obtained except by years of work. It is for this reason fortunate that the Jewish organisations are in possession of a large reserve of land not yet settled or developed. Their operations can continue without break, while more general steps of development, in the benefits of which Jews and Arabs can both share, are being worked out. During this period, however, the control of all disposition of land must of necessity rest with the authority in charge of the development. Transfers will only be permitted in so far as they do not interfere with the plans of that authority.

The details which follow are a *précis* of the Hope Simpson proposals ; and they mark the beginning of an active land policy, aimed at securing the livelihood and improving the cultivation of the Arab cultivators, and thereby to gain by intensive culture room for additional Jewish settlement. The full implications of this policy can only be realised by reading Sir John Hope Simpson's Report (with a map). Everyone should do so ; it is excellent reading, and the more convincing in that its main conclusions on fact, and some on policy, are confirmed by the Jewish Joint Survey Commission's Report.

An active land policy in Palestine will be new indeed, as a retrospect of our government shows. We took over an agricultural country in the state of dereliction known as the 'Turkish blight.' Two-thirds of its people were peasants, capable and hard-working farmers, but victims of a land system under which all the profit wrung from the soil went into the pockets of landlords and usurers. They were too poor to improve their mediæval methods. Some were small-holders, the majority tenants who could be turned out at the will of their landlords. There were also colonies, German and Jewish. The 13,000 rural Jews were chiefly settlers in 'P.I.C.A.'[1] colonies subsidised by the Rothschilds. They were refugees from the oppressions of Eastern Europe ; as a rule they acted as merchants and hired Arabs to do

[1] Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association.

the actual cultivation. Wages were low, but the Arabs were allowed to remain on P.I.C.A. lands. They were better off than under some Arab landowners, and their relations with their employers were excellent.

After the war the great flood of Zionist colonisation set in. Their settlements have increased from five to fifty-two. Inspired by a passionate belief that the National Home must strike roots, they cultivate the soil themselves. Land is bought with subscriptions from world Jewry to the Jewish National Fund as 'the inalienable property of the Jewish race.' Only Jews may inhabit it, and the Arab tenants are evicted. If he hires non-Jewish labour the colonist may be turned out. The colonies are subsidised; only one, Kfar-Yeheskiel, is self-supporting in a limited sense. The Jews, divorced for ages from the soil, have naturally wasted much money and effort in training themselves. But with boundless enthusiasm, modern equipment and teaching, and money behind them, they promise to produce a true peasantry. Already their holdings show great agricultural advance by contrast with Arab farming, as is always the case with rich modern colonies set in a poor and backward land; though in some things, such as irrigated orange-culture, the Jews have merely copied Arab methods.

Palestine, then, has seen Jewish land purchase, often at inflated prices. The Arab landowner has been enriched; the fellah has been evicted. The Administration has done nothing, reasoning, in the realistic British way, that if it left the land to the free play of economic forces capital would win, the Jews would get the land, and their settlement would be encouraged. In effect, except for prices, the *régime* has suited the Zionists very well. All Palestine was theirs to buy, and their attitude was fairly summed up by the Joint Survey Commission's Report: 'The possibilities for Jewish settlement are limited by the supply of cultivable land in Palestine.' It was, of course, dead against British colonial tradition to leave the peasants helpless. Yet three successive ordinances, all so feeble that they indicate little intention of seeing that the fellah was protected, have been, in practice, dead letters. For instance, from 1921–29 the law directed that tenants whose holdings were sold over their heads by landlords should retain enough land to support their families. This law was evaded by the landlord evicting first and selling the land as vacant, or by inducing the tenants to go for a money compensation. The Jewish purchasers must have been cognisant of these dealings. A typical case was the sale of the Valley of Esdraelon by the absentee Sursock family. This is the best stretch of cornland in Palestine. Its sale depopulated twenty-one out of twenty-two villages of cultivators; the District Com-

missioner considers that 6000 people lost their livelihood. Th Jews gave 30,000*l.* compensation to some 800 tenants, and hav sought to prove that the whole population is settled elsewhere but of 688 Arab families they can only list 379 as now cultivatin the land.

In any case, the result of the *laissez-faire* British systen has been the creation of Jewish reserves. In Palestine this i emphasised by the peculiar terms of the Zionist land purchase anc leases. But history relates no instance of land acquired by colonists returning to native ownership, so that this positior may be regarded as normal. Conditions in Palestine, however are abnormal, being dominated by land shortage. The countr is chiefly desert and infertile hills, and partly plains. Th cultivable hill country, reckoned by the Hope Simpson Repor as 612,500 acres, is already tilled to the last inch, and the Repor holds out little hope of its improvement save for some forestr and fruit-growing with Government help. Here it agrees with th Joint Survey Commission, which recommends that the Zionist should attempt no further hill settlements, as they cannot pay The fertile land in the plains capable of intensive, and in certair areas of irrigated, farming is given as 1,023,500 acres. The Jewisl holdings of some 321,250 acres are almost all in the plains, so tha they may be counted as owning a third of the fertile soil. Th Jewish cultivating settlers are about 18,300, or 3600 families, with an average available acreage of 86 acres per family. The Join Survey Commission says that 40 to 80 acres are necessary for dry farm—preferably at least 60. It gives also the possibl farms of Palestine as 33,000 irrigated and 50,000 non-irrigate and the rural population as 446,000, or five people (an averag family) for each possible farm. In the orange groves of th coastal plain 2½ to 5 acres will keep a family. The Hope Simpsor Report says that outside the Jewish areas the remaining land i 1,314,750 acres; the number of cultivating fellahin families i 61,408, and of landless fellahin families is 25,572. The are required to maintain a fellahin family decently is 32½ acres. Bu if all the land were divided between the cultivating familie only 20½ acres is available; and if the landless families wer added, $15\frac{1}{16}$ per family. The number of peasants who have beer rendered landless by the Jewish land purchase is uncertain, bu it must run into thousands, and the land which would normall have been available for their development, and has passed int Jewish hands, is cut off from them for ever.

Neither the Joint Survey Commission nor the Hope Simpsor Report counts the Beersheba Plain in the south nor the Hule Swamp as available for immediate development; because the firs would need expensive well-boring, the second even dearer drainage

In view of the desperate situation of the fellah, Sir John Hope Simpson suggests that a Development Commission should be set up, consisting of a British chairman, an Arab and a Jew, to carry out a great scheme of land settlement for both Jews and Arabs. This will involve control over all sale of land (expropriation if necessary), the redistribution of peasant holdings, the granting to them of occupancy rights against eviction, their education in intensive cultivation. The scheme would cost 60*l.* per holding; and if Jews settled demand more money and equipment than is allotted, they must get them outside the Government scheme. Land credits and co-operation should also be organised. Years of work will be needed, but Sir John believes that by the economy in land resultant upon intensive culture the landless Arabs can be settled and room found for 20,000 families from outside. Meantime the Jews can continue settling their lands; more than half the Zionist holdings are still untilled.

Now, the drawback of this plan, from the Zionist point of view, is that it will prevent land purchase for the meantime and the growth of the Jewish 'islands' in the country. Its advantage will be that it is the only hope of allaying the dangerous hatred and fear of the Arab people, who all believe that the Jews mean to push them beyond Jordan out of their country. For the Government it means that it is at last, by carrying out Article 11, beginning to fulfil the second of its obligations in Palestine, to further the welfare and development of the natives, and see that their economic position is not prejudiced. This duty, so far, Britain has disregarded. It is interesting that the Permanent Mandates Commission, in June, strongly recommended Government land development to help the Arabs, in the interests of both races.

Space forbids detailed consideration of the whole of the Government statement on such matters as security. But its provisions on immigration must be dealt with. Since 1922 Britain has reiterated that Jewish immigration must be limited by the absorptive capacity of the country, and that it must not cause unemployment, a principle accepted by the Zionists. The Hope Simpson Report indicates that some Arab employment has been created by the National Home. But apart from the fellah, there is serious unemployment among trades such as camelmen, stonemasons and carpenters, displaced by Jewish competition. Moreover, the General Federation of Jewish Labour not only insists on the exclusive racial system of the Zionist colonies, but works for the substitution of Jewish for Arab Labour in P.I.C.A. colonies, and sees to it that Jewish industries employ Jews only. This is fair enough in cases where money is subscribed for Jewish enterprises. Where a visa is asked for an immigrant to fill a permanent job, it will of course be granted. But when the

immigrant, after temporary employment, will be thrown upon the general labour market, the Government is obviously right in saying that it must 'reduce or if necessary suspend Jewish immigration until the unemployed portion of the 'other sections' is in a position to obtain work.' Zionists have read extraordinary meanings into this—for instance, that all immigration is to be stopped. It only applies, of course, to the category of workmen under the Labour Schedule, and fears should be calmed by the recent permit for 1500 immigrants, which does not indicate any departure from the policy of the White Paper, but merely follows the principles laid down on p. 136 in the Hope Simpson Report.

The problem of Palestine and of the National Home has always been quantitative. How large can the Home become, allowing for the development of native welfare? How many settlers can a tiny land hold whose population at its present rate of increase will have doubled in thirty-five years, and which is too hot and too short of power for much industrial development? There is a moral dilemma for Zionism involved; is it right to press for increase, even if that means hurting the Arabs, or should the purity of the unselfish Zionist ideal be preserved even if it means a smaller National Home? It is difficult for the Jews to admit limitations. They feel an almost religious fervour for the National Home, and, like all people who combine desire and ideal, tend to think that the end justifies the means. To outside observation, however, the patriotism of the Arab is as worthy of respect as that of the Jew. In any case, the duty of Great Britain is clear, if difficult; we cannot defraud the native race for which we are trustees, and we must establish the National Home. The only way in which we can balance these obligations is to create peace between Arab and Jew by an active development of the country, for the benefit of both nations, such as the Government proposes. When this is begun we shall for the first time be fulfilling our whole duty under Covenant and Mandate.

FREDA WHITE.

INDIA: THE SUPREME OPPORTUNITY

It would be agreed, I think, by everyone associated with the Round Table Conference that the proceedings of the opening days produced a remarkable and very encouraging change of atmosphere. Before November 12, so far as my experience went, it was the rarest thing to meet any informed man in London, whether British or Indian, who would confess to being hopeful. The assertion was made, positively and in many quarters, that there was no possibility of any general agreement among the Indian groups. It was said that the gulf between the Hindus and the minority communities was being widened, that either the rigidity of the Princes or else the extremism of the political left wing would create an early deadlock, that the Conference might break up within a fortnight. It was said, further, that the fact of the Government's going into the debate without a definite programme must prove fatal. The forecasts, indeed, were more melancholy than anyone could recall in connexion with the many conferences of the past ten years. This article is being written at the end of the first week of plenary sessions. In commenting upon the events or prospects of the Conference I must, of course, be cautious. But I begin with an emphatic word of hope in the Round Table. Its task is appallingly difficult, but I am convinced that, given certain conditions, it could succeed, and succeed in a notable, even an impressive, degree.

The ceremonial opening in the Royal Gallery of the Lords was an extraordinary occasion, and it made an irresistible appeal to the imagination. Compared with an imperial Durbar at Delhi, it was, of course, a sober affair, but in actual significance it was infinitely more impressive. In no other country than England could a parallel assembly be convened. He would have been an insensitive Briton indeed who could witness unmoved this gathering of Princes and Indian statesmen, lawyers and councillors, agitators, social reformers—some of them representing communities which had never before permitted one of their members to cross the sea. There was no pageantry. Apart from the silent entry of King George, who wore morning dress and did not even seat himself upon the throne before beginning

to read the royal speech, there was no ceremony. This was a conference for business—for business of the highest moment; and the first thing one noticed was that the sense of urgency found expression in every one of the speeches. When the Maharaja of Kashmir said that neither Britain nor India could afford to have the Conference fail, he was saying in the fewest words what everyone present knew to be the plain fact. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is a man for a great occasion. There were many who expected that he would deliver an inaugural address containing a fine gesture towards India. There were certainly not a few who believed that he would give some indication of a more or less positive policy as a lead to the Conference, although as a matter of fact the Prime Minister's caution, at the Lord Mayor's banquet and elsewhere, had shown quite clearly that he could not do this. He preferred to be colourless in style and studiously general in terms—except that he indicated, in a word, that the proceedings of the Round Table Conference were not to be public.

The surprise of the opening day was twofold. It came first in the substance of the brief speeches from the Princes, and secondly in the challenging unanimity with which the delegates from British India, and especially Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the Moslem leader from Bombay, sounded the note of Equal Status in the British Commonwealth and Dominion self-government. The utterances of the four political delegates who spoke in the Royal Gallery ought not, as a matter of fact, to have aroused even a slight degree of astonishment in any listener. It has long been known to all who endeavour to keep abreast of Indian movements that during the past few years there has been in India a steady consolidation of opinion upon the issue of racial inequality, with which, inevitably, is involved the question of a new essential relationship between India and the paramount Power. The Report of the Statutory Commission contains only a few references to the public mind of India, to prevalent opinion or feeling, but such passages as it devotes to this subject are accurate and discerning. The most important of these is the concluding paragraph of Part I. It contains the following:

> We should say without hesitation that, in all its variations of expression and intensity, the political sentiment which is most widespread among all educated Indians is the expression of a demand for equality with Europeans and a resentment against any suspicion of differential treatment. The attitude an Indian takes up on any given matter is largely governed by consideration of his self-respect. It is a great deal more than a personal feeling; it is the claim of the East for due recognition of status. . . . While the member of a minority community, putting the safety of his community first, will stimulate for [illegible] whil[illegible]

the moderate may look askance at extremist methods which he will not openly denounce, *all alike are in sympathy with the demand for equal status with the European and proclaim their belief in self-determination for India.*

There is no possibility of disputing the rightness of that reading of the Indian mind. Considered in relation to political theories and expedients, it means an insistence upon Dominion status, not as a remote or indefinite goal, but as a matter of agreed principle, the acknowledgment of which is to be followed by immediate practical steps; or, as Mr. Jinnah put it, the translation and fulfilment in action of British declarations and pledges. The universal demand for equal status with the Europeans, noted by the Simon Commission, means, when stated in political terms, that Dominion status represents the main constitutional demand made by all the parties and leaders in common. However moderate the leader, whatever the character of the community he may represent, we shall find that the minimum is this. True, it has not been defined by any Indian statesman or group. No one, so far as I know, has ever set out to describe a Dominion of India in terms comparable with those that describe the peculiarly British institutions of Canada and Australia. But that, when we are thinking of the growth of Indian opinion and the influence of a political idea, is beside the point. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, in the powerful speech with which he opened the first session, argued that when the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia were being created, people did not pause to ask what exactly it all meant. The important point would seem to be that in the India of our time Dominion status has come to stand as the only alternative to *puran Swaraj*, complete independence, which the politically-minded classes are willing to entertain. The Maharaja of Bikaner, speaking at the first plenary session of the Conference, said that the Princes had watched with the most sympathetic interest the rise of the 'passion for an equal position in the eyes of the world, expressed in the desire for Dominion status, which is the dominant force among all thinking Indians to-day.' That statement contains the essence of the matter, and coming from a great Rajput Prince it is all the more significant. We may add to it the declaration of Mr. M. R. Jayakar, who spoke immediately after the Maharaja: 'If India were given Dominion status to-day, in the course of a few months the cry of independence would die of itself.'

Equality of status, then, was the matter upon which the Indian delegation made its initial affirmation, and the Conference passed immediately to the discussion of the immensely important question whether the scheme of the new India should take the

form of a unitary government or an All-India Federation. The Simon Commission, it will be remembered, had drawn in outline the project of a federal India. The Commissioners held the view that this must be the form of the ultimate Constitution, if settlement of the problem is to be achieved upon an All-India basis. But they assumed the opposition of the Indian States, thus being led to the conclusion that a federated India must be a far-off event, while in the Simla dispatch upon the Simon Report the Government of India has treated the project of an All-India Federation as a project which cannot be other than remote. It may have been known—it certainly should have been—that Dominion status would be so widely advocated as to amount to an almost unanimous demand; but no one, I think, could say that the Government could be expected to foresee that the Conference would display an almost equal measure of agreement on behalf of an All-India Federation, or the United States of India. The minorities were understood to be unfavourable to the idea. It had always been recognised that many prominent Liberal and moderate leaders regarded it as a danger. Not the Government alone, but virtually everyone who had discussed the issues of the Round Table with the delegates on their arrival in London, had been led to the conclusion that the crux of the Conference would be the question of autocratic government for India (as envisaged and insisted upon by the Simon Commission) or some definite measure of responsible government at the centre. Predictions, indeed, were freely made that the demand of the Indian Liberals and their allies upon so crucial a matter might prove to be an insuperable obstacle; that, in short, the Conference might break upon it. This question, however, did not emerge in the early stage, but instead the interest of the Conference was absorbed in the problem of Federation, to which a series of plenary sessions were exclusively allotted. As a matter of fact, they were not entirely devoted to the principle of Federation, but that was to some extent because Lord Peel, by means of a speech of brilliant provocation, made a diversion of which Dr. Moonje, a champion of orthodox Hindu nationalism, took the fullest advantage in debate.

Federation, however, was the first great issue of debate, with the Maharaja of Bikaner, in the noteworthy speech from which I have already quoted, taking the lead. His Highness said:

> We of the Indian States are willing to take our part in, and make our contribution to, the greater prosperity and contentment of India as a whole. I am convinced that we can best make that contribution through a federal system of government, composed of the States and of British India. . . . It will not be beyond the wealth of experience available at this table to

devise a means of linking these differing units into a powerful federal administration.

To Bikaner succeeded Patiala, whose Maharaja stated his adhesion to federalism in no less emphatic terms. Sir Muhammad Shafi, for the conservative Moslems, took the same side, and Lord Peel, coming to practical matters before the Conference after the more militant portions of his speech, not only declared for federation, but pointed to the effect of the solidifying opinion upon the constitutional proposals submitted by the Government of India:

> I can hardly conceive myself that in a country so vast, so diversified, and so populous, it is possible to set up and maintain what is called a unitary government. . . . This idea [of federation] has been planted, has flourished, and has grown rapidly. With all respect, I should say that in this matter the Report of the Government of India seems to me to be somewhat out of date. It seems to contemplate the setting up of such a scheme as being a remote possibility of the future, but not, I think, in the present.

Whereas, on the contrary, Lord Peel argued, the rapid growth of the idea, and the large amount of sympathy it had enlisted, was a tremendous gain. It would, he added, be one of the most remarkable federations in history. Undoubtedly it would; and the fact that its sponsors stretch over the wide hinterland between the greater Princes and an ex-Secretary of State in a Conservative Cabinet implies an unlooked-for body of support for the federal idea.

I have noted that the Conference was opened in an atmosphere of hope and expectation which contrasts with the general gloom in which the delegates made the journey from India to London. By the time these lines appear in print the Round Table will have covered a large portion of the ground that it is required to survey. The outlook may in the interval have undergone further changes, possibly of serious import. We cannot tell. In the meantime, however, we must take account of the fact that transcends all others in importance—namely, that, while the Conference is at work in London, the eyes of the world are upon an India in revolution; an India which, to many European and American observers, is overflowing with portents that are—or so these observers believe—unrealised and largely unremarked in England, the country most deeply affected by them. It used of old to be said that there were no facts in Ireland. There are men and women living in Britain to-day who are inclined to think that there are no facts—concrete and calculable facts—in India. We British people—responsible, as no people in history has ever been, for decisions affecting the destiny of one-fifth of the human race—will be courting disaster, for ourselves and for India, if we fail to

understand the momentous things that have happened and ar happening in India. Let me try to set forth, in the briefes and simplest terms, a few of the more salient features of the unparalleled crisis upon which, in the November issue . this Review, Sir Francis Younghusband had some earnest an weighty things to say.

India is the most sensitive region of the Oriental world. I is inconceivable that, after a century and a half of Wester influences and British rule, the country could have remain unmoved in the midst of the revolutionary forces which hav transformed the greater part of the Asiatic continent. Let u suppose, as we may, that the prolonged chaos of China ha served as a terrible warning to the educated classes of Indi It is far otherwise with the Moslem countries within easier reach Twenty years ago nothing seemed less possible than tha they should awake. No death of society, it was thought, coul be deeper than that which had fallen upon the Islamic land And yet, within a short space of ten years, India has looke out upon the new life of Turkey and Arabia, of Persia an Afghanistan, and has seen many of the peoples of Central Asi within the Russian system reacting to the harsh stimulus of th Soviets. The traditional Anglo-Indian view has been that, n matter what might happen to Hindu Nationalism, the Moslem of India would remain content with the position of a protecte minority, a steady support to the British Raj. That view w tenable so long as the Islamic peoples from the Black Sea to th borders of China lay undisturbed in their sleep. It disappeare with the creation of the Arab kingdoms, the dictatorship Mustapha Kemal in new Turkey, and the as yet unadvertise efficiency of Riza Khan in Persia. Here is the major part of th explanation of the new Moslem confidence at the Round Tabl National awakening and political consciousness move onl in one direction, towards self-assertion and self-determinatio which mean in the end equality of status with the surroundin world.

Turn now to the profoundly disturbing spectacle which Indi has presented since the revival of civil disobedience nine month ago. Mr. Gandhi's decision to carry out his march fro Ahmedabad to the sea came after three months of vexatio debate and vacillation, during which one thing at least w placed beyond all doubt—the impossibility of negotiating wit the Mahatma. Following the Viceroy's declaration of Novem ber 1, as to the 'natural issue' of Dominion status, Mr. Gandh discussed with a group of Indian leaders, representing differe shades of Nationalism, the conditions under which the Nation Congress Party might enter the Round Table Conference. It

well known that there was, among the political leaders, a strong wish to accept the Viceroy's offer, that as a preliminary Lord Irwin consented to meet Mr. Gandhi and four others, and that the Mahatma, disregarding the points agreed upon before the audience of the Viceroy, took a line in reference to conditions which clearly revealed his own determination to give no sanction to the Round Table. It was perfectly well known that he himself had, from the beginning, intended to stand aside. He is well aware that a constitutional conference is no place for him. Perhaps, indeed, he would agree that there could be few imaginable things more incongruous than that. But it is conceivable that, left alone with Lord Irwin, or freed from the pressure exerted by the Nehrus, he might at any rate have been ready to recommend the choice of National Congress delegates. His refusal to do that, and his refusal to discuss the conditions framed by the political leaders, amounted to a final announcement of his resolve to ignore the experience of the first non-co-operation campaign (1920–22) and risk everything upon a call to mass civil disobedience.

It was this resolve, needless to say, which precipitated the amazing scenes in Bombay and other cities which, since the arrest of the Mahatma in May, have provided the Press of the world with the revelation of an Oriental mass movement without a parallel in the annals of empires. The National Congress leaders themselves were certainly not prepared for this revelation. The Mahatma's own despairing appeals, during the weeks before his arrest, were proof enough that he read failure in his symbolic march and his ritual defiance of the salt laws. We should not be wrong in thinking that the Congress leaders expected the collapse of the civil disobedience campaign when it was made clear that the Government had decided to arrest all the local leaders, to proscribe the Congress organisation, and to make an end of the district 'councils of war.' It appears to be undeniable that the Nationalist leaders were hardly less astonished than the Government was when civil disobedience continued and the boycott was maintained after all the Congress leaders were put in prison.

Since the declaration of independence in January and the defiance of law and authority by the leaders, the National Congress agitation presents three aspects at least which combine to make it unique among mass movements. It is kept up despite the imprisonment of all the leaders of the front rank and the rigorous proscription of its local committees; it has retained, notwithstanding countless acts of lawlessness and the use of repressive force by the police, so large and widespread an element of non-violence as to demonstrate the immense personal influence of the Mahatma; and it has been supported by sections of the Indian

commercial classes, including many industrialists and men wealth, to an extent which has amazed the Government and th British community in India, who—naturally enough—found impossible to believe that manufacturers and merchants coul bring themselves to back a crusade containing the certainty heavy losses for themselves. The events of 1930, however, ar without precedent. They make a record of disturbance an persistence which, combined with the continued popular influenc of the intransigent Congress leaders—Jawaharhal Nehru by fa the most important—adds a chapter of enormous significance t the chronicles of Eastern nationalism.

The first stage of the Conference in London has seemed t bring a promise of settlement greater than had seemed possibl before the gathering at the Round Table. But that more hopeful prospect is counterbalanced by a condition of affairs in India from which it is difficult to infer anything save clouds and darkness for the closing months of Lord Irwin's Viceroyalty—unless the Government, in agreement with the Conservative and Libera leaders, should be enabled to make a decisive gesture at St. James's Palace. There is only one mind at the Round Tabl upon certain matters which are of the essence of the problem. It is realised that the foundations of a settlement must now be laid, that a break-up of the Conference would be an immeasurabl disaster, that the present chance can never recur. It is th supreme opportunity, and as such British and Indian statesmanship must confront it. Sir Francis Younghusband has stated th central issue in terms which I may be permitted to paraphras thus: The policy of Britain towards India has been repeatedl declared, and the British declarations stand. That policy comprises what the Prime Minister at the Guidhall called 'freedom in self-government.' It involves the principle of equal status, an one further principle which might well be announced wit authority and finality—namely, that unwilling membership o the Commonwealth is no longer conceived as possible by th British people. One other thing, surely, is overwhelmingl manifest. Britain cannot hold an unreconciled India. Th Round Table has gone far to demonstrate that a reconciled India is within our reach.

S. K. Ratcliffe.

HEREDITY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS

THE advent to power of a Labour Government has given rise to many problems, but perhaps no body of men have to face greater difficulties than the members of the House of Lords. The responsibility and difficulty of their position must be apparent to all who consider the nature of the situation. On the one hand, the majority of them feel strongly that many of the measures which they are called upon to pass are contrary to the interests of the nation. On the other hand, they are aware that to provoke an election on any but the gravest issues would be more productive of harm than of good. The curtailment of their power by the Parliament Act does to some extent decrease their responsibility, but it is not generally realised that even their present power of delay is sufficient, in the congested state of parliamentary business, in a great measure to wreck the programme of any Government. Although the House of Commons possesses the power to pass a Bill in the teeth of the Lords, yet by a resolute opposition the Upper Chamber can so delay its passing that the rest of the Government's programme would be thrown out of gear.

The firm and yet moderate attitude adopted by the Peers when confronted by the Coal Bill of last session must have come as a surprise to those who considered that the present Upper House is powerless. The Lords' amendments were not confined to points of detail or drafting. They were maintained unaltered in the face of really bitter Labour attacks. They were pressed up to the point at which substantial victory was assured, and it is safe to say that the House, which, by its comparative subservience to Conservative measures of very doubtful wisdom, had to some extent lost prestige during the late Administration, has more than regained it to-day.

But if as a result of future controversies the Government goes to the country on a 'Peers *versus* People' issue the result may well have a fatal effect on Conservative prospects for many years. This is because the actual composition of the House of Lords is misunderstood and deliberately misrepresented in the country. The man in the street thinks of the Peers as a purely hereditary body mainly composed of rich landowners. It is the

object of this article to show the complete fallacy of such a belief by discussing the actual composition of the Upper House.

Over 700 peers have a right to attend the House of Lords. This figure includes minors. The number who do attend fluctuates within much smaller limits. Less than 100 peers may be called regular parliamentarians. A number of others come up for an occasional debate, such as that of the Prayer Book, which attracted the unusual attendance of 329 peers, but do not normally sit. Others make their only appearance in the House in order to speak on some topic in which they are particularly interested. But in 1929 only 138 peers are recorded in *Hansard* as having spoken.

Divisions in the House of Lords take place at very irregular intervals. The small numbers of the Labour Party make it unprofitable for them to challenge many. The practice is very different from that of the House of Commons, where divisions are frequent. Moreover, the practice of abstention from the Lobbies is much more common in the Upper than in the Lower Chamber. Any analysis of the divisions would, I feel, give a fallacious picture of the actual weight of the hereditary element in the House of Lords. The power that a peer enjoys does not consist so much in his vote as in the privilege of using the House of Lords as a platform from which he may use his powers of persuasion. It is not uncommon to see the Government, after marshalling their followers to defeat the amendment of a private peer, subsequently accepting its substance in an amendment of their own. The House of Lords, more truly than the House of Commons, is a deliberative assembly, and there is probably no assembly in the world in which a persuasive speech has more influence, though that influence is not to be measured by its immediate effect in the Lobby. An analysis of the importance of the hereditary element in the House of Lords will rather be gained by a study of *Hansard* than by the division lists. The analysis of *Hansard* (House of Lords) for 1929 discloses some interesting facts. A peer who never speaks probably seldom votes. In 1929, 138 peers addressed the House of Lords. Of these 73 owed their membership of the Chamber to heredity and 65, including bishops and law lords, to their own prominence. Thus more than 43 per cent. of the speakers were created peers, law lords, or bishops.

An even more striking result is obtained if we analyse the columns of *Hansard* spoken. Out of 2131 columns in 1929, only 639 were spoken by hereditary peers. Twenty-seven were spoken by bishops and the large figure of 1465 by created peers. This is partly due to the fact that most front-bench speakers are created, not hereditary, peers. Thus the hereditary peers occupied less than 32 per cent. of the time of the House. *Out of*

three words uttered in the 'hereditary' Chamber two came from the lips of non-hereditary peers.

I have spoken in this article of 'those who owe their membership of the Chamber to heredity.' But we are not to assume that the hereditary system is solely responsible for the high positions that most of the active peers hold in the State. Without suggesting that the weight of their counsels is to be measured by the amount of *Hansard* that their speeches occupy, we may safely assume that the active House of Lords member speaks more than ten columns of *Hansard* in a year. Now let us look at the noblemen who exceeded this length in their speeches in 1929. I speak here only of lords who have inherited their titles. It is surprising to find that they are only nineteen in number—a tribute, perhaps, to the usual brevity of peers' speeches. Of this number ten have for longer or shorter periods been members of the House of Commons. In their case it is obvious that the hereditary system has curtailed, not increased, their power in the State. Few would exchange the position of an M.P. for a peerage without some regret and a sense of diminished power and influence. It is interesting to note that of the remaining nine peers two were members of the Labour Party and two are Liberals.

What do these figures show? Surely, that the *actual* membership of the House of Lords (as opposed to its potential membership of non-attending peers) is not of a character to justify the gibes levelled against its hereditary character by 'progressives.' In fact, the majority of those who regularly or frequently attend the sessions would be found worthy of a place in a reformed Chamber. The bulk of the 'reformed peers' would, of necessity, have to be men of considerable political experience. That is certainly true of the present House. They must, it is urged, have among them a considerable number of experts and of men who have won recognition in the professions. Here, again, the present House satisfies the conditions: no profession is unrepresented among the peers. The suggestion has often been put forward that representation should be given to other ecclesiastical bodies than the Church of England; in practice this obtains in the present House. Whenever the interests of a particular denomination—be it Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, or Jewish—are involved a spokesman for his co-religionists can be found among the peers of to-day.

In one respect only does the actual attending membership of the House of Lords differ markedly from a reformed House. It is most desirable that in the latter there should be an adequate representation of trade unions. Although several members of the House of Lords have in the past earned the right to be called

manual workers, none of them is, I believe, a trade unionis dealing with labour problems it is a disadvantage that the hears the employer's side of any dispute set forth with knowledge and does not hear the opinions of trade union first hand. In point of fact, the veteran leaders of trade would not find the atmosphere of the House of Lords uncon They would meet there men of long administrative exp whose fundamental point of view is not dissimilar to their The main reason why the present Government has not tri experiment of introducing this element into the House natural dislike of trade unionists to accept hereditary ho Life peerages would meet the case more satisfactorily. Government were seriously anxious to improve the efficier the House of Lords—which they are not—they could within its present limits and without tackling the extremel cult question of its ultimate reform.

Many proposals for a reformed House have been put fo in recent years. But before we consider the different meth choosing members—by local authorities, by special ele divisions, by panels of the House of Commons, or by appoin —we should make up our minds as to the type of men sc With the exception noted above, the most proper men i country to fulfil the duties of members of a revising chamb already to be found in the present House, and they are the who, in *any* sensible scheme of reform, would ultimately pose it. The principal reason for the hostility of Labour t reform proposals of 1927 and those brought forward by Midleton and other peers in subsequent years was in resp the retention of the hereditary element. So far the Peers insisted upon this. All proposals for reform have giver hereditary peers a right of nominating some of their numb seats in the reformed House, if they did not prefer the char election to the Commons. It is seriously to be quest whether, in the interests of the peerage itself, such a condit really necessary. An analysis of the hereditary peers actually take a considerable part in the debates of the Hous show that they are nearly all men of such experience and pol capacity that their nomination to a reformed House by moderate Government would be practically certain. Is it r necessary to safeguard, by a provision which would certainly unpopular in many quarters, the modicum of the rights of peers who seldom attend the House and whose share in its de is small ? I do not wish to be understood as decrying the ac tages of heredity in politics, but in the circumstances I whether it is worth while to uphold it to such an extent prejudice an agreed settlement of the problem of reform.

only by an agreed settlement will the reformed House, if it ever comes into being, command the necessary influence in the country.

The so-called 'backwoodsman' by no means deserves the strictures generally levelled against him. Immersed in the care of his estates, in local work of an administrative character, in the government of industry or in his profession, he naturally has little time to attend the sittings of the House. But his contributions to national politics, though rare, are often extremely valuable. Many of the most important and fruitful debates in the House have been initiated by peers who seldom attend its sittings. These men are experts in some particular subject: the House of Lords probably contains a greater number and a wider range of experts than any other body. The ideas and experience which these 'backwoodsmen' bring to its debates are of incalculable national value, and it is important that in any reformed House that contribution should be preserved. Might not this be effected by giving to all hereditary peers *a seat without a vote* in the Upper Chamber?

Nothing has here been said on the question of the powers of a reformed House. The conviction is steadily growing among the peers and others interested in reform problems that this should not at present be discussed. When the membership of the House of Lords has been reformed the question of powers may arise, but it is more probable that a reformed House confidently using the powers at present theoretically attached to the unreformed House would find those powers amply sufficient. It is the menace of a 'Peers *versus* People' election, rather than the Parliament Act, that curtails our powers.

There is little hope that any Government will seriously take in hand the task of reform of the House of Lords. The weakness of the last Administration—or perhaps we should say the thoughtlessness and intransigence of some Conservative members of Parliament—let slip an opportunity that is unlikely to recur. But Lord Hugh Cecil has recently set us an excellent example in keeping the matter in the public mind by publishing a scheme of reform in a pamphlet. His proposal to leave the present House of Lords 'high and dry' as a dignified debating society, while constituting a Third Chamber to do most of their work, is open to one serious objection. There are not enough first-class brains in politics to make two efficient Chambers under the present system. Where, one may well ask, would be found the human material for *three* Chambers? But it is important for his scheme, as well as others, to be discussed. While our legislative machinery goes halting on an injured leg, ill-conceived and ill-drafted legislation will continue to handicap the country.

IDDESLEIGH.

THE RIDDLE OF RUSSIA

It has been said that in the time of Catherine II. Europe was completely mystified about Russia. A similar mystification, perhaps more explicable, prevails to-day. Unfortunately the testimony of those to whom one would naturally look for guidance—those who lived in Russia for years, and are not now restrained by Bolshevist supervision—is often of little value. Their personal losses or prejudices debar them from seeing objectively. When not explaining why all the prophecies made during a decade have been successively falsified, they are intent upon drawing comparisons between 1913 and 1930. That contrast may be of historical value. But those seeking to peer into the future turn with more interest to a comparison between 1929 and 1930. It is not what Czarism might have done, but what Communism has done and is doing, which alone can throw any light on the problem.

The idea that the Bolshevist leaders are all rogues and adventurers must be dismissed. It is confuted by their mode of life. With the power at their disposal they could satisfy the most exacting fancies and indulge in the greatest luxury. But they pass an austere and laborious existence. It is not entirely a coincidence that the two or three who have erred in this respect have fallen from power. Even comfort is hardly possible on an income of 250*l*. a year, though one pays no rent, is provided with a motor car, and can obtain free theatre tickets. Nor have these men even that outward appanage of power which flatters the vanity of many democrats. They submit to a party discipline which, in rigidity and strictness, is equalled only by that of Fascism. It is not extraordinary that (apart from those who fear to return to Russia for political reasons) there are from time to time officials of the Soviet Government abroad who, having tasted of the fleshpots, are unwilling to take up again that life of unremitting toil. Official corruption, a handicap of good government from the days of Peter the Great, and which was responsible for the Japanese War and the subsequent downfall of the Czarist *régime*, has been in a great degree eliminated. A murderer will only suffer imprisonment for a few years. Peculation at the expense of the

State may lead to capital punishment; and on such charges Communists are judged more severely than those who are outside the party pale.

It would be futile to dwell upon the horrors which form part of the story of the Russian Revolution; and equally futile to seek to excuse them. The Bolsheviks are practical revolutionaries, and therefore terrorism is one of their natural weapons. Every revolution gives rise to cruelties which appear as senseless as they are appalling. Rosa Luxemburg truly said that at close range the great French Revolution must have seemed a bloody and useless farce. It is only in the course of time that these inevitable accompaniments of any violent national upheaval assume their proper proportion. The psychology of terrorism may be interesting; and probably revolutionaries sometimes become terrorised themselves by the phantom of counter-revolution. But the Bolsheviks, who have no nerves, belong to a *different* category. There is reason to believe that in this respect Russian terrorism is defeating its own ends. The foreign engineers and experts in Moscow do not conceal the fact that their work is often delayed or impeded because their Russian colleagues are too afraid of possible consequences to do anything on their own responsibility.

The Bolshevist leaders are attempting a grandiose experiment. They are not actuated by hope of personal reward, but solely by their belief in a political economic creed which they have exalted into a religion. Their sincerity is as unquestionable as is their ruthless and unscrupulous application of the doctrine that in the maintenance and propagation of their faith the means justify the end. They resemble less the makers of the French Revolution than the Spanish inquisitors. The strength of their convictions makes them genuinely indifferent to the judgment of this generation. Time alone can definitely pronounce whether they are far-seeing statesmen or misguided fanatics. But at present they are inoculating the Russian people with a belief in their convictions. To an extent unsuspected in Western Europe, those who are not Communists, including many who were once definitely hostile to Communism, are beginning to believe, almost reluctantly, that the new order of things will finally enure to their material welfare. The unflinching confidence Bolshevism shows in itself has contributed to this result almost as much as the constant propaganda of its precepts.

Even one who finds the political doctrines of Communism repugnant, and its economic theories of doubtful value, conceives that it should be possible to regard the panorama (and everything is still kaleidoscopic) with reasonable detachment. However much Europeans may disapprove of the methods used by Asiatics in what is fundamentally an Asiatic country, the only opinion on

that subject which possesses any practical importance is that of the people directly affected. And since there is no parallel of this stupendous attempt of a great country, which is unable to borrow money abroad and unwilling to obtain capital by developing its natural resources in partnership with foreign capitalists, seeking to industrialise itself at reckless speed, and to pay its own way while engaged in that costly operation, one may well murmur, 'L'expériment vaut d'être vue.'

Eighty-five per cent. of the 150,000,000 people who dwell in Russia live on or by the land. There are more than 25,000,000 peasant families. The United States, with a population of 120,000,000, has in all about 6,500,000 farm units. The problem of the peasants is, therefore, of paramount importance.

One hears of the dictatorship of the peasants and proletariat. It is perhaps significant that the Constitution should mention only the 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' The sole qualification of this bald assertion is a subsequent reference to that dictatorship 'mustering around itself the majority of the population.' To what extent, after ten years, has the proletariat mustered around itself the peasantry, which constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population? The Bolsheviks were alert to turn the revolution to their advantage. In 1917 they did not forget the lesson to be drawn from 1905. That astute observer Count Witte once wrote that the essential part of the 1905 outbreak was the peasants' cry, 'Give us land.' Of the various groups weltering in the turmoil of 1917 it was only the Bolsheviks who realised the importance of this fact. Lenin won the support of the peasants when he advised them to seize and divide among themselves the estates of the great proprietors, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. The peasants neither knew nor cared anything about the theories of Marx and Engels. Bolshevism earned their temporary support simply because it partly satisfied their land hunger. In fact, the revolution did not abolish private ownership in land as the peasants had known it, but only abolished private ownership of vast properties by great landlords. At the same time, it acknowledged the practical peasant ownership of small properties, augmented enormously the number of these holdings, and in many cases increased them in size.

The dilemma was obvious; and the Bolshevist leaders were under no illusion. They recognised that Russia could not be considered a Communist country, although the land was theoretically vested in the State, so long as 85 per cent. of the population was able to insist upon being guaranteed *bourgeois* privileges. It was therefore necessary either quickly and absolutely to subjugate the peasants, or patiently to try to inoculate them with

the serum of Communism. To the first course there were several objections. Comparatively, the number of peasants was overwhelming. However, their inability to combine or to organise rendered that an almost negligible danger. Of more importance was the fact that 75 per cent. of the Red Army was composed of peasants. There was thus always the risk of unpleasant repercussions if that class became too dissatisfied. That would have been fatal, since the army is one of the two shields which ensures the safety of the *régime*. Finally, the Soviet administration was dependent upon the good-will of the peasants in order to get the means to industrialise the country—dependent upon them for the surplus grain which could be sold abroad for the gold necessary for machinery, and to pay for foreign technical assistance.

Lenin was always greatly impressed by the gravity of the problem. But the solution he advocated varied. At one moment he asserted that there was no necessity to make unwilling converts of the peasants. He contended that as they perceived the advantages of Communism they would embrace it of their own accord. At first he had no doubt that it would be possible to reconcile the views and interests of the proletariat and the peasants, and that therefore the revolution could triumph and Soviet Russia could thrive in isolation as a Communist State. On this subject Trotsky followed the ideas of Marx more closely than did Lenin. He was convinced that no real unity between the proletariat and the peasantry could ever be attained. In his opinion, therefore, the Russian Revolution could never be successful except through the support of similar uprisings in Western Europe.

As time passed Lenin became less confident of any speedy solution, while not abandoning his contention that it was possible finally to reach an agreement between the two elements. This change in his ideas was reflected when he said:

> The critical question is whether we shall be able to proletariatise the peasants before they are able to organise themselves against us. Their numbers are overwhelming, and they could swamp us. The conversion of the peasants can only be carried out by electrification and tractorisation—thousands and thousands of tractors must be brought into use. . . . It is by communal farming that the Socialist State is systematically progressing by gradual stages.

Wise words! But it was Lenin himself who set them at defiance. The peasants having answered his purpose in ousting the great landed proprietors, he inaugurated the period of Militant Communism. The poorer peasants were incited against their richer neighbours. All crops in excess of what was necessary for bare subsistence were confiscated, in order to obtain a maximum supply of grain for sale abroad. Then began a stubborn struggle. Moscow

used all the forces at its command, not excluding the most violent measures of terrorism and coercion. The peasants held firm, hid their produce, and eventually refused to sow. The people in the towns suffered, as food ceased to come from the country. This was the *impasse* when the sailors of Kronstadt, who in 1917 had turned the tide of the revolution, rose in rebellion. They threatened to take the situation into their own hands unless the whole policy was reversed, and the peasants were allowed to produce and sell freely. The Communist leaders, always resolute in action when faced by a physical crisis, did not hesitate. They repressed the revolt with a strong hand. But the sinister warning was not lost on them. Militant Communism was succeeded by the New Economic Policy, and confiscation gave way to a tax on produce.

In 1925 Stalin made further concessions, whereby the richer peasants were allowed to take more land on lease, and to employ a limited amount of labour—which was also a distinct benefit to the poorer peasants, whose time is never fully occupied on their own holdings. The opposition of Kamenev and Zinoviev to this policy led to their being expelled from the inner councils of the Communist Party. Stalin, an Asiatic of Asiatics, has always contended that Soviet Russia could survive as a Communist State, even were no other European country to adopt the same system. Leaving aside possible personal differences (respecting which the evidence is necessarily scanty and obscure), that was the essence of his difference with Kamenev and Zinoviev. But he believes that the socialisation of Soviet Russia will—or anyway must—come through collective farming. Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky declared, in effect, that the *tempo* of industrialisation was too rapid, that collective farming was not feasible within any reasonable time, and that the State would have to leave the individual farmers to their own devices, since it was absolutely dependent on their good-will. This was almost abandoning Communism as a lost cause. It was not simply that they were opposed to pressure being put upon the peasants. The matter was more important and went much deeper. This explains why, although Stalin had already relaxed the pressure on the peasants, and Rykov and Tomsky had already publicly recanted, they were compelled to do so again at the Congress of the party in July 1930, when (Bukharin was absent on account of illness) they were even cruelly pilloried and mercilessly ridiculed.

In March 1930 Stalin modified the orders given at the end of 1929. There had been a gross abuse of the arbitrary power given to the local soviets to ruin those alleged to be Kulaks. Tens of thousands of cattle were slaughtered by those who feared to be given that dreaded cognomen if they owned more than one cow; and Soviet Russia is, in consequence, suffering to-day from a

scarcity of meat. Within a few weeks after the new decrees had been issued many thousands deserted the collective institutions and returned to individual farming. To-day proportionately 30 per cent. of the peasants are collectivists. This is considerably less than the number at the height of the campaign of forcible collectivisation. Still, seven or eight years ago the total was only per cent.; and it may be recalled that between 1926–27 and 27–28—in the space of twelve months, when no pressure was brought to bear—the number and area of collective farms just doubled.

There is the root of the whole matter. The cause of collective farming in Russia needs no support except that provided by ample and visible demonstration of its benefits. Any impulsion of another kind from Moscow will only defeat its own ends by arousing the suspicion of the peasants. The Soviet Government is fortunate, since in this instance sound economic policy coincides with its political aims. There is no doubt that in the ordinary course the number of collective farms would continue to increase steadily, until the vast majority of the peasants had adopted one or other form of the collective system. But Communism must ever press the *tempo*, and can rarely let time do its beneficent work. That is a weakness inherent in all revolutions.

Those who imagine that the Russian peasants are hoping for change of *régime* misconceive the facts. Their standard of life higher than it was before the revolution, but they are even less content, for now they have been taught to expect more. In the jargon of the day, their class-consciousness has been awakened. They resent the fact that the supply of the manufactured articles they need is restricted, and that they can get less of them, for any given amount of their agricultural produce, than before the revolution. Moreover, in view of their ingrained individualism, certain restrictions weigh upon them more heavily than upon the proletariat. They are more articulate about these grievances than about what they have gained. But they are never unmindful of the fact that it was the revolution which gave them the land that they had coveted for generations. Their anticipations were not fully realised. But they recognise that whatever was available was divided amongst them. Now they have no great landlords over them. They are therefore suspicious about any change of *régime*, and hostile to it in advance. They argue that it could only be to their detriment. They are unable to conceive that they would be left in undisturbed possession of the land they seized. The Russian peasants will never be Communists at heart, though by adopting collective farming they may appear to practise the theories of Communism. But in a large measure they accept the present *régime*; and, although they want more liberty

than it gives them at present, they definitely do not want to see it superseded.

The increase in grain production is striking. After the war and the days of militant Communism it sank, in 1921, to 34 per cent. of the 1913 crop. By 1927 it had risen to 77 per cent., and has since exceeded the pre-war total. The wheat-producing area under cultivation this year was said to be 6 per cent. greater than that sown in 1913. The Soviet authorities find this persistent progress encouraging. But circumstances beyond their control have upset their calculations. The world is glutted with grain, and there is no natural market for the surplus produced by Russia. The 1930 Russian crop is somewhat larger than that of 1929, which was a good average year. This has enabled the Soviet Government to make heavy sales abroad below the market price. However, since it pays for the grain in its own paper money and is paid for it in gold, any price is practically pure profit. And the end is not yet, in respect either to grain or manufactured articles. Nevertheless, ruthless dumping is likely to prove a two-edged sword, and to end by restricting rather than increasing the total of Soviet Russia's exports. It is significant that, acting under the provisions of an existing law, the French Government now proposes to establish a system of import licences for various products sold abroad by Soviet Russia.

The Bolsheviks can repeat Peter the Great's boast that he had made the Russian people work as they had never worked before. The thoroughness with which the State has mobilised the working power of the nation is illustrated by the number employed. In 1922–23 there were 6,636,000 engaged in industry, transport, building, health work, and other branches of activity. This number increased in the succeeding years as follows: 7,330,000, 8,256,000, 9,808,000, 10,313,000, and 11,801,000. To-day the total is well over 13,000,000, or approximately double what it was eight years ago. This accounts for the increased production. For the production has increased substantially, although quality has not always kept pace with quantity. Since 1927–28 both the amount and the value of the industrial output has surpassed that of 1913. About 99 per cent. of all that is produced comes from State organisations. Notwithstanding the increased production, there has only twice been a favourable trade balance—in 1926–27 and in 1928–29. The figures for the first seven months of the fiscal year 1929–30 showed a large adverse balance. But the period when exports are usually heavier—May to October—had yet to come.

In order to reach any conclusions about the Russian situation the official basic figures must be accepted as correct. Only the Soviet Government knows the facts. Those critics who reject *en*

lies the Soviet's statistics are left with only their own conjectures and predilections as a foundation. No good reason has ever been advanced for condemning Soviet accounting in this wholesale fashion. Contradictions are sometimes disclosed. But figures are as clay in the hands of the potter for anyone who has a little ingenuity in the art of making them perform. An American authority, who recently spent some time in Russia,[1] decided that the 'statistics prepared by the Commissariat of Finance represent profound study, and compare favourably in accuracy with those prepared by similar institutions in most other countries.'

Russia is to-day a country of statistics. Too much is expected from them, and there is a tendency to attempt to prove too much by them. But it is an error to imagine that all figures issued by the State are treated as sacred. In this, as in many other matters of fact, the Communists are their own severest critics. Only a few months ago, when statistics issued about the progress of collective farming seemed too favourable, they were immediately denounced by the Moscow Press.

The official basic figures, those relating to the amount of agricultural or industrial production, to the amount of gold reserve, and to similar subjects, must, I think, be accepted as accurate. But the Soviet Government sometimes arranges its statistics in the fashion which will present the position in the best possible light, even when it has to do so at the expense of clarity.

It is difficult to assess the financial situation of Soviet Russia. Upon analysing the budget, one finds that what may be called the ordinary budget is comparatively simple and quite moderate. But a budget including the whole economy of a State which jealously monopolises all foreign commerce, and controls, directly or otherwise, a great percentage of internal trade, must necessarily be complicated. In one way the position of the Government is strengthened by its entire freedom from any question of exchange. It uses its paper money (which it maintains at a fictitious figure by the simple process of not allowing it to be taken out of or brought into the country) in payment for the produce which it sells abroad for gold. The fact that the Government itself absorbs, and uses for its own ends, the outcome of all labour, over and above what suffices to provide a bare existence for the toilers, and that it controls and regulates prices, gives it peculiar powers of manipulation. Apparently it can inflate and deflate at will.

The Soviet Government claims that the Russian working man is better off than under the Czarist *régime*. That contention is derided by many critics. But there can be no doubt that rela-

[1] Mr. Bruce C. Hopper, *formerly an instructor at Harvard.*

tively the position of the working man has been greatly improved. He gets the best that is obtainable, little and poor as that may be. No one is treated so well. To-day there is no wealthier class which he sees or envies. He is made to believe that he is the important person in the State; and, given the pettiness of human nature, that counts for much. Above all, he has been made to feel that he is the part-owner of every enterprise. Amongst the more positive advantages he enjoys are the provision made for the education of his children, and the fact that he himself gets the best of care when he falls ill. The diminished power of his increased wages do not allow him to have any comforts; but he never had any in the past. The great difference to-day is that he has a firm belief in the future. He is convinced that he must necessarily submit to a low standard of living to-day in order to attain a higher level on a permanent basis. This enables him to do a maximum of work on a minimum of sustenance. Despite certain peculiar privileges he possesses, the general conditions under which he lives certainly compare unfavourably with those prevalent in Western Europe. But of that he knows nothing, and even does not believe it when told. In Russia the people are at present nourished—over and above what just suffices for their existence—on skilfully administered injections of hope, which answer their purpose extremely well. Possibly that is because hope is a stimulant to which the Russians were unaccustomed in former times. They are confident that the plans in process of execution will, within the next few years, enable them all to live upon a higher scale. Time alone can tell whether they are being deluded.

The Five-Year Plan is designed, *inter alia*, to industrialise a country which has always been overwhelmingly agricultural. It contemplates that in 1932–33, although the grain exports will have been greatly increased, the total agricultural exports shall be only 50 per cent. of the grand total. The plan proposes to do more than double production in both branches. It also provides for the amelioration of social conditions, including a great increase in the available housing. Much has been written about what has already been accomplished or is under way. There is the great tractor factory at Stalingrad, with its housing accommodation for 10,000 men, which, when in full operation, will turn out 100,000 tractors every year; or, as the Communists like to express it, one every five minutes of the twenty-four hours, day and night. In Leningrad is the largest electrical equipment factory in the world. And there is also a Ford motor factory, the immense Dnieprostroy hydraulic station, and the large cement works being established at different points throughout the country.

The Five-Year Plan has not been executed in its entirety in

either of the two years it has been in operation. But an impartial observer will probably be astonished by what has been accomplished. The incomplete details which have been published during the past few weeks indicate that a very great percentage of the programme for 1929–30 has been carried out. Only the implacable Communist leaders are likely to regard this as a failure, especially as there has been an important increase in the production of pig iron. It is the light-industry section of the Five-Year Plan which is falling behind. The costly equipment of heavy industry absorbs most of the available money. This will bear hardly on the proletariat and peasantry, which were counting on the light-industry factories to supply them with the manufactured articles which they so sorely need.

All Russians seem to be interested in the Five-Year Plan. All are working feverishly for it. Many hundreds of thousands who have no liking for Communism are enthusiastic about it. They are impressed by the grandeur of the conception, are confident that it will minister to their ultimate welfare, and readily make the sacrifices which its completion demands. The Five-Year Plan is not Communist, though it is being carried out by Communist methods. The industrialisation of Russia is a natural economic development, which was even progressing in the final period of the bankrupt empire. It was not difficult to increase the *tempo*, when everyone was made to work for the State. But that is only half—and the simpler half—of communisation. The equalisation of distribution is more complicated than the harnessing of all labour to one chariot. So long as a low level is set for all, a fair measure of equality is possible. But it will become increasingly difficult to maintain that equality in proportion to the raising of the standard of living. The late Lord Balfour's gibe, that Bolshevism was an excellent instrument for making all poorer, but had yet to prove that it made anyone richer, was the terse enunciation of a problem which one day will perhaps tax the ingenuity of the Communist Party.

The opinions of the principal American engineers and other experts, whose services have been retained by the State, are of exceptional value. It would probably be a fair summary to say that they have been astonished by the general desire to learn, and by the quickness the Russians have displayed, especially in their comprehension of everything mechanical; disappointed by the lack of application and of perseverance; and appalled by the entire absence of organising or directing ability. They see no reason why the Soviet Government should not be able to carry out its plans of industrialisation, in so far as they are limited to building great factories and obtaining the labour and raw material necessary for mass production. They doubt whether it will be

possible to operate them successfully without the aid of foreign managers and technicians. They are amazed by the docility of the people; and they consider that Russia is the only country in the world which excels their own in richness and variety of undeveloped natural resources.

More illuminating than statistics are the attitude and sentiments of the Russian people. They form a curious object-lesson in the effect of habit, and the result of listening to the same story, day after day, over a long period of years. No one who has not recently been in Soviet Russia can fully realise the miracle wrought by constant and intelligent propaganda, together with segregation from the rest of the world. For it is little short of a miracle that, notwithstanding all hardships, the majority of Russians actually believe that they are better off than the masses in other countries, and indignantly reject all suggestions to the contrary. Communist foreign propaganda is an inferior product. It is sometimes absurdly inept, and is rarely so extensive as is usually supposed. It derives some of its importance from the very fact that it is exaggerated by a certain portion of the Press.

Russian propaganda abroad is carried on less with the object or hope of forcing a speedy issue than in order to worry and engage the attention of capitalistic countries, so as to prevent any attack during the reconstruction period. For the Soviet Government is almost absurdly nervous of a conflict being forced upon it. It believes that sooner or later a clash with Russia's most ancient enemy, Poland, must come about. The result is not feared; but it is clearly realised that even a successful war would delay the continuation of its economic plans, and to some extent destroy the work already accomplished. Soviet Russia devotes 12·7 per cent. of her budget to military purposes, as compared with 35 per cent. so spent by Poland. It may be confidently asserted that the aviation and chemical branches are under German direction. This co-operation has become closer within the last twelve months. It is noteworthy that, although Russian Communism is based on the theory of internationalism, it has aroused sentiments of nationalism more intense and more widespread than ever prevailed in the days of the Romanoffs. Anyone who imagines that the Russian people are sunk in the depths of apathetic resignation will be amazed to discover how often it only requires a little scratching to disclose a Chauvinist.

Stalin is the supreme master. He has a firmer hold on the situation than Lenin ever had. He neither enjoys an equal measure of popularity, nor does his personality have the same influence on the country. But he has the party machine more completely within his grasp. Stalin does not inspire affection or devotion as did Lenin, but he is much more feared by his political

associates. The Russian people do not put him on a pedestal as they did Lenin, even during his lifetime. They probably will not venerate his memory after death. But he is indispensable to the Communist Party. He lacks Lenin's imagination and breadth of vision. But the fact that he is a pure Asiatic better qualifies him to direct the Communist Party at the present stage. For Russian Communism is basically Asiatic—unlike the old autocracies or the new dictatorships of Europe. Only an Asiatic could conceive it in its present form, only an Asiatic people would submit to it, and probably none but an Asiatic can fully comprehend it.

The interesting and perhaps decisive point in the history of Russian Communism will be reached when the generation which is now growing up—the generation which has been born and nurtured in Communism, and has never known anything else—obtains control of the political and economic direction of the State. Relatively that will be at no very distant date; for it is the tendency and practice of Communism to give office and power to the young, and constantly to oust their elders in order to make way for them. It may safely be assumed that all Communists to-day occupying a position of great responsibility have momentary doubts about the success of the grandiose plan to which their party has committed itself and Russia. They believe that if they succeed in their designs they will go down to history as the regenerators of the human race. But they realise that if the force of circumstances should overpower them and wreck their plan, posterity will not concern itself with them further than contemptuously to query whether they were more fools than knaves, or more knaves than fools. Far different is it with those of the coming generation. From their earliest days the principles of Communism have been drilled into them at every turn and at every moment. Many of them have never read a foreign newspaper. They sincerely believe that they are better off than others, and that their future mission is to rescue and enlighten the oppressed proletariat of Europe. The party propaganda has succeeded to an almost incredible degree in breeding a race of Communists which is convinced that it can descry, and to some extent even mould, the future, and which is never tortured by any passing or lingering doubt.

To summarise: The Soviet *régime* is firmly established. It maintains itself by force, but its strength does not lie solely in force. In the natural order of events the number of its implacable opponents is dwindling year by year, partly through the gradual disappearance of the older generation. Nor have those who remain firm in opposition anything to suggest in its place. The idea of a new Czarism is repugnant to them, and of the *emigrés* they usually speak with lofty pity. Whether Russia is becoming

Communist is another question. The Communist Party is un taking to industrialise in an incredibly short period a great agri tural country, and to meet the cost out of income. Two elem essential to the experiment were a State monopoly of all lal and production, and some confidence on the part of the peopl the feasibility of the scheme and Communist ability to bring i fruition. The first already existed. The second has been insp to a degree which sometimes seems fantastic. Almost invaria underneath all restiveness and irritation, one finds the firm (viction that the Five-Year Plan spells salvation. The n striking feature in Russian life to-day is this hope, despite adverse conditions. Perhaps the explanation is that, contı to the general idea, the passage of time has played in favo the Soviet Government. Burdens long supported have bec tolerable, and the continued existence of the *régime* has bred in the success of its plans and increased the number of its herents. But the only vital questions are—what is the limi the endurance of the Russian people ? and will the Commu leaders make the mistake of overstepping that limit ? It is evident that only the future can supply the answers. In meantime, Western Europe is committing the mistake of un rating the progress which is being made, and of exaggerating dissatisfaction of the people.

LAURANCE LYO

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

DURING 1917–18 a Parliamentary Committee, representative of all parties and of the Civil Service, with Lord Haldane as its chairman, inquired generally into the functions of government, as they obtained both before and during the war, and made far-reaching recommendations for procedure when peace was restored. The old order of things, a Cabinet consisting of departmental ministers meeting under the Prime Minister, they condemned out of hand. 'The inevitable outcome of our existing method of organization is,' they stated, 'a tendency to Lilliputian administration.'

The growth of bureaucracy was foreseen and safeguards were suggested. These fall broadly under two heads—first, more effective supervision by the Cabinet over the activities of the departments, and, secondly, more real and more stringent control by Parliament itself over departmental methods. The Cabinet, they say, must be small in number, and should be composed mainly, if not entirely, of ministers without portfolio. The proved impracticability of a Cabinet minister having leisure to think out organisation and preparation for action 'in the mere interstices of the time required for the transaction of business' is emphasised. In other words, he must be freed from departmental cares and pre-occupations. To enable the House of Commons to exercise effective control over the departments it is recommended that Estimates and Accounts should be made more significant of the expenditure proposed or recorded in them, that a series of Standing Committees should be formed, each charged with the consideration of the activities of a group of cognate departments, and that the ministers in charge of departments, as well as their subordinate officials, should appear before these Standing Committees.

That some such checks are needed is made clear, not only by the rapid extension during recent years of bureaucratic practices, but also by the failure of departments to reduce their establishments to anything approaching pre-war dimensions, even though the work they are now called on to do is, in some instances, appreciably less than in 1914. Nor is this result surprising. No

Cabinet composed wholly or mainly of departmental chiefs is likely to be economically minded or to prove itself an adec supervisory body. Each minister, quite naturally, has his departmental axe to grind, and each is fully aware that, starts throwing stones at his colleagues' departments, he discover that he himself is living in a glass house. Moreo the temptation to indulge in the pastime known as log-rollin obvious. Under such conditions the departments stand to on every occasion, without check or hindrance from above.

A new note—new, that is, to the present generation—is str in the Committee's Report. A distinction is advocated betw the executive powers derived from the Crown and the finan powers which have their origin in the House of Commons. clear-cut cleavage between the functions of direction w properly pertain to the Cabinet and the work of the departme minister is implicit throughout the whole Report, and, in t proposals for a drastic rearrangement of departmental duties, Committee have attempted to disentangle the executive busi of government from the purely administrative.

Had they seen fit to do so, they might have added that distinction they advocate and all its implications were, till li more than 100 years ago, regarded as a bed-rock principle of Constitution. During the eighteenth century no head o department or supply board was in the Cabinet. The First L of the Admiralty, the sole apparent exception to this rule, o his Cabinet rank to his representing the executive office of Lord High Admiral, then, as now, in commission. With exception of naval and judicial business, all executive actio fulfilment of policy, both in peace and in war, fell to the F Lord of the Treasury and to two, later three, Secretarie State. The sphere of responsibility of each of these execu authorities was clearly defined.

The invasion of the Cabinet by departmental ministers comparatively modern innovation, and matters have now reac such a pass that every head of a department, no matter h insignificant it may be, is prepared to maintain that his dignity and the dignity of his department are impugned unles has a seat in the Cabinet. During little more than 100 y the Cabinet has been doubled in size, and there is no valid rea why it should not be redoubled in another century or so, un measures are adopted to check its growth. A redrawing of lines of demarcation between executive and administra duties, as proposed by the Haldane Committee, would be a step in the right direction.

The Committee refer in terms of strong approval to existing arrangement in the Army, where 'the principle has

adopted of placing the business of inquiry and thinking in the hands of persons definitely charged with it, whose duty it is to study the future and advise those engaged in actual administration.' 'This principle,' they add, 'ought by no means to be limited in its application to military and naval affairs. The business of executive government has been seriously embarrassed from the incomplete application to it of similar methods.' As a preliminary step to the further discussion of the Committee's recommendations I propose to follow out the train of thought suggested by these paragraphs taken from their Report, and to inquire what advantages have accrued where the principle in question has been logically applied in military affairs, and what disadvantages have ensued from its non-observance. Broadly, for the purposes of such an inquiry, the history of the Army may be divided into three periods, the first period lasting from 1689 until the Crimean War, the interval of forty odd years between the Crimean War and the Boer War forming the second period, and the time that has elapsed since then constituting the third period.

The outstanding feature of the first period was the strict maintenance of a clear line of separation between executive and administrative functions. The bargain struck in 1689 between William III. and Parliament is common knowledge. The size of the Army and the funds necessary for its maintenance were matters to be decided by Parliament, its government and command being exercised by the Crown, which acted through one of the Secretaries of State. When the system eventually reached full fruition powers of command were delegated to a Commander-in-Chief, whose headquarters were at the Horse Guards in Whitehall, while the Secretary-at-War, with his office in Pall Mall, was the principal administrator of the Army. Both approached the Cabinet through one or other of the Secretaries of State, who, in the words of one who had himself been Secretary-at-War, 'could move and control the machine without being troubled with its details.' This system was strenuously upheld and defended by statesmen like Castlereagh, Liverpool, and Palmerston for constitutional reasons, and on practical and military grounds by Wellington and Hardinge. In the Navy till 1831 and in the Army in India till 1905 a similar distinction between executive and administrative duties was rigidly maintained.

Further, it is an interesting though little known fact that German military institutions, since copied in most countries, had their origin in our own system. In 1821 the King of Prussia, owing to the spread of liberal ideas after the Napoleonic wars, was faced with much the same problem as had confronted William III., and it was on the advice of the Duke of Wellington

that he formed a General Staff office for executive purposes apart from the War Ministry. Thus our own Horse Guards and the Great General Staff in Berlin were plants grown from the same seed; differences of soil and environment account for variation in growth and appearance. During fifty years Prussia applied thoroughly and scientifically the principle of distinguishing between executive action and administrative business, and in 1870 she demonstrated to the world the inherent soundness of that principle. Moltke, the leader and strategist, and Roon, the army reformer and organiser, were the fine products of the system thus evolved. Since then Germany has, to her own advantage, applied this same principle, originally borrowed from us, in the domain of industry and commerce as well as in the affairs of State.

The weakness of our own military system during the pre-Crimean era lay in the administrative machinery being throughout civilian in character, in the military executive having no control whatever over it in peace, and in the Secretary of State, the co-ordinating authority in the Cabinet, taking, as a general rule, very little interest in military affairs. Consequently, when war came, we were invariably unready, and a Marlborough or a Wellington had to build up an administrative service as best he could in the face of the enemy. Hence arose the scandals of the Crimean War, when a small stationary army almost starved within five or six miles of its sea-base. As Lord Wolseley bitterly remarks in his *Story of a Soldier's Life*, our army before Sevastopol 'was not a going military machine.'

The lesson of the Crimea was obvious. The administrative services of the Army had to be militarised, and the story of the next forty years and more is concerned with this process. The Horse Guards was abolished and the Commander-in-Chief's functions were merged into the general amalgam of miscellaneous duties entrusted in 1855 to the newly appointed Secretary of State for War. Now, for the first time, generals and their staffs, not in the War Office alone, but in the districts as well, found themselves saddled with financial responsibilities which, more and more, absorbed their time and attention to the exclusion of military considerations. No one, I venture to assert, who knew the Army at home during the 'nineties will deny that ability to deal with the office file had become the chief criterion of the good general and the good staff officer. Between 1873 and 1898 no Army manœuvres were held, and the stereotyped Aldershot field-day was the beginning and the end of advanced military training.

All this while most valuable work was, it is true, in progress—work connected with the names of Airey, MacDougall, Wolseley,

Cardwell, Ralph Knox, Haliburton, and Buller. An Army Reserve was created, connexion between the Regular Army and the Auxiliary Forces was established, and medical, supply, transport, ordnance, veterinary and remount services were called into being to remedy the glaring defects of the past. All honour to the memory of the men who gave the Army what it most needed—efficient administrative services of its own! Nor can they be blamed if they were compelled by circumstances to direct their own energies, and the energies of their subordinates, mainly into an administrative channel, and to spend every penny wrung from the Treasury on administrative needs. The smooth working of the supply machinery both in South Africa and during the recent war constitutes their ample reward and justification.

None the less, this success must not blind us to the fact that administrative efficiency had been won at the expense of the military qualities embodied in the term 'the art of war.' It was something more than mere chance that, when disaster befell in South Africa, salvation came at the hands of an old man, almost seventy years of age, who had spent nearly his whole military career in India, where the gulf between the fighting man and the office man was still inviolate. Furthermore, the Report of the South African War Commission and, later, Mr. Justice Farwell's Report on the incidence of financial responsibility during and after the war elucidate the outstanding lesson of the period from 1856 to 1903. It is this that, if no distinction between executive and administrative functions is observed, and if a load of financial responsibility is imposed on executive authority, not that authority alone pays the penalty, but, in the long run, economy and efficiency are bound to suffer as well.

In 1904 it fell to the Esher Committee, of which I was the secretary, to redraw the old lines of demarcation between executive and administrative functions which had disappeared in 1856. The constitution of an Army Council, the creation of a General Staff, and the appointment of generals in charge of administration, subordinate to, but financially independent of, the general officers commanding-in-chief, were steps found necessary for the attainment of this object. As matters now stand a Commander-in-Chief in the field and his staff are relieved of all financial responsibility, which normally rests with the directors or heads of administrative departments who are accountable through well-recognised channels to Parliament itself. Each of the three principal staff officers at General Headquarters supervises a certain number of directorates, brings all relevant matter to the Commander-in-Chief's notice, and ensures that policy, once decided on, is carried out effectually by subordinate commanders and by the directors concerned. In an emergency a principal

staff officer can overrule a director even in matters of finance; if he does so, he automatically relieves the director of his normal accountability and takes the burden of financial responsibility on his own shoulders. Thus the group consisting of a Commander-in-Chief, his principal staff officers, his Judge Advocate-General and his Financial Advisor, the only officials who have the right of direct access to him, is not dissimilar both in number and in the method of transacting business from the sort of Cabinet that is adumbrated in the Report of the Haldane Committee.

The chief characteristics of Army government and administration, as now practised in most civilised countries, are as follows:

First. A sharp line of cleavage is observed between executive functions on the one hand and administrative business on the other.

Secondly. The *rôle* of the executive authority is leadership pure and simple. It looks ahead, elaborates policy, and gives subordinate commanders and the heads of administrative services the assistance that comes only from clear thinking in high places. An executive burdened with the details of financial responsibility and the pre-occupations of office procedure has been proved by the stern logic of facts incapable of fulfilling its mission either in war or in peace.

Thirdly. The importance of the executive duly co-ordinating the work of all subordinate services cannot be exaggerated. This object is achieved by a scientific grouping of all cognate functions, each group being supervised and controlled by an individual member of the executive staff, who ensures that the Commander-in-Chief's decisions are made clear to all concerned and that his policy is carried into effect.

Fourthly. It follows that the administrative departments are, *for executive purposes*, completely under the control of the executive, which, in an emergency, may overrule the head of a department in a purely financial matter. Normally, however, a departmental head is financially accountable, both as regards the provision of funds and their expenditure, not to the executive, but to Parliament, whose business it is to arrange for the adequate examination of departmental Estimates and Accounts and the continuous supervision of departmental methods and transactions.

It is the purpose of this article to inquire whether these principles which underlie the government of armies can with advantage be applied generally to the machinery of State government. As already explained, the Haldane Committee of 1918 held not only that they can be, but also that they ought to be, so applied, though they recognised that 'the elaboration of policy

cannot be so readily distinguished from the business of administration' in the sphere of civil government as in naval and military affairs. None the less, their recommendations conform throughout to the military precedent. The limitation of the Cabinet in point of numbers, the exemption of its individual members from administrative responsibilities, the well-thought-out grouping of services, the drastic departmental reforms proposed by the Committee, and the machinery suggested to enable Parliament adequately to control departmental, and incidentally bureaucratic, activities : all these proposals are in strict accord with the principles underlying naval and military government.

At great length the Committee advocate the grouping of State departments according to the particular service rendered to the community as a whole. National Defence and External Affairs form, for example, one such group, and a generation which, year in and year out, witnesses the repercussions of foreign and Dominion relations on questions of armaments and disarmament is hardly likely to cavil at such a conclusion.

The Haldane Committee, writing as they did during the war, make in their Report one observation of very far-reaching significance for the future. 'The gradual introduction,' they say, 'of the co-operation of the ministers of the Dominions in affairs which belong to a Cabinet now charged with the interests of the Empire as a whole, points to the probability that the organisation we have in view is likely to become requisite in new directions.' Within a limited space it is not possible to discuss all that this remark imports. Suffice it to say that, if and when Imperial Defence becomes something more than a mere phrase, the full meaning of the distinction between the functions of command and of administration will at once become apparent, and this truth, principle or maxim, call it what one will, might well be inscribed in letters of gold on the agenda paper of every Round Table Conference which deals with Imperial affairs. The production of armed forces and their administration is, and must ever remain, the concern of each self-governing portion of the Empire. If, on the other hand, Imperial Defence means anything at all, command is, and must ever remain, a prerogative of the Crown, to be exercised by the Crown acting through a minister or a body of ministers representative of the Empire as a whole.

I cannot do better than conclude by drawing attention to the achievements of a man of genius who had the vision to comprehend the legitimate demands of executive authority, with special reference to the grouping of the national resources for a given object, and was ready to stake everything to win for himself the powers necessary for success.

On December 4, 1756, William Pitt, later Earl of Chatham,

became a Secretary of State in the Duke of Devonshire's Cabin and in this capacity he was specifically charged with sup vising the departments dealing with foreign, colonial, and m tary affairs. Simultaneously, his close ally, Lord Temple, appointed First Lord of the Admiralty. Through a Court intri both were summarily dismissed from office on April 6, 1757.

The Seven Years War had been in progress since May 17 and never were England's fortunes at so low an ebb. With population of 7,000,000 she was engaged in a life and dea struggle throughout the world with France, which had thrice population. Ireland, on her flank, was sullenly hostile a absorbed one-fifth of the standing army for its defence. Parts Scotland, only eleven years before, had been in open rebelli France, Austria and Russia, with Saxony and Sweden, w united to crush Prussia, her only ally on the Continent—90,000,0 against 5,000,000. Hanover, the British king's own provin was an ever-compelling encumbrance on the island power. North America France, with the support of the principal Indi tribes, aimed at hemming the British power within the distri lying between the Atlantic seaboard and the Alleghany mounta to the westward. Firmly established in Canada, she claimed her own the whole of the hinterland from the Mississippi to t Pacific, and with Montcalm, a man of genius, in command she fair to make good her claim. On the British side the coloni were unorganised, disunited, and little inclined to help. True the tradition they had brought with them from the Mot Country, they regarded war as being solely the business of t regular naval and military forces and the finance of war as appropriate charge against the British Exchequer.

The nation hardly had time to recover from the shock of disaster before some other, even more startling, was announc The opening act was the loss in June 1756 of Minorca, which fifty years had been a British possession and, even more th Malta to-day, was regarded as the keystone of our naval posit in the Mediterranean. As a consequence of this loss the life British admiral was sacrificed in the following March. In J 1757 news arrived from India of the fall, some months earlier, the trading station of Calcutta, with its attendant horrors of t Black Hole, and in the same month Frederick of Prussia m with a crushing defeat at Kollin which seemed to presage an e to his resistance. In July the Hanover defence force, 40,0 strong, commanded by a son of George II. and paid for by subsid from the British Treasury, was overwhelmed on the Weser, a two months later a humiliating convention was signed. August the French occupied the Belgian coast, and invasi threatened throughout the whole length of the Channel.

Gloomy as was the prospect in Europe, that in America was as bad, or even worse. Thrice in little more than two years considerable British forces, composed mainly of regular troops had been exterminated in frontier warfare. Each of these defeats, not only relatively, but actually, was much more serious and more far-reaching than the disaster at Isandlwana which half a century ago stirred the nation to its depths. The great lakes had become a French possession, and both there and in the Mississippi valley Montcalm was busy establishing and strengthening a long chain of forts and trading posts in pursuance of his hemming-in policy. In August the British Commander-in-Chief in America reported that the French position at Louisburg and in Canada generally was impregnable, and he definitely refused to attack. To make matters worse, the British North American naval squadron was so shattered by a hurricane in August that it had to abandon its station and recross the Atlantic to refit.

Small wonder that Chesterfield, a cool observer, could write in July as follows: 'I am sure we are undone both at home and abroad. At home by our increasing debt and expenses; abroad by our ill-luck and incapacity. The King of Prussia, the only ally we had in the world, is now, I fear, *hors de combat*. The French are masters to do what they please in America. We are no longer a nation. I never yet saw so dreadful a prospect.' Such, briefly, was the setting of the drama during the opening stages of the Seven Years War.

What was Pitt's attitude in this desperate crisis? During his brief spell of office in the winter he had seen enough to convince him that divided control in war spells disaster, and he has left on record in imperishable words his impressions of direction by a sanhedrim. 'The members of such a body,' he said, 'shift and shuffle the charge from one to the other. Says one, I am not general. The treasury says, I am not admiral. The admiralty says, I am not minister. From such an unaccording assemblage of separate and distinct powers with no system, a nullity results. One, two, three, four, five lords meet—if they cannot agree: —Oh! we will meet again on Saturday. Oh! but, says one of them, I am to go out of town.' Such was a War Council in 1756, and such, or something near akin, was more than one War Council within the memory of the present generation.

Every conceivable factor, personal as well as political, combined, it would seem, to make Pitt ready to grasp at high office, if the opportunity offered. He had been twenty-two years in Parliament without attaining Cabinet rank. He had married three years previously, and for the past two years he had been largely dependent, for the support of his wife and young family, on an allowance of 1000*l*. a year given him by his brother-in-law,

nd Temple. He was now in his forty-ninth year and his health as wretched; he was constantly subject to attacks of gout of a y virulent description which prostrated him physically and entally for weeks on end.

Politically he stood almost alone in the world. The King and : Court party were openly hostile to him. The great Whig idal clans who monopolised the offices of State disliked him as uch as he despised them. The Grenville family alone supported m. The faith the people of England had in him was his chief litical asset, but, in an age of pocket boroughs, this was not a undation of much value on which to build.

Incapacity, counsels of despair, and a long series of disasters ared him in the face, but he never quailed. 'My lord,' he had id to the Duke of Devonshire in March, 'I am sure I can save is country and nobody else can.'

Such were Pitt's circumstances, and such his ideas, when, on ay 25, 1757, Newcastle approached him with an offer of the pointment of Secretary of State in a new ministry he was rming. Pitt refused the offer pointblank unless naval affairs ere brought as completely under his control as foreign, colonial, id military affairs had been during his previous term of office. ie King, who wanted to retain Lord Winchilsea, a Court vourite, at the Admiralty, was furious. Newcastle and the ilk of the Whig magnates were secretly pleased, as they held iat Pitt would be discredited in the eyes of all patriotic men for sisting on what appeared to them to be a question of quite inor importance. They regarded his action as a display of ere personal vanity and ambition. Pitt's friends and political lherents took the same view and were aghast. On May 27 they eld a meeting to protest against their leader's attitude.

Pitt could have been under no illusions as to the risks he ran oth to his own reputation and to his chances of preferment. He as fully aware that the King and the Court party would, if ossible, carry on without him; and he knew Newcastle, the old rliamentary hand and arch intriguer, well enough to underand that he would be only too glad of a good excuse to exclude om office a most uncongenial colleague. But he never wavered. or nearly a month he refused to compromise on the subject of ie Admiralty. He, and he alone, realised that war is a one-man usiness; he, and he alone, had the vision to foresee that, in the ears to come, neither he nor any other man, however gifted, ould save the country under a system of divided control. During ie weeks of uncertainty that followed, Pitt's lonely figure stands ut as one of the noblest in all history.

At last, towards the end of June, Pitt won his point, and on une 29 he began a period of office that has left an indelible mark

on the world. Anson, a distinguished sailor, became First Lord of the Admiralty. In this connexion the late Sir Julian Corbett, in his *England in the Seven Years War*, has given so lucid a description of the system which from now on held good during more than four years that I make no apologies for quoting at some length what he wrote.

> Pitt, [he says] within the broad lines of the Government's policy, practically exercised the office of First Lord, while Anson discharged that of First Sea Lord or Naval Chief of Staff, a part which exactly suited his taste and his capacity. But even so, the system of direct communication was rarely, if ever, applied to purely naval operations. Its chief use was for combined expeditions in which an admiral and a general had to co-operate, and it was essential to have one fountain of instructions to co-ordinate their action, as well as to preserve the secrecy which is the soul of such operations. . . . In practice the system worked admirably. Indeed the whole direct-acting organisation into which our clumsy constitutional machinery had suddenly been transformed was one of peculiar perfection. In effect, for the purposes of the war the administration was scientifically separated into a supply department and an executive department which were kept practically distinct. At the head of the one was the Duke of Newcastle, as First Lord of the Treasury, at the head of the other was Pitt; that is, diplomacy, the army and the navy—the three executive factors in war—were under his supreme direction, and the great officers in each department were in relation to him as expert advisers. Thus without the preoccupation of supply he was free to co-ordinate the three national forces as completely and harmoniously as a general in the field wields his horse, foot and artillery.
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> It is for this reason—because on this occasion we had for once an organisation for war which, theoretically at least, could scarcely be nearer perfection—that the progress of the struggle is so well worth patient study, not merely for soldiers and sailors, but for every man who directly or indirectly feels the responsibility of government.

Such in broad outline was the system of conducting war for whose attainment England's greatest statesman risked more than life itself. For nearly four and a half years he was Defence Minister in the widest significance of the term, and as such he was able to save his country in the hour of her direst need. His achievement was the British Empire.

Pitt was in no sense a dictator untrammelled by constitutional observances. He was just a minister of the Crown carrying out a policy decided on by the Cabinet of which he was a member. This was made abundantly clear when, in October 1761, he was overruled in the Cabinet on a major question of war policy and resigned office in consequence. In executive action only, within his recognised sphere of influence, he had wide latitude, as many other ministers have had both before and since. It was primarily owing to the position he had won for himself by his foresight that he was able to accomplish what he did, and, given such a

position, others doubtless could and can achieve similar success in circumstances where a council or committee is foredoomed to failure.

Has Pitt's example no lessons for us to-day? Men of experience in affairs argue that nowadays it would be impracticable to confer on any one individual, other than the Prime Minister himself, such powers as Pitt wielded, and that obviously the Prime Minister cannot, or ought not to, attempt to assume the *rôle* of Defence Minister over and above his other heavy responsibilities. Such an argument cannot be gainsaid, if it has to be accepted as a prior assumption that a Cabinet of twenty or thirty ministers is the hall-mark of democratic government. This assumption, however, is negatived directly or implicitly on every page of the Haldane Committee's Report.

Given a small Cabinet consisting wholly or mainly of ministers without portfolio, as suggested in that Report, a Minister of Defence possessing powers similar to Pitt's would be one only of four, five, or six ministers, each of them, under the Prime Minister, supervising and co-ordinating the activities of a group of cognate departments. They all would stand to the Prime Minister much in the same relation that his staff stands to a commander-in-chief in the field. So far from overshadowing their chief, they would enable him, without his being overburdened by detail, to get a much firmer grip on the machinery of government as a whole than is now practicable. Matters brought to his notice would have been well threshed out beforehand and his task of arriving at sound and sane decisions would be rendered as simple as is humanly possible. In peace such a conception is desirable, in war it is essential, and it can be, and should be, applied throughout the whole machinery of government, and not in defence matters alone.

The plan of government outlined in the previous pages is not the mere dream of an idealist. It has been put forward as a practical proposition by men of immense experience in the business of State—men like Sir Robert Morant, Sir George Murray, and the Right Hon. J. H. Thomas—and it is sponsored by an ex-Lord Chancellor and one of the most eminent constitutional lawyers of his day: 'There is much overlapping and consequent obscurity and confusion in the functions of the departments of executive government. . . . A rearrangement of the supreme direction of the executive organisation has been rendered necessary, not merely by the war itself, but by the prospect after the war.'

Such was their considered and unanimous opinion.

GERALD F. ELLISON.

PRINCIPLES OF INDIRECT RULE IN AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION

THE agitation which has broken out among the settlers in East Africa over the new White Paper on Native Policy is not a little surprising. For, as a recent message from Uganda reminds us, the White Paper involves no change whatever in the principles according to which Uganda—and for that matter Tanganyika also—is administered. All it does, in fact, is to work out in detail the applications of the principles already enunciated by the Hilton Young Commission, already accepted by the Colonial Office. Indirect Rule is one of the chief methods which we have adopted to foster native interests along the general lines laid down in the White Paper; accordingly, it may be of some interest to enunciate some of its principles.

My own interest in the question was kindled by a visit to the Wanyamwezi and Wasukumu country, north of Tabora, in western Tanganyika, where indirect rule is achieving remarkable results. I must confess that 'indirect rule' had previously only a very hazy meaning for me. After seeing it working in a particularly interesting form at Shinyanga and Ngudu, I was made more able to grasp the significance of what I afterwards read about it; and so, what with my visit, Lord Lugard's *Dual Mandate*, and the extremely interesting memoranda on Native Administration issued by the Tanganyika Government under Sir Donald Cameron's signature,[1] I feel I am beginning to understand something of this peculiarly British contribution to the methods of Colonial administration.

The principle of Direct Rule is that native peoples are to be administered, their taxes collected, their disputes settled, their schools and hospitals, seed farms and irrigation works, and other social and economic services provided, all by the interposition of the central Government, working through agents appointed directly by it. In territories like those of Central Africa this, of necessity, means that local administration must be put into the hands of paid headmen appointed by Government, who accord-

[1] No 1, *Principles of Native Administration and their Application*; No. 2 *Native Courts*; No. 3, *Native Treasuries* (Dar-es-Salaam, 1926).

ingly come too often to be looked on only as tax-gatherers and tools of a remote and arbitrary power, alien to the actual life of the people, their ideas and customs, their aspirations. In these circumstances, the tribal organisation, its customary law, its traditions will tend gradually to disintegrate, or to be forced underground and take the form of anti-governmental organisations and secret societies. Policies of direct rule were followed by the Germans in Tanganyika before the war, and by us in Kenya until the establishment of native councils in very recent times.

The policy of indirect rule, on the other hand (I quote from one of the above-cited memoranda), is 'the principle of ruling through the Native Chiefs, who are regarded as an integral part of the machinery of Government, with well-defined powers and functions recognised by Government and by law, and not dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.' And thus follows a rider: 'It must be clearly understood that the policy of the Government is to maintain and support native rule (within the limits laid down) and not to impose a form of British rule with the support of native chiefs, which is a very different thing.'

Indirect rule, in fact, means the employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate, their gradual moulding, by means of the laws made and taxes imposed by the central Government, and of the guidance given by the administrative officers, into channels of progressive change, and the encouragement within the widest limits of local traditions, local pride and local initiative, and so of greatest possible freedom and variety of local development within the territory.

The principles of indirect rule were first fully worked out in Nigeria under Lugard's Governorship. There, however, large and important kingdoms and emirates were already in existence, already linked on to world civilisation by means of their Mohammedanism, and with their own highly-developed if not always admirable systems of law, taxation and government, their own traditions and history often extending far into the past. The method of ruling through these existing agencies was in many ways the line of least resistance. The chief novelty was the insistence as a matter of principle on the wide freedom given to the local organisation to keep its own traditions and basic ideas and to develop along its own lines, with the minimum amount of central despotism, however benevolent, or tutelage, however well-meaning.

The special interest of the application of these principles in Tanganyika lies in the fact that in this territory even the most advanced native institutions were on a far more primitive plan than those of Nigeria, or even than the more-developed systems

in neighbouring parts of Central Africa, such as the elaborate kingdoms of the Baganda or the Banyaro to the north in Uganda, or the Watusi to the west in Belgian Ruanda. Here in Tanganyika it would have been far easier to ignore the native tradition and social structure, and to impose our own methods and systems from above. Up till 1925, although the British Government in Tanganyika had decided against any system of purely direct rule, it had not really thought out whether it was going to embark upon indirect rule in the full sense, or upon the compromise policy of using native chiefs and native institutions to introduce our British methods according to a system devised in a Government office at the capital. The real difference between true indirect rule and the imitation article is whether the system is home-grown, authentic local produce, or is imposed from outside, take-it-or-leave-it, stamped with the manufacturer's name—'British Government.'

In Tanganyika, since 1925, the unit of governmental organisation has been, wherever possible, the native authority, working in conjunction with the white district officers. And the native authority consists usually of a chief and his elders; but the importance of the council may vary greatly from place to place, and in some cases government is carried on by a federation of chiefs. The areas over which these bodies exert their authority vary greatly in importance, from little districts of less than a thousand inhabitants up to sultanates of perhaps a quarter of a million. The natural tendency has been towards the amalgamation of the quite small districts into larger units and federations, as giving greater efficiency of administration.

The chiefs are not appointed by the Governor: they are recognised by him, which is a very different matter. Sometimes a chieftainship is strictly hereditary, in other cases the people elect, or we had better say select, their chief; and there are various grades of latitude between the two extremes. In general, the Government reserves to itself the right to refuse to acknowledge a particular individual as fit to hold office; but this is only exercised in extreme cases.

This, then, is the first great difference in practice between direct and indirect rule: in the one case, the chief is a creature of Government, a mere appointee; in the other, the traditional representative of the people. The second great difference concerns the payment of the native authorities. Under the direct system the headman or chief is paid a salary from headquarters. Under the indirect system he is not paid at all by the central Government. On the contrary, he is looked upon, in regard to the finance of his district as in regard to his own status and appointment, as the repository of local independence. In the old

tribal days the normal state of affairs was for chiefs to receive from their subjects either tribute or service (or both). Under the system of indirect rule this bond of economic duty between people and chief still receives recognition, but it has been regularised and modified both in relation to the existence of central authority and to new conceptions of the duty of the local ruler to his people. The essential point is this—that although the central Government fixes for each district the amount of the native tax (hut and poll tax), this is collected by the native authorities and paid into their own treasuries. A certain percentage is then paid over by the native treasuries to the central Government as their contribution to the business of general administration; and a certain fixed sum (varying with the size and importance of the district) is further paid to the chief as his 'civil list,' and as salaries to various officials of his native administration. In this way the people feel that the chiefs belong to them, while the chiefs are brought to realise that they are no mere puppets of the central Government, but an integral part of the administrative and economic organisation of the territory.

After these amounts have been paid out, a considerable proportion of the tax-money (in all save a few backward districts where the tax so far has had to be fixed very low) remains unspent. In addition, the native treasury receives other revenue from fines and fees imposed in the local native courts, and from various minor sources, such as market dues, salt royalties, and so forth.

How is the spending of this balance controlled? Here is the third essential of indirect rule. Under direct rule any surplus of money from native tax would probably go straight into general revenue, and in any case would be expended by the Government according to schemes planned out at headquarters. Some centrally planned schemes of wide application are always necessary; where indirect rule exists, the Government can carry them out with the aid of the fraction of the tax-money passed on to it by the native authorities. But here the balance in a native treasury is regarded as being entirely under the control of the local native authority, to be expended as the chief and his council think fit for the benefit of the district. Not unnaturally there will be need for many years of guidance and advice from the District Officer; and his sympathetic and even forceful influence may sometimes be needed to prevent extravagance or folly. But he has no official control, and the system does in practice work out as it was intended—as an encouragement to foresight and an increased sense of responsibility on the part of the native authority, and as an enhancement of local patriotism and general interest in the development of the district.

Fourthly and finally we come to the administration of law. der direct rule an overburdened white man attempts to deal the legal affairs of tens of thousands of natives. In spite of ling his energies overtaxed, he knows, if he reflects a little, only a fraction of the accumulated litigiousness of the people ually finds its way to him. Either violent or illegal means of ling disputes may be increasing, or the old traditional methods native justice, although unrecognised by white authority, are ling with the bulk of cases out of his sight, below the surface. latter state of affairs seems undoubtedly to have been going in Kenya before native councils were created. Among large es like the Kainondo only an infinitesimal number of cases e up to be tried in the white man's courts. No Africans are d of going to law, and we have no reason to think that the ya tribes suddenly changed their character in this respect. ny case, it is certain that the elaborate system of native land ure has continued to work through the ancient machinery hout any organic connexion with 'Government.' Very ily for the future of the country, the traditional native itutions tenaciously continued to live a subterranean life, ting until circumstances allowed them to sprout fully again ve ground.

But under the full system of indirect rule, not only are native rts recognised, but they are recognised as the mouthpieces of l law and custom, only to be interfered with or modified if conflict with certain fundamentals of white justice. Thus the which regulates the dealings of a native people with each er is no more imposed upon them from without than the chief rules them; it is their own law, an indigenous product.[1]

As time goes on, attempts will naturally be made to approxi- e the various local codes, thus avoiding obvious difficulties as the trial of a stranger according to laws wholly different n his own. Meanwhile, in some districts the interesting eriment is being carried on of recording in writing the local mon law, as well as the decisions of the native courts. In way, since writing is the parent of large-scale coherence, an ochthonous legal system, closely adapted to local conditions

[1] In the Musoma district I was given an example of how under indirect rule natives get the law they like, and not an alien code. The people here are very tened of witchcraft, and take great precautions to conceal their excrement, parings and so forth, for if an enemy got hold of such products of their es there would be no limit to the harm he might do. Recently a man was ht stealing another man's urine. The presumption was that he wanted it magic purposes, and the native court inflicted the heavy fine of 10s. And District Officer, when he went through the records, upheld the judgment. rding to certain standards, he was wrong to confirm what he knew was d in error; but, granted that the territory has embarked on the policy of ect rule, he was perfectly correct.

and yet far more elaborate than the original tribal code, may gradually develop.

Here, as elsewhere, some control must be reserved to the representative of the central Government; and the District Officer, in addition to being the first court of appeal from the native court, has the duty of examining the records kept by the clerks of the native courts as he goes on tour through his area, and the right of revising sentences or of ordering the rehearing of cases where he thinks fit.

There are some parts of Tanganyika territory where the German method of ruling through paid headmen or akidas, coupled with the policy of deliberately discouraging the old tribal organisation (a policy which appeared to have been vigorously practised in some parts of the colony, hardly or not at all in others), seemed to have broken down the spirit of tribalism and its institutions. In the southern coastal area of Lindi (I am citing the Report on the Administration of the Tanganyika Mandate in 1927 issued by the Colonial Office to the League Council) the forty years of direct rule, combined with other detribalising influences such as the penetration of Arab culture, seemed to have destroyed all trace of the original social system. Investigation showed, however, that the tenacious conservatism of the people had retained a clan or family group system, and that in the heads of the various family groups (who still dealt with the apportionment of land) there lay to hand the raw materials for native administrators under an indirect system of rule. In spite of months of investigation by District Officers, followed by explanation and promises of a change of system, the people refused to believe that the old paid headmen (who had to be continued in office until new officials could be appointed) would ever really be replaced by men representative of popular institutions. When finally the change was effected, and native administrations were actually formed, ruled by councils of family heads, collecting their own taxes, and trying cases in their own courts, the people became enthusiastic. One member of a council summed up the situation by saying, 'You have given us back our country. We are men again.' Since then very notable progress has been made in shouldering the new responsibilities and in recovering the spirit of independence so long suppressed.

Then in some regions there exist tribes whose organisation is such that it is impossible to use it as a basis for an efficient system of indirect rule. Back from the south-eastern shore of Lake Victoria, for instance, as I was told by a friend who is Administrative Officer there, is a tribe organised so completely on the age-group system that the elders have no say in affairs. Each age-class consists, of course, of all the young men initiated

at one time; and a new class is inaugurated about every seven years. The affairs of the tribe are in the hands of the senior age-class of warriors—young men from about twenty-five to thirty-two years of age. At the conclusion of their time they pass on to the elder stage and hand over the reins of office to the age-class below. This meant a complete lack of continuity, and was always liable to lead to their making the best of their short term of office by practising extortion. The United States has been finding the Spoils System unsatisfactory. It is equally unsatisfactory for Africa. So the old organisation, in its existing form, had to be suppressed, and one deliberately set up which was more adapted to modern conditions when peace, not war, is the rule, and the tribes are not sovereign entities, but parts of a larger community.

There still, I believe, are a few backward or difficult communities in Tanganyika among which it has not yet been practicable to introduce indirect rule. But their number is decreasing year by year. Year by year, too, the responsibilities of the existing native administrations are being enlarged, and, through adjustments of tax, the amount of money which they have at their disposal for their people's advancement is being increased. Every administration has its faults; doubtless our administration of this Mandated Territory is no exception, but at least no one can deny that we are putting into practice and carrying out, with a thoroughness and rapidity which has surprised even the warmest partisans of the system, one important duty laid upon a mandatory Power—the development of the native inhabitants along lines fitting them to take over more and more of the government of their own country.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY.

VISITORS FROM THE EAST TO THE PLANTAGENET AND LANCASTRIAN KINGS

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the British Isles repre sented to the dwellers in the East the Ultima Thule of the know world, and few and far between were the Oriental visitors of th period who penetrated to our remote and forbidding shores Nevertheless, the leading part played by English kings in tl Crusades, the contact so strangely established between Edward and certain rulers of the Mongols by a mutual hatred of tl Saracen, the need of Western help against the growing menace the Turks felt by the eastern outposts of Christendom, led sundr emissaries from the East to seek the presence of the westernmos of the sovereigns of Europe. The five visitors of whom I propos here to tell have only one factor in common—namely, that th object of their visits was the same: to seek the aid of the Englisl king against the armies of Islam; in other respects they show singular diversity. Three were the envoys of a king; two wer themselves crowned heads. One was Catholic and by race Frank, one was Orthodox and a Greek, one a Genoese establishe in Central Asia, one a Tatar converted to Christianity, one Mongol born a Nestorian Christian in Peking. It is with the las mentioned that I will begin my narrative.

In 1227 there died the Mongol conqueror Jenghiz, who, bor the son of a petty Central Asian chieftain, had built up an empir that extended at the time of his death from the China Sea to th Crimea. Of this empire Jenghiz was the first khakan (Grea Khan), the supreme overlord, under whom individual province were governed, with varying degrees of autonomy, by feudator khans of his family. In 1251 one of his grandsons, Hulagu, th conqueror of Baghdad, established in Persia, subject to th suzerainty of the khakan in Peking, the dynasty of the il-khans which endured for the ensuing century; and it is with a grandso of Hulagu, Argon, who reigned in Persia and Mesopotamia as th fourth il-khan from 1284 to 1291, that we are for the momen concerned.

One of the outstanding and perhaps most surprising charac teristics of the princes of the House of Jenghiz was their toleranc

matters of religion. Nominally Shamanists, as were the earlier Mongol sovereigns, they were equally friendly to Christianity, Buddhism and Islam; it was not until the empire of Jenghiz and Kublai fell to pieces from sheer unwieldiness that the rulers of its component parts gravitated definitely towards Islam in the West, Buddhism in the East. If they showed favour to one faith more than to another in this earlier period they did so towards Christianity. They took to wife not only Mongol ladies belonging to Nestorian Christian tribes, but even Byzantine princesses; sometimes they allowed their children to be baptised; while they sought on several occasions to enter into political relations with Christendom, seeing in the pope and the temporal rulers of Europe possible allies against their principal western enemies, the Arab khalifate, the Egyptian Mamluks, and the empire of the Seljuq Turks. One of those most favourable to Christianity and most eager for an alliance with the Christian West was the Il-Khan Argon, whose three embassies to the Court of Edward I. form the subject of the first part of this paper.

The story of the earliest of these embassies is told in one of the most curious manuscripts that have come down to us from the Middle Ages—one of the most curious because, true counterpart of the narratives of Marco Polo and his European contemporaries, it relates the experiences of a Mongol Christian, a native of Peking, in the course of his travels from his birthplace overland to the remote West. I will not recapitulate here the beginning of the story, which is concerned with the birth, parentage, and upbringing of two native members of the Nestorian Church in China, Mark and Bar-soma, both Uighurs by race, of their determination to enter the monastic life and the priesthood and to make the pilgrimage from their distant Chinese home to the holy places of Palestine, of the vicissitudes of their long and dangerous journey across Asia. Suffice it to say that Mark ultimately finds himself elected patriarch of the Nestorian Church under the name of Yahb-Allaha III., and, instead of returning to his native land, remains at the seat of the patriarchate in Mesopotamia with his friend Bar-soma at his side.

Six years after Yahb-Allaha's consecration Argon determines to enter into negotiations with the pope and the princes of Europe for an alliance against the Egyptian Mamluks, and asks the patriarch, with whom he is on friendly terms, to find him a suitable envoy. Yahb-Allaha nominates Bar-soma, a choice particularly agreeable to Argon, who believes the despatch as his ambassador of a real Mongol Christian of high rank, the intimate friend of the patriarch of Eastern Christendom, to be well calculated to convert to his views the pope and the Frankish kings. Accompanied by an appropriate retinue and entrusted with letters and

presents to the potentates to whose courts he is being despatched. Bar-soma sets out on his mission in 1287, supplied with 'thir excellent mounts and 2000 *mithqals* of gold.' The manuscr now proceeds to describe in detail the successive stages of h journey, first to the shores of the Black Sea and thence to Cor stantinople, where he is welcomed by the Byzantine empero Andronicus II. This emperor, whom the author of the manu script calls Basil, mistaking his title *Basileus* for his name, w connected with the Mongols through the marriage of one of h daughters to the ruler of the Golden Horde, and receives the env with great friendliness, placing at his disposal as a residence wha would now be described in Constantinople as a *khan*. Havin inspected the sights and shrines of Byzantium, Bar-soma obtain the emperor's leave to proceed on his way in order to comply wit the orders of King Argon 'to penetrate among the Franks,' take ship to Italy, sees Stromboli in eruption, and from the terrace c a house in Naples witnesses a naval battle between *Irid Kharlad* the author's version of the name of the King of Naples ('il r Carlo due'), and *Irid Arkun* ('il re d'Aragon'). After this intro duction to European politics our envoy proceeds to Rome, wher he learns that the pope (Honorius IV.) is dead, but he is con ducted into the presence of twelve great lords called *kardinal* assembled in conclave to elect a new pope; to these he expound the nature of his mission as well as the Nestorian confession faith. Since, however, there is for the moment no pope wit whom he can discuss the business of his embassy, Bar-soma pro ceeds to the other States to which he is accredited, beginning wit Genoa, where he sees the Holy Grail, taken by the Crusaders a the capture of Cæsarea, in Palestine, in 1101. His next visit is t the King of France, Philip IV., who orders his 'emirs' to sho the envoy the sights of Paris, and then follows that part of hi embassy which is of special interest to us—namely, his visit t 'King *Alangitar* in *Kasonia*.' The author of the manuscript, or copyist, has here again mistaken, as is his habit, the title for th personal name, for this mysterious personage is none other tha the King of 'Angleterre,' Edward I., then visiting his province Gascony. Twenty days after leaving Paris Bar-soma reache 'the town'—no doubt Bordeaux—where the king is in residenc and is received by Edward with enthusiasm upon his unfoldin his master's proposals for a simultaneous invasion of the Hol Land from east and west. 'We, the kings of these regions,' declar Edward, 'have placed the emblem of the Cross upon our bodie and have no preoccupation greater than this [*sc.* the recapture Jerusalem]. My heart rejoices to learn that what I long for, Kin Argon desires also.'

The king then received, at his own request, the Holy Con

munion at the hands of this Nestorian from Peking, whom he sends on his way with gifts and with a favourable answer to the invitation of his master. Bar-soma, having thus no need to cross the Channel, now revisits Rome to negotiate with Nicholas IV., the pope elected during his absence, and returns home towards the end of 1288.

In the hope of converting from words into deeds the offers of co-operation brought back by Bar-soma, Argon in 1289 decides to despatch another embassy to the pope and to the Kings of France and England, and on this occasion selects as his envoy not only a Christian but a European in the person of one Buscarel, a Genoese of whose previous history little is known. Leaving Persia after the Easter of 1289, Buscarel presented himself in the first instance to the pope, who from Rieti on September 30 of that year addressed a bull to Edward; in this bull Nicholas requested the king to receive kindly the noble Genoese, *Biscarellus de Gisulfo*, and to give careful ear to the message he would deliver from Argon, the illustrious King of the Tatars. We have few details of the incidents of the voyage, but we know that on the eve of the Epiphany, January 5, 1290, Buscarel arrived in London, accompanied by three gentlemen, a cook, eight horsemen and six domestics. Remaining in England twenty days, thirteen of which were spent at court, he presented his letters from Argon and the pope, and was received with great friendliness by the king, who defrayed from his own purse the mission's entire expenses. When Buscarel recrossed the Channel it was as the bearer of a letter from Edward to Argon, in which the English king expressed his intention to lead an army against the Sultan of Babylon (*i.e.*, Egypt) as soon as he had obtained the pope's concurrence. It is curious to note the modern sound of his form of address to Argon: 'Your Royal Highness—*vestra regia celsitudo*'; but he was in keeping with his times in his promise to send by special messengers a consignment of falcons for which the il-khan had asked.

The pope, more than anxious to take advantage of the proffered Mongol help, was urgent that Edward should keep his promise, but Edward, whilst full of good intentions, was immobilised in Britain by his wars with the Scots. Thus was Argon twice disappointed of his hopes, but he made yet another attempt to organise the campaign he had at heart, and in 1290 despatched a third embassy to the pope and the King of England, under the leadership of one Chagan, a converted Tatar. Chagan, who had adopted the baptismal name of Andrew on his conversion, was evidently a personage of importance, since the previous plenipotentiary, Buscarel, was now a member of his suite, and only figures as the second name on the list of his staff. The details of

Chagan's stay in England are not preserved, but the missio remained in the West sufficiently long to learn in Rome of th capture of Acre, the last outpost of the Crusaders in the Hol Land, by the Mamluk Melek al-Ashraf in May 1291. The new caused something like consternation in Europe, and the pope no redoubled his efforts to give tangible effect to the il-khan's pro posals. But Argon did not live to see the return of his ambas sador, for he had died on March 7 of that year. While we hav the text of the pope's letters by Chagan, we do not know th nature of Edward's answer; more than ten years later, howeve in March 1302, he wrote to one of Argon's sons, Kazan, the reigning as the seventh il-khan, and to the Patriarch Yahb Allaha, to excuse and explain his failure to lead an army Palestine. Accompanying Edward's envoy, one Geoffrey Langles, we meet once again our old friend Buscarel, who joine the party in his native Genoa and there helped the English missio to buy their requirements for the journey. That they equipp themselves on a generous scale may be inferred from the sum 193*l.* 12*s.* 7*d.*, a heavy amount in those days, which they expende on silver plate, 44*l.* 5*s.* on crockery and accoutrements, an 15*l.* 15*s.* 6*d.* on the fifteen carpets which they used as beds. Le extravagant was the outlay of 2*s.* on two 'parasols,' bought a Trebizond and Tabriz respectively. On the conclusion of the mission the envoys returned to England with a caged leopar fed during the voyage on sheep carried from Constantinople fo the purpose.

We will now pass to the reign of Edward III. and to the visi to his Court of the king who may justly be called the greates knight-errant the world has seen, King Peter I. of the Lusigna dynasty, that reigned in Cyprus from 1192 to 1489. The Lat kingdom of Cyprus was in truth a prolongation of the crusadin kingdom of Jerusalem. On the execution of the luckless Conradi in 1268 the title of King of Jerusalem, together with the meag remnants of the kingdom, passed to the Kings of Cyprus; an after the fall of Acre, the Kings and Queens of Cyprus receiv the crown of Jerusalem at Famagusta as being the Cypriote tow geographically the nearest to the lost kingdom, the reconquest which was henceforth their prevailing ambition. By none of thes princes was the ambition more passionately cherished than by Peter I., who reigned from 1359 to 1369, but was vowed, ev from the days before his accession, when he was still Count Tripoli, to a perpetual crusade against the Saracens. Peter com memorated his vow in his Order of the Sword, whose motto w '*pour loyauté maintenir*'; and it is recorded that he kept a nake sword constantly suspended on his neck in memory of his oat Whatever be the truth of this story, it is at all events the ca

that of all the Kings and Queens of Cyprus he is the only one to be depicted on the coinage holding a sword instead of a sceptre.

This Peter, then, filled with crusading ardour, twice went the round of the courts of Europe to collect men and money for the recovery of the Holy Land. In 1362 he set out on the first of his journeys to the rulers of Christendom and, after visiting the pope, the emperor, and the King of France, crossed the Channel to enlist the aid of the Kings of England and Scotland. He was helped in his quest by his handsome appearance, his courtly manners, his gallant demeanour, and his skill in all knightly accomplishments; and Froissart, to whom we are primarily indebted for our detailed knowledge of Peter's Odysseys, calls him 'a man of excellent understanding, master of many languages, and much beloved.' It was in 1364 that King Peter, after waiting in Calais for twelve days for a favourable wind, crossed the Channel and landed at Dover, where he remained two days while his ship was unloaded and his horses were disembarked. He then travelled by easy day-journeys to London, where he was honourably received, not only by the British lords sent by Edward to meet him, but also by several barons of France, then held as hostages in England.

It would take me a day [relates Froissart] were I to attempt relating to you the grand dinners, suppers, and other feasts and entertainments that were made, and the magnificent presents, gifts and jewels which were given, especially by queen Philippa, to the accomplished king of Cyprus. In truth, he was deserving of them, for he had come a long way and at a great expense, to visit them, to exhort the king to put on the red cross, and assist in regaining countries now occupied by the enemies of God. But the king of England politely and wisely excused himself, by saying: 'Certainly, my good cousin, I have every inclination to undertake this expedition; but I am growing too old, and shall leave it to my children. I make no doubt, that when it shall have been begun, you will not be alone, but will be followed most willingly by my knights and squires.' 'Sir,' replied the king of Cyprus, 'what you say satisfies me. I verily believe they will come, in order to serve God, and do good to themselves; but you must grant them permission so to do; for the knights of your country are eager in such expeditions.' 'Yes,' answered the king of England; 'I will never oppose such a work, unless some things should happen to me or to my kingdom which I do not at this moment foresee.' The king of Cyprus could never obtain any thing more from king Edward, in respect to this croisade; but, as long as he remained, he was politely and honourably feasted with a variety of grand suppers.

About this time king David of Scotland had some affairs to transact with king Edward that made it necessary for him to come to England; so that when he heard the king of Cyprus was there, he hastened his journey, in order to meet him, and made such dispatch that he arrived in London before he had left it. The two kings were much rejoiced to meet, and congratulated each other upon it. The king of England gave them two grand entertainments in his palace of Westminster. At the last of these,

the king of Cyprus took his leave of the king and queen of England, who made him very magnificent presents: king Edward gave him also a shi called the *Catharine*, which was very beautiful and well built. The king o England had had her constructed, by his orders, to make the voyage to Jerusalem. She was valued at twelve thousand francs, and lay in the harbour of Sandwich.

Not by Edward alone was Peter feasted in London, for, like royal visitors of a later age, he was dined by the mayor of the city; one of the historical paintings in the Royal Exchange depicts the celebrated banquet, at which the Kings of England, Scotland, France and Denmark were King Peter's fellow-guests. Stow, in his *Chronicle*, gives us the following account of this entertainment, which appears to have lived long in the memorie of the citizens of London:

Henry Picard, vintner, mayor of London, in one day did sumptuously feast Edward king of England, John king of France, the king of Cypru (then newly arrived in England), David king of Scots, Edward prince of Wales, with many noblemen and others: and after, the said Henry Picarc kept his hall against all comers whosoever that were willing to play at dice and hazard. In like manner, the lady Margaret, his wife, did also keep her chamber to the same intent. The king of Cyprus, playing with Henr Picard in his hall, did win of him fifty marks; but Henry being very skilfu in that art, altering his hand, did after win of the said king the same fifty marks and fifty marks more; which when the said king began to take in ill part, although he dissembled the same, Henry said unto him, 'My lorc and king, be not aggrieved: I covet not your gold, but your play; for I have not bid you hither that I might grieve you, but that amongst other things I might try your play'; and gave him his money again, plentifully bestowing his own amongst the retinue. Besides, he gave many rich gifts to the king and other nobles and knights, who dined with him, to the great glory of the citizens of London in those days.

Returning to the East after an absence of nearly three years Peter swooped down upon Egypt, the stronghold of Arab power and by a brilliant *tour de main* seized Alexandria, although he held it for only one day. Again he went on his travels, unde terred by the ephemeral nature of his triumph, but was recallec by troubles in Cyprus. In 1369, after a reign of ten years fille with a variety of picturesque and tragic incident with which the history of the Middle Ages affords no parallel, he was stabbed to death by some of his nobles, and with Peter died the hopes of the last Crusade. Not wholly undeserved is Chaucer's kindly judgment on the gallant and ill-fated king, whose visit to Edward III. brought to England something of the glamour of his romanti island kingdom:

O worthy Petro, King of Cypre, also,
That Alisaundre wan by heigh maistrye,
Ful many a hethen wroghtes tow ful wo,
Of which thyn owene liges hadde envye,

And, for no thing but for thy chivalrye,
They in thy bedde han slayn thee by the morwe.
Thus can fortune hir wheel governe and gye,
And out of Ioye bring men to sorwe.

The last of the five visitors was the only one in the long list of Byzantine emperors to penetrate to the British Isles. In 1391 Manuel Palæologus, being then a prisoner in the hands of the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid I., the terrible 'Yildirim' (Thunderbolt), succeeded to the perilous inheritance of his father, the Emperor John V., and had to escape from Brusa in order to ascend a throne that was already tottering before the pressure and blows of the Turks. Little more than Constantinople and the Peloponnese remained to the Eastern emperors of their former territories, and the Turk was drawing ever closer the ring of ships and armies that was gradually encircling the coveted capital. An attempt to relieve the pressure with western support resulted in a crushing defeat of the Christian forces by Bayazid at Nicopolis on the Danube in 1396, and Manuel's situation was well-nigh desperate when he decided in 1399 to make a personal appeal to the kings of the West for farther succour in his plight.

On December 10, 1399, Manuel set sail from Constantinople in Venetian galleys, breaking his journey in the Peloponnese in order to leave his wife, the Empress Irene, and his three young sons in the care of his brother Theodore, despot of the Morea. He then proceeded to Venice, where he was received in state by the Doge and the Senate, was lavishly entertained and was promised material aid against the common enemy. The Italian chroniclers of the time make many references to the imperial visitor, whom they call Chiriamomolle, a corruption of Κὺρ Μανουήλ, the Lord Manuel.

His sojourn in Venice at an end, the emperor passed on to Padua and Pavia, being treated with all honour by the Carrara and the Visconti, and then crossed the Alps into France, where, but for his visit to England, he spent the ensuing two and a half years. The French king, Charles VI., had recently recovered from one of his attacks of madness and gave, together with his family and his court, a warm welcome to his august but unfortunate guest. Manuel's well-proportioned and impressive stature, his noble mien and bodily activity, his superb horsemanship which belied the long hair and beard, both prematurely whitened by misfortune, impressed themselves deeply upon the imagination of the Parisians, who were astonished to see the venerable sovereign vault with the agility of a youth, without setting foot on the ground, from the horse which had carried him from the Bridge of Charenton to the back of the white charger that awaited him, a particular honour, at the gates of Paris.

It may be well to recall here how it came about that th monarch in distress, without lands, without money, witho troops, without resources, with the mere shadow of power, w yet able, an itinerant beggar, to command the respect, indeed th veneration, which was enjoyed by the greatest and most powerfu of his predecessors. Not even the long tale of defeats and othe humiliations had served to kill the awe which was felt by mediæv Europe for the sacrosanct character of the Byzantine emper The Basileus of Constantinople had always embodied in its com pletest form the monarchical conceptions of Christendom: th heir to the authority and traditions of the Cæsars, he was not onl the final legislator and the supreme military commander of h people—he was the elect and anointed of God, the head an defender of the Christian religion, the equal of the apostles. H was king and priest alike, infallible both in temporal and i spiritual affairs; and he exacted and received the most Orient forms of submission from his subjects, who approached his perso in the attitude of adoration and were content to style themselve his slaves. Thus, not even the misfortunes which had left th once glorious Eastern empire but a maimed torso had extinguishe the tradition of majesty built up in more prosperous centurie and men still regarded Manuel, even on his humiliating erran as the Lord's anointed and as the personification of imperi Rome.

Manuel rapidly endeared himself to the Parisians. He w an honoured guest at the important social events of the day. H hunted and he visited churches (having an especial affection f the Abbey of St. Denis), while to attend his private chapel, whe the liturgy was celebrated for him according to the Byzantin rite, became one of the fashionable pastimes of society in th French capital, to whom the icons and the Eastern ceremoni afforded an interesting novelty. All was going well when Kin Charles's health suffered a relapse; and it was doubtless th circumstance which led Manuel to visit England, at a seaso unpropitious both politically and climatically. For it was litt more than a year since Henry IV. had seized the Crown from th unfortunate Richard II. (who met his end in the very year of th visit), while the Channel crossing on that 11th day of Decembe 1400, was evidently a rough one. Landing at Dover and thenc proceeding through Kent, Manuel was well received at Cante bury by the Austin Friars, and on December 21, the feast of S Thomas, was met at Blackheath by Henry. From Blackheat the two sovereigns made their entry in procession into Londo and both there and subsequently at Eltham, where he spe Christmas, Manuel was entertained in a manner which evoked h warm appreciation.

The Prince with whom we are now residing, [he writes to his friend Manuel Chrysoloras in Constantinople (the emperor added to his other qualities a wide range of intellectual interests and considerable gifts of literary expression)] the King of Great Britain—a country which may be called a veritable other world—this Prince of great substance, embellished with a thousand great qualities, adored even by those who do not know him and causing those who have seen him but once to say that Fame, losing her divine power, is unable to celebrate such merit; this Prince, I say, illustrious in rank, illustrious in mind, who can deal a hard blow but also knows how to win friends with prudence, who holds out to everyone a helping hand, offering himself as a universal protector to all who have need of protection, has followed his natural inclination in becoming for us a haven after a double tempest, the one of nature, the other of fortune. His speech is full of charm; he delights us in every way, honours and loves us equally. His only fear is that what he does for us is not enough, and he seems on this account to blush, so magnanimous is he. He will give us help in men-at-arms, in archers, in money and in ships, which will convey the troops whithersoever it be necessary.

Alas! that Henry failed to justify this somewhat fulsome praise. Accepting at their face value Henry's assurances, Manuel returned in February 1401 to Paris, whence he wrote to his friends in Constantinople that his plans for the expedition to be fitted out by the French and English kings were maturing so well that he hoped soon to be returning in its wake to his dominions. Unhappily, Charles VI. now suffered another return of his malady. While Manuel lingered impotently in France, waiting for Henry's promises to materialise, the French were too distracted by the struggle between the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans for the control of the kingdom to give much thought to the luckless Greek. And then, suddenly, salvation came whence it was least expected—from the East. The Mongol Timur the Lame, that greatest of all human destroyers of men, had burst, himself a rebel against the House of Jenghiz, out of Central Asia and, at the battlefield of Angora in July 1402, brought the advance of the Ottomans for the time being to a standstill. The terrible Yildirim was a prisoner in the hands of the yet more terrible Tamerlane, to die in captivity a few months later. Manuel now hastened back to his capital, the richer only by a few galleys, sundry presents, and happy recollections; but his empire had received, as if by a miracle, a respite of half a century before it met its end under the heroic leadership of the last Constantine, Manuel's youngest son.

H. C. Luke.

RENAUDOT, FATHER OF FRENCH JOURNALISM

In the history of every country there are men of distincti whose merit only a few realise, and whose fame is confined t small circle. At the same time, in drawing a sketch of any m who seems in the world's eyes only to have played a seconda part, one is apt to find that what he did has turned out infinit more beneficial than has ever been acknowledged. Theophra Renaudot, journalist and philanthropist, with his 'innoc inventions,' as he himself termed them, falls into this catego The inauguration of registry offices and bureaux of informati the 'Mont de Piété' in France, the dispensary, and above all t *Gazette*, were his creations. On the whole, little has been writt about him, even in France; probably because his life was a bu life of organising, without that element of personal adventure, romantic incident, so necessary for biography. His inventic have stood the test of time, while his everyday life and conver tion are unknown. He first gained some posthumous fame 1859, when the bibliographer, Hatin, called attention to. achievements and reproached France for her neglect and forg fulness of them.

Renaudot was born in 1586 in Loudun, in Poitou, a sm hill-town overlooking a valley through which three rivers fl into the Vienne. Loudun, now so peaceful, was at that ti the centre of conflict between Catholics and Huguenots. T father of journalism, as Renaudot may be justly called, w reared among scenes of incendiarism and bloodshed. But the was as yet no war-correspondent.

His childhood was an unhappy one, due in large measure physical defects, among which a flattened nose was a conspicuo feature. Neither his father nor his mother were proud of th child; the former treated his son with harshness, the latter wi indifference; she could never, she said, understand how this u boy had come to be her offspring. But, while Renaudot grew manhood deficient in grace and comeliness, his face show intelligence of no mean order and kindness; and it also wore expression of great energy. As time went on he developed

charm of manner and a gift of conversation that made listeners forget his deformities, and won him the admiration of many and the affection of the poor.

Renaudot went to a grammar school in his native town, but his school days were as fraught with unhappiness as his home life. His companions teased and mocked him, playing every kind of trick on him. After he had borne this treatment with fortitude for some months, M. Boulanger, the master, awoke to the fact that he had among his pupils a particularly bright lad. His school life at once assumed a new aspect. The master rejoiced to find a boy who wished to learn; the boy was glad to have an understanding and sympathetic mentor. An intimacy sprang up between the two, for which Renaudot was grateful; they went for long walks together along the river banks, when the younger, handicapped as he was by nature, found it possible to make a confidant of the elder. We are nowhere told the tenor of their conversations, but the liberal and broad-minded attitude of Renaudot's mind throughout his life must largely be attributed to the teaching of this uncommon schoolmaster. School days soon drew to a close. After a sad leave-taking and with many searchings of heart, the pupil separated from his master in 1592, and took the 'diligence' for Montpelier to enter the university, whither his father, at last alive to his son's talents, willingly sent him, though opposing the career his son proposed to follow.

Renaudot's university life was in many ways a replica of his school days—a new set of mockers and a fresh batch of companions, whose delight similarly was the coarse and rather brutal practical joke. But character and brains won in the long run. His talents were too conspicuous to be disregarded. When at the age of nineteen he took his degree of doctor of medicine, his fellow-students hailed him with triumph.

History has drawn a veil over Renaudot's doings during the next two years. He seems to have travelled extensively in Italy; to what town or princedom he went is, however, a matter of surmise; he may, possibly, have visited the medical schools of Bologna or Padua. Renaudot's biographer makes these suggestions to account for his introduction of the 'Mont de Piété' into France, which institution originated in Italy. In any case, it was good for him to leave his native country for a time to learn about things beyond its borders and to widen his outlook.

During these years France, and not only Poitou, was in a piteous condition, owing to the prolonged wars of religion. The bitter fight between Huguenot and Catholic had been ruining agriculture and decimating the town population. Loudun itself was divided into two camps, and nothing appeared to stay the

hands of the partisans, except on one memorable occasion of visit of Louis XIII. to the town. When at last some cessati of hostilities took place throughout the country, disband soldiers and unemployed flocked to the cities, spreading dise and famine. Communications were unsafe, bandits roamed roads, pillage and murder were rampant. Paris in particular w in a sad plight, a large part of the wandering population migrati thither.

Now, about this time a highly interesting and unexpec meeting took place, which changed the course of Renaudot's li Richelieu, already Bishop of Luçon (1606), had begun his upw career, and was living in semi-seclusion in his priory at Couss awaiting the hour when the wheel of fortune would turn definit in his favour. His chosen guide and counsellor at this criti period of his life was a crafty and extremely able Capuchin pri known in history as Père Joseph. His fiery eloquence in t pulpit, his skill and coolness in diplomacy, combined to pl him in the confidence of Richelieu. While still a young m he was deputed to lead a crusade into the very stronghold of t Huguenots. He came to Loudun, and here he met with Renaud in whom he quickly recognised exceptional gifts. That Renau was a Huguenot did not deter the Catholic father from maki friends, while each saw qualities of mind in the other that ma friendly intercourse a foregone conclusion. They met again a again, until Renaudot was taken by his friend to be introduc to Richelieu, with whom a friendship was struck and continu unbroken till the death of the latter. Richelieu was so impress by the medical ability and, above all, by the progressive ideas Renaudot that when an opportunity offered a little later— 1612—he put the claims and merits of his friend before t Queen Regent. Renaudot was summoned to Paris and giv the title of Physician to the King, with, it is supposed, a sala of 800 livres. His career in his native town, where he h employed all his leisure in increasing his knowledge of anatom was thus cut short. He left for the capital, owing his appointme not only to his medical skill, but also to his humanitarian vie since he regarded his profession as 'a means of proving l devotion to the public good.'

Before leaving his native town Renaudot married for t second time Jeanne Baudot, by whom he had five children three sons and two daughters; but, as has been hinted, public life so absorbed his powers of mind and body that home life never came into the limelight.

On his arrival in Paris Renaudot immediately set himself t task of making life easier for the proletariat, but these phila thropic activities, which fill a chapter by themselves, do n

directly concern Renaudot as father of the French Press, and may, therefore, be omitted here.

Renaudot's journalistic fame rests on the *Gazette*. In recent years modern French Press-writers, stung perhaps by Hatin's reproaches of seventy years ago, have raised him to even greater glory by acclaiming him father of French journalism and by founding in 1926 a literary prize in his honour called the 'Theophraste Renaudot prize.' It is adjudicated on by a jury of ten leading journalists, who meet in anterooms of the restaurant A la Fontaine Gaillon, where the Goncourt Academy lunch together to decide who shall be the Goncourt prizeman. The journalists come to interview the academicians before the meal, round about eleven o'clock. As they have usually to wait two or three hours for the final decision, they decided to turn this enforced leisure to account, and founded this prize, which carries no monetary reward. The selection the journalists make is, however, a recommendation of considerable value.

Details of the beginnings of the *Gazette*, the forerunner of the modern newspaper, are wanting, but it was probably printed in the House of the Grand Coq in the Rue de la Calandre (now non-existent) and distributed by newsvendors in the city and through the country. Renaudot was convinced that his venture would supply a long-felt want. But starting a paper in the seventeenth century was not a simple matter. Would-be editors were confronted with many obstacles. A first and indispensable necessity was a permit to print. In the circumstances, Renaudot naturally turned to Richelieu, who had now (1631) taken hold of the reins of government, and put his scheme of a paper before him. It was a memorable meeting between these two friends so different in character—the one expounding his ideas for the public good; the other regarding the matter from the point of view of the State and the confirmation of his own power. Since Richelieu's consent was essential and the success of the paper dependent on him, Renaudot listened with patience while the Minister laid down the lines on which the paper should be run, and indicated the manner in which he would receive State aid. There seems no doubt that diplomatic agents and those who controlled foreign affairs in those days co-operated in supplying items of interest, much in the way that is done to-day. Richelieu himself was quite alive to the uses of this 'innocent invention' in spreading news to a public growing in importance. Information and articles were directly due to his pen, and it is certain that Louis XIII. contributed notes and articles, some of which, on account of their disparaging remarks against the Court, got Renaudot into trouble a few years later.

The first number of the first French paper, the *Gazette*, at

last made an appearance on May 31, 1631, and has continu practically without interruption up to the present day. Othe in Holland, England, and Germany may claim precedence, bu the French paper was not fitful, as they were, and, once starte it continued. What is interesting about the first issue is, not s much what it contained, but the comparatively short time two months—that the news took to reach Paris from Constant nople, while from Rome, Venice, and Vienna one month onl was required.

The success of the *Gazette* was immense; it was literally to from the hands of the newsvendors as soon as issued. Th excitement of this new thing thrust upon a wondering public ca well be imagined. Carriers delayed their journeys to provinci towns and across the borders in order to provide themselves wit copies. The demand was great everywhere, and even subscribe to the new publication are mentioned in letters of the perio It seems almost a miracle that the *Gazette* became known rapidly. Peiresc, that learned seventeenth-century patron letters in France, who lived at Aix en Provence, was among th early subscribers. A glance at his correspondence shows how l looked forward to its receipt. When it did not arrive he wro with bitterness to his friend Dupuy, in Paris, complaining of th irregularity of delivery, and fretting because numbers we wanting in his set and begging him to buy and remedy th defect. He got angry because the people in Marseilles receiv the *Gazette* sooner than he did at Aix, and because the printers Lyons pirated the news and sold counterfeit numbers. When l was asked to contribute articles himself to the *Gazette* he refus on the ground that there was nothing to write about. At th same time, he was especially critical of the would-be journalis of that day. 'The importunity,' he wrote, 'of those who com to ask for news is sometimes very great. They imagine, not on that one is obliged to tell them when one has any news, but have news when one has none—at least, of the kind they require

The pirating that went on was a serious matter for Renaudc The privilege granted to him had been very complete. It ga him the monopoly of papers and news as well as the permissic to print and sell wherever he liked. But these extensive pow were not sufficient. Competitors appeared in spite of the Printers and colporteurs were jealous of his success and defie the injunctions, and detractors rose up among the literary. speaks volumes for Renaudot's courage, and also for Richelieu patronage, that he weathered the storms that raged round hin Renaudot not only maintained his position, but extended it the publication of a variety of supplements under different nam with information not considered suitable for insertion in t

Gazette itself. A contemporary in a eulogy of the paper concludes with a remark as true to-day as it was then: 'So much knowledge is necessary to the making of a paper that I do not understand how anyone has ventured to try it.' From a historical point of view the value of the *Gazette* cannot be exaggerated; it is one of the authorities for the reign of Louis XIII. and the minority of Louis XIV. Treaties of alliance forwarded by ambassadors, the relations of sieges and battles written by generals and accounts of events by Richelieu, have made this collection a source-book for the period.

Besides Louis XIII. and Richelieu, mentioned before, the list of editors and contributors is a long one, including men of standing in French literature. An interesting episode about a change of editorship, but after Renaudot's day, is told when the Duke de Choiseul resigned in 1770. The then editors, Suard and Arnaud, were dismissed. They had been indiscreet enough to allow the insertion of a paragraph in which it said 'that the Countess of Waldegrave, wife of the Duke of Gloucester, was in receipt of a *pension of 5000l. payable by the establishment in Ireland.*' The English ambassador protested at the printing of such a sentence, declaring that these remarks were unpleasing to his Court, since the marriage had not been recognised. Any reason is at times sufficient when a scapegoat is wanted!

We may pass over as not deserving of a layman's attention those points about the publication of the *Gazette* in which the curiosity of the bibliographer would delight. But the story of the issue of two editions on June 4, 1633, are significant as evidence of what a powerful Minister would ask and an energetic editor carry out. On the evening of June 3 the abbot Le Masle, one of Richelieu's staff, knocked at the door of Renaudot's house demanding immediate attention. Renaudot, worn out by the editorial duties of the day, was on the point of retiring for the night. Hearing the nature of the interruption, he went out to meet the abbot, who, without any preliminaries, explained that he had come with imperative injunctions from his master to make sure of the printing of an article of twenty-eight lines in the morrow's issue. It was late, the *Gazette* had already been printed off, and some copies had even gone out to country subscribers. Renaudot, however, rose to the occasion; the distribution was stopped, twenty-eight lines were struck out here and there, the article inserted, and a fresh issue was quickly run off. The crisis was overcome, and the first issue was for all time placed among bibliographical curiosities. Ever since that day journalism has continued the handmaid of politics. The true independent Press is still an ideal to be sought after. Ministers to-day write or speak to the representatives of the Press much

as Mazarin did to Renaudot: 'I need your invention and yo
Press more than I ever did; you see the condition to which I a
reduced, you see the storm that has arisen. Your skill is neede
to turn the affair in its right direction.'

Though Renaudot's journal was now well launched he wa
beset by enemies for other reasons. He had won the love of t
poor and needy by his registry office and his 'Mont de Piété
but had incurred the implacable enmity and displeasure of t
doctors of Paris. The medical faculty, headed by Guy Pati
rose up in arms against him. It objected to his practisi
medicine; it disapproved of his methods of treatment and of h
giving his services to the poor gratis; it declared, further, th
there was an ancient rule that no one should be allowed t
practise in Paris without having first obtained the degree of t
University of Paris, and that it held the privilege of granti
them direct from the Pope. Aspirants for licences must
presented to the Chancellor of the Academy and receive t
apostolic blessing before he could treat or practise. Hatr
knew no bounds; disputes waxed furious, pamphlets full of gr
personal invective followed each other in quick succession, un
the Faculty appealed to the courts and to Parliament, whe
after a protracted struggle between the litigants, a verdict host
to Renaudot was pronounced. The charitable institutions
which he had spent so much time and thought were close
This was the end for a while of much of his work. The *Gazet*
however, was untouched, and the journalist unconquered. T
strain of continued struggle at last began to tell on his healt
He succumbed to the common enemy on October 23, 1653, aft
an illness of many months, to remain for ever in the annals
France as the foremost philanthropist of his day and her fi
great journalist.

It is not without interest to recall the scene in *Cyrano*
Bergerac where Rostand introduces Renaudot inquiring
details of Cyrano's victory over the 100 hirelings sent to pun
the poet who had written satirical verses about the Duke
Guise. Cyrano at first refuses, but Le Bret, his friend, poin
out that Theophraste Renaudot himself, the inventor of t
Gazette, is waiting and wishes to know, adding in explanation:

> Cette feuille où l'on fait tant de choses tenir!
> On dit que cette idée a beaucoup d'avenir!

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

BLIND-SPOTS IN ENGLISH CIVILISATION

II. Placards and Public Notices, Lettering, Postage Stamps

A preceding article on this subject treated of the shortcomings of English railway stations and travel amenities, and of the unwarranted self-assertion of poster advertisers in forcing their names and activities on public notice, without either obtaining public permission or paying their footing as a public nuisance.

It was maintained that England does herself less than justice by tolerating uncivilised survivals in stations and gross lack of consideration toward railway travellers; further, that, although local authorities are in many places showing an increasing determination to control, in the interest of a town's outward appearance, indiscriminate and discordant advertising, we have still a long way to go before our towns can compare for decency and ordered efficiency with those of, for example, Germany.

It is now desirable to carry a little further our investigation into the more remediable shortcomings of which English urban communities are guilty; and to pass, by a natural transition, from poster advertising of a purely commercial kind to those announcements of a more informative nature, which too often bear their share in the disfigurement of England.

Predominant among them are the placards announcing coming and contemporary events—sporting fixtures, concerts, public meetings, plays, films and so forth. These are useful and necessary phenomena, but it is not essential for them to occupy as much space or appear as ubiquitously as at present. Indeed, their purpose would be more practically served if all could be on view in regular and appointed places—a state of affairs easily establishable by the adoption of the placard-kiosk so familiar in European cities, combined with a definite limitation of the size permissible to individual notices. It is nonsense to maintain that, in order to inform the public of its existence, a film or a play needs a coloured poster as big as a house or a gigantic cut-out representing the star actor kissing the heroine. If the public know that all entertainments are set out on a special kind of kiosk, they will take the trouble to visit such a kiosk and read the programmes

through. The consequent disappearance of display advertis ments will be accepted with resignation, if not with deligh Incidentally, also, producers and organisers will be saved a ' of money.

Allied to the desirability of less blatant announcements various amusements is the need for improvement in house-fro lettering generally. This is perhaps the most urgent and yet t most easily effected of all reforms in the present demeanour the English town. It will be observed that the giant placar and cut-outs advertising films and plays, to which reference ha just been made, appear not only on rented sites, but on the actu theatres and cinema-houses themselves. When thus affixed the produce an effect which can without exaggeration be described a loathsome.[1] And they do something more. They betray wit melancholy clearness the muddled thinking and wasteful stupidit of the various persons concerned in the exploitation of theatric and film production. One almost despairs of a mentality whic having presumably taken some trouble over the design of a buil ing, having certainly spent a lot of money in putting one up, ca deliberately deface the main front of that building with discorda lettering and figure-painting, usually bad in themselves an always alien to their background.

Equally senseless, because equally damaging to architectur design, is the style in which shop names are too often affixed t the buildings in which they are housed. Here and there a welcome signs of improvement in this shop-naming, but reform still very far from complete.

An almost perfect example of contradictory folly in th defacing of a carefully designed street front is provided by th section of the Strand which backs on to the Adelphi. Recent erected buildings consist of a large cinema (uninspired and to heavy for its site, but at least within limits designed) and delicate and really considered row of buildings in an adapte Adam style and built of brick and stone. The cinema lost n time in covering its facade with the crudest and most superfluo posters, figures and coloured lights. This is the way of cinema and one can only hope that their right to act so blatantly in public street will sooner or later be challenged. But there wa worse to come. The Adam building was hardly unscaffolded week, before a dozen different kinds of shop-front lettering ha been scrawled and sloped all over it. How in the world can practical race like the English tolerate such lunacy ? Why go '

[1] The facade of the Garrick Theatre, as it is at the moment, may be recom mended to anyone anxious to see how to advertise a play with a maximum crudity and a minimum of consideration for others. Also as evidence of ho easily the English, when they want to be dashing, succeed in being vulgar.

the pains of an Adam building at all, if you are forthwith going to permit its degradation with miscellaneous and inharmonious inscriptions? Life must be a tragic business for the English architect; and one marvels, not that so few fine examples of civilised urban architecture exist in this country, but that so many devoted designers are willing for their art's sake to create beauty and novelty, knowing that the children of their imagination will instantly be sacrificed on the altar of a ruthless commercialism.

Now, that this sort of thing should happen far less aggressively in Germany is not altogether due to the greater discretion of German tradesmen. Certainly the more sensible business men in Germany have got beyond the rather crude reliance on advertisement by noise which, under American influence, now possesses our English salesmanship. But there are hundreds of less intelligent persons who would, if they had the chance, vulgarise German towns as ours are vulgarised. Quite rightly, however, they have not the chance. And an admirable illustration of what they *would* do to Germany if they could, what they *do* do to England because they can, is provided by the same Strand of which a cautionary tale has just been told.

Not long ago there was erected at the corner of Wellington Street a new office building. It had not the faultless artistry in upright design which distinguishes the great Karstadt store in Hermannplatz; but at least its theme was perpendicular, and it relied on unbroken upward lines for its significance as part of a street wall and as a corner piece. Two or three of its upper floors are now occupied by two advertising agents, and both of these firms have elected to plaster their names right round the building in great *horizontal* rows of lettering. One of them is a very large and important German firm, whose self-announcements at home are impressively different from that decided on for London. It is difficult not to conclude that in Germany such wanton destruction of the essential pattern of a building would not be permitted, although clearly the will to destroy is not necessarily absent.

The undeniable want of style and finish in the streets of English towns, though principally due to the excesses of advertisement or commercial self-assertion, is not wholly so. Not only are there certain announcements (street names, traffic instructions, Post Office notices, and the like) made on civic or governmental responsibility, which do not in general reach the standard of taste and practical good sense desirable in a civilised community, but there are also such essential elements in the make-up of a street as the use of colour on walls and woodwork; the design and placing of lamp standards; and the employment of lighting for

after-dark effect, which could as easily be harmoniously an trenchantly manipulated as they are at present unimaginativ and indiscriminate.

The first group of imperfections must, as has been said, charged to the sloth or conventionality of officialdom. In department of urban activity is complacent maintenance of a ba old tradition more evident than in the methods adopted fo naming and numbering streets. Here and there are notable excep tions, to which tribute should joyfully be paid. More than on of the London borough councils have introduced a style of nam plaque which shows that definite thought has been given to secu an effect both clear and harmonious. But how many suc councils shall be found among the hundreds of boroughs respon sible for labelling their streets? Also, in what other count are, generally speaking, the names of streets so awkwardly an thoughtlessly placed as in England? The majority are set high on the walls that after dark they are invisible, and even b day none too obvious. Further, they are not frequent enough, being the custom to put a name on one corner only of a side stree and virtually never on a main road at the point where a side stree joins it, so that persons coming up toward this main road migh by looking straight ahead, see what street they are approachin As for the numbering of houses, the English system (in Londo particularly) is of international fame for its illogicality an inconvenience. Is it not extraordinary that in these days much vaunted equality and efficiency the traditions of nineteenth century snobbery should be allowed to persist, so that a house ca still claim membership of some once fashionable square or terrace although in fact it opens into a quite different thoroughfare? I this matter of house-numbering authority in England is of a unpardonable laxity. The design of a town should be determine in the interests of communal convenience and efficiency, not t flatter the social aspirations of a small minority; and it is a par of majority convenience that all and sundry should be able t find their way about by the mere application of their own commo sense.

The best system, in my experience, for street-naming an street-numbering is that long ago adopted in Berlin. At ever street corner, and on both sides, is a lamp standard, and from th arms of each standard hangs a plaque, bearing the name of th street along which the arm in question points, and the hous numbers included in the block immediately indicated. Thes plaques are so placed as to be easily legible by day or by night from the pavement or from omnibus or tram. It is impossible fo the stranger not to know where he is; it is impossible for him t turn to the right in search of his particular goal when he shoul

properly turn to the left or even cross the road. In short, by perfectly simple means, *but as the result of deliberate thought on the part of officials*, the charting of Berlin is complete and universally comprehensible. Why has no such thought ever been taken in England? Does such a community as London deserve less consideration than the capital of Germany? One is naturally reluctant to think so. But this much is certain—that, deserved or undeserved, London has never got it, and will not get it unless it insists on intelligent forethought as a necessary qualification in its governors.

The numerous street announcements made necessary by the development of modern traffic conditions give to Londoners an all too rare opportunity for self-congratulation. Quite lately (presumably a man of taste has come to authority in official circles) the style of lettering adopted for one-way traffic notices has admirably changed. Real thought has gone to the designing of these notices; and it is gratifying that the doctrine of good lettering for public announcements, so courageously and for so long a time maintained by the Underground, should at last have gained a really important disciple. A similar improvement may be noted in lettering the boxes for litter recently affixed to London lamp standards. They were at first frankly bad. They are now markedly improved. In the same way Post Office notices are beginning to be printed and manufactured with a greater regard for typographical good manners.

The potentialities of house-colouring and of electric-lighting, as beautifiers of a city respectively by day and by night, constitute an element in town design of rather a different kind from the preceding. But they are even more important (because more noticeable) and in England no less deplorably neglected.

Consider first of all the part played by colour in the streets of English towns. Not only is it very small, but one cannot fail to be struck with the dulness and lack of enterprise in the very scale of available colourings. The greens, reds, browns, greys and purples, which a builder or decorator in this country is prepared to supply, have a flat conventionality of tone which is the despair of any seeker after a slight variety of colour. Unusual colours *can* be obtained; but it is nearly always necessary for them to be specially mixed, nearly always certain that they will fade or sour; and no one who has set out to obtain such special mixings will deny that the experience is exhausting, infinitely lengthy, and far from reliable.

Now, nothing of this kind happens in France or Germany. There, in the smallest colour merchants' or decorators' shops, may be seen long ranges of subtle and carefully differentiated colours;

while, as one walks the streets, houses are visible on either han colour-washed in two or even more of those tints, usually w matched, always cheerful and stimulating. In Germany it is ver frequent for the railway station and other public buildings of small town to be treated in harmonious colour-wash ; and if an intending traveller desires to see for himself how attractively suc treatment can be carried out he may be recommended to look ou of the train as he goes through Offenbach a/M. (ten miles fror Frankfurt) and note the entire group of station buildings (incluc ing a well-designed goods yard) clean and gay in their fresh gree and pinkish grey.

The limitations of after-dark display-lighting in Englis towns are of course to a great extent due to the fabulous cost our electricity in comparison to that in many European cities. lot might be said of the price paid by Englishmen for the privile of supporting a large number of private electrical companie and a lot more of the prospects of really cheap electricity eve under the new system of national power supply. But, aft allowing for the handicap of unnatural expense, the use made i England of illuminations for commercial purposes is considerabl behind the times.

Apart from the flood-lit tower of the Underground headquarte (the loveliest sight in all London after dark), apart from a ver occasional modernist experiment in facade-lighting of constructiv design, our achievements as practitioners of the art and scien of sky-signing are pitifully crude. American example has, i this as in other things, put us on the wrong road. The majorit of our sky-signs are of the spotty, winking variety, which onc made of Broadway a wonder of the world but are now *démod* and uninteresting. Without denying that striking and, until or tires of them, attractive effects can be secured by the restle whirling ingenuities which now adorn one side of Piccadill Circus and are nibbling at Trafalgar Square, one must realise th the most up-to-date technique relies rather on flood or on plast strip-lighting than on mechanically manipulated sets of lamp In other words, light is now used architecturally rather tha pictorially. The latest German and Scandinavian cafés, cinema dance-halls, and department stores make considerable and ver telling use of lights shielded by dull glass and arranged in such way as to outline the main uprights or cross lines of the buildin Sometimes the very essence of the facade consists of frosted-gla pinnacles, which at night become simple columns of light fror pavement to roof, and not only call attention to the buildin they adorn, but help the whole street by emphasising the pe pendicular lines on which in last resort its beauty should depen

At a corner, on the other hand, a fine effect is often gained by several horizontal lines of light—differently coloured, maybe, but continuous and with no movement save a sort of liquid flicker, set high up on the house fronts, and translating the curve of the buildings into terms of brilliancy.

Why are such experiments as these the commonplaces of European towns, the exceptions of our own? Why has England, to all intents and purposes, not yet emerged from the nursery in this matter of display-lighting? We cannot excuse ourselves because we have to work with buildings of Victorian design which, all broken up into cornices, ornaments and other protuberances, do not lend themselves to long straight stretches of illumination. The so-called West End of Berlin consists almost entirely of houses of the same kind, and their elaborations have been successfully subdued. We can hardly (without confessing failure on another score) complain that our newest buildings are rarely of sufficiently modern outline or proportion. No. In this, as in every aspect of the problem of public stylishness and good manners, we must blame our traditional selfishness and lack of taste. As with railway stations, as with open-air advertising, so with sky-signs, those responsible for English practice think of nothing but their own purposes and their own self-interest; nor is there any authority to force them to think otherwise. As for English taste, is it too much to say that in its corporate manifestations—as expressed, for instance, in the design and embellishment of public or commercial buildings, in the conception and practice of advertising—it is, generally speaking, either frankly common or else timid and, in a feeble way, over-ornate?

From all of the foregoing there emerges that bizarre but melancholy contradiction in racial psychology with which our whole discussion opened. It is surely undeniable that, although *individually* the English are capable of a more cultivated taste and a more scrupulous way of life than the nationals of any other country, corporately—that is to say, in the persons of their official representatives or directorial bodies—they show a fundamental obtuseness to the finer points of public behaviour, combined with a traditional indifference to the impression made on foreigners.

Which brings us to the final count in this very summarised indictment of our avoidable shortcomings. For in no expression of national character is our unconscious but damaging mediocrity mirrored with a more dreadful precision than in the contemporary English postage stamps.

How many people ever stop to think of the effect on the reputation of a great people produced by a wide dissemination of

stamps at once pretentious and feeble? How many people ev think to compare the productions of the English Post Office wit those of other nations? And yet, were they to make such comparison, how many could deny that, whereas the stamps twenty other countries (some more or less equal but man greatly inferior to our own in resources, influence, and aspiration show in varying degrees attempts at originality, at modernis or at beauty, ours are utterly unworthy of their motherlan heedlessly designed and coloured, unimaginative and fussil genteel?

And their wretchedness is the more humiliating in that th first postage stamp of all was issued by England, and was a stam whose dignity and elegance of design has never been excelle The 'black penny' of 1840 is a beautiful stamp, with a beaut due not only to its reproductive process (in those days and fo small numbers engraving, which would now be too expensive was economically possible), but also to its simplicity. The fac points the moral of our later degradation and links the argumen to what has gone before. In any corporate capacity we seem unable to realise any longer that the simple, if it be right in proportion, is more beautiful than the elaborate. As a result, w send all over the world little bits of paper, each one of which is mortifying betrayal of the spiritless and antiquated taste of thos appointed to decide our national designs. Take a set of th current English stamps and study them. What is wrong? Ask rather what is right. The designs are hardly designs at all they are crowded agglomerations of wreaths and ribbons and dolphins and poor conventional lettering and numerals. The colours (with one or two exceptions) are thin, and, what is worse utterly ordinary. By the Postal Convention certain values hav to be printed in certain colours. So be it. But there are good reds and one or two reds so trite as to be bad; there are blue which are unusual, considered and satisfying, and there is jus blue. Inevitably those responsible for our stamps choose a trit red and the mere blue. Why? Because, presumably, it is to much trouble to try and improve the colours, and because th department responsible for choice of inks and of designs does no regard that responsibility as a particularly heavy one.

Roughly speaking, the history of English philatelic design is a history of decadence. Until the middle 'fifties the standard the original 'black penny' was well maintained. A little extr wording or ciphering was introduced, but the designs remaine serene and dignified, and the first reds and blues were admirable Then came the introduction of surface printing; and althoug the issues of 1855, 1862, 1865, and 1873 were more platitudinou than their predecessors, they were comparatively free from

trivial ornament. With 1880 matters began to degenerate. The stamps of that year, of 1884, and of the Jubilee issue of 1887 were like those of the Australian Colonies of the same epoch—mean, indeterminate, and washy in colour—which timid tradition persisted right on to the death of Queen Victoria. But still the small-bourgeois quality of English philately remained untarnished with sham elegance. The stamps were just dowdy; nothing more. With Edward VII., however, first crept in the horrid gentility which has become our master. Like the silly little wreaths and useless pilasters with which the Regent Street of to-day commemorates its murdered Nash, the incidental decoration of our stamps became pretty but trivial. The tendency grew stronger; until to-day we have a series of designs as feebly stylish as any in the world.

The situation has during the last two years been aggravated by the appearance of two special issues. The commemorative issue was for long enough held to be beneath the dignity of a powerful and gentlemanly country. Nicaragua and Portugal and so forth might tickle the palates of speculators with this special set or that; Great Britain was above the need for such financial shifts. But, whether from a sudden blossoming of official æstheticism or because it actually dawned on someone in authority that money would not come amiss even to Great Britain, the old policy was abandoned; and within a very short time were devised and published a special series of stamps to commemorate the Wembley Exhibition, and another in virtue of the International Postal Congress.

The former were, as matters turned out, a fair equivalent to the disastrous vulgarity which they claimed to celebrate. The Wembley stamps, like the Wembley Exhibition, were large and square, with a design at once pompous and confused. It seems that we are still at the stage when brooding or aggressive lions and waxwork Britannias express our utmost idea of grandiose dignity. But Wembley was not the worst. The meeting of the Postal Congress called forth an issue meaner in design, more torpid in colouring, and cruder in execution than any issue achieved in this country since the worst days of the 1880's. Without exaggeration, this Postal Congress issue was a tragedy; for not only was it Great Britain who came upon the stage thus pitifully attired, but the occasion was one when, of all others, care should have been taken to do something worthy of the country's capacity. The stamp authorities of the world were meeting in England. The eyes and minds of every stamp official, stamp user and stamp collector were turned on England. And with a flourish, which would be comic were it not rather cause for tears, England produced these lamentable things.

There is an unanswerable argument for the immediate replacement of the stamps of Great Britain with something of which their users need not be ashamed,

Is there no official in the Post Office, who in his heart of hearts grieves over the sorry lack of distinction in our present issue, who longs for something more forcible, something at which—whether they approve it or not—users and recipients alike will look a second time? English philatelic *workmanship* is among the finest in the world. We can produce fine stamps if we are allowed to do so; but of what use as national propaganda is good workmanship if it be degraded to the service of tasteless and trivial design?

As for what manner of stamps are to be substituted for those now in use, discussion could be usefully invited. Perhaps some newspaper will launch an inquiry? I believe the venture would provoke more enthusiasm than authority is inclined to realise, and whether or no a verdict of general value were to emerge from the experiment, at least opinion would have been stirred on a matter of some national importance. Also the views of the public would be of themselves intriguing.

Many people would vote for a pictorial set, representing the historic scenes or buildings of a historic land. Personally, I am not an enthusiast for the purely pictorial stamp, which smacks of the holiday poster and easily degenerates into over-elaboration and unnecessary detail. But even a pictorial issue would be better than what we have at present; and if general approval could not be won for something at once plainer and more arresting, let us by all means be pictorial.

Others, perhaps, would favour our following the example of New Zealand and reverting frankly to the earliest 'Queen's heads.' A set on the lines of the 'black penny' in really unusual shades of colour, and with the very minimum of wording required by modern usage, would be a beautiful and impressive thing. If, on the other hand, something quite new were desired, why not vary the King's head as a centre-piece with a telling but simplified design of St. George and the Dragon for, say, values to sixpence; a *good* Britannia for sixpence to one shilling; and introduce a really fine King's head, in two-colour labels with as little incidental decoration as possible, for the remaining high values?

It would be so easy to get a hundred good competitive designs; and among them would certainly be two or three which, though they might not satisfy everybody, would at least give an indication of the artistic capacity of the race, and would prove to other countries that at last we recognise the importance of stamps as an element in national good manners

MICHAEL SADLEIR.

CHRISTINA ROSSETTI

December 5, 1830 ; December 5, 1930

I

One by one the great Victorians round the point of their centenary ; and to the eyes of the younger generation, no doubt, most of them seem like vague, spectral galleons of the past, scarcely visible through the intervening mist of prejudice and change. But with Christina Rossetti that is most emphatically not the case ; between her and us there stretches no such obscuring cloud. Her clear and shining genius is still so close to us, so inalienable a part of our daily converse with poetry, that it is difficult to realise that, if to her heritage of Euterpe there had been added the guerdon of Tithonus, the author of *Goblin Market* would actually be 100 years old this month. Of all the legacy of the Pre-Raphaelites—poetry, painting, criticism, precept—her simple, sincere, and exquisite contribution has ' worn ' incomparably the best. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that her credit as an artist has never stood so high as it does in the present year of her centenary ; and the cause is rooted in the essential virtues of her temperament and workmanship.

There are just two infallible preservatives in the life of poetry—perfection of technique and sincerity of vision ; and Christina Rossetti held the secret of them both. They were inseparable qualities of her work, and they were spontaneous expressions of her nature. ' Her style,' Mr. Arthur Symons has said, ' was innocently unaware of its own beauty ' ; and her work has, in its more intimate appeal, outlived that of the turbulent little group into which she was born, for the simple reason that she saw further than they did, and felt more deeply. Poetry, more perhaps than any other art, is the sport and victim of changing taste ; and the poetry that is most emphatically in fashion at one period is the first to fall out of date. But from every ebb and flow of taste there is left a certain residue of poetry that is unaffected by ' movements ' and reactions. The country songs of Herrick and the religious dreams of Vaughan are as fresh

to-day as in the years when they were written; and in simplici sincerity, and close affinity to the lasting consolations of human heart Christina Rossetti is sealed of the company Herrick and of Vaughan.

We can realise more clearly what this implies when we co sider her relation to the movement in which she was involv The Pre-Raphaelites were deliberate reactionaries. They fou themselves exiles in a material, commercial, ugly univer struggling in the throes of an industrial revolution. They want a way of escape from 'the snorting steam and piston-strok and they believed that they had found in the Middle Ages a the Italian Renaissance the most comfortable sanctuary from t chimneys of Sheffield and the lorries of Tottenham Court Roa They chose that world of the past to typify the world of the so a garden full of flowers and fruit, of fountains and of mus What they did not realise was the shattering fact that all the consolations were purely artificial, joys of the eye and ear, w no lasting appeal to the heart. Christina Rossetti alone of t little company was swept off her feet by the conviction that t palace of peace, like the Kingdom of God, was within, and n without. She loved the good things of the senses, light a colour, sound and savour, but she was not content to accept the as Life. Unless they were laid aside, she believed, the soul co never commune with itself in confidence. So within the borc of her little garden she built an oratory, and closed the door up herself, her dreams, and her prayers. From that time onwa her life and her art grew into perfect harmony with one anoth She had discarded forever the mistaken idea that the self-respec ing artist can use his art as a sort of compensation or balance f a life lived on an entirely different level. Like Milton, s determined that he who would 'write well in laudable thin ought himself to be a true poem.' And it is that confession faith which lends significance to the outlines of a life, which otherwise quite remarkably bare of the sort of incident a adventure which might appeal to the ingenuity of the biograph or the psychologist.

II

The Rossettis came from the neighbourhood of Naples, a from a family in humble circumstances enough. Christina grandfather was a blacksmith, and her grandmother could neith read nor write. But the grandfather, Nicola, gave his sons a go education, and they profited by it. Andrea became a cano and Domenico a lawyer, while Gabriele, father of the poets, 'to to poetry and other forms of literature.' He wrote librettos f operas, was curator of marble and bronzes in the Naples Museu

and when his political poems got him into trouble escaped to England; settled in that rather depressing metropolitan area between Tottenham Court Road and Great Portland Street; and in 1826, when he himself was forty-three and his bride in her twenty-sixth year, married Frances, daughter of Gaetano Polidori, a native of Tuscany, himself a poet and a man of letters. Polidori's wife was English, and he lived in a pleasant country house at Holmer's Green, near Great Missenden, with a shady garden, full of flowers, to which he delighted in welcoming his grand-children, who were born to Gabriele and Frances more rapidly perhaps than their slender means could comfortably justify. Maria Francesca was born in 1827, Dante Gabriel in 1828, William Michael in 1829, and Christina Georgina on December 5, 1830.

The home in which this remarkable family first saw the light was at 38, Charlotte (now Hallam) Street, a dreary backwater, with a *cul-de-sac*, and a publichouse immediately opposite the windows. There they lived until Christina was between five and six years old, and when they moved, it was only to a house a little further down the road. The child's infancy was entirely associated with an atmosphere of fog and lamplight, the cry of the milkman, and the evening debates of her father's Italian friends, who used to gather in the parlour, many of them squalid and menacing, to denounce the political condition of their native land, and call down vengeance upon all existing Governments. There, from her seat by the fireside, the little girl listened and wondered. In the spring came visits to her grandfather in the country, green trees, a pond, animals, sunshine, and sweet scents. She came back to her dingy home, and pondered these things in her heart. There could hardly have been a better prelude to poetry, unpromising as it might look on the surface.

For, if it be true that one half of poetry is emotion remembered in tranquillity, it is no less true that the other half is beauty yearned after in exile. In the moment of ecstasy, when the heart is overflowing with impressions, the power of speech is in abeyance. It is when the vision has passed, and the mind is travailing to recover it before it vanishes, that the moment of record arrives. The Hebrew poet was registering a very unusual emotion when he refused to sing the Lord's song in a strange land. It is the melody of captivity that goes home to the heart; and it was that melody that Christina Rossetti learned to sing, as she gazed across the street at the soiled window-curtains and broken furniture, and dreamed of the meadows and woods around Great Missenden, and of the dead mouse she had found by the garden path and buried in a bed of moss—her first experience of death and dissolution.

III

Her personal appearance in those early days has been viv preserved to us, not only in description, but in pictorial p traiture. In her sympathetic and searching monograph, wh was the first, and is likely to remain the most permanent, of these centenary tributes,[1] Miss Mary Sandars reproduces a draw by Filippo Pistrucci, one of the Rossettis' Italian refugees, wh was made when Christina was seven years old. It is an arrest little face. The expression is moody; the well-arched mouth sensitive and sad; and the entire face is dominated by the lar expressive hazel eyes, half-meditative, half mischievous, glittering with a quiet sense of humour. For, in spite of her youthful seriousness, Christina Rossetti was never devoid fun. She is said to have been irritable, careless over her lesso and always delicate in health, but she had a way of laughing her troubles, which often found its expression in verse. S began to write rhymes in the nursery; the earliest of th preserved was written when she was eleven; and many of th were playful and ironic. It cannot be pretended that the humc penetrated very deeply, but the form of the verse was, from very first experiments, true and musical. When Grandfat Polidori was shown a sheaf of these exercises he predicted once that Christina would be a poet, and in her seventeenth y he gave practical evidence of his approval by printing a volu of her verses at the private press with which he used to amu himself at Park Village, Regent's Park. These poems were aft wards reprinted by William Michael Rossetti in his Collect Edition of his sister's work, and they remain curiously interesti as illustrations of the first natural impulses, to which she w eventually to return, after her brief bondage to the fashion the Pre-Raphaelites. Religion, love of Nature, and a femin yearning for primal affection are the recurrent themes, a religion is the most powerful of all.

The Christian religion was indeed the prevailing influence the childhood of the Rossettis, and their mother was its dome priestess. Gabriele, the father, had begun life as a Rom Catholic, and declined into a sort of benevolent agnosticis but his wife was fervent in training her family in the traditic of the Church of England, and at Christ Church, Albany Str Christina received her first instruction in that discipline to fa and doctrine which was to dominate her life and irradiate h poetry. The church she attended was conducted upon what known as Anglo-Catholic principles, and she embraced th without challenge or hesitation. From the moment when

[1] *The Life of Christina Rossetti*, by Mary F. Sandars (Hutchinson).

began to think for herself her religion became the pervading spirit of her life; nothing that threatened to disturb it was allowed to intrude upon her thoughts.

The story of her two love affairs has been often repeated; she sacrificed them both to the convictions of her faith. She was only nineteen when James Collinson, the first of her admirers, presented himself, and he does not appear to have been a very attractive person. He was an artist of sorts, but Holman-Hunt, under whom he studied, found both the man and his work 'tame and sleepy.' He must also have been vacillating by nature, for he had exchanged the Church of England for the Roman communion; and then, when he learnt that Christina, who had responded to his protestations of love, would never consent to marry a Roman Catholic, he 'set about,' in her brother's words, 'considering whether he really was so firmly a Catholic as to be unable to revert to his original' allegiance. He did so, and was accepted as a suitor. Two years later he was troubled by fresh scruples, and was received again into the Roman Church. Thereupon Christina broke off the engagement, though not without bitter suffering The sense of loss never really left her, and returns again and again to overshadow her poetry.

> I have a room whereinto no one enters
>   Save I myself alone:
>   There sits a blessed memory on a throne,
> There my life centres . . .
>
> If any should force entrance he might see there
>   One buried yet not dead,
>   Before whose face I no more bow my head,
> Or bend my knee there;
>
> But often in my worn life's autumn weather
>   I watch there with clear eyes,
>   And think how it will be in Paradise
> When we're together.

Her second love affair was years later, when she was in her early thirties; but, since this alliance also was frustrated by religious difference, it falls naturally into this context. Charles Bagot Cayley was a writer and a linguist, who had translated Dante and the Hebrew psalms, and was considered a reputable scholar, if possibly a bit of a bore. For two or three years he was a frequent visitor at Dante Gabriel's house, and an assiduous attendant upon the poet's sister. Then, at last, he declared himself, was questioned as to his religious views, and had perforce to confess himself unorthodox. Christina liked him very much; she had taken great pleasure in his company; but she could not possibly yoke herself with an unbeliever. So once more she preferred celibacy to a marriage of mixed interests, though in

this instance she did not deny herself the privilege of a friendsh which lasted until Cayley's death. Henceforward her days w untrammelled by such bitter-sweet accessions of impulse a denial; and, though there were moments when she might s persuade herself that her heart was like a singing bird, the b was caged, and the cage was no less certainly a prison becau she had chosen it for herself and had closed its door of her o free will.

IV

But long before this haven was reached Christina Rosse was to experience a stormy passage of influence and emotic which for the time turned her genius aside from its natu direction altogether; she was to be engulfed in the turbule waters of Pre-Raphaelitism. This particular incident in her l has not hitherto been separated by her biographers from immediate context; they have been inclined to take it in th stride, as though *Goblin Market* and *The Prince's Progress* w natural phases of the poet's development. As a matter of fa they were quite different from the body of her work—they w derivative and deliberate exercises in poetic expression; a though technically and metrically they produced some of t most beautiful poetry that Christina Rossetti ever wrote, it w poetry of a kind uncongenial to her native genius, of a kind which she did not again return, when once the stress of the fam 'movement' had passed over and left her free to follow her o inclination.

This point invites rather closer consideration. To begin wit it is the first truth about Christina's poetry that she never forc herself to write, nor attempted to seek subjects for her a 'Just because poetry is a gift,' she said, 'I am not surprised find myself unable to summon it at will, and use it according my own choice.' Happily she had no need to do so. The flo of her poetic impulse was continuous, as the dates in the Collect Edition prove. New every morning was the well-spring of h poetry, which bubbled up again, clear as crystal, with eve fresh daily impact of beauty, faith and love. But the Pr Raphaelite idea of poetry was quite different from this sp taneous lyrical aspiration. In poetry, as in painting, the P Raphaelites set out to counterfeit what they called Nature minute observation, and to replace the woolly smugness of t popular artists of the day by an elaborate canvas, in which eve stitch in a tapestry, or every shaving on a carpenter's floc should be conscientiously copied from the actual object. Th called it Nature; it was really Still Life; and their poetry w encrusted with verbal jewels and heavy with imagery.

When *The Germ*, the first ill-fated manifesto of the movement, began its brief career of four disregarded numbers, Christina Rossetti was just completing her nineteenth year. She contributed seven poems to the magazine, of which four at least are among the most beautiful things she ever wrote, and these were written when she was no more than eighteen.

> Oh roses for the flush of youth.
> And laurel for the perfect prime ;
> But pluck an ivy branch for me
> Grown old before my time.
>
> Oh violets for the grave of youth,
> And bay for those dead in their prime ;
> Give me the withered leaves I chose
> Before in the old time.

That lovely lyric was written two months after her eighteenth birthday, and an even more perfect poem, *When I am dead, my dearest*, was written earlier than that. The achievement is wonderful ; and, like all absolutely natural art, it seems inevitable and unconscious.

But during the next few years the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was busy proclaiming its new gospel ; and it was impossible for Christina, an impressionable girl, and the youngest of the household, to avoid being drawn into its discipleship. In this regard she was essentially a follower ; and when Swinburne acclaimed her as 'the Jael who led our hosts to Victory,' he was only, in his characteristically flamboyant fashion, paying tribute to the influence which her natural and untutored mastery of rhythm exercised over his own early experiments in quantitative verse. So far as she was ever a Pre-Raphaelite, Christina Rossetti was a captive, and not a champion. But, while she remained in their tents, she gave to the movement two of its most exquisite and characteristic pieces of poetry—*Goblin Market* and *The Prince's Progress*.

Both these poems are finished, elaborate, and satisfying works of art ; and both of them are entirely outside their author's customary range. Like Tennyson's *Maud, The Prince's Progress* was the result of a friend's remark that a lyric, otherwise complete in itself, seemed to need some surrounding story to explain it. Sir John Simeon said that to Tennyson when he first read the lines 'O that 'twere possible,' and Gabriel Rossetti made the same remark to his sister when she showed him the poem beginning 'Too late for love, too late for joy.' In both instances the hint resulted in a fine, various, and balanced piece of workmanship ; but there is no denying that both were constructed upon the Victorian principle of seeking a subject from outside and investing it with individuality by treatment rather

than by conception. And this was particularly the case with Christina Rossetti's two outstanding narrative poems, which are simply saturated in the opulent colour, and decked out with all the heaped-up detail, of the Pre-Raphaelite studio.

The story of *Goblin Market* might have been found in the pages of Grimm; but it is twisted into a sort of moral allegory by the intervention of the *dévote's* passion for self-sacrifice. It is on every account, by far the most imaginative of its author' works; but, it seems, compared with the rest of her poetry, be seen through a distorting glass, which, however harmonio and beautiful the picture may be, leaves it always with a sense the grotesque, to puzzle the fancy. The metrical ingenuity add to the effect of bewildering elaboration; as Mr. George Saintsbur says, 'The more it is studied, the more audacious may its com position seem.' In one sense it is 'a *macédoine* of measures apparently deliberate and scholarly; in another it is a spon taneous outburst of melody, utterly unconscious of its ow technical achievement. In fact, without the least realising wha she was doing, Miss Rossetti was effecting, in *Goblin Marke* something very like a revolution in English metrical resource. and all with so natural a grace that it needs a prosodist as learne as Mr. Saintsbury himself to analyse her innovations. 'As i stands,' he says, 'it is doubly or even trebly enjoyable as a mer feast to the ear, as a display of prosodic skill, and, historicall as an exemplification of the powers given by centuries of successfu and unsuccessful endeavour, and of the way in which the mos apparently lawless excursions can be reduced by law.' An through it all there gleams the rich imagination of a min content to revel at leisure in luxuriant and fantastic imagery.

> White and golden Lizzie stood,
> Like a lily in a flood,—
> Like a rock of blue-veined stone
> Lashed by tides obstreperously,—
> Like a beacon left alone
> In a hoary roaring sea,
> Sending up a golden fire,—
> Like a fruit-crowned orange-tree
> White with blossoms honey-sweet
> Sore beset by wasp and bee,—
> Like a royal virgin town
> Topped with gilded dome and spire,
> Close beleaguered by a fleet
> Mad to tug her standard down.

All this is in the full Pre-Raphaelite fashion; and the romantic idyllic story of *The Prince's Progress* is even more closely cut the prevailing mode. It was almost the only instance, say

William Michael Rossetti, 'in which she wrote anything so as to meet directly the views of another person'; and in adopting Dante Gabriel's suggestion she had also caught no uncertain echo of his method. This simple story of a wayward prince, who set out in quest of his promised bride, lingered on the way, played with light loves in the portal, and arrived to find that his princess had died of a broken heart, is indeed, in Edmund Gosse's phrase, 'adorned with verse of the very highest romantic beauty,' but there is yet an air of artificial, self-conscious narrative about it, which is the very antithesis of the poet's native temperament.

Midway down the mountain side
(On its green slope the path was wide)
Stood a house for a royal bride,
Built all of changing opal stone,
The royal palace, till now descried
In his dreams alone . . .

Above his head a tangle glows
Of wine-red roses, blushes, snows,
Closed buds and buds that unclose,
Leaves and moss, and prickles too;
His hand shook as he plucked a rose,
And the rose dropped dew.

The voice is the voice of Christina; but the hands are the hands of Gabriel. We do not actually escape again into the clear, crystalline atmosphere of the sister's lyrical genius until the procession of the Brotherhood has passed her by, carrying with it its banners and garlands, its flutes, viols and manifold instruments of music; and leaving her virginal solitude once more undisturbed in contemplation of the barren road, winding uphill all the way, to its lonely summit, surmounted by the cross and crown of thorns.

V

'Hers was a stern God,' says her latest biographer,[1] but that perhaps is in itself a too stern judgment. There was nothing really stern about Christina Rossetti's religion, for its final sanction lay in a harmony of will and purpose. The God of her faith did indeed demand the full service of the soul, but He repaid the sacrifice with interest. In quietness and confidence His servant found her strength. She loved the good things of the world, but she was glad to give them up, because she knew that the world of the spirit was more satisfying than the world of the body. It may be objected that she was always sad; and we have her own testimony to that effect—'I suppose I have a natural

[1] *The Life of Christina Rossetti*, by Mary F. Sandars (Hutchinson).

tendency to despondency'; but her sadness was due to an imaginary sense of her own shortcomings, not to any fear of punishment or retribution. She set herself constantly to subdue her depression. 'Cheerfulness,' she said, 'I consider a fundamental and essential Christian virtue,' and she extolled it as protective colouring which the sufferer can always, by the exercise of free will, impose upon sadness, 'as a bright and shining veil.'

In this spirit of reconciled resignation she settled down to a middle age of meditative peace. In her younger days she had submitted herself to many distasteful experiences: to the toil of teaching in a school which no one seemed to need; to the contemplation of her brother drifting from the faith which was the lodestar of her life into associations from which her virginal reticence may well have shrunk back alarmed; to the momentary adoption of literary ideals with which she could not possibly be at ease. But she was liberated early from these trammels, and the rest of her life was self-contained, conventual, and confident. She made a home with her mother and two aunts in a quiet backwater in Bloomsbury, dedicating her pen exclusively to the themes that lay nearest to her heart. She wrote devotional books in prose, many of them quite beautiful in form as in feeling; the flow of her religious poetry was constant and fervid; the bulk of her work in verse is among the most considerable of all the fecund Victorian period. She made very little money. Her brother records that until she was sixty years old she never made as much as 50*l.* in any one year by her pen; and there exists a touching letter from her to Edmund Gosse, in which she protests that the twenty guineas which he had obtained for her from an American magazine is really more than she ought to accept, and suggests that she shall refund some of it, 'especially as so much of the bulk of my article accrues from quotation.' She was poor, by any modern standard of competency, but she had enough for her needs; and, for the rest, her life was a vigil, awaiting the perfect realisation of a dream which was never far removed from her imagination. From time to time visitors broke in upon her solitude, and all of them seem to have carried away the same impression of a nature entirely in harmony and at rest. She was pale and delicate, but her eyes were strikingly bright, grey with blue lights in them, which kindled under the influence of sympathy into a swift, responsive glance of comprehension. She dressed austerely in a style which concealed the gracefulness of her figure, generally in black silk, with white cuffs and collar, secured by a plain brooch.[8] Her voice was musical, and she read poetry with a charming emphasis. Sometimes her friends would remonstrate with her for over-taxing her strength, would even

[8] *Christina Rossetti*, by Mackenzie Bell (Hurst & Blackett).

hint that such lack of care might have alarming results. 'What then?' she would reply. 'The sweeter after this stripped earth will be the shady rest of Paradise.' That vision had indeed become for her the closest of all realities.

Fair City of delights, the Bride
In raiment white and clean,
When shall we see thee loving-eyed,
Sun-girdled, happy Queen?
Without a wrinkle or a spot,
Blood-cleansed, blood-purchased once:
In how fair ground is fallen the lot
Of all thy happy sons!

Dove's eyes beneath thy parted lock,
A dove's voice soft is thine;
Thy nest is safe within the Rock,
Safe in the very Vine:
Thy walls salvation buildeth them
And all thy gates are praise,
O fair, O fair Jerusalem,
In sevenfold day of days.

It is thus that, in the most perfect of all her lyrics, she confronts the transitory pleasures of the world she had rejected with the consolations of her abiding kingdom of faith and hope.

Passing away, saith my Soul, passing away:
With its burden of fear and hope, of labour and play,
Hearken what the past doth witness and say:
Rust in thy gold, a moth is in thine array,
A canker is in thy bud, thy leaf must decay.
At midnight, at cockcrow, at morning, one certain day
Lo the Bridegroom shall come and shall not delay;
Watch thou and pray.
Then I answered: 'Yea.'

A mind so closely attuned to the things of the spirit had no need of lengthy preparation for release; yet she was given a very long period of illness to endure, and a severe ordeal, mental and physical alike. For the last eighteen months of her life she was racked by pain, and weakened by exhaustion; it was inevitable that she should be depressed; yet she resolutely refused to spare herself any of her manifold services and duties. None the less, she was weary now, and ready to go. The last lines she ever wrote are witness to that.

No more a tired heart downcast or overcast,
No more pangs that wring or shifting fears that hover,
Sleeping at last in a dreamless sleep locked fast.

Fast asleep. Singing birds in their leafy cover
Cannot wake her, nor shake her the gusty blast.
Under the purple thyme and the purple clover,
Sleeping at last!

She died very peacefully, on the morning of December 29, 1894, within a month of completing her sixty-fourth year.

VI

Religious verse is of all forms of poetry the most difficult in which to keep a firm footing; it is surrounded by pitfalls, and the descent into insipidity is swift and fatal. It would be impossible for any poet to write as copiously as Christina Rossetti wrote in this perilous vein without sometimes catching an echo from the popular vocabulary of the hymnologist. But, if there are such slips in her workmanship, they are almost miraculously few; and it is universally agreed that there is hardly a lyric bearing her name which does not charm the imagination and linger fragrantly in the memory. It has been said that the shadow of death lay too persistently across her sunlight; and that is not unnatural when the frailty of her own health was perpetually reminding her of the fragile tenure of human life. But it cannot be too firmly insisted that, in her familiarity with the idea of death, there is not even a passing taint of morbidity. To leave this beautiful world might be sad, she seems to say, were it not the fate of all things beautiful to fade; but there are tears in the laughter of man; and the suffering of the present time is not worthy to be compared with the happiness to be revealed.

In that great hour of unknown suffering
God shall be with me, and His arm made bare
Shall fight for me: yea, underneath His wing
I shall be safe at last and freed from care.

That confidence stands firm, a ringing challenge to the sceptic; that sincerity seems to sweep doubt off its feet; and the secret of Christina Rossetti's hold upon the world, 100 years after the day of her birth, lies in the perfect intercommunion of the twin qualities of her genius. Her art was naturally and incomparably true, and she devoted it to a faith which was the very well-spring of her being. Fashion, trick, sensation, all those glib passports to popularity, are inconceivable in connexion with the poetry of Christina Rossetti. She endures as seeing, with perfect clarity, an invisible world which transcends all types and shadows, gathering to itself, transformed and ennobled, the joys, distractions, and consolations of our bewildered humanity. Her art is true, simply and innocently true, to her vision; and art and vision, inextricably commingled, acclaim her the most perfect of all the English women poets, if not indeed of all the women poets in the literature of the world.

Arthur Waugh.

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The titles of articles are printed in italics

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE WHITEFRIARS PRESS, LTD., LONDON AND TONBRIDGE.

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or the next issue of *The Nineteenth Century and After* hould reach the Office not later than the 14th of the month.

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